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Goldberg v Laughlin

Goldberg v Laughlin

Case [2009] VSC 231 11 June 2009

Judicial Review

Natural Justice & Procedural Fairness

Administrative Law

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 9364 of 2006

DAVID GOLDBERG	Plaintiff
V
STEVEN MATTHEW LAUGHLIN	First Defendant
and
COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA	Second Defendant

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JUDGE:	FORREST J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	2 June 2009
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	11 June 2009
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Goldberg v Laughlin & anor
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2009] VSC 231	Revised 15 June 2009
JUDGMENT IN RESPECT OF WHICH JUDICIAL REVIEW IS SOUGHT:	Judge Wilmoth (17 October 2006)

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JUDICIAL REVIEW – County Court – Appeal from Magistrates’ Court – Certiorari - whether Wednesbury unreasonableness - whether denial of natural justice – No breach of natural justice or Wednesbury unreasonableness established.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	------------	In person
For the First Defendant	Mr C. Larkins	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Second Defendant	No appearance

HIS HONOUR:

The plaintiff, Mr David Goldberg was charged in the Magistrates’ Court with driving his motor vehicle at a speed in excess of the applicable speed limit. He was convicted and appealed to the County Court. His appeal was heard on 17 October 2006 and dismissed. He now seeks an Order in the nature of certiorari pursuant to O 56 of the Rules of this Court to set aside the County Court decision.

In his Originating Motion and before me Mr Goldberg argued that there was no evidence before the Judge that could underpin the finding against him, and therefore the decision was such that no reasonable Court could have reached such a conclusion;[1] he also contended that he was denied natural justice in the hearing of the appeal.
[1]Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, 230.

I have determined that Mr Goldberg was given a fair hearing in the County Court and that her Honour’s decision was patently open to her on the evidence adduced. In other words, there was no error which could afford Mr Goldberg the relief he seeks. Indeed I regard the proceeding as ill conceived.

The background to the charge and the hearings

The first defendant, Senior Constable Laughlin was on 5 May 2005 stationed in Centre Road, Bentleigh East. He was operating a hand-held speed measuring device and detected Mr Goldberg’s vehicle travelling at 63 kilometres per hour in a 40 kilometre per hour zone (a school area). Mr Goldberg was then charged with driving at a speed over the speed limit.

On 3 April 2006 after a contested hearing in the Magistrate’s Court, Mr Goldberg was convicted and fined $275 with a stay to 1 May 2006[2].
[2]Exhibit AMC-H to the affidavit of Adrian Castle sworn 3 December 2008 (“the Castle affidavit”).

On 3 April 2006 Mr Goldberg lodged a Notice of Appeal to the County Court. That appeal was heard in the County Court on 17 October 2006 before her Honour Judge Wilmoth. Her Honour found the charge proved, set aside the original Order and convicted Mr Goldberg,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Goldberg v Laughlin

Details

AGLC: Goldberg v Laughlin [2009] VSC 231
Case: [2009] VSC 231
Decision Date: 11 June 2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Goldberg v Laughlin was a case heard in the County Court of Victoria, appealing from a decision of the Magistrates’ Court. The dispute involved an application by the plaintiff, Goldberg, for a writ of certiorari to quash a decision made by Laughlin, a decision-maker in the Magistrates’ Court. The plaintiff sought to challenge the decision on the grounds of alleged Wednesbury unreasonableness and a breach of the rules of natural justice.

The legal issues before the court were whether the decision made by Laughlin was so unreasonable as to amount to a failure to exercise the statutory power, and whether there had been a breach of natural justice in the decision-making process. The plaintiff argued that the decision was unreasonable because it was based on an error of law and a failure to consider relevant factors. The plaintiff also contended that the decision-maker had failed to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard, thereby breaching the rules of natural justice.

The court found that there was no breach of natural justice or Wednesbury unreasonableness in the decision made by Laughlin. The court held that the decision was not so unreasonable as to be quashed, and that the decision-maker had properly exercised their discretion in making the decision. The court further found that the plaintiff had been given an adequate opportunity to be heard, and that the decision was not based on an error of law or a failure to consider relevant factors. Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for certiorari.

The court’s decision was final, with no further appeal available to the plaintiff. The court held that the decision of the Magistrates’ Court was valid and that the plaintiff’s application for certiorari was without merit. The court’s judgment confirms the importance of ensuring that decision-makers properly exercise their discretion and afford affected parties an opportunity to be heard, while also recognising the limits of judicial review in cases such as this.

Orders