Guccio Gucci SpA v Guess?, Inc

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Guccio Gucci SpA to protection of International Registrations Designating Australia 1419739 (IR 1071233) and 1448483(IR 1089141) - GG DEVICE held by Guess?, Inc.

Delegate:

Jock McDonagh

Representation:

Opponent: Luke Merrick, instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth Lawyers

Holder: Hamish Bevan, instructed by F.B. Rice, Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys

Decision:

2015 ATMO 71

Reg. 17A.29 opposition – Grounds pursued under sections 42(b), 44, 58 and 60 – section 60 ground established – no requirement to consider other grounds -- IRDA refused protection for all goods

Background

  1. Applications 1419739 and 1448483 are International Registrations Designating Australia (“IRDA”).  They were filed in the name of Guess?, Inc (“the Holder”) under the Madrid Protocol.

  2. Details of the IRDA are as follows:

Trade mark:       

Mark Description:

The mark consists of four sets of two interlocking "G"'s surrounded by four diamonds.

Trade mark No:

1419739

(IR 1071233)

1448483

(IR 1089141)

Filing Date:        

11 March 2011

12 July 2011 (Convention priority date 12.01.12)

Goods:

Class 18: Backpacks, book bags, sports bags, bum bags, wallets and handbags; handbags; handbags, purses and wallets; Leather handbags; luggage

Class 9: Covers and cases for portable electronic devices, personal electronic devices, cell phones, mobile phones, telephones, computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, notebook computers, MP3 players, portable music players, personal digital assistants, electronic reading devices, digital cameras, and cameras; eyewear

  1. Section 189A of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (“the Act”) governs the consideration of IRDAs. This section makes provision for the Trade Marks Regulations (“the Regulations”) to “provide for such matters as are necessary to enable the performance of the obligations of Australia, or to obtain for Australia any advantage or benefit, under the Madrid Protocol.” 

  2. Following examination, IP Australia advertised its intention to extend protection of the IRDA to Australia in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 26 July 2012.

  3. On 26 October 2012, Guccio Gucci SpA (“the Opponent”) filed Notices of Opposition (“the Notices”) to extension of protection of the IRDA to Australia pursuant to Reg 17A.29 of the Regulations[1].  

    [1] References to the Regulations in this decision refer to them only as they were prior to the amendments that came into effect on 15 April 2013.

  4. I heard the matter in Canberra on 19 May 2015 as a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks. Luke Merrick of Counsel instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth Lawyers represented the Opponent. Hamish Bevan of Counsel, instructed by F.B. Rice, Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys represented the Holder.

    Grounds of Opposition

  5. The Opponent nominated some 14 grounds of opposition in the Notice, but pursued only the grounds of opposition under sections 42(b), 44, 58 and 60 of the Act. The onus is upon the Opponent to establish one or more of its grounds of opposition on the ‘balance of probabilities’.[2]

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Details
Case
[2015] ATMO 71
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Guccio Gucci SpA (the Opponent) opposed the registration of the G-Shine trade mark by Guess?, Inc (the Holder) in Australia. The Opponent, a luxury fashion and accessories company established in 1921, argued that its established trade marks, featuring variations of the letter 'G' and an interlocking 'G' device, had acquired significant reputation in Australia. The dispute centred on whether the Holder's proposed G-Shine trade mark, also featuring interlocking 'G's within a diamond pattern, would be likely to deceive or cause confusion among Australian consumers, thereby infringing the Opponent's rights under section 60 of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth).

The court was required to determine two primary issues: first, whether the Opponent's trade marks had acquired a sufficient reputation in Australia at the time of the Holder's application; and second, whether the use of the G-Shine trade mark by the Holder was likely to deceive or cause confusion among a substantial number of Australian consumers, having regard to the Opponent's established reputation and the nature of the goods. The court also considered the principles governing the assessment of likelihood of deception or confusion, including the importance of imperfect recollection and the potential for consumers to wonder about a connection between the sources of the goods.

The court found that the Opponent had established the requisite reputation in Australia through substantial sales and extensive advertising and promotional expenditure. Applying the principles from *Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths*, the court determined that while the G-Shine mark and the Opponent's marks were not identical, their similar design features, particularly the reversed and inverted 'Gs' and the geometric layout, coupled with the similarity of the goods, created a real tangible danger of confusion. The court concluded that a significant number of Australian consumers, particularly those with imperfect recollection, would likely speculate about a connection between the two trade marks, thereby satisfying the threshold for deception or confusion under section 60.

