Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Cassegrain [2013] NSWCA 455 Hearing dates: 26 and 27 June 2013 Decision date: 20 December 2013 Before: Meagher JA at [1];
Ward JA at [2];
Emmett JA at [3]Decision: 1. The appeal by Claude Cassegrain and Anthony Sarks (CA 2012/256538) be dismissed.
2. The appellants in appeal CA 2012/256538 pay the costs of the first to fifth respondents to that appeal.
3. The appeal by Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Limited (ACN 000 342 174) (in liquidation) by its Liquidator Chris Chamberlain (CA 2012/259522) be dismissed with costs.
4. The appeal by Felicity Cassegrain (CA 2012/253268) be allowed.
5. Order 17 of the orders made by the primary judge on 24 July 2012 in the proceedings at first instance (2008/281625) be set aside in relation to Felicity Cassegrain.
6. The matter be remitted to the primary judge for the purpose of considering any application on behalf of the plaintiffs for leave to amend their second further amended further statement of claim filed on 20 June 2011 in terms of the draft pleading provided to this Court and for the making of appropriate orders, dealing with the matters indicated in [180] of these reasons, depending upon the outcome of any such amendment application.
7. The first to fifth respondents in appeal CA 2012/253268 pay the appellant's costs of that appeal.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Catchwords: DIRECTORS' DUTIES - whether directors breached their duties under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and at equity in causing their company to transfer shares it owned in two other companies to an individual who was the wife of one director and the daughter of the other - whether shares transferred at undervalue - whether breach of directors' duties under the Corporations Act and at equity regardless of whether shares transferred at undervalue due to improper purpose breach and conflict breach - whether directors should be excused under s 1318 of the Corporations Act
EQUITY - knowing receipt - where statement of claim did not seek relief from knowing recipient - where primary judge awarded relief against knowing recipient as well as directors in breach from whom the statement of claim had sought relief - where knowing receipt complained at first instance that relief not pleaded against her - where primary judge did not give leave to plaintiffs to amend statement of claim and did not advert to the issue in awarding relief against knowing recipient
EQUITY - knowing receipt - whether individual was a knowing recipient - where individual who was both…
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- Case
- [2013] NSWCA 455
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the directors, Claude Cassegrain and Anthony Sarks, had breached their duties by causing the company to transfer the shares to Felicity Cassegrain, particularly whether the shares were transferred at an undervalue. Further issues included whether such breaches occurred irrespective of the undervalue, due to improper purpose or conflict of interest, and whether the directors should be excused under s 1318 of the *Corporations Act*. The court also considered whether Felicity Cassegrain was a knowing recipient of the shares, meaning she had knowledge of circumstances indicating the breaches of fiduciary duty, and whether she could be excused under s 85 of the *Trustee Act 1925*. Finally, the court examined the remedies available, including the assessment of damages or compensation for the company and the appropriateness of the primary judge's orders.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals by Claude Cassegrain and Anthony Sarks, upholding findings of breaches of directors' duties. However, the appeal by Felicity Cassegrain was allowed. The court found that the primary judge had erred in awarding relief against Felicity Cassegrain for knowing receipt when such relief had not been specifically pleaded against her in the statement of claim, nor had leave been granted to amend the pleadings to include this claim. The court noted that while the statement of claim sought declarations that Felicity held the shares on trust and orders for retransfer, it did not specifically seek compensation from her.
Consequently, the Court of Appeal set aside the primary judge's order in relation to Felicity Cassegrain and remitted the matter for the primary judge to consider any application for leave to amend the statement of claim and make appropriate orders thereafter. The appeals by Claude Cassegrain and Anthony Sarks were dismissed with costs, while Felicity Cassegrain's appeal was allowed with costs payable by the respondents to that appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal by Claude Cassegrain and Anthony Sarks (CA 2012/256538) be dismissed.
2. The appellants in appeal CA 2012/256538 pay the costs of the first to fifth respondents to that appeal.
3. The appeal by Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Limited (ACN 000 342 174) (in liquidation) by its Liquidator Chris Chamberlain (CA 2012/259522) be dismissed with costs.
4. The appeal by Felicity Cassegrain (CA 2012/253268) be allowed.
5. Order 17 of the orders made by the primary judge on 24 July 2012 in the proceedings at first instance (2008/281625) be set aside in relation to Felicity Cassegrain.
