Goldberg v Laughlin
[2012] VSCA 106
•14 May 2012
SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
(CIVIL DIVISION)
S APCI 2009 3784
| DAVID GOLDBERG | Appellant |
| v | |
| STEVEN MATTHEW LAUGHLIN | First Respondent |
| and | |
| THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA | Second Respondent |
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| JUDGES | MAXWELL P, MANDIE JA and CAVANOUGH AJA |
| WHERE HELD | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING | 14 May 2012 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT | 14 May 2012 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION | [2012] VSCA 106 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM | Goldberg v Laughlin & Anor [2009] VSC 231 (J Forrest J) |
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Certiorari – Decision of County Court Judge – Whether open on the evidence – Whether manifestly unreasonable – No error of law – Appeal dismissed – Supreme Court Rules 0.56.
CRIMINAL LAW – Security and intelligence – Appellant suspected ASIO involvement in traffic prosecution – Alleged ASIO harassment over long period – No evidence to support – Appellant’s activities raised no national security issue – No complaint made to Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security – Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 17, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth).
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| Appearances: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| The Appellant appeared in person | ||
| For the Respondents | Mr Gyorffy SC | Craig Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
MAXWELL P:
I will invite Cavanough AJA to deliver the first judgment.
CAVANOUGH AJA:
This is an appeal from a judgment of Forrest J given on 11 June 2009.[1] The following recitation of the facts and circumstances of the matter draws heavily on his Honour’s judgment.
[1]Goldberg v Laughlin & Anor [2009] VSC 231.
The appellant, Mr David Goldberg, was charged in the Magistrates’ Court with driving his motor vehicle at a speed in excess of the applicable speed limit. He was convicted and appealed to the County Court. His appeal was heard on 17 October 2006 and dismissed. He sought from the Trial Division of this Court an order in the nature of certiorari pursuant to Order 56 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 to quash the decision of the County Court.
In the originating motion and before Justice Forrest, Mr Goldberg argued that there was no evidence before the County Court judge that could underpin the finding against him, and that therefore the decision was such that no reasonable court could have reached it. He also contended that he was denied natural justice in the hearing of the appeal to the County Court.
Justice Forrest determined that Mr Goldberg was given a fair hearing in the County Court by Judge Wilmoth and that her Honour’s decision was patently open to her on the evidence adduced. Justice Forrest saw no error which could afford Mr Goldberg the relief he sought. Indeed Forrest J regarded the proceeding as misconceived.
Factual background
On 5 May 2005 the first respondent, Senior Constable Laughlin, was stationed
in Centre Road, Bentleigh East. He was operating a hand held speed measuring device. According to the evidence he later gave, he detected Mr Goldberg’s vehicle travelling at 63 kilometres per hour in a 40 kilometre per hour zone (a school area). Mr Goldberg was accordingly charged with driving at a speed over the speed limit.
On 3 April 2006, after a contested hearing in the Magistrates’ Court, Mr Goldberg was convicted and fined $275 with a stay to 1 May 2006.
On the same day Mr Goldberg lodged a notice of appeal to the County Court. The appeal was heard on 17 October 2006 by Judge Wilmoth. Her Honour found the charge proved, set aside the original order and convicted Mr Goldberg. A fine of the same amount, namely $275, was imposed with a stay of one month.
The hearing before Judge Wilmoth
No transcript of the hearing before Judge Wilmoth was made available to Justice Forrest. His Honour considered that this was probably due to the delay in bringing on the application. However, both Mr Goldberg and the barrister who prosecuted the appeal in the County Court on behalf of the informant filed affidavits detailing their recollection of the events before Judge Wilmoth. Further, her Honour kept extensive and clear notes of both the evidence and her reasons. Justice Forrest relied mainly upon her Honour’s notes.
The only witness called by the prosecution was the informant, Senior Constable Laughlin. He was cross-examined by Mr Goldberg. Mr Goldberg then gave evidence and was cross-examined by prosecuting counsel. At the end of the evidence both counsel and Mr Goldberg made submissions.
