FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gudgeon v Gudgeon [2020] FCA 680
File number: NSD 2158 of 2019 Judge: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 20 May 2020 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – determination of separate question – whether removal of director of a company at a meeting of the company’s members was valid – where no quorum present at the meeting – where notice of meeting was defective – removal of director was not valid Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 135, 251A, 1322, 1378
Corporations Law (Cth) (repealed) ss 249, 1415, Sch 1 Table A regs 41-43, 62
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 30.01
Cases cited: Clarke v Australian Computer Society Incorporated [2019] FCA 2175
Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361
Moala v Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Victoria) Inc [2019] VSC 205
Date of hearing: 29 April 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 58 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr G Babe Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Corbett Jessop Law Solicitor for the First Defendant: Mr B Long of Celtic Legal ORDERS
NSD 2158 of 2019 BETWEEN: MAURICE GUDGEON
Plaintiff
AND: PETER GUDGEON
First Defendant
P & M GUDGEON PTY LTD ACN 061 799 746
Second Defendant
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
Third Defendant
JUDGE:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 MAY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The separate question the subject of Order 2 made pursuant to r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) on 27 February 2020, that is:
“Was the plaintiff validly removed as a director of the second defendant at a meeting of the second defendant’s members on 27 June 2018?”
be answered “No”.
2.The first defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the hearing of the separate question.
3.The parties are jointly to approach the Associate to Markovic J to arrange for the proceeding to be listed for case management hearing on a mutually convenient date.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
By originating process filed on 24 December 2019 Maurice Gudgeon commenced this proceeding against Peter Gudgeon and P & M Gudgeon Pty Ltd (P & M Gudgeon) as first and second defendants respectively. Maurice Gudgeon and Peter Gudgeon, who without meaning any disrespect I will refer to as Maurice and Peter, are brothers and equal shareholders in P & M Gudgeon, each holding one share.
In his originating process Maurice seeks relief in relation to two matters: first, in relation to his purported removal as a director of P & M Gudgeon; and secondly, in the form of access to P & M Gudgeon’s books and records.
On 27 February 2020, by consent between the parties, I ordered that pursuant to r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the following question (Separate Question) be heard separately from…
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- Gudgeon v Gudgeon [2020] FCA 680
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- [2020] FCA 680
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the procedural requirements set out in the Corporations Act 2001 and the company's Articles of Association. It noted that Maurice had received notice of the meeting, but the form of the notice was defective. The court found that the notice did not comply with the requirements of the Corporations Act, which necessitated proper notice to all shareholders. Furthermore, the court found that the meeting was not properly convened as there was no quorum present. Consequently, the court concluded that the removal of Maurice as a director was not valid. The decision hinged on the procedural shortcomings in the notice and the absence of a quorum, rendering the meeting and the subsequent resolution ineffective.
The court ruled that Maurice's removal as a director was not valid, answering the separate question in the negative. The court further directed that Peter should pay Maurice's costs associated with the hearing of the separate question. Additionally, the court ordered that the parties were to jointly approach the Associate to arrange for a case management hearing to be scheduled at a mutually convenient date. This decision ensures that the procedural integrity of the company's governance is upheld and highlights the importance of compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements in corporate meetings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The separate question the subject of Order 2 made pursuant to r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) on 27 February 2020, that is:
“Was the plaintiff validly removed as a director of the second defendant at a meeting of the second defendant’s members on 27 June 2018?”
be answered “No”.
2. The first defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the hearing of the separate question.
3. The parties are jointly to approach the Associate to Markovic J to arrange for the proceeding to be listed for case management hearing on a mutually convenient date.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Peter submits that cl 25 of the Articles is not the appropriate framework for the removal of a director because the heading under which that clause appears clearly outlines that cl 25 is to deal only with the “disqualification of directors”. Peter notes that this was not a disqualification matter. CONSIDERATION The first matter raised by Maurice is that there is insufficient evidence for the Court to find that any resolution was passed to remove Maurice as a director of P & M Gudgeon on 27 June 2018. Peter’s evidence in relation to what occurred at that meeting, which was admitted over objection by Maurice, is set out at [15] above. There are no minutes of the meeting in evidence and Peter conceded that no minutes had been prepared. Thus the only record of what occurred is that given by Peter for the purpose of this proceeding. The failure to prepare minutes of a meeting constitutes a breach by P & M Gudgeon of s 251A of the Corporations Act which requires that a company must keep minute books in which it records within one month, among other things, proceedings and resolutions of meetings of the company’s members. Maurice says that the failure to comply with s 251A goes to the lack of weight that I would afford Peter’s evidence of what occurred at the meeting. I accept that there is no corroborating evidence of what occurred at the meeting and that the only account is that given by Peter. That is not surprising as he was the only person present. While P & M Gudgeon has breached s 251A of the Corporations Act by failing to enter a record of the meeting in P & M Gudgeon’s minute books within one month of the meeting taking place, that does not lead me to afford little weight to Peter’s evidence. P & M Gudgeon is a family held company where the two shareholders, who were at least until the meeting in issue in this proceeding also its directors, have fallen out and are no longer speaking directly to one another. While its failure to follow the legislative obligations imposed on it is a matter of concern and one to be taken seriously, it is not surprising in the circumstances. The second matter raised by Maurice relies on the decision in Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361 (Kuhl) at [63] where Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ said:The rule in Jones v Dunkel is that the unexplained failure by a party to call a witness may in appropriate circumstances support an inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted the party’s case. That is particularly so where it is the party which is the uncalled witness. The failure to call a witness may also permit the court to draw, with greater confidence, any inference unfavourable to the party that failed to call the witness, if that uncalled witness appears to be in a position to cast light on whether the inference should be drawn. These principles have been extended from instances where a witness has not been called at all to instances where a witness has been called but not questioned on particular topics. Where counsel for a party has refrained from asking a witness whom that party has called particular questions on an issue, the court will be less likely to draw inferences favourable to that party from other evidence in relation to that issue. That problem did not arise here. The plaintiff’s counsel did ask the plaintiff relevant questions.(Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis added.)