Gibbs v City of Charles Sturt

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Land and Valuation Division)

GIBBS v CITY OF CHARLES STURT

[2010] SASC 26

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bleby

16 February 2010

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION OF CONSENT AUTHORITY - GENERALLY - CONSIDERATION OF PLANNING SCHEMES

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION OF CONSENT AUTHORITY - CONSIDERATION OF PARTICULAR PLANNING MATTERS - TRAFFIC AND PARKING

Appeal from the Environment Resources and Development Court - development application to change use of building on subject land from a dwelling to an office - whether failure to assess development application against provisions of the Development Plan - whether misapplication of Development Plan principles - need to consider development as a whole in deciding compliance with Development Plan - failure to apply qualititative assessment of application against Development Plan - failure to assess qualitatively issues of car parking and vehicle access - appeal allowed.

Environment Resources and Development Court Act 1993 (SA) s 30(2); Development Act 1993 (SA) s 33, s 35(2), s 88(2), referred to.
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Corporation of the City of Micham (2001) 79 SASR 509; AG Building and Developments Pty Ltd v City of Holdfast Bay and Tanti [2009] SASC 11; City of Mitcham v Terra Equities Pty Ltd (2007) 249 LSJS 416, applied.
Hickinbotham Blue Gum Pty Ltd v Corporation of the City of Campbelltown (1981) 29 SASR 93; City of Mitcham v Freckman (1999) 74 SASR 56, considered.

GIBBS v CITY OF CHARLES STURT
[2010] SASC 26

Land and Valuation Division

BLEBY J.

Background

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of a Commissioner of the Environment Resources and Development Court (“the Environment Court”). The appeal concerns an application by the appellant for Development Approval relating to an irregularly shaped allotment located on the north-eastern corner of the intersection of Grange Road and Military Road, Grange. The land has a frontage to Military Road on its western boundary of 24 metres and a frontage to Grange Road on its south of 8 metres. The eastern boundary is approximately 30 metres long, and the northern boundary a little less than 20 metres. There is a corner cut off of the land at the intersection of Military and Grange Roads.

  2. The land presently contains an early 20th century detached dwelling with a floor area of 154 square metres. It faces Grange Road with a southern verandah of approximately 33 square metres. Vehicle access to the premises is from Military Road by means of a 6 metre crossover close to the northern boundary of the land. That gives access to a double carport with a roller door on the western boundary.

  3. The premises have hitherto been used as a dwelling. The application sought approval to the change of use of the building on the land from a dwelling to an office. The evidence before the Commissioner was that there would normally be three people…

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Details
Case
[2010] SASC 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Gibbs v City of Charles Sturt, the appellant challenged a decision of the Commissioner of the Environment Resources and Development Court, who dismissed the appeal against the refusal of the respondent council to grant development approval for a change of use of the subject property from a dwelling to an office. The appellant contended that the Commissioner had failed to properly assess the development application against the provisions of the Development Plan and had misapplied the principles of the Development Plan. The appellant also argued that the Commissioner had failed to qualitatively assess the development and the issues of car parking and vehicle access. The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted for rehearing by a differently constituted panel of the Environment Resources and Development Court.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the Commissioner had erred in failing to properly assess the development against the Development Plan and in misapplying the principles of the Development Plan. The Court held that the Commissioner had failed to undertake a proper planning assessment by weighing the pros and cons of the proposed development against the relevant objectives and principles of the Development Plan. The Court also held that the Commissioner had erred in his interpretation of the car parking discount provision contained in Principle 81(a) and (f) of the Development Plan.

The Court held that the Commissioner had failed to properly assess the development against the Development Plan and had misapplied the principles of the Development Plan. The Court held that the Commissioner had failed to weigh the pros and cons of the proposed development against the relevant objectives and principles of the Development Plan and had not undertaken a proper planning assessment. The Court also held that the Commissioner had erred in his interpretation of the car parking discount provision contained in Principle 81(a) and (f) of the Development Plan. The Court held that the appeal should be allowed, and the matter should be remitted for rehearing by a differently constituted panel of the Environment Resources and Development Court.

The Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for rehearing by a differently constituted panel of the Environment Resources and Development Court. The Court held that the Commissioner had failed to properly assess the development against the Development Plan and had misapplied the principles of the Development Plan. The Court also held that the Commissioner had failed to weigh the pros and cons of the proposed development against the relevant objectives and principles of the Development Plan and had not undertaken a proper planning assessment. The Court held that the appeal should be allowed, and the matter should be remitted for rehearing by a differently constituted panel of the Environment Resources and Development Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BLEBY J
The third observation I would make is that the Council Wide Principles are just that. They are intended to apply across the whole of the area covered by the Development Plan. Accordingly, Principles of Development Control relating to access, for example, will need to be read as applying to access to a variety of different kinds of development, such as to major shopping centre car parks, service stations, small shopping centres and individual allotments used for a variety of purposes and having widely different effects on traffic generation through those access points. Likewise, car parking requirements of Principle 81 applicable to offices on their face apply to both a multi-storey office block and to a small converted house such as in this development. The stringency of their application may well depend on the nature of the development. Furthermore, the Principles cannot be applied literally to every development, otherwise Principle 80, for example, would require the provision of on-site parking for a detached residence not only for the vehicle or vehicles of the occupier of the residence but for all vehicles driven by visitors to the residence. I cannot accept that this Development Plan seeks to ban all kerb-side parking.The appeal to the Environment Court and the decision of the Commissioner The appeal to the Environment Court was against the “planning decision” of the Council. In other words, the appeal was against the refusal of the Council to grant Development Approval. The stated reasons for the appeal concentrated, not surprisingly, on the reasons why approval should be granted notwithstanding that the proposed development did not comply with Principle of Development Control 81(h). As was acknowledged by the Commissioner and all parties to the appeal, a literal application of Principle 81(h) required that this development provide six on-site car parking spaces. The Commissioner concluded that the proposed development did not merit consent and that the appeal should be dismissed. The reasons were that the number of on-site car parks was inadequate, that the requirements of Principle 81(h) could not be reduced by the application of para (f) (second occurring) of Principle 81 and that the nature of the access arrangements had the potential to cause delays to north bound traffic on Military Road and to create unsafe conditions for vehicles leaving the roundabout travelling north along Military Road. The question of access does not seem to have been an issue of concern by the Council in its consideration of the application. It will be necessary to return to a more detailed consideration of the Commissioner’s reasons in due course.The grounds of appeal The appellant relies on two grounds of appeal in this Court. The first is that the Commissioner erred in discharging the task required by s 33(1)(a) of the Development Act, namely to assess the development against the provisions of the Development Plan, by failing to weigh the “pros and cons” of the proposed development against the relevant Objectives and Principles of the Development Plan, and thereby constructively failed to undertake the required planning assessment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BLEBY J