6. The matter be remitted to the primary judge for the purpose of considering any application on behalf of the plaintiffs for leave to amend their second further amended further statement of claim filed on 20 June 2011 in terms of the draft pleading provided to this Court and for the making of appropriate orders, dealing with the matters indicated in [180] of these reasons, depending upon the outcome of any such amendment application.
7. The first to fifth respondents in appeal CA 2012/253268 pay the appellant's costs of that appeal.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Background
Background to the litigation
The plaintiffs, Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (in liquidation) and its liquidator, Chris Chamberlain, brought proceedings against the directors and Felicity Cassegrain. They sought various declarations and orders concerning the transfers of shares, including declarations that the transfers were voidable under statute and void as against the company's creditors. The plaintiffs further sought declarations that the directors breached their duties under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and at equity by causing the company to transfer the shares at undervalue. The plaintiffs also sought orders for compensation for the breaches of duty and requested that Felicity be ordered to retransfer the shares to the company.
The plaintiffs' case was that the directors breached their duties by transferring the shares to Felicity at a price that was significantly below their true value, thereby depriving the company of a fair market value for the shares. The plaintiffs further argued that the transfers were made for improper purposes and involved conflicts of interest, thus breaching the directors' duties both under the Corporations Act and at equity. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought declarations that Felicity, upon receiving the shares, knew of the breaches of fiduciary duty and held the shares on trust for the company, making her liable as a knowing recipient.
In the subsequent appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the primary judge should have assessed the equitable compensation to be paid immediately by reference to the difference between the amount received by the company for the shares and the value of the shares at the time of transfer. They also contested the valuation date for the shares in calculating statutory compensation under the Corporations Act. Felicity Cassegrain, on the other hand, argued that the primary judge should not have granted relief against her as it had not been specifically pleaded in the statement of claim. She also questioned whether she could be excused for knowing receipt under the Trustee Act 1925.
The case thus centres on the conduct of the directors in transferring shares to a family member at an undervalue, the knowledge and liability of the recipient, and the appropriate remedies for the breaches of directors' duties and knowing receipt. The chronology of events involves the transfer of shares, the subsequent litigation, and the appeals by the directors and Felicity Cassegrain.
The case of Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Cassegrain originated in the Federal Court of Australia, where the plaintiffs, Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (in liquidation), sought to challenge the transfer of shares in two companies to an individual, Felicity Cassegrain, who was both the wife of one director and the daughter of another. The plaintiffs alleged that this transfer constituted a breach of directors' duties under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and at equity. The matter proceeded through several stages, with initial proceedings being filed in the Federal Court, followed by appeals to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The primary judge's decision included an order for relief against Felicity Cassegrain, despite the plaintiffs not specifically seeking relief against her in their statement of claim. The primary judge also ordered an enquiry into the damages or compensation to be awarded to the company, without immediately assessing the equitable compensation to be paid by reference to the difference between the consideration received for the shares and their value at the time of transfer.
Following the primary judge's decision, multiple appeals were lodged by the directors, the liquidator, and Felicity Cassegrain. The first and third appeals were against the primary judge's decision to grant relief against the directors and the liquidator, while the second appeal was by Felicity Cassegrain against the relief granted against her. The appeals raised issues such as whether the primary judge erred in granting relief against Felicity without specific prayer in the statement of claim, and whether the relief granted was appropriate under the circumstances. The Full Court of the Federal Court considered these appeals and made orders dismissing the appeals by the directors and the liquidator, while allowing the appeal by Felicity Cassegrain and setting aside the relief granted against her. The Full Court also remitted the matter to the primary judge for consideration of any application for leave to amend the statement of claim and for making appropriate orders in light of the Full Court's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the directors breached their duties under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and at equity by causing their company to transfer shares it owned in two other companies to an individual who was the wife of one director and the daughter of the other.
2. Whether the shares were transferred at undervalue, and if so, whether the directors' breach of duties under the Corporations Act and at equity was solely due to the undervalue transfer or included improper purpose and conflict breaches.
3. Whether the directors should be excused under s 1318 of the Corporations Act for their breach of duties.
4. Whether the individual who received the shares was a knowing recipient of the breach of directors' duties and if so, whether she knew of the circumstances that reasonably indicated the fact of the breaches.