Judge Wilmoth retired for approximately fifteen minutes. Her notes indicate that she then returned to the bench and gave reasons along the following lines:
This is an appeal against conviction and sentence, brought by Mr Goldberg. He was convicted of one charge of speeding and was fined $275. I set aside that order.
S/C Laughlin gave evidence that he is authorised to operate a Laser Speed Measuring device, and the device used had been tested as operating correctly. It measured Mr Goldberg’s speed on the day in question at 65 kph. with a speed of 63 kph being alleged against him. This was in a 40 kph school zone, in Centre Road, Bentleigh East. Mr Laughlin gave evidence, which I accept, that he visually estimated the speed of Mr Goldberg’s car at 55-60 kph and aimed the device at the car, maintaining it for 3-4 seconds and obtaining a digital display of 65 kph.
Mr Goldberg gave evidence that he was merely following the cars ahead of him and that he had not checked his speedo. He said he was the only driver pulled over, and he alleged that he had had an altercation with Senior Constable Laughlin three or four years previously; and he produced Mr Laughlin’s business card.
Mr Laughlin could not recall any such previous meeting with Mr Goldberg, and said he often gives his card out to people.
Mr Goldberg submitted that I should have a reasonable doubt as to the evidence against him. Mr Bliss (prosecuting counsel) drew my attention to s 79 of the Road Safety Act which states: ‘If in any criminal proceeding …’ [her Honour then read s 79 of the Road Safety Act].[2]
Here, there is no evidence to the contrary, and no reason for me to doubt the evidence of Mr Laughlin and the results of the use of the speed measuring device.
Accordingly, I find the charge proved and I shall proceed to record a conviction and fine in due course, but I shall hear from Mr Goldberg first.
$275. Stay one month.
[2]Section 79(1) of the Road Safety Act 1986 provides: ‘If in any criminal proceedings the speed at which a motor vehicle or trailer travelled on any occasion is relevant, evidence of the speed of the motor vehicle or trailer as indicated or determined on that occasion by a prescribed road safety camera or prescribed speed detector when tested, sealed and used in the prescribed manner is, without prejudice to any other mode of proof and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof of the speed of the motor vehicle or trailer on that occasion.’
The proceeding in the Trial Division
Mr Goldberg’s originating motion was filed on 24 October 2006. An appearance was entered by Mr Laughlin on 31 October 2006. On 17 November 2006 a notice of appearance was filed on behalf of the second defendant, the County Court. On the same day its solicitor advised that it did not intend to take an active role in the proceeding and would abide the decision of the court. Nothing was done in relation to the proceeding for two years until Mr Laughlin sought to have the proceeding struck out for want of prosecution. The Listing Master acceded to the application but on appeal a judge of the Trial Division dismissed Mr Laughlin’s application.
The principles applied by Justice Forrest
Justice Forrest noted that s 83 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (‘MCA’) provides a right of appeal to the County Court upon a person being sentenced in the Magistrates’ Court. Under s 85 of the MCA an appeal is conducted as a re-hearing so ‘the successful party at first instance derives no advantage from the victory and must win the case a second time’.[3]
[3]Director of Public Prosecutions v Shoan [2007] VSCA 220 [20].
Justice Forrest then referred to Craig v South Australia[4] in which the High Court stated that an application for certiorari is not an appellate procedure enabling a general review of the impugned decision or order of the inferior court; and that it does not permit the substitution of an order which a superior court thinks ought to have been made. Justice Forrest quoted the following passage from Craig[5]:
Where the writ runs it merely enables the quashing of the impugned order or decision upon one or more of a number of distinct established grounds, most importantly, jurisdictional error, failure to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness, fraud and ‘error of law on the face of the record’.
[4](1995) 184 CLR 163. He cited also SFZDE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189 [17].
[5](1995) 184 CLR 163, 175-176.
Justice Forrest stated that there was no claim of jurisdictional error.[6]
[6]In this regard, his Honour referred to DPP v His Honour Judge Fricke [1993] 1 VR 369, 376, noting that in that case the Full Court observed that the County Court judge had as much jurisdiction to decide a case wrongly as to decide it correctly.
