Galvis & Galvis
[2024] FedCFamC1A 123
•26 July 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Galvis & Galvis [2024] FedCFamC1A 123
Appeal from: Galvis & Galvis [2024] FedCFamC2F 429 Appeal number: NAA 81 of 2024 File number: PAC 6181 of 2022 Judgment of: AUSTIN J Date of judgment: 26 July 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – CONTRAVENTION – Where the primary judge found the appellant had contravened parenting orders –Where the primary judge denied the appellant procedural fairness by not affording her the opportunity to make supplementary submissions on the question of sanction – Where the appellant was sentenced globally for multiple contraventions – Where the primary judge erred by not imposing individual sanctions for the individual contraventions – Where the reasons for judgment do not explicate material considerations in the sentencing exercise – Where discretion miscarried – Appeal allowed – Where the appellant was not ready to adduce additional evidence in the appeal for the re-exercise of discretion – Where the question of penalty is remitted for rehearing – Costs certificates granted for the appeal only Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VII, Div 13A, ss 65N, 70NBF, 70NCB, 70NEB, 70NEC, 70NECA
Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth) Sch 2
Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth)
Cases cited: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172; [2000] HCA 40
AZC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 411 ALR 615; [2023] HCA 26
Commonwealth v Bank of NSW (1949) 79 CLR 497; [1949] ALR 925
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; [1986] HCA 33
Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321; [2000] HCA 54
Dobbs & Brayson (2007) FLC 93-346; [2007] FamCA 1261
Driclad Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 121 CLR 45; [1968] HCA 91
Gravis v Major [2010] FamCAFC 239
Langer & Griffin (2013) FLC 93-559; [2013] FamCAFC 170
Lim v Comcare (2019) 165 ALD 217; [2019] FCAFC 104
McClintock v Levier (2009) FLC 93-401; [2009] FamCAFC 62
Mead v Mead (2007) 235 ALR 197; [2007] HCA 25
Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68; [1985] HCA 28
Repatriation Commission v Nation (1995) 57 FCR 25; [1995] FCA 355
Stanley v DPP (NSW) (2023) 407 ALR 222; [2023] HCA 3
Stead v State GIO (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491; [1988] HCA 12
Zamir & Zamir (2022) FLC 94-115; [2022] FedCFamC1A 193
Number of paragraphs: 59 Date of hearing: 22 July 2024 Place: Newcastle (via Microsoft Teams) Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Ahmad Solicitor for the Appellant: Thornton and King Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Baston Solicitor for the Respondent: Hills Family Law Centre ORDERS
NAA 81 of 2024
PAC 6181 of 2022FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MS GALVIS
Appellant
AND: MR GALVIS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
AUSTIN J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 JULY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.Orders 1, 2, 3 and 6 made on 8 April 2024 are set aside.
3.The two Applications-Contravention filed by the respondent on 16 October 2023 are remitted to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) for the imposition of sanctions upon the appellant according to law in respect of the four contraventions found proven against her (as recorded in Notation A made on 8 April 2024).
4.The appellant’s application for costs against the respondent is dismissed.
5.The respondent’s application for costs against the appellant is dismissed.
6.The appellant is granted a costs certificate pursuant to s 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the appellant in respect of the costs incurred by her in relation to the appeal.
7.The respondent is granted a costs certificate pursuant to s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the respondent in respect of the costs incurred by him in relation to the appeal.
8.The parties’ applications for costs certificates in respect of the re-hearing are dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Galvis & Galvis has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AUSTIN J:
This is an appeal from orders made on 8 April 2024 by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) determining contravention applications brought by the respondent against the appellant.
The sealed orders state they were made on 8 April 2024, the date upon which the reasons for judgment were published, but the reasons for judgment curiously state the orders were made on 5 April 2024. The parties proceeded upon the basis the orders were made on 8 April 2024.
The appeal is allowed for errors of law related to the way in which the appellant was sanctioned for the four contraventions proven against her. As the appellant was unready to proceed in the appeal by way of the re-exercise of the sentencing discretion, there was no alternative but to remit the proceeding for re-hearing on the question of penalty.
Background
On 27 March 2023, with the parties’ consent, parenting orders were made between them with respect to their children under Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The children live with the appellant in Queensland, while the respondent lives in New South Wales. The orders relevantly provide for the children to spend time with the respondent in Sydney during school holiday periods (Order 10), for the children to communicate electronically with the respondent once per week (Order 16), for the parties to keep one another advised of contact details for themselves and the children (Order 19), and for the children to travel overseas with each parent upon meeting certain conditions (Order 27).
