Green v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   GREEN -v- FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD [2020] WASC 250

CORAM:   LE MIERE J

HEARD:   3 JUNE 2020

DELIVERED          :   3 JULY 2020

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1011 of 2019

BETWEEN:   JEMMA MARIE GREEN

Plaintiff

AND

FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD

First Defendant

AARON ODYSSEUS PATRICK

Second Defendant


Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Pleadings - Strike out application - Application to strike out paragraphs of the defence

Defamation - Defences - Justification - Whether particulars pleaded are capable of proving substantial truth of imputation - Whether particulars are embarrassing - Whether a defendant may amend defence to pleads as particulars of justification facts derived from the plaintiff's discovery

Defamation - Defences - Contextual truth - Contextual imputations - Whether material is capable of carrying contextual imputation

Defamation - Defences - Mitigation of damages - Particulars of mitigation - Whether publications by or on behalf of the plaintiff in response to defamatory matters may mitigate damages

Legislation:

Defamation Act 2005 (WA)

Result:

Application allowed in part

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff : Mr M L Bennett
First Defendant : Mr A T S Dawson SC
Second Defendant : Mr A T S Dawson SC

Solicitors:

Plaintiff : Bennett + Co
First Defendant : Carmel Galati & Banki Haddock Fiora
Second Defendant : Carmel Galati & Banki Haddock Fiora

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Abou‑Lokmeh v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 228

Allen v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (Unreported, NSWSC, 2 December 1988)

Berezovsky v Forbes Inc [2001] All ER (D) 452

Bookbinder v Tebbit [1989] 1 WLR 640

Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027

Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44

Cornwell v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 255

Crosby v Kelly [2013] FCA 1343

Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62

Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135

Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Zeccola (2015) 91 NSWLR 341

Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (2005) 79 ALJR 1716

Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 135

Gallagher v Destiny Publications Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 40

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Hitchcock (2007) 70 NSWLR 484

Lord Ashcroft KCMG v Foley [2011] EWHC 1710 (QB)

Lord Ashcroft KCMG v Foley [2012] EWCA Civ 423

Maisel v Financial Times Ltd (1915) 84 LJKB 2145

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Warton [2002] NSWCA 377

Pahuja v TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1074

Rush v Nationwide News (2018) 359 ALR 473

Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149

Weeks v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [No 2] [2019] WASC 44

LE MIERE J:

Summary

  1. The plaintiff, Jemma Green, is a co‑founder and chairman of Power Ledger Pty Ltd which is a blockchain technology company.

  2. On 28…

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Details
Case
[2020] WASC 250
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Green v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd, the plaintiff sought to strike out specific paragraphs of the defendant's defence, which had been filed in response to the plaintiff's defamation action. The defendant, Fairfax Media, published an article alleging that the plaintiff had engaged in dishonest practices in relation to Power Ledger, a blockchain technology company. The plaintiff argued that the particulars in the defence were vague, misleading, and insufficient to inform her of the case she had to meet, and thus should be struck out. The legal issues before the court were whether the particulars pleaded were capable of proving the substantial truth of the imputations, whether they were embarrassing, and whether the defendant could amend the defence to include facts derived from the plaintiff's discovery as particulars of justification.

The court found that while some of the particulars were of a high level of generality, they were not so vague as to be embarrassing. The court noted that while it is important for pleadings to be specific enough to inform the party of the case they have to meet, it is not necessary to plead every fact that may be relevant to the case. The court found that the particulars were sufficient to give the plaintiff a fair opportunity to meet them and were not likely to cause confusion at the trial. The court also found that the distinction between factual conclusions and factual supporting allegations is often illusory, as all factual assertions are conclusions to some extent. However, the court held that a pleading which simply states a conclusion without stating the underlying facts is likely to be found to be embarrassing.

The court held that the defendant was entitled to amend the defence to include facts derived from the plaintiff's discovery as particulars of justification. The court noted that it is not always possible to plead all the facts that may be relevant to the case at the time the defence is filed, and that the parties should be given an opportunity to amend their pleadings where necessary. The court found that the defendant's proposed amendments would provide the plaintiff with sufficient information to meet the defence and would not cause confusion at the trial. The court also held that the plaintiff's publications in response to the defamatory matters could potentially mitigate the damages she suffered.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's application to strike out the particulars in the defence. The court ordered that the defendant be allowed to amend the defence to include the proposed amendments, and that the parties proceed to exchange further particulars as necessary. The court also noted that the plaintiff's publications in response to the defamatory matters could potentially mitigate the damages she suffered, and that this issue would be considered at a later stage in the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is not sufficient to simply plead a conclusion from unstated facts; such a pleading is embarrassing. There is a distinction between factual conclusions (the plaintiff was intimately involved in Power Ledger's day‑to‑day affairs) and factual supporting allegations (what the plaintiff did and said). The distinction between a conclusion and supporting allegations is illusive. At some level everything is inference; all factual assertions are conclusions. However, courts distinguish between conclusions and the facts that permit them to be made because they may not agree that the inference drawn by a party is justified. As Gleeson CJ said in relation to questions about the specificity of pleaded imputations, the solution will usually be found in considerations of practical justice.[20] A defendant may plead a particular at a high level of generality providing that it is sufficient to allow the plaintiff a fair opportunity to meet it and it is not likely to cause confusion either at the pleading stage or at the trial in relation to the factual allegation.[20] Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135, 137. In my opinion [4], in its context, is sufficient to inform the plaintiff of the case she has to meet and to give her a fair opportunity to meet it. The plaintiff does not object to [5] ‑ [11] of the particulars. Paragraph 5 refers to Power Ledger developing a blockchain‑based energy trading platform. Paragraphs 6 and 7 refer to a White Paper produced by Power Ledger which describes its platform and was published on its website. Paragraph 8 refers to Power Ledger creating 1 billion tokens (POWR tokens). Paragraph 9 refers to Power Ledger putting on its website a Token Paper which provided information in relation to Power Ledger's proposed ICO using POWR tokens. Paragraph 10 says that Power Leger made available on its website a Bounty Paper which provided information about a campaign to be launched by Power Ledger to allocate free POWR tokens to persons who promoted Power Ledger, the ICO and the POWR token on social media during the ICO. Paragraph 11 sets out statements made in the Bounty Paper including that Bounty Campaign participants who created blog posts or articles meeting certain standards would accumulate Bounty Reward Points. Paragraph 12 of the particulars is that Power Ledger did not require or suggest, either in its Bounty Paper or otherwise, that Bounty Campaign participants publicly disclose (whether in the relevant post or otherwise) that they produced, posted and/or shared online promotional content with a view to accumulating Bounty Reward Points. Paragraph 13 of the particulars is that the allocation of Bounty Reward Points and/or POWR tokens to Bounty Campaign participants was not conditioned upon Bounty Campaign participants publicly disclosing (whether in the relevant post or otherwise) that they produced, posted and/or shared online promotional content with a view to accumulating Bounty Reward Points.