5. Whether the individual, if liable for knowing receipt, could be excused under s 85 of the Trustee Act 1925.
6. Whether the primary judge erred in not immediately assessing the equitable compensation to be paid by reference to the difference between the amount the company received as consideration for the shares and the findings made by her Honour as to the value of the shares as at the time of transfer.
7. Whether, in calculating statutory compensation under s 1317H of the Corporations Act, the shares were to be valued as at the time of transfer or as at the time of assessment of compensation.
8. Whether the primary judge erred in awarding relief against the knowing recipient (Felicity) as well as the directors in breach from whom the statement of claim had sought relief, without leave being given to the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim to include a claim against her.
9. Whether the relief granted to the plaintiffs under the Conveyancing Act 1919 was appropriate given the circumstances of the case.
Held
1. The court concluded that the directors breached their duties under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and at equity. The result was that the appeal was dismissed in relation to this issue.
2. The court found that the shares were transferred at undervalue. It concluded that the breach of duties under the Corporations Act and at equity was not solely due to the undervalue transfer, but also included improper purpose and conflict breaches.
3. The court held that the directors should not be excused under s 1318 of the Corporations Act for their breach of duties.
4. The court concluded that the individual who received the shares was a knowing recipient of the breach of directors' duties and knew of the circumstances that reasonably indicated the fact of the breaches.
5. The court found that the individual, if liable for knowing receipt, could not be excused under s 85 of the Trustee Act 1925.
6. The court held that the primary judge erred in not immediately assessing the equitable compensation to be paid by reference to the difference between the amount the company received as consideration for the shares and the findings made by her Honour as to the value of the shares as at the time of transfer.
7. The court concluded that, in calculating statutory compensation under s 1317H of the Corporations Act, the shares were to be valued as at the time of transfer.
8. The court held that the primary judge erred in awarding relief against the knowing recipient (Felicity) as well as the directors in breach from whom the statement of claim had sought relief, without leave being given to the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim to include a claim against her.
9. The court concluded that the relief granted to the plaintiffs under the Conveyancing Act 1919 was appropriate given the circumstances of the case.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first and third declarations relied on s 232 and s 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act), which provide that the Court may grant appropriate relief if the conduct of a company's affairs be either contrary to the interests of the members as a whole or is oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against certain members. The relief may include an order that the company be wound up and an order for the purchase of any shares by any member. In addition, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that each of the Transfers was a voidable transaction under s 37A of the Conveyancing Act1919 and a declaration that the Transfers were void as against the Company's creditors to the extent necessary to satisfy those claims. Section 37A relevantly provides that every alienation of property made with the intent to defraud creditors is voidable at the instance of any person thereby prejudiced. The provision does not apply to any estate or interest in property alienated to a purchaser in good faith who, at the time of the alienation, had no notice of the intent to defraud creditors. The plaintiffs also sought orders that the Company do all things necessary to avoid the disposition of the Shares and that Felicity do all things necessary to retransfer the Shares to the Company. Finally, the plaintiffs sought an order that, upon the avoidance of the Transfers, Claude and/or Felicity acquire all of the plaintiffs' shares in the Company at a price determined by the Court. In the alternative to the orders avoiding the Transfers and requiring retransfer of the Shares to the Company, and for purchase of the plaintiffs' shares in the Company by Claude and Felicity, the plaintiffs sought further declarations and orders. First, the plaintiffs sought declarations that each of Claude and Anthony: In addition, the plaintiffs sought declarations that when Felicity received the Shares she knew of the breaches of fiduciary duty and so held them on trust for the Company absolutely, such that she was liable for receiving property that she knew was transferred to her in breach of fiduciary duty (see Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 Ch App 244). The plaintiffs also sought orders: Thus, the plaintiffs sought two orders in relation to compensation. Both referred to compensation "as a consequence of the foregoing contraventions of the Corporations Act". No specific order was sought for equitable, as opposed to statutory, compensation. Nothing, however, turns on that, as some of the statutory breaches clearly overlapped with some of the fiduciary breaches. Of critical significance, however, is that neither of the two orders seeking compensation mentioned Felicity. Orders for equitable or statutory compensation were sought only against Claude and Anthony. Finally, the Statement of Claim included a prayer for such further or other order as the Court may see fit. That prayer is significant as one of Felicity's complaints in her appeal is that the primary judge granted relief against her that had not been sought by any specific prayer in the Statement of Claim.