Legal Research
Cases
Green v Police

Green v Police

Case [1999] SASC 412 15 September 1999

Type to search within this case.

GREEN v POLICE
[1999] SASC 412

Magistrates’ Appeal
Bleby J

The appellant was originally charged on complaint with two breaches of the Road Traffic Act 1961 and one breach of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959, all arising out of his driving of a motor vehicle on the Sturt Highway at Lowbank on 16 February 1999.
On 23 July 1999 in the Magistrates Court sitting at Waikerie, the appellant, through his counsel, pleaded guilty to counts 2 and 3 on the complaint, namely count 2, that on 16 February 1999 at Lowbank, he drove a vehicle, namely a motor car, on a road, Sturt Highway, at a speed which was dangerous to the public, contrary to s 46 of the Road Traffic Act, and count 3, that on the same day at Lowbank, being the holder of a licence endorsed with conditions pursuant to s 81A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959, he drove a motor vehicle, namely a motor car, on Sturt Highway at a speed exceeding 100kph, namely at about 160kph, contrary to s 81A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
The prosecution thereupon withdrew the complaint reflected in count 1 of a breach of s 49 of the Road Traffic Act.
The facts as related by the prosecutor to the Magistrates Court were that police who were performing highway patrol duties on the Sturt Highway at Lowbank by means of a mobile radar unit detected the speed of the appellant’s sedan motor car travelling in an easterly direction at 160kph. The car was stopped and the police had a conversation with the appellant, the driver. He produced a provisional driver’s licence, but no P plates were displayed on the car.
A conversation then ensued and the facts were reported. The appellant told the police that he was on his way to Mildura for work, that he was driving a rented car and had only just begun his turn at driving. He had two other passengers in the car.
He said that he was unfamiliar with the car and had not been driving it long. He said that he thought he was only travelling at 120kph, and had no reason other than stupidity for driving so fast.
The police prosecutor indicated that the road at that point was a bitumen road with a single lane for east and west-bound traffic; that the road was dry and in good condition; that the permitted speed on that part of the road was 110kph; that the vehicle was in good condition; traffic was medium at the time; that there were no main roads entering the Sturt Highway at the location of the offence and there were no houses nearby. He did say, however, that the area was notorious for kangaroos.
The appellant had a relevant record of previous convictions for driving offences. On 20 September 1996 at Port Adelaide he had been found guilty of a number of charges, including driving at a speed dangerous to the public, for which…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Green v Police

Details

AGLC: Green v Police [1999] SASC 412
Case: [1999] SASC 412
Decision Date: 15 September 1999

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Green, appealed against his conviction on count 2 for driving at a speed dangerous to the public. The appeal arose out of a speeding incident on the Sturt Highway at Lowbank on 16 February 1999. The appellant pleaded guilty to counts 2 and 3, but the prosecution withdrew count 1. The appellant submitted that he misunderstood the penalty consequences of pleading guilty to count 2, believing his licence would be disqualified for a period of six months only. The appellant argued that had he known the mandatory minimum period of disqualification was three years, he would not have pleaded guilty.

The central legal issue was whether the appellant could successfully appeal against his conviction after pleading guilty, where the only ground of appeal was a misunderstanding of the penalty consequences. The court considered whether a plea of guilty could be withdrawn and the conviction set aside in such circumstances. The court had to determine if there was a miscarriage of justice or if the appellant could not possibly have been guilty of the charge on count 2.

The court held that a plea of guilty is an admission of all the essential elements of the charge, including the qualitative nature of the offence. The appellant pleaded guilty on advice, which may have been incorrect as to penalty, but the appellant withheld vital information from his solicitor. The court held that the appellant intended to admit his guilt of all the essential elements of the charge and that there was no suggestion he did not understand the nature of the charge. The appellant could not show that he could not have been guilty of the offence on the admitted facts. The court dismissed the appeal, finding there had been no miscarriage of justice.

The court ordered that the appellant be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of three years, commencing at 12.01am on 24 July 1999 and ending at midnight on 11 August 1999, when the suspension was itself suspended, and then commencing again for the balance of the period.

Orders