Gainfoot Pty Ltd v T&H Keliher Contracting Pty Ltd

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Gainfoot Pty Ltd v T&H Keliher Contracting Pty Ltd [2022]
QDC 296
PARTIES:  GAINFOOT PTY LTD
(ACN 010 665 424)
t/as THE PUMP HOUSE
(plaintiff)
v
T&H KELIHER CONTRACTING PTY LTD
(ACN 164 202 215)
(defendant)
FILE NO:  15/2022
DIVISION:  Civil
PROCEEDING:  Application
ORIGINATING  Maroochydore Registry
COURT: 
DELIVERED ON:  6 October 2022 (oral reasons)
23 December 2022 (written judgment)
DELIVERED AT:  District Court, Maroochydore
HEARING DATE:  6 October 2022
JUDGE:  Long SC, DCJ
ORDER:  On 6 October 2022:
1. The defendant is to produce for the inspection of the

plaintiff in accordance with Part 2 of Chapter 7 of the

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) the

source records for the financial statements disclosed as items 298, 300, 302, 304, 306, 310, 312 and 314 in the amended list of documents attached as HJK-2 to the affidavit of Holly Jean Keliher filed 7 September 2022.

2.   In respect of the application to strike out parts of the

defendant’s reply to the plaintiff’s answer to the

counterclaim:

(a) on or before 20 October 2022, the plaintiff is to file

and serve any further written submissions;

(b) on or before 8 November 2022, the defendant is to

file and serve any further written submissions;

(c) on or before 15 November 2022, the plaintiff is to

file and serve any written reply; and

(d) unless the Court determines otherwise, the
remaining issue will be further heard and
determined on the further written submissions.

3.    Costs reserved.

On 23 December 2022:

4.    Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 23(b) and 38 of the defendant’s reply

to the answer to the defendant’s counterclaim are struck

out.

CATCHWORDS:  PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND
TERRITORY COURTS – DISCLOSURE – Where the
plaintiff applies pursuant to UCPR 223 for an order that the
defendant disclose “source and application documents” for
various financial statements and tax returns – Where by

UCPR 211 the defendant has a duty of disclosure to the plaintiff of documents which are directly relevant to an

allegation in issue in the pleadings– Where an order for

disclosure is permitted by UCPR 223(4)(b) if it appears there is an objective likelihood that a duty to disclose has not been

complied with – Where the defendant contends that their duty
to disclose has been complied with on the basis that source
records which have not been disclosed are reflected in
financial statements which have been disclosed – Where the
plaintiff pursues the source documents on the basis that they
are directly relevant to the ‘counterfactual’ nature of the
defendant’s counterclaim – Where if financial statements are
directly relevant so too are any available source documents
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND
TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT

Where in answer to a counterclaim, the plaintiff contends an exclusion clause had been incorporated into a contract by

reference – Where the plaintiff applies pursuant to UCPR 171
for an order striking out paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 23(b)…
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Details
Case
[2022] QDC 296
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Gainfoot Pty Ltd initiated legal proceedings against T&H Keliher Contracting Pty Ltd in a court of law. The crux of the dispute revolves around issues of disclosure in civil proceedings within the state and territory courts. Specifically, the case centres on whether sufficient measures were taken to bring standard terms to the attention of the other party, especially when an express offer containing those terms has been accepted. The central legal issues that the court had to resolve pertain to the conditions under which standard terms can be enforced and the extent to which a party can be held to have consented to such terms.

The court examined the principles articulated in Maxitherm, where it was established that once an express offer containing standard terms has been accepted, the primary concern shifts to whether it is reasonable to assume that the other party has consented to those terms. The court noted that while express acceptance of an offer which includes terms by reference does not necessarily imply acceptance of all those terms, it generally connotes acceptance of terms appropriate to the type of contract in question. Furthermore, the court held that if the terms include provisions that are unusual or more than ordinarily onerous, special steps must be taken to draw attention to those terms to ensure reasonable consent. The court also emphasised that the basic inquiry remains whether it is reasonable to assume that a contracting party has assented to the terms put forward by the other party.

The reasoning of the court was aligned with the observations made in previous cases, particularly Maxitherm, where it was held that a party relying upon a document containing conditions may be relieved of the need to take steps to inform the other party that the document contains conditions if the other party expressly accepts an offer of which the document forms part. The court concluded that the reasonableness of assuming consent to the terms would depend on the circumstances of each case, including whether the terms were explicitly referred to by the offeror and whether they were of a kind that might not reasonably be expected to be part of the terms of the contract. The outcome of the case hinged on whether the respondent could reasonably be taken to have assented to the particular terms in question.

