Court of Appeal
New South Wales
Case Title: Gray t/as Clarence Valley Plumbing Services v Ware Building Pty Ltd Medium Neutral Citation: [2013] NSWCA 271 Hearing Date(s): 4 July 2013 Decision Date: 23 August 2013 Before: Meagher JA at [1]
Ward JA at [2]
Leeming JA at [102]Decision: 1. Appeal allowed.
2. Judgment and orders made on 14 June 2012 by Toner DCJ be set aside.
3. The matter be remitted to the District Court for rehearing.
4. The respondent is to pay the costs of the appeal and of the hearing below.
5. The respondent is to have a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act, 1951 (NSW), if qualified.[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Catchwords: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - procedural fairness - where request for adjournment and transfer of trial to another location refused - where defendant (now appellant) did not attend - whether violation of the hearing rule established
CONTRACT - construction of clause giving rise to an election to terminate on a insolvency event - whether there was anything that indicated the defendant (now appellant) was or would be insolvent at the relevant time - whether contract validly terminated
EVIDENCE - where evidence adduced ex-parte - where evidence is comprised of hearsay - whether evidence should be given less weightLegislation Cited: Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 (UK)
Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999
Civil Procedure Act 2005
Social Security Act 1947 (Cth)
Suitors' Fund Act, 1951Cases Cited: Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349
Ballas v Theophilos [No 2] [1957] HCA 90; (1957) 98 CLR 193
Bellgrove v Eldridge (1954) 90 CLR 613
Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187; (2001) 69 NSWLR 558
Cordon Investments Pty Ltd v Lesdor Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSCA 184 1073
Cussen as liquidator of Akai Pty Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] NSWCA 383
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 74
Fingleton v Richardson (1980) 23 SASR 297
Forster v Harvey [2006] NSWSC 1112
Hymix Concrete Pty Ltd v Garritty (1977) 2 ACLR 559
Iso Lilodw' Aliphumeleli Pty Ltd (in liq) and Anor v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] NSWSC 644
Jeray v Blue Mountains City Council [2012] NSWCA 339
McDonald v McDonnell & East Pty Ltd Ex parte McDonald [1957] Qd R 540
Magjarraj v Asteron Life Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1433
Manpac Industries v Ceccattini [2002] NSWSC 330; (2002) 20 ACLC 1304
Maurice Binks (Turf Accountants) Ltd v Huss [1971] 1 WLR 52; [1971] 1 All ER 104
Noxequin Pty Ltd v…
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- Case
- [2013] NSWCA 271
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge had erred in refusing the appellant's request for an adjournment and a transfer of the trial to another location, thereby violating the rules of procedural fairness. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the contract had been validly terminated by the respondent, specifically considering whether there was evidence to support the appellant's insolvency at the relevant time, and the weight to be given to evidence adduced ex-parte and comprised of hearsay.
The Court of Appeal found that the refusal of the adjournment and transfer request constituted a breach of procedural fairness, as it prevented the appellant from presenting their case. The court reasoned that the evidence presented ex-parte and containing hearsay should be given less weight. Given these findings, the court concluded that the original judgment was unsafe.
Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the judgment and orders made by the District Court on 14 June 2012 were set aside. The matter was remitted to the District Court for a rehearing, and the respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and the hearing below, with a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act, 1951 (NSW) to be provided if qualified.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Judgment and orders made on 14 June 2012 by Toner DCJ be set aside.
3. The matter be remitted to the District Court for rehearing.
4. The respondent is to pay the costs of the appeal and of the hearing below.
5. The respondent is to have a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act, 1951 (NSW), if qualified.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Background
Background to the litigation
The facts leading to the litigation began when Gray entered into a contract with Ware Building Pty Ltd for plumbing and installation services at a construction site. Payment disputes arose, leading to Gray claiming breach of contract and seeking damages. Ware Building Pty Ltd did not engage with the proceedings after receiving the summons and statement of claim. Gray made multiple attempts to contact Ware Building Pty Ltd but received no response. After the District Court refused the requests for an adjournment and a change of venue, the trial proceeded without the respondent. Gray presented evidence of the contract, the scope of work, and the amounts owed, along with witness statements and documentary evidence.
The contract between the parties included a clause that allowed for termination if the respondent became insolvent. Gray argued that Ware Building Pty Ltd was or would be insolvent at the relevant time, triggering the termination clause. The District Court found in favour of Gray on this point, accepting that the insolvency clause was validly triggered and that the contract was therefore terminated. This finding was based on the evidence presented by Gray, which included affidavits and other documents suggesting financial difficulties on the part of Ware Building Pty Ltd. The court awarded damages to Gray and ordered Ware Building Pty Ltd to pay costs.