In October 2023, the respondent filed two Applications-Contravention alleging the appellant’s breach of those orders without reasonable excuse on seven occasions in September 2023. The applications were heard by the primary judge in March 2024.
In respect of the seven counts, the appellant:
(a)denied the contravention alleged by Count 1 (at [26(a)]), but contended for a reasonable excuse in the alternative (at [26(b)]);
(b)denied the contravention alleged by Count 2 (at [26(a)] and [26(c)]);
(c)denied the contravention alleged by Count 3 (at [26(a)] and [26(d)]), which count the respondent subsequently abandoned and so it was consequently dismissed (at [27]);
(d)admitted the contravention alleged by Count 4, but contended for a reasonable excuse (at [87]);
(e)denied the contravention alleged by Count 5 (at [26(a)] and [26(e)]); and
(f)admitted the contravention alleged in Count 6 (at [10] and [29]), but the respondent conceded it would be duplicitous for both Counts 6 and 7 to be found proven against the appellant and so he pressed for only Count 6 to be sustained (at [9] and [28]), in which event Count 7 was dismissed (at [30]).
In the upshot, four counts (Counts 2, 4, 5 and 6) were found proven against the appellant without reasonable excuse (Notations A and B).
The appellant was sanctioned for all four contraventions by the imposition of a single good behaviour bond of 12 months duration imposed under ss 70NEB(1)(d) and 70NEC of the Act (Order 2).
The appellant appealed from the orders on 10 April 2024, though the appeal was amended on 21 June 2024.
Ground 1
This ground seeks to challenge a finding of fact made in respect of Count 1 but, as the count was dismissed (at [76]), the ground is entirely superfluous. No appeal lies from merely findings in reasons for judgment (AZC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 411 ALR 615 at [34]; Driclad Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 121 CLR 45 at 64; Commonwealth v Bank of NSW (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 625).
The appellant conceded that was so and therefore abandoned the ground.
Ground 2
This ground challenges the finding of the contravention which underpins Count 2.
Count 2 comprised an allegation that the appellant breached Order 10(a) at Region B Airport at 12.00 noon in mid-September 2023 by “interfering” with the time that two of the three children were spending with the respondent.
In advance of that date, the appellant notified the respondent she would not be producing one of the children (aged 10 years) to him at the changeover at the airport in mid-September 2023 (at [57]). Notwithstanding such notice, the mother contrarily deposed she had intended taking the child, along with the other two, to the changeover so they all could go with the respondent, but she recanted due to the child’s violent opposition. Accordingly, she only took the other two children to the changeover venue (at [66]).
The two children were duly delivered to the respondent at the airport, but the respondent’s flight with them to Sydney was delayed, so he decided to wait with them at the airport until their delayed departure (at [77]). The appellant did not promptly leave the airport once she delivered the children to the father. Rather, she loitered in the vicinity. The primary judge found she “followed the [respondent] telling him what to do”, despite him trying to “navigate” away from her (at [78]). The primary judge found her behaviour amounted to an “interference” in the sense contemplated by s 65N(2)(b) of the Act (at [79]–[85]) and, as a consequence, the contravention was proven (at [86]).
Ground 2 alleges the primary judge erred by finding the appellant “interfered” with the time the children were spending with the respondent (Ground 2(a)), by finding the appellant understood the requirements of s 65N(2) of the Act, which provision articulated her obligations under the orders to include her non-interference (Ground 2(b)), and by finding the appellant understood it was an implied condition of the orders that, once the children were delivered to the respondent, she could not be with him and the children without his consent (Ground 2(c)). All contentions are rejected.
First, the factual finding of “interference” made by the primary judge was clearly open, given his Honour’s acceptance of the respondent’s evidence about the appellant’s conduct. In the appeal, the appellant’s counsel was obliged to concede he did not challenge the respondent in cross-examination about the correctness of the respondent’s factual version of the event, in which event the appellant cannot now complain of his Honour’s satisfaction with such evidence. His Honour was not precluded from accepting the respondent’s evidence just because the appellant gave a different factual version. The civil burden of proof applied.