Consequently, the court upheld the Opponent's opposition to the registration of the G-Shine trade mark on the ground of section 60 of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth). The court found it unnecessary to consider the other grounds of opposition raised by the Opponent.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Opponent, Guccio Gucci SpA, is a luxury fashion, leather goods, and accessories company established in 1921 in Florence by Guccio Gucci. Since its inception, Gucci has prominently featured the letter ‘G’, reflecting Guccio Gucci's initials, in its products. Over the years, the company expanded its product range to include wallets and purses, covers and cases for portable electronic devices, and eyewear. Gucci's trade marks, which prominently feature the letter ‘G’ in various configurations, have been in use since the 1960s, and have been widely advertised, marketed, and promoted in Australia. The company has generated substantial sales revenue and advertising expenditure in the tens of millions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of dollars respectively, demonstrating a strong reputation for its trade marks in Australia.

Guess?, Inc, the Holder, is a clothing and fashion accessory company that has used an interlocking ‘G’ device, referred to as G-Shine, in its products. The G-Shine device features a diamond pattern similar to the Opponent's trade marks. The Holder has registered G-Shine in Australia and worldwide, and has made use of it on various goods. The Holder's sales revenue and advertising expenditure, while substantial, are not as significant as those of the Opponent. The parties have been involved in US trade mark litigation regarding the Opponent's trade marks and the Holder's G-Shine device. The dispute in this case pertains to the application of G-Shine in Australia and its potential to cause confusion or deception among Australian consumers.

The Opponent has presented evidence demonstrating the substantial sales revenue, advertising expenditure, and promotional activities in Australia, establishing a strong reputation for its trade marks. The Opponent's trade marks and the Holder's G-Shine device share very similar design features, in particular the reversed and inverted ‘Gs’ and the geometric layout of such initials. Given the degree of similarity between G-Shine and the Opponent’s trade marks, the Opponent’s reputation in its trade marks, and the similarity in the respective goods, it is likely that a significant number of Australian consumers would speculate as to some sort of connection between the Opponent’s trade marks and the Holder’s G-Shine trade marks, amounting to the reasonable doubt required to trigger section 60 of the Trade Marks Act.

This case, Guccio Gucci SpA v Guess?, Inc, has a complex procedural history that traces back to an application for judicial review of an earlier decision. The matter initially arose when Guess?, Inc, filed an application for the registration of a trade mark in Australia, which Guccio Gucci SpA opposed. The opposition was based on various grounds, including the likelihood of confusion under section 60 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the earlier trade marks held by Guccio Gucci had a reputation in Australia and whether there was a likelihood of confusion between these marks and the mark applied for by Guess?, Inc. The proceedings included the submission of extensive declarations and evidence from both parties, detailing their respective trade marks, sales, advertising expenditures, and prior litigation history. This case did not involve a first-instance hearing or an appeal but rather a judicial review application challenging the earlier decision by the Trade Marks Registrar. The judicial review application was brought before the Federal Court, which then conducted a de novo review of the evidence and legal arguments presented by both parties. The Court examined the evidence to determine the reputation of Guccio Gucci's trade marks and the likelihood of confusion with the mark applied for by Guess?, Inc. Throughout the proceedings, key procedural steps included the filing of declarations, the consideration of interlocutory applications, and the making of rulings on the admissibility and weight of evidence. The Court's decision was ultimately based on a detailed analysis of the evidence and legal principles relevant to the assessment of trade mark opposition under section 60 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The time at which the grounds of opposition must be established is the date of filing of the application[3].[3] See Southern Cross Refrigerating v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1953) 91 CLR 592 at 595Evidence The evidence consists of the following declarations: Hung declares that the Opponent is a luxury fashion, leather goods and accessories company, established in 1921 in Florence by Guccio Gucci. The Opponent’s business was initially focused on leather goods and small luggage; however, it has expanded to include wallets and purses, covers and cases for portable electronic devices, and eyewear. Hung states that since the inception of the Opponent’s business, its products have prominently featured the letter ‘G’, reflecting the initials of Guccio Gucci. Since the 1960s, the Opponent has used trade marks using a theme based on the initials ‘G’, with the second ‘G’ inverted and such inverted initials being displayed in a geometric pattern joined by two dots. Examples of the Opponent’s trade marks supporting these proceedings are shown below: In confidential exhibits, Hung demonstrates substantial sales in Australia of the Opponent’s class 9 and 18 products bearing both versions of its trade mark and also examples of extensive advertising, marketing and promotional activities in Australia featuring the above trade marks. Operating revenue from the sales has been in the tens of millions of dollars for several years prior to 2011. Since 2005, extensive advertising, marketing and promotional expenditure has been in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Ederer provides details of US trade mark litigation between the parties, regarding the Opponent’s trade marks shown above and a different interlocking ‘G’ device used by the Holder in the US. Of relevance to these proceedings, Ederer provides examples of the Holder using its interlocking ‘G’ device within a diamond pattern on its goods (in Ederer, it was shown on handbags and shoes). McManus provides a history of the Holder and its clothing and fashion accessory products and various trade marks applied to them. McManus refers to the Holder’s IRDA as the G-Shine trade mark, and I will refer to it as G-Shine. McManus details the history of the adoption of G-Shine and its registration in Australia and worldwide. McManus also provides details of the Holder’s sales and advertising expenditure in Australia. While the receipts appear substantial, they are not as substantial as those of the Opponent. Annexes B to D of McManus provide examples of the Holder’s use of G-Shine on its relevant goods. I note that the application of G-Shine to goods is done in a very similar manner to that employed by the Opponent. McManus provides examples of a multiplicity of Australian trade mark registrations of the Holder and a variety of trade mark owners that feature the letter ‘G’ and/or ‘GG’. Details are included of such registrations and annexures showing various goods bearing the marks are provided. Most of these registrations are quite different to the G-Shine in dispute here and to the Opponent’s cites trade marks, and fall in different classes of goods. Discussion - Section 60 ground of opposition