Having regard to the limited scope of the remedy of certiorari, Justice Forrest observed that, at the most, Mr Goldberg could raise only two issues, namely want of procedural fairness and ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’. His Honour was of course satisfied that a claim of denial of procedural fairness can be brought in a proceeding for certiorari. However, his Honour observed that it was not settled that Wednesbury unreasonableness was either a basis for alleging jurisdictional error or a separate ground for obtaining certiorari.[7] Further, Justice Forrest expressed doubt as to whether Mr Goldberg was entitled to go beyond the formal record of a court’s order and rely upon the reasons given by the County Court judge or the evidence adduced at the hearing.[8]
[7]Citing Eshetu v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1999) 197 CLR 611 [124]-[126], Upham v The Grand Hotel (1999) 74 SASR 557 [159]-[169]. See now in relation to fact-finding in inferior courts, Rees v County Court [2011] VSC 67, [5]–[26] and the cases therein referred to, especially Kirk v Industrial Relations Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531 and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611.
[8]Citing Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, 182, but comparing Neill v County Court of Victoria [2003] VSC 328, in which Redlich J, at [7], said that it was ‘beyond argument’ that the court’s records included the reasons of the court. See also s 10 of the Administrative Law Act 1978; Sherlock v Lloyd (2010) 27 VR 434, [46].
However, Justice Forrest considered that he was not required to resolve either of those issues. Counsel who appeared before his Honour on behalf of the informant accepted for the purpose of the proceeding that the concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness was applicable to the decision of the County Court judge and counsel was also content to have the reasons of her Honour and the evidence as recorded by her scrutinised in the course of the proceeding before Justice Forrest. In Mr Goldberg’s favour, his Honour proceeded on that basis. In the absence of any submission to the contrary on behalf of the respondent, I would do likewise, but without accepting or deciding that either the concept of ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ or the concept of ‘illogicality’ or ‘irrationality’[9] is necessarily applicable to a case of the present kind.
[9]The latter concept may be a refinement of or a replacement for ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ in relation to non-discretionary decision-making. See Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611. See also the other cases referred to in footnote 7 above.
Analysis by Justice Forrest
Justice Forrest held that Mr Goldberg had not established that there was any denial of natural justice or procedural fairness in the course of the hearing before the County Court judge. His Honour said this:
At times he [Mr Goldberg] categorised certain findings of her Honour as constituting a denial of natural justice. For instance he criticised the failure of the prosecution to call a particular witness as constituting a denial of natural justice. [Here, in a footnote, Justice Forrest says that the relevant witness was a Senior Constable Bell and that her Honour’s notes make it clear that Mr Goldberg was asked by Mr Bliss whether Mr Bell was required and that Mr Goldberg responded in the negative.] Mr Goldberg was afforded a fair hearing. He had the opportunity to test the case for the prosecution, which he did. He had the opportunity to give evidence, of which he availed himself. He had the opportunity to make submissions relevant to the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution case – which he did. Her Honour’s reasons should have made it clear to him why the prosecution case was accepted by her. There was no breach of procedural fairness.[10]
[10]Goldberg v Laughlin & Anor [2009] VSC 231, [17].
As to Wednesbury unreasonableness, Justice Forrest held that there was nothing to indicate that Judge Wilmoth reached a conclusion which no reasonable judge could have reached. Her Honour had had the evidence of Mr Laughlin as to the operation of the radar device. She had considered and rejected Mr Goldberg’s denial that he was travelling at the recorded speed. Justice Forrest noted that, in this context, her Honour may well have regarded Mr Goldberg’s concession that he had not checked his speedometer as being relevant to any estimate by Mr Goldberg of his own speed.
