FZF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FZF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1032  

Appeal from: FZF18 v Minister for Immigration [2020] FCCA 830
File number(s): WAD 66 of 2020
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 17 August 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – claim to refugee or complementary protection under Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)(a) or (aa) – whether Immigration Assessment Authority failed to consider general security situation in Kabul in determining whether reasonable for appellant to relocate there from home area – held: appeal dismissed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2), (2B) and (3)
Cases cited:

CIT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 265 FCR 572

CSZ16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 156

DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs (2021) 273 CLR 1

Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

MZACX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 161 ALD 73

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 36
Date of hearing: 16 March 2021 (before re-docketing to Rares J on 30 June 2023) and 17 August 2023
Counsel for the appellant: Mr H Glenister
Solicitor for the appellant: Savannah Legal
Counsel for the first respondent: Ms S Oliver (16 March 2021, before re-docketing to Rares J on 30 June 2023) and Ms C Taggart (17 August 2023)
Solicitor for the first respondent: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

WAD 66 of 2020
BETWEEN:

FZF18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 AUGUST 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The costs of the appeal be reserved.

3.The appellant file and serve any written submissions limited to two pages as to what, if any, costs orders are appropriate having regard to the outcome of the proceeding and the possibility of an order under the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) by 24 August 2023.

4.The first respondent file and serve any written submissions limited to two pages in reply by 31 August 2023.

5.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 19 October 2018 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1032
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of FZF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involved the appellant, a national of Afghanistan from Paktia Province, challenging the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to deny his claims for refugee status and complementary protection under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant contended that the Authority failed to consider the general security situation in Kabul when determining the reasonableness of his relocation there from his home area. The central legal issue before the court was whether the Authority erred in its consideration of the reasonableness of the appellant relocating to Kabul for the purposes of his claims for refugee status and complementary protection. The court had to determine if the Authority appropriately assessed the security situation in Kabul and whether it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate there, considering the risk of harm he faced.

The court considered the reasoning of the Authority and the submissions made by the appellant’s migration agent, which highlighted the dangers and hardships of relocating to Kabul. The court emphasised that the review of an administrative decision should focus on whether the decision-maker acted according to law, not on the merits of the decision. The court also noted that the reasons of the decision-maker should be read fairly and as a whole. In applying these principles, the court found that the Authority had appropriately considered the appellant’s circumstances and the risks associated with relocating to Kabul, and that the Authority's decision did not constitute a jurisdictional error.

Based on this reasoning, the court dismissed the appeal and made orders for the costs of the appeal to be reserved. The appellant was required to file submissions on appropriate costs orders by 24 August 2023, and the Minister was to respond by 31 August 2023. The court also amended the name of the respondent to reflect the current title of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The costs of the appeal be reserved.

3. The appellant file and serve any written submissions limited to two pages as to what, if any, costs orders are appropriate having regard to the outcome of the proceeding and the possibility of an order under the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) by 24 August 2023.