Secondly, the parenting orders were made with the parties’ consent and the primary judge expressly recorded how the appellant’s understanding of the obligations created by the orders was not the subject of any dispute in the contravention hearing (at [23]). The primary judge made that point during the hearing by saying this:
HIS HONOUR: …It’s just been formally conceded that this material, that the questions you’re asking on this topic, which I understand to be the understanding of the [appellant] of the order, isn’t in dispute. And there wasn’t any suggestion in the outline, nor have I otherwise been told that there’s any dispute about that aspect of the matter. …
(Transcript 26 March 2024, p.22 lines 39–45)
The appellant’s counsel did not take issue with the correctness of that observation when it was made by the primary judge. Nor, during final submissions, did the appellant’s counsel raise in her defence any issue about her understanding of her obligations under the orders. The appellant’s understanding was a factual issue which could have been addressed by evidence given at first instance, had there been any challenge raising the issue, but there was not. The appellant cannot now, in the appeal, run a quite different case and dispute the fact of her understanding of obligations created by the orders (Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68 at 71; Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7–8; Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491 at 497).
Thirdly, the appellant did not explain in the appeal why it was impermissible for the primary judge to logically infer she realised she could not loiter around after delivering the children to the respondent, at least without his consent, giving him directions about what to do.
Ground 3
This ground challenges the finding that the appellant failed to prove “reasonable excuse”, which finding underpins the proof of Count 4 against her.
Count 4 comprised an allegation the appellant breached Order 19 on 19 September 2023 by failing to inform the respondent of one child’s mobile telephone number. The appellant admitted the contravention, but contended her breach was reasonably excused (at [87]).
The relevant child was aged 13 years and only spends time with the respondent as and when he wishes (at [89]). He is the only child with a mobile telephone (at [93]) and he had blocked the father’s calls (at [91]). The primary judge found the child’s expressed desire for the respondent not to have his mobile telephone number was not a reasonable excuse for the appellant to intentionally withhold the number from the respondent in breach of the orders to which she had consented (at [94]–[96]). Consequently, the contravention was proven (at [97]).
The appellant’s argument at trial, merely repeated in the appeal, was she reasonably believed that withholding the child’s mobile telephone number from the respondent was “necessary to protect the health and safety” of the child, in which event she had a reasonable excuse for not complying with the orders. The submission is rejected. The repetition of an argument lost at trial does not sustain an appeal. The appellant failed to demonstrate how the primary judge erred by rejecting her argument. Her belief, even if honestly held, that she was acting responsibly in the child’s best interests is neither objective proof of the fact nor dispositive of the issue of “reasonable excuse”. The appellant was impelled to accept that proposition and so this ground was abandoned.
Ground 4
This ground challenges the finding of the contravention which underpins Count 5.
Count 5 comprised an allegation that the appellant breached Order 27 on 19 September 2023 by failing to provide the respondent with the children’s passport details. She conceded she had not given such details to the respondent (at [102]).
The appellant denied the contravention allegation, asserting that Order 27 neither explicitly nor implicitly requires her to provide the children’s passport details to the respondent (at [99]). In the appeal, the appellant submitted no such obligation could arise by implication unless and until one party gave notice of an intention to travel internationally with the children.
The primary judge objectively construed the meaning of Order 27 in the context of the entire suite of orders and concluded they implicitly required the parties to keep one another informed of the children’s passport details (at [103]–[111]), saying in conclusion:
112.For the parties to be able to meaningfully give effect to the orders relating to the obtaining, holding and use of the passports, the passports themselves need to be capable of being sighted and the details of them known by both parties.
113.The inevitable consequence of the orders read as a whole is that other than when not in use, the passports are effectively shared. I am of the view that this includes sharing or holding in common all the details of the each of the children’s passports.
114.I find that there is an implied obligation in the primary orders to provide the passport details for each child located in such passports if requested by the other parent.
As a consequence, the count was found proven against the appellant (at [115]).
This ground simply asserts the primary judge erred by so finding, but the appellant does not explain how or why the finding was made in error. Court orders must be construed objectively (Repatriation Commission v Nation (1995) 57 FCR 25 at 33–34; Lim v Comcare (2019) 165 ALD 217 at [40]–[41]) and the primary judge’s construction of the orders was well open.
Grounds 5 and 6
These two grounds challenge the sanction imposed upon the appellant. She contends the “sentencing exercise miscarried” because she was denied the chance to make submissions on sentence “until after the findings were made” (Ground 5) and the “indicative sentence” in respect of each contravention was “manifestly excessive” (Ground 6).
Ground 6 is rejected. First, the primary judge did not give any “indicative sentence”. Rather, his Honour heard submissions, reserved judgment, then later pronounced judgment by the imposition of sanction. There was no advance discussion of provisional views and the appellant confirmed this complaint was confined to the fairness of the result. Secondly, the ground is not meaningfully supported by any submission other than that the penalty imposed upon the appellant was too severe, which is no more than a subjective value judgment and a bare refrain. The imposition of sanction is a discretionary exercise and no submission made by the appellant persuades the exercise of discretion was “unreasonable or plainly unjust” in this instance.