The penultimate paragraph of Justice Forrest’s judgment reads as follows:
There is one other matter I need to mention. As I pointed out to Mr Goldberg in the course of the hearing, this was not the occasion to relitigate the factual contest as it emerged before her Honour. Nonetheless I permitted Mr Goldberg, in the context of his argument concerning the asserted unreasonableness of her Honour’s conclusion, to address individual aspects of the evidence before her Honour. These included allegations as to the motivation behind the prosecution: that the prosecution was orchestrated by ASIO and that Mr Laughlin was engaged in harassment as Mr Goldberg claimed that Mr Laughlin had apprehended him on a previous occasion. As well there was considerable dispute about particular factual matters raised before her Honour such as the location of speed signs, the nature of the flow of traffic, the position of Mr Laughlin on the roadway, the failure of Mr Laughlin to show Mr Goldberg the speed gun reading, the lack of independent witnesses, the failure by Mr Laughlin to stop any other car at the time Mr Goldberg’s car was stopped, the lack of illuminated signs in the area, the lack of provision of information as to when schools opened and closed in the area. All these matters, ultimately, are irrelevant to the conclusion that I have reached. This is not the place for a canvassing of the pros and cons of the decision reached by her Honour who heard all the evidence, and reached a conclusion well open to her.[11]
[11]Ibid [19].
Conclusion of trial judge
Justice Forrest determined that the originating motion should be dismissed with costs.
The appellant’s argument in this Court
In his written outline of submissions filed 11 August 2010, Mr Goldberg asserts that he told Judge Wilmoth that ‘this matter is conducted by ASIO as the original infringement notice was withdrawn by the police and this is a continuation of relentless persecution by ASIO of the Appellant’. However I note that Mr Goldberg himself opted to have the original infringement notice withdrawn so that the matter could go to court. Mr Goldberg said that the matter was dormant between October 2006 and November 2008 ‘due to the fact that ASIO through another matter forced the appellant into bankruptcy for not paying alleged legal costs’.
The appellant’s written submissions then proceed to make bizarre allegations of persecution of the appellant by ASIO and of control by ASIO of the police, the State Revenue Office, the Office of Fair Trading and the courts themselves. The allegations are not substantiated by any admissible evidence of any kind led before any of the courts below. Nor was any attempt made by Mr Goldberg to adduce admissible evidence of such matters before this Court.
In my opinion, there is no relevant error in the judgment of Justice Forrest. Indeed, his Honour’s decision to dismiss the application for certiorari was plainly correct, essentially for the reasons his Honour gave.
In my view, the appeal should be dismissed. The respondent does not seek the costs of the appeal.
MAXWELL P:
I too would dismiss the appeal, for the reasons which Cavanough AJA has given. It is, however, necessary to say a little more on the subject of the claimed involvement of ASIO.
As his Honour has already mentioned, Mr Goldberg believes that he has been the subject of what he describes as ‘ruthless persecution’ by ASIO. What follows is Mr Goldberg’s complete outline of argument:
1.The Appellant’s argument is that ASIO uses members of Victoria Police to bring number of traffic charges against the Appellant as most common and easy way to persecute and harass the Appellant.
2.It the Appellant’s submission that he has been discriminated before the Courts when the cases are not heard and determined in accordance with the law.
3.It is also submission of the Appellant that a number of Judges including former president of Court of Appeal Justice J S Winneke in the matter number 4344 of 2000 indicated that the law should be changed so such cases could not come before the Court of Appeal. In His retirement speech another Court of Appeal’s Judge, Justice Ormiston, said quite clearly that the situation became intolerable that the justice department is telling Judges what to do. In another case on 15th August 2003 His Honour Justice Phillips and Justice Ashley when they dismissed my application to return a ceased motor car they clearly indicated to me that this is not their decision. It is the Appellant’s submission that it is quite evident that ASIO was fixing the courts in every case where the Appellant was involved.
4.For number of years I have been ruthlessly persecuted by ASIO despite the fact that I am a law abiding citizen. My basic human rights have been violated and abused, and I have been denied Natural Justice before the courts.
What is very striking is that Mr Goldberg here advances a single contention, namely, that this entire proceeding against him was driven by ASIO as a form of persecution and harassment. Although he has addressed in argument other evidentiary aspects of the decision, it is apparent from the outline that what really brings him here is his belief that it is ASIO which conducts cases against him and that, as a result, ‘they are not heard and determined in accordance with the law’.