The second ground is that the Commissioner erred in his interpretation of the car parking discount provision contained in Principle 81(a) and (f) of the Development Plan.Consideration – Ground 1 In essence, the appellant argued that the Commissioner effectively confined his reasons to the application of the parking and access requirements of the Development Plan without balancing them against the other relevant provisions of the Development Plan and against the features of the land and the building erected on it in which the proposed use was to take place. There was an unnecessarily literal application of Principles 69-71 and 80-81 without any other proper planning analysis. At the outset it is appropriate to repeat the following general observations agreed to by a five member bench of this Court in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Corporation of the City of Mitcham:[2]The Court has repeatedly stated that the provisions of the Development Plan are not to be construed like a statute: see, for example, St Ann's College v Corporation of City of Adelaide [1999] SASC 479. A development plan is a planning document couched in the language of planning objectives and principles, rather than that of legal obligation. It uses language appropriate to the expressions of goals and guiding principles, rather than the expression of legal mandates: Walkerville Town Corporation v Adelaide Clinic Holdings Pty Ltd (1985) 38 SASR 161 at 187 per King CJ approving observations of Wells J in both Claude Neon Ltd v City of West Torrens (1982) 29 SASR 260 at 270-271 and in Hassen v District Council of Murray Bridge (1984) 35 SASR 448 at 449. As the Court said in District Council of Mallala v M & B Farmer Nominees Pty Ltd (2000) 76 SASR 443 at 449, the Plan does not always use expressions in a consistent manner. Thus, in order to determine the intended meaning it may be necessary to have regard to either or both the overall purpose and objectives of the relevant zone and of the Plan. [2] [2001] SASC 166, [25], (2001) 79 SASR 509, 515-516. In City of Mitcham v Freckman[3] Debelle J, speaking on behalf of the Full Court,[4] described the necessary approach of a planning authority to the task under s 33(1)(a) of the Development Act. He said:[5]Section 33 of the Development Act 1993 states the task for a planning authority when determining whether to grant development consent to a change in the use of land. It is to assess the proposed development against the provisions of the appropriate Development Plan. That simple statement obscures the complexity of the task. It is first necessary for the planning authority to examine the proposal and determine its nature: see reg 16 of the Development Regulations 1993. Having done so, the planning authority must assess the proposal against the appropriate provisions of the Development Plan. That will require the authority to identify the provisions which are relevant to the particular proposal and to determine whether they speak for or against the proposed development. The relevant provisions will, of course, vary from proposal to proposal. The task does not consist only in identifying relevant provisions of the Development Plan as a kind of checklist against which the proposal must be assessed. That is one aspect of the task. But it is important also to distil from the relevant provisions of the Plan the overall intent and purpose and the desired character of the zone in which it is sought to place the proposed development, a task which is often assisted by reference to the stated objectives of the zone and the principles of development control. Given that it is manifestly impossible to make provision in the Development Plan for every kind of development, the ultimate criterion by which a proposal might have to be judged is whether it is conducive to the desired character and amenity of the zone. The less conducive it is, the less likely that it might merit planning approval. In addition, as was noted in South Australian Housing Trust v Lee (1993) 81 LGERA 378 at 388, there may be occasions when the planning authority must resolve inconsistencies within the Development Plan. Those inconsistencies will often be resolved by considering the desired character and amenity of the zone.Once the relevant provisions of the Plan have been identified and the purpose and intent and desired character of the zone have been ascertained, the planning authority must proceed to assess the proposal by reference to those factors. The Development Act, like its predecessors the Planning & Development Act 1966-1967 and the Planning Act 1982, is a practical code calling for practical application. I respectfully adopt the remarks of Jacobs J in District Council of Munno Para v Remove-All Rubbish Co Pty Ltd (1985) 41 SASR 188 at 201:"...where the Development Plan neither permits nor prohibits a particular development, the task of the planning authority is to weigh up the "pros" and "cons" with due regard to the guidance afforded by such of the general planning precepts and policies in the Plan as may be relevant. But to suppose that the "pros" and "cons" are in watertight compartments, or that they do not overlap, is to ignore the complexity of the subject matter and the competing elements which have to be weighed in deciding where the planning balance lies."[3] [1999] SASC 234, (1999) 74 SASR 56.[4] Doyle CJ, Duggan and Debelle JJ.[5] [1999] SASC 234, [18]-[19], (1999) 74 SASR 56, 62-63.