The final orders of the court were made on 6 October 2022, reflecting the court's determination on the issues of disclosure and consent to standard terms in the context of the specific contractual arrangement between Gainfoot Pty Ltd and T&H Keliher Contracting Pty Ltd.

Orders

Orders of the court

On 6 October 2022:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Maxitherm, Buchanan J made the following observations:[6] [6] At 568. “Once the conclusion has been reached that an express offer containing a party's standard terms has been accepted, there is no occasion to then consider whether sufficient steps have been taken to bring the standard terms to the attention of the other party. The ultimate question is whether the party relying upon the standard terms can properly assume that the other party has consented to those terms. When a party is issued with a ticket or document containing terms, and the ticket or document performs a function other than being the embodiment of the terms of the contract, proof of consent will usually depend upon the efforts taken to bring the terms to the attention of the recipient of the ticket or other document. In Parker v South Eastern Railway Co. (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416 , Mellish L.J. said at 423: ‘The railway company, as it seems to me, must be entitled to make some assumptions respecting the person who deposits luggage with them: I think they are entitled to assume that he can read, and that he understands the English language, and that he pays such attention to what he is about as may reasonably be expected from a person in such a transaction as that of depositing luggage in a cloak-room. The railway company must, however, take mankind as they find them, and if what they do is sufficient to inform people in general that the ticket contains conditions, I think that a particular plaintiff ought not to be in a better position than other persons on account of his exceptional ignorance or stupidity or carelessness. But if what the railway company do is not sufficient to convey to the minds of people in general that the ticket contains conditions, then they have received the goods on deposit without obtaining the consent of the persons depositing them to the conditions limiting their liability.’ On the other hand, a party relying upon a document containing conditions may be relieved of the need to take steps to inform the other party that the document contains conditions where the other party expressly accepts an offer of which the document forms part. I do not intend to convey that express acceptance of an offer which incorporates other terms by reference necessarily connotes acceptance of all those terms. In a case where the person expressing consent has not read the terms, his consent may be taken to be a consent to those terms which are appropriate to a contract of the type in question. If the terms include provisions which no one would anticipate in a contract of the type in question, it would not be appropriate to assume consent to those provisions. The basic enquiry remains whether it is reasonable to assume that a contracting party has assented to the terms put forward by the other party. …. As I have said, in my opinion the inclusion of an unusual term, at least in an entitles a court applying the common law to reject it as a term unless special steps have been taken to draw attention to it. The relevant question is whether a contracting party can be reasonably taken to have assented to a particular term, not whether a contracting party should be subject to an unreasonable unsigned document, may require its proponent to take special steps to bring it to the attention of the other party, for otherwise it may not be reasonable to assume consent to the term. Whether special steps are required, and what those steps must be, will depend upon the circumstances of each case. Further, I think that a term may be unusual because it is more than ordinarily onerous. term.” Callaway JA expressed agreement with the reasons of Buchanan JA, subject to some observations, which included:[7] [7] At 561-562. “Pacific Dunlop was therefore in the position of a person receiving an offer in the form “I offer to contract on my standard terms and conditions”, who does not know what the other party's standard terms and conditions are and does not enquire but goes ahead and accepts the offer. In such a case there is no question whether the offer is a contractual document or whether a reasonable person in the position of the offeree would understand that it contained conditions. The document is plainly a contractual document; as an offer, it necessarily contains, or refers to, terms of the proposed contract. Subject to what I shall say hereafter, Pacific Dunlop must be taken to have assented to them, including Maxitherm's standard terms and conditions. It is not uncommon to enter into a transaction on another party's standard terms and conditions without enquiring what they are. It is often not worth doing so and a sensible commercial risk to run. The law reflects commercial reality by holding the party who does not enquire to such of the other party's standard terms and conditions as may fairly be regarded as within the risk the first party took. Some terms are outside the risk and the first party is not bound by them. A term may be contrary to industry practice or, however appropriate to other contracts into which the other party regularly enters, unsuited to the particular contract. It is rarely, if ever, sufficient that a term is onerous, but its onerous quality or some other feature may show that it was not reasonably to be expected.” Ormiston JA also agreed with the reasons of Buchanan JA and “the observations of Callaway JA in his judgment”, adding his own observations, including that:[8] “Where terms are explicitly referred to by an offeror, it can be rare that an apparent acceptance by the offeree should not carry with it the offeree’s assent to the whole of the terms described but I would agree that, where a term is so onerous or is otherwise of a kind such as to suggest it might not reasonably be expected to be part of the terms of the contract, the issue is whether the accepting party can reasonably be taken to have assented to the particular term.” [8] At 561.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established