I am prepared to accept for the purposes of the hearing that that is a belief sincerely held, that is to say, that there is a campaign against him by ASIO. Indeed Mr Goldberg told us in answer to questions that he believes this campaign dates back to 1985 and some unspecified events in Perth. When questioned, however, as to how any question of domestic criminal law could be of any interest to ASIO, let alone within its statutory remit, Mr Goldberg was unable to help us.
It is apparent that his belief about ASIO’s involvement has been an animating force in his prosecution of and defence to various proceedings in the Supreme Court over many years.[12] It is, in my view, past time for Mr Goldberg to put this belief about ASIO – which I have no doubt is a delusion – to the test.
[12] See Goldberg v Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 46, Goldberg v Office of Fair Trading & Business (2000) 31 MVR 11, Goldberg v Maclennan [2000] VSCA 129, Goldberg v Commissioner of State Revenue (2002) 49 ATR 558, Goldberg v Brown (2003) 38 MVR 389, Goldberg v Laughlin & Anor [2009] VSC 231, Goldberg v Morrow [2003] VSCA 127, Goldberg v Howells [2003] VSC 414, Goldberg v Morrow [2004] VSC 170, Goldberg v Walter & Anor [2009] VSC 260.
Section 17 of the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (the ‘ASIO Act’) makes it unambiguously clear that ASIO has no statutory authority to engage in law enforcement, whether in relation to criminal law or tax law or traffic law or any other such matter:
17 Functions of Organisation
(1) The functions of the Organisation are:
(a)to obtain, correlate and evaluate intelligence relevant to security;
(b)for purposes relevant to security, to communicate any such intelligence to such persons, and in such manner, as are appropriate to those purposes;
(c)to advise Ministers and authorities of the Commonwealth in respect of matters relating to security, in so far as those matters are relevant to their functions and responsibilities.
(ca)to furnish security assessments to a State or an authority of a State in accordance with paragraph 40(1)(b);
(d)to advise Ministers, authorities of the Commonwealth and such other persons as the Minister, by notice in writing given to the Director‑General, determines on matters relating to protective security; and
(e)to obtain within Australia foreign intelligence pursuant to section 27A or 27B of this Act or section 11A, 11B or 11C of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, and to communicate any such intelligence in accordance with this Act or the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979; and
(f)to co‑operate with and assist bodies referred to in section 19A in accordance with that section.
(2) It is not a function of the Organisation to carry out or enforce measures for security within an authority of the Commonwealth.
The term ‘security’ is defined in s 4 of the ASIO Act to mean:
(a) the protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and the several States and Territories from:
(i) espionage;
(ii) sabotage;
(iii) politically motivated violence;
(iv) promotion of communal violence;
(v) attacks on Australia’s defence system; or
(vi) acts of foreign interference;
whether directed from, or committed within, Australia or not; and
(aa) the protection of Australia’s territorial and border integrity from serious threats; and
(b) the carrying out of Australia’s responsibilities to any foreign country in relation to a matter mentioned in any of the subparagraphs of paragraph (a) or the matter mentioned in paragraph (aa).
Reviewing these provisions in R v Thomas(No 4), this Court said emphatically that ‘ASIO has no power to act as a law enforcement agency’.[13] The suggestion that ASIO has taken any interest in Mr Goldberg’s activities is so wildly improbable that it can be rejected out of hand. There is not a scintilla of material to suggest that he has engaged in activities which might, on any view, attract the national security remit of that organisation. But this is a very firmly held belief of Mr Goldberg's, and he is clearly a man of high intelligence, because of the articulate way in when he presents his arguments. It therefore comes as a surprise to hear that he has never taken his complaints about ASIO to the Inspector‑General of Intelligence and Security.[14]
[13]R v Thomas (No 4) (2008) 19 VR 214, 225 [44] (Maxwell ACJ, Buchanan and Vincent JJA).
[14]See Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) div 2.
