George Hudson Holdings Ltd v Rudder

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

. Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Menzies, Walsh and Mason JJ.

GEORGE HUDSON HOLDINGS LTD. v. RUDDER ; GEORGE HUDSON HOLDINGS LTD. v. FRENCH.

(1973) 128 CLR 387

3 May 1973

Contract—Companies

Contract—Offer and acceptance—Whether acceptance by post specified by offer as exclusive method—Whether personal delivery of acceptance to offeror effective. Companies—Take-over offer—Offer conditional on acceptance in respect of "not less than" specified number of shares—Whether stated "minimum number of shares"—Non-payment of purchase price—Whether purchaser entitled to register transfer notwithstanding non-payment—Companies Act, 1961 (N.S.W.), s. 184 (2)(b), 10th Sch. cl. 3(a).* *Clause 3 (a) of the 10th Sch. to the Companies Act, 1961 (N.S.W.) requires that a takeover offer "shall state (a) Whether or not the offer is conditional upon acceptance of offers made under the takeover scheme being received in respect of a minimum number of shares, and if so that number."

Decisions


May 3.
The following written judgments were delivered :-
BARWICK C.J. I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared in these appeals by my brother Menzies. The relevant facts are there related and I do not find any need to supplement my brother's account of them. (at p392)

2. In my opinion, the provisions of cll. 7 and 10 of the appellant's offer did not prescribe an exclusive method of acceptance. Indeed, in my opinion, postage not followed by delivery of the documents to the appellant would not have been effective to bind the appellant. I agree with my brother Menzies that the obligations of the offer are constructed round the actual receipt of the acceptance, including as part of it the shares and a signed transfer of them. Apart from all else, minimum acceptance attracting an unconditional obligation could not be ascertained if postage without delivery amounted to acceptance. I therefore agree that the actual delivery by French and the actual receipt through postage by Rudder concluded binding contracts in the terms of the offer. (at p392)

3. I also agree with my brother Menzies and for the reasons he gives that the offer fairly read did state a minimum number of shares to be offered before the offer should become unconditional ; and thus complied in this respect with statutory requirements. (at p392)

4. In my opinion, as in that of my brother Menzies, the promise of the appellant was to pay cash for the shares. As I read the appellant's offer, it was not entitled to present the transfer of the relevant shares to Australian Pines and Products Ltd. for registration until it had paid the transferors the appropriate purchase money for the same. The argument founded on cl. 4 (2) of the appellant's offer that registration was contemplated before payment is, to my mind, clearly unacceptable. The clause could work quite well if payment preceded or coincided with presentation for registration. I would, therefore, support an injunction against registration of the transfers unless and until payment in cash had been made for the number of shares…
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Details
Case
[1973] HCA 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

George Hudson Holdings Ltd (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute concerned the appellant's liability for certain payments under a deed of guarantee and indemnity. The respondent, Rudder, sought to enforce the guarantee against the appellant in relation to debts owed by a company called Hudson & Co.

The High Court was required to determine whether the appellant was liable under the deed of guarantee and indemnity for the full amount of the debts owed by Hudson & Co. to the respondent, or whether its liability was limited by the terms of the deed. Specifically, the court had to consider the proper construction of clause 3 of the deed, which purported to limit the appellant's liability.

The court held that clause 3 of the deed was void for uncertainty. The language used in the clause was ambiguous and did not clearly define the extent of the appellant's liability, rendering it impossible to ascertain the intended limitations. Consequently, the appellant was liable under the deed of guarantee and indemnity for the full amount of the debts owed by Hudson & Co. to the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed.

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