Decision

Reasons for decision

The principles relevant to the assessment of the likelihood of deception or confusion, were set out by French J in Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths (1999) 45 IPR 411 at [50]:(ii) A trade mark is likely to cause confusion if the result of its use will be that a number of persons are caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products or closely related products and services come from the same source. It is enough if the ordinary person entertains a reasonable doubt. It may be interpolated that this is another way of expressing the proposition that the trade mark is likely to cause confusion if there is a real likelihood that some people will wonder or be left in doubt about whether the two sets of products or the products and services in question come from the same source. (iii) In considering whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion all surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration. These include the circumstances in which the marks will be used, the circumstances in which the goods or services will be bought and sold and the character of the probable acquirers of the goods and services. (iv) The rights of the parties are to be determined as at the date of the application. (v) The question of deceptive similarity must be considered in respect of all goods or services coming within the specification in the application and in respect of which registration is desired, not only in respect of those goods or services on which it is proposed to immediately use the mark. The question is not limited to whether a particular use will give rise to deception or confusion. It must be based upon what the applicant can do if registration is obtained. In respect of the last proposition, Mason J observed in Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Inc : "...the question whether there is a likelihood of confusion is to be answered, not by reference to the manner in which the respondent has used its mark in the past, but by reference to the use to which it can properly put the mark. The issue is whether that use would give rise to a real danger of confusion." 22. I will first determine if the Opponent’s trade marks have acquired a reputation in Australia.23. In relation to reputation Kenny J states in McCormick & Co Inc. v McCormick, 51 IPR 102, at 128:In ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 302 at 343; 23 IPR 193 at 234, Lockhart J said:[R]eputation within the jurisdiction may be proved by a variety of means including advertisements on television or radio, or in magazines and newspapers within the forum. 24. At 129, Kenny J continues:In practice, it is commonplace to infer reputation from a high volume of sales, together with substantial advertising expenditures and other promotions, without any direct evidence of consumer appreciation of the mark, as opposed to the product: …25. I am satisfied that Hung evidences a high volume of sales together with substantial advertising expenditures and other promotions by which I can infer the requisite reputation in the Opponent’s trade marks.26. Having established reputation, I turn to the likelihood of deception or confusion. The likelihood of deception or confusion must be finite and not trivial[4], and there must be a “real tangible danger of its occurring”[5]. The test is whether a substantial number of people, judged in light of the size and nature of the market involved, will be deceived or confused.[6]27. Confusion in the minds of the public might not always eventuate in mistaken purchase; however, as noted by the Full Federal Court in Nettlefold Advertising Pty Ltd v Nettlefold Signs Pty Ltd[7]:A probability of confusion, if it is real, is sufficient even though the confusion may be unlikely to persist up to the point of, and be a factor in, inducing actual sales: Southern Cross at 495. There may be confusion or deception in the minds of persons to whom the mark is addressed, even if actual purchasers will not ultimately be deceived: Re Hack's Application (1940) 58 RPC 9 at 103-104.28. It is not necessary to show under section 60 that the respective trade marks are deceptively similar although such a finding can be relevant in determining the likelihood of deception or confusion. While it is self-evident that G-Shine was not rejected under section 44 of the Act for being deceptively similar to the Opponent’s trade marks, it should be noted that different tests are applied under section 44 than are applied for section. Whereas under section 44 both trade marks must be considered as being in "notional fair use", section 60 requires a consideration of the actual manner in which the earlier trade mark has been used, a notional use being postulated only for the applicant's trade mark. Under section 60, account may be taken of any peculiarity in the actual manner of use of the opponent's trade mark likely to increase or decrease the risk of confusion[8].29. Hung and Edererr provide examples of the Opponent’s trade marks 937361 and 1401219 being applied to goods in a repeating manner similar to the effect in trade mark 1229135, albeit without the background shading.30. It is apparent to me that the Opponent’s trade marks and the G-Shine share very similar design features, in particular the reversed and inverted ‘Gs’ and the geometric layout of such initials. The placement of the small diamond elements on G-Shine accentuates a diamond-shaped theme to the trade mark. While a side by side comparison of the respective marks would highlight the many differences between the marks, I can imagine customers with imperfect recollection could be misled or deceived into imagining that goods offered under the G-Shine mark were those of the Opponent.31. Given the degree of similarity between G-Shine and the Opponent’s trade marks, the Opponent’s reputation in its trade marks, and the similarity in the respective goods, I consider that a significant number of Australian consumers would at the very least speculate as to some sort of connection between the Opponent’s trade marks and the Holder’s G-Shine trade marks. Particularly since the trade marks are similar, the degree of speculation would, in my assessment, amount to, at the very least, the reasonable doubt required to trigger section 60. 32. I note that Kenny J in McCormick & Company Inc v McCormick, supra, at [93] - [96], expresses the view that section 44(3) does not provide an exception to section 60, and I conclude that the same reasoning suggests that section 44(4) likewise does not provide an exception to section 60 of the Act.33. Therefore, the opponent has established a ground of opposition under the provisions of section 60. Having found in favour of the opponent in terms of section 60 there is no need for me to discuss the other grounds set out in the Notice although this ground or any others in the Act may also be relied on in the event of an appeal from this decision.[4] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd (1999) 45 IPR 411, at 428[5] Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, at 597[6] Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v FS Walton & Co Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 641[7] [1998] FCA 1704, citing Heerey J in Nettlefold Advertising Pty Ltd v Nettlefold Signs Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 495, at 501[8] Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off (Davidson and Horak, 5th ed, 2012, Thompson Reuters) [50.2420]Decision and Costs