As for Ground 5, there indeed was a miscarriage of discretion in the process of imposing sanction upon the appellant, which the respondent conceded during the appeal hearing.
During the original hearing, the appellant’s counsel first suggested the primary judge should determine the appellant’s liability on any of the counts, after which time she could give evidence and make submissions in respect of sanction, saying this:
[Counsel for the appellant]: …It would be my submission that your Honour hear evidence on the contravention in the first instance, and then if – depending on the nature of the sanction that’s being sought, then we could give evidence and submissions in relation to the sanction. …
(Transcript 26 March 2024, p.27 lines 11–14)
Then later, at the close of the evidence, the primary judge invited the parties to make conjunctive submissions in respect of the proof of the contraventions and the appropriate sanctions for any contraventions found proven, saying it was his Honour’s usual practice to do so. The respondent’s counsel signified his consent to that process and then made submissions in respect of both issues. However, the appellant’s counsel adhered to his initial submission about the desirability of separate determinations in respect of liability and punishment, saying:
[Counsel for the appellant]: …Can I make also one further submission with respect to sanction?
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
[Counsel for the appellant]: That if your Honour was seeking to impose a sanction – impose any sanction other than, of course, no sanction, that I would ask your Honour to consider adjourning the question of sanction to after the hearing in three weeks.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. Thank you. Yes. Thank you, [naming counsel for the appellant]. Yes. …
(Transcript 26 March 2024, p.45 lines 15–24)
The primary judge then reserved judgment but, in ignorance of the appellant’s express request, delivered judgment several weeks later without giving the appellant the chance to supplement her submissions on the question of sanction. It could not be doubted she could have said more than she already had about the imposition of penalty following the later pronouncement of findings made to sustain the four contraventions, as she confirmed in the appeal her wish to both adduce further evidence and make further submissions on the question of penalty.
In contempt proceedings, it is usual for the question of penalty to be separately addressed after the findings of contempt are made (Mead v Mead (2007) 235 ALR 197 at 198). The same procedure should apply in respect of contravention proceedings. That is because the evidence which is pertinent to the imposition of penalty is usually different from that which is relevant to the anterior question of fault.
After the findings were made to sustain the four contraventions, the appellant ought have been afforded the chance to adduce any further evidence and to make any further submissions which could influence the determination of the penalty imposed upon her. That denial of procedural fairness was an error of law which demands the re-exercise of the sentencing discretion. The respondent could not gainsay the result might be different if the appellant is allowed the chance to adduce evidence and make further submissions on the issue of penalty (Stead v State GIO (1986) 161 CLR 141). It is no answer for the respondent to say he believes the primary judge reached the right result regardless and so the error of law is immaterial.
However, there were two other errors of law not raised by the appellant which must also be corrected. First, the appellant was sentenced globally for the multiple contraventions. Secondly, the reasons do not satisfactorily explain the global sanction.
For the four separate contraventions, the primary judge imposed the single sanction of a good behaviour bond of 12 months’ duration, even though three of the four contraventions were adjudged not to be serious enough to require bonds of that length and were instead found to have attracted bonds of only six months duration (at [138]–[139]). In respect of the three contraventions warranting bonds of only six months, the appellant ought not have been penalised more harshly by the imposition of a bond of 12 months duration.
The error of that approach may be exemplified in two ways.
First, if the appellant refuses to enter into the single bond as directed, she will then be liable to only a single alternate financial penalty instead of four separate financial penalties for the four separate contraventions pursuant to s 70NEB(1)(da) of the Act (but now s 70NBF(1)(b)).
Secondly, the single bond would have to be enforced in inconsistent ways if breached. Imagine the appellant again contravenes an order without reasonable excuse within the 12 months period of the bond. Aside from any penalty separately imposed for the fresh contravention, the imposition of any substitute sanction in respect of the breached bond pursuant to s 70NECA of the Act (but now s 70NCB) would presumably depend upon whether the breach occurred within the first six months of the bond (thereby offending the sanction imposed for all four original contraventions) or the latter six months (thereby offending the sanction imposed for only one of the four original contraventions).
In Zamir & Zamir (2022) FLC 94-115 at [60]-[63], the Full Court recently explained why the practice of imposing global sanctions should be deprecated. While Zamir & Zamir concerned sanctions imposed for contempt rather than for contraventions, the circumstances are analogous. In the past, the Full Court has taken the same procedural approach to the imposition of penalties for contraventions as for acts of contempt (Gravis v Major [2010] FamCAFC 239 at [161] and [169]; McClintock v Levier (2009) FLC 93-401 at [65]–[67] and [166]–[172]; Dobbs & Brayson (2007) FLC 93-346 at [48]–[50]). The primary judge therefore erred by not imposing individual sanctions for the individual contraventions.