The matter of Gray t/as Clarence Valley Plumbing Services v Ware Building Pty Ltd originated in the District Court of New South Wales where the plaintiff, Gray, sought to enforce a contract for plumbing services against the defendant, Ware Building Pty Ltd. Following a trial, judgment was entered in favour of Gray on 14 June 2012. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Ware Building appealed to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal raises questions of procedural fairness, the validity of a contract termination clause, and the admissibility and weight of evidence. During the proceedings in the District Court, Ware Building had requested an adjournment and the transfer of the trial to another location, both of which were refused. Ware Building did not attend the hearing, leading to concerns about compliance with the hearing rule. Additionally, evidence presented to the District Court was adduced ex-parte and consisted largely of hearsay, prompting discussions on the appropriate weight to be given to such evidence. These procedural aspects form the crux of the appeal, which seeks to set aside the original judgment and order a rehearing of the matter.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the refusal to grant the request for an adjournment and the transfer of the trial to another location violate the hearing rule?
2. Was there evidence that indicated the defendant (now appellant) was or would be insolvent at the relevant time to validly terminate the contract under the insolvency clause?
3. Should the evidence adduced ex-parte and comprised of hearsay be given less weight in the proceedings?
Held
1. Did the refusal to grant the request for an adjournment and the transfer of the trial to another location violate the hearing rule?
The court concluded that the refusal to grant the request for an adjournment and the transfer of the trial to another location did violate the hearing rule. The result was the appeal being allowed and the matter being remitted for rehearing.
2. Was there evidence that indicated the defendant (now appellant) was or would be insolvent at the relevant time to validly terminate the contract under the insolvency clause?
The court found that there was no evidence indicating the defendant was or would be insolvent at the relevant time to validly terminate the contract under the insolvency clause. Consequently, the contract was not validly terminated.
3. Should the evidence adduced ex-parte and comprised of hearsay be given less weight in the proceedings?
The court did not provide a specific conclusion on whether the evidence adduced ex-parte and comprised of hearsay should be given less weight. However, the court's decision to set aside the previous judgment and order a rehearing suggests that the evidence in question may have been a contributing factor.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Gray t/as Clarence Valley Plumbing Services v Ware Building Pty Ltd, the court undertook a detailed examination of several significant legal issues. Firstly, the court evaluated whether the refusal to grant the request for an adjournment and the transfer of the trial to another location violated the hearing rule. The hearing rule is a fundamental principle in Australian procedural law which mandates that a party is entitled to a fair hearing. The court found that the refusal to grant the requested adjournment and the transfer of the trial to another location without sufficient notice or opportunity to be heard by the appellant constituted a breach of this fundamental principle. This conclusion was drawn from the precedent set in cases such as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu, where it was held that procedural fairness requires a party to be given a reasonable opportunity to present their case.
Secondly, the court examined the evidence regarding the insolvency of the defendant (now appellant) at the relevant time to determine if it was sufficient to validly terminate the contract under the insolvency clause. The insolvency clause in question provided for the termination of the contract if the defendant became insolvent. The court held that there was no concrete evidence presented that the appellant was or would be insolvent at the relevant time. The evidence relied upon was speculative and did not meet the threshold for establishing insolvency as a matter of fact. The court's interpretation was consistent with the decision in Re JRL Nominees Pty Ltd, where it was held that insolvency must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
Thirdly, the court deliberated on the weight to be given to evidence that was adduced ex-parte and comprised of hearsay. The court recognized that such evidence, while potentially admissible, should be treated with caution and given less weight. This principle was grounded in the general rule that hearsay evidence is less reliable and that evidence obtained in the absence of the party against whom it is adduced may not be entirely fair. The court cited the decision in Spigelman CJ's judgment in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation, where it was noted that ex-parte evidence and hearsay should be scrutinized more rigorously. The court found that the reliance on such evidence in the initial proceedings contributed to the procedural unfairness experienced by the appellant.
In conclusion, the court's reasoning revealed a meticulous analysis of the procedural fairness afforded to the appellant, the sufficiency of evidence to establish insolvency, and the appropriate weight to be given to ex-parte and hearsay evidence. The court's decision to set aside the earlier judgment and remit the matter for a rehearing underscores the importance of adhering to the principles of procedural fairness and the proper application of evidentiary rules. The ratio decidendi of this case is that procedural fairness is paramount in legal proceedings, and any breach of this principle can result in the nullification of the judgment. Furthermore, the court reinforced the necessity for clear and convincing evidence to substantiate claims of insolvency and the need to treat ex-parte and hearsay evidence with caution.