In her 2010/11 Annual Report, the Inspector‑General describes her role as an independent statutory officer, pointing out – importantly for present purposes – that the office has been in existence since 1987, just over 25 years:
The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) is an independent statutory office holder who reviews the activities of the agencies which collectively comprise the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC). The IGIS has own motion powers in addition to considering complaints from members of the public or requests from ministers.
…
The office was formally established by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) and commenced operating on 1 February 1987.
The Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (OIGIS) is situated within the Prime Minister’s portfolio and reports to the Special Minister of State for the Public Service and Integrity for administrative purposes.
As an independent statutory office holder, the IGIS is not subject to general direction from the Prime Minister, the Special Minister of State for the Public Service and Integrity, or other Ministers on how responsibilities under the IGIS Act should be carried out.
The role and functions of the IGIS are set out in sections 8,9, and 9A of the IGIS Act. These sections provide the legal basis for the IGIS to conduct regular inspections of the AIC agencies and to conduct inquiries, of varying levels of formality, as the need arises.
The overarching purpose of these activities is to ensure that each AIC agency acts legally and with propriety, complies with ministerial guidelines and directives, and respects human rights.
The majority of the resources of the office are directed towards on-going inspections and monitoring activities, so as to identify issues, including about the governance and control frameworks within agencies, before there is a requirement for major remedial actions.
The inspection role of the IGIS is complemented by an inquiry function. In undertaking inquiries the IGIS has strong investigative powers, akin to those of a royal commission.
The focus of inquiries which were conducted under the authority of the IGIS Act were generally limited to the activities of the six AIC agencies from the date when IGIS Act first took effect (that is 1 February 1987) until 23 November 2010.[15]
[15]Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Annual Report 2010-11 (2011) vii.
When asked whether he had communicated with the Inspector‑General about these concerns, Mr Goldberg said he had not, because he believed that any complaint he might make would be intercepted by ASIO. One of the purposes of these additional reasons for judgment, therefore, is to place on the public record the fact that Mr Goldberg makes these serious (but I think groundless) allegations against ASIO, and that he has been told that he should raise his concerns, with appropriate details, with the Inspector‑General. As I have said, that is the statutory office set up to ensure that members of the community who have concerns about any of the intelligence services are able to have their concerns examined.
Unless Mr Goldberg takes that step, he cannot expect these assertions to be given any credence whatsoever in any future Court proceeding. If he does not pursue that avenue of complaint, it will demonstrate that he prefers to make these assertions in forums like this one which, plainly enough, are unable to investigate them. And he should not be surprised if he becomes the subject of an application that he be declared a vexatious litigant.
The proceedings with which the Court is concerned today are, in my view, wholly without merit. They are based on a groundless perception about the intelligence service. They involve very, very low level criminal penalties, as Mr Goldberg was frank enough to acknowledge to the Court. They are matters which should never have occupied the time that they have, before trial judges and again before three judges of this Court. If Mr Goldberg is again involved in proceedings where he advances this notion of ASIO’s involvement, he must expect an application for summary dismissal without a hearing on the merits. I trust this judgment will serve to mark a point in time beyond which, unless he is able to substantiate these concerns, they are no longer entertained.
Mr Goldberg has, of course, a right to be treated lawfully but, as Cavanough AJA has pointed out, there is no basis for doubting that the process in this case was lawful, or that his case was determined on the merits by a judge acting impartially, both in the County Court and on appeal to the Trial Division of the Supreme Court. Finally, I would wish to acknowledge the care and thoroughness with which this matter was dealt with by the trial judge. This was in keeping with the best traditions of this Court, to which I referred in Phillip Morris v Attorney‑General,[16] of dealing respectfully and patiently with unrepresented litigants and being astute to ensure that a genuine point of law is not overlooked. The trial judge here performed that task in an exemplary fashion and I am sure Mr Goldberg recognises that the failure of this appeal is again not for want of his concerns having been properly addressed.
[16] Phillip Morris v Attorney‑General (2006) 14 VR 538, 553–4.
MANDIE JA:
I agree with Cavanough AJA and I would further endorse what has been said by Maxwell P.
MAXWELL P:
The order of the Court is appeal dismissed.
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