Despite some past circumspection by the Full Court about the use of common law sentencing principles to guide the determination of sanctions for contraventions of parenting orders (McClintock v Levier at [125], [156]–[158] and [233]–[237]), more recently the Full Court has embraced the use of such principles (Langer & Griffin (2013) FLC 93-559 at [55]). As was the case in Langer & Griffin, where error resulted in that appeal being upheld, in this instance the primary judge’s reasons did not advert to material considerations in the sentencing exercise, in which event the discretion miscarried.
His Honour said only this about factors relevant to the sanction imposed:
130.In determining what (if any) sanction is to be made in this matter the Court takes into account the following matters in addition to the terms of the Court's earlier findings:
(a) The [appellant] lives in Queensland and the [respondent] in Sydney;
(b)The [appellant] is engaged in the full- time care of the children and the [respondent] is self-employed;
(c)That there is to be a hearing of substantive parenting matters in about three weeks’ time from the date of the hearing of the present applications.
On that premise, his Honour then selected a good behaviour bond as the appropriate sanction (at [132]–[135]). In the reasons for judgment, his Honour did not explain: any comparative assessment of the objective seriousness of the appellant’s conduct in respect of the four contraventions to justify differentiating the length of the bond commensurate for each; the existence and the nature of aggravating and mitigating factors; why the period of 12 months was ultimately selected as the appropriate head term of the good behaviour bond in the context of a maximum bond period of two years; or how that type of sanction was selected in preference to others to satisfy the objectives of general deterrence and specific deterrence.
The imposition of a penalty is an exercise of discretion (Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321 at 324–326, 329 and 339–340) involving “a process of instinctive synthesis of multiple factors” (Stanley v DPP (NSW) (2023) 407 ALR 222 at [59]). Accordingly, the exercise must entail the consideration of material factors, the disregard of irrelevant factors, and be properly explained. The reasons for judgment do not demonstrate that happened here.
Disposition
The appeal succeeds for errors of law which vitiate the sanction imposed upon the appellant.
In the event of the appeal being allowed, the appellant originally sought that this Court then re-exercise discretion within appellate jurisdiction, rather than remit for re-hearing within the original jurisdiction the appellant’s sanction for the four findings of contravention. However, at the appeal hearing, the appellant recanted and wanted the proceeding remitted because she was not ready to adduce the extra evidence in the appeal which she anticipated was necessary to be taken into account on the question of her penalty.
Having conceded the appeal on Ground 5, the respondent instead wanted the legal error corrected by the re-exercise of discretion in the appeal. However, the appellant had the right to adduce further evidence before discretion was re-exercised – either in the appeal or at first instance (Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at 183 and 191–192) – and, since she was not ready to do so in the appeal, the question of penalty is remitted for re-hearing according to law by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Co of Australia (Division 2).
The appellant wanted the proceeding remitted to a judge other than the primary judge, but there was no reason to disqualify his Honour from the re-hearing. No actual or apprehended bias was alleged against his Honour by the appellant and so the re-hearing may be conducted by the first available judge.
The discretion under Pt VII Div 13A of the Act should be re-exercised on the basis of the primary judge’s undisturbed factual findings, the additional evidence adduced by the appellant, and the supplementary submissions made by the parties.
The appellant sought her costs of the appeal against the respondent, which application is dismissed. The appeal succeeded only on one ground, two of the residual grounds were abandoned, and the other three failed. The solitary successful ground comprised a legal error which was not induced by the respondent and which he conceded during the appeal.
The respondent conversely sought his costs of the appeal against the appellant, which application is also dismissed. There could be no rational basis for it when the appeal succeeded.
The respondent even ambitiously sought his costs of the re-hearing against the appellant, which application is also dismissed. The costs of the re-hearing, yet to be held within the original jurisdiction of the Court, lie within the province of the judge who re-hears the proceeding.
The parties alternatively sought costs certificates for the appeal, which are granted pursuant to the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) due to the appeal succeeding for an error of law by the primary judge.
The respondent also expressly sought a costs certificate for the re-hearing, as did the appellant, albeit only inferentially, but those applications are dismissed. The re-hearing will likely be very short, contained to the allocated judge reading the fresh affidavit filed by the appellant and hearing fresh submissions as to penalty from both parties.
I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin. Associate:
Dated: 26 July 2024
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