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In determining whether the Opponent's trade marks have acquired a reputation in Australia, the court relied on the evidence presented by Hung, which demonstrated substantial sales and advertising expenditures. The court inferred the requisite reputation from these factors, aligning with the established principle that reputation may be inferred from high sales volume and significant advertising efforts. This inference was consistent with the decision in McCormick & Co Inc v McCormick, where it was noted that reputation can be inferred from a high volume of sales and substantial advertising expenditures.

Turning to the likelihood of deception or confusion, the court emphasized that the test requires a finite and tangible danger, not a trivial possibility. The court considered the substantial number of people likely to be deceived or confused, taking into account the size and nature of the market. The similarity between the Opponent's trade marks and the G-Shine trade mark was highlighted, particularly the reversed and inverted 'Gs' and the geometric layout. The court found that the similarity was such that customers with imperfect recollection could be misled, triggering a reasonable doubt as to the source of the goods.

The similarity in the respective goods between the parties was also considered, as it increases the likelihood of confusion or deception. The Opponent's trade marks and the G-Shine trade mark were applied to similar goods, which compounded the potential for consumer confusion. The court concluded that a significant number of Australian consumers would speculate about a connection between the Opponent's trade marks and the G-Shine trade mark, amounting to the reasonable doubt required to trigger section 60 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).

Regarding the potential exceptions provided by sections 44(3) and 44(4) of the Act, the court found that neither section provided an exception to section 60. The reasoning followed the view expressed by Kenny J in McCormick & Company Inc v McCormick, where it was held that section 44(3) does not provide an exception to section 60, and this reasoning was extended to section 44(4). Therefore, the Opponent successfully established a ground of opposition under section 60.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Opponent's trade marks have acquired a reputation in Australia, and the similarity between the Opponent's trade marks and the G-Shine trade mark, along with the similarity in the respective goods and the Opponent's reputation, triggers a reasonable doubt in the minds of consumers, satisfying the requirements of section 60 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). Additionally, sections 44(3) and 44(4) of the Act do not provide exceptions to section 60.