4. The first respondent file and serve any written submissions limited to two pages in reply by 31 August 2023.

5. The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

As is well understood, the Parliament chose to define in the Act its understanding of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations in public international law, including by definitions of “refugee” and “well-founded fear of persecution” in ss 5H and 5J and the concept of complementary protection in s 36(2)(aa). The latter concept is that Australia must afford protection to persons in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied that Australia has protection obligations because he has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and reasonable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia (relevantly here, to Afghanistan), there is a real risk that a person (such as the appellant) will suffer significant harm, as defined in s 36(2A) and (2B). BACKGROUND The Authority found that the appellant was a national of Afghanistan from Paktia Province. It rejected his claims that he only spoke Pashto and could not read or write any language. It found that he ran his own business in his home village’s bazaar providing services in respect of electronics in motor vehicles. In March 2021, this appeal first heard by another Judge of this Court who since has retired and thus was unable to give judgment. At that time, the governance of Afghanistan was very different to its current situation, and these reasons are not concerned with whatever may be the position the appellant is now in or which the Minister in the future may be asked, or wish, to consider for the purpose of ss 48A and 48B of the Migration Act. THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION The Authority accepted the appellant’s claims that he faced a real chance of both serious harm from the Taliban, within the meaning of s 5J(5), and significant harm, within the meaning of s 36(2A), if he returned to his own area or to the district in his home province in which that was located. It then proceeded to consider, for the purposes, first, of his refugee claim under s 36(2)(a) and, secondly, his claim for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa), whether there would be a real chance of him suffering the harm that he claimed to fear to which he would be exposed both in his home province (as it found he would be ) or by reason of, among other matters, the general security situation in Kabul at that time. The appellant’s migration agent made a detailed written submission to the delegate which the Authority addressed in its reasons. The migration agent submitted that: ·the appellant could not relocate from his home province to any other region within Afghanistan, including to Kabul; ·Kabul was not a safe or reasonable area for him to relocate to, even though it was comparatively safer than some other areas in Afghanistan because, at that time, it was still subject to insurgent attacks, violence and sectarian tensions and the then continuing influence of the Taliban there posed a significant threat to his life and security, placing him in grave danger were he to return;·the Taliban had made a number of attacks in Kabul in recent times against agencies and individuals which it considered either to support the then Afghani government or pose a threat to the Taliban; ·those attacks demonstrated the general fragility of the situation and the wide-ranging influence of the Taliban in Kabul and elsewhere;·the security situation in Kabul was deteriorating;·based on country information, there was inadequate access to electricity, water, sanitation facilities and employment in Kabul for a person in his position; ·the appellant had no relatives, friends or contacts in Kabul upon whom he could rely if required to relocate there; and·he would be exposed to the likelihood of being homeless, starving and unable to survive were he to relocate to Kabul.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In March 2021, this appeal first heard by another Judge of this Court who since has retired and thus was unable to give judgment. At that time, the governance of Afghanistan was very different to its current situation, and these reasons are not concerned with whatever may be the position the appellant is now in or which the Minister in the future may be asked, or wish, to consider for the purpose of ss 48A and 48B of the Migration Act. THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION The Authority accepted the appellant’s claims that he faced a real chance of both serious harm from the Taliban, within the meaning of s 5J(5), and significant harm, within the meaning of s 36(2A), if he returned to his own area or to the district in his home province in which that was located. It then proceeded to consider, for the purposes, first, of his refugee claim under s 36(2)(a) and, secondly, his claim for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa), whether there would be a real chance of him suffering the harm that he claimed to fear to which he would be exposed both in his home province (as it found he would be ) or by reason of, among other matters, the general security situation in Kabul at that time. The appellant’s migration agent made a detailed written submission to the delegate which the Authority addressed in its reasons. The migration agent submitted that: ·the appellant could not relocate from his home province to any other region within Afghanistan, including to Kabul; ·Kabul was not a safe or reasonable area for him to relocate to, even though it was comparatively safer than some other areas in Afghanistan because, at that time, it was still subject to insurgent attacks, violence and sectarian tensions and the then continuing influence of the Taliban there posed a significant threat to his life and security, placing him in grave danger were he to return;·the Taliban had made a number of attacks in Kabul in recent times against agencies and individuals which it considered either to support the then Afghani government or pose a threat to the Taliban; ·those attacks demonstrated the general fragility of the situation and the wide-ranging influence of the Taliban in Kabul and elsewhere;·the security situation in Kabul was deteriorating;·based on country information, there was inadequate access to electricity, water, sanitation facilities and employment in Kabul for a person in his position; ·the appellant had no relatives, friends or contacts in Kabul upon whom he could rely if required to relocate there; and·he would be exposed to the likelihood of being homeless, starving and unable to survive were he to relocate to Kabul. Next, the submission addressed the reasonableness of relocation for the purposes of the appellant’s complementary protection claim, arguing that:·the guidelines of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) suggested that the threshold for safety and security in any relocation assessment required that a claimant be free from any danger or risk of injury in the locality and that Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ stated a test in SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18 at 27 [24] which, the submission asserted, was consistent with the understanding of the UNHCR guidelines;·the violence that had occurred in Kabul before and after the dates referred to in country information to which the submission referred made it imperative that ongoing violence “must not exist” in a region for it to be considered safe for relocation and that this was the standard to be met for any relocation assessment;·it would be unreasonable to require the appellant to relocate in his particular circumstances because of his limited ability to find work in other areas of Afghanistan (including Kabul) lack of any relatives or family in other areas and the significant hardship he would face in re-establishing himself; ·life in Kabul would not be affordable for a person in the appellant’s position and so it would not be reasonable or feasible for him to relocate there and re-establish himself and his family without due hardship so that they could subsist;·the addressee should apply Kenny J’s reasons in MZACX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 161 ALD 73 at 83 [35], where her Honour distilled a requirement for a decision-maker considering the possibility of relocation within a person’s country of nationality as raising two questions, namely:[T]he first question that arises is whether, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution in another part of that country. If there is an appreciable risk then the issue of relocation for a particular applicant is concluded. If, however, there is no appreciable risk, of the feared persecution at some other place in the country of nationality, the issue of relocation can be further explored. At this point, as indicated earlier, the question is whether the relocation of the visa applicant to that place is “reasonable”, in the sense of “practicable”, having regard to the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon the applicant of relocation to that place. In answering this question, it may be relevant to include different or lower risks of harm faced by the applicant at a suggested place in assessment of the reasonableness of relocation in the particular circumstances of the case. Issues of risk of harm arise at these two stages of inquiry, although each stage of the enquiry has a different focus. (emphasis added)·the addressee was obliged to consider the practical reality for the appellant in determining whether it was reasonable to expect him to relocate;·relocation to another area of Afghanistan was not practicable because of, first, the risk of harm were he required to return to his home town to take his family with him to another area, including the danger of his travelling to or from there and anywhere else, and secondly, the absence of stable accommodation and a job to protect and provide for his family.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

He argued that SZATV 233 CLR 18 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317 were not applicable to, or were distinguishable from, the current provisions of the Migration Act, because those cases had dealt with the evaluation of the reasonableness of relocation in the context of Australia's international non-refoulement obligations prior to the amendments to the Migration Act in 2014. He argued that the Authority’s reasons, including those in pars 27 and 37, wrongly applied the test under the previous legislation and did not address whether it was reasonable for him to relocate to Kabul because of a lesser risk of harm (than serious or significant), based on the general security situation there. He contended that the decision of the Full Court in CSZ16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 156 at [5]-[10] encapsulated his complaint that the Authority had committed a jurisdictional error and his Honour erred by failing to identify that the Authority had conflated the two stages of the reasonableness of relocation inquiry that Kenny J had explained in MZACX 161 ALD 73.CONSIDERATION In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272, Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ explained that, in reviewing an administrative decision, a court:should not be "concerned with looseness in the language ... nor with unhappy phrasing" of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker” ... "The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error."These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision.(footnotes omitted) Their Honours also held that a judicial review of an administrative decision is concerned with whether the decision-maker acted according to law in making the challenged decision and that this was not a review of the merits of the decision. That is because the merits are the sole concern of the administrative decision-maker under the legislation that the Parliament has enacted. In Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173 at 184-186 [23]-[25] and 195-196 [59]-[60], French CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ held that a decision-maker’s reasons had to be read fairly, as a whole, and re-emphasised the caution against engaging in merits review the court must adopt in reviewing administrative decisions. Importantly, in SZATV 233 CLR at 27 [24], Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ held: What is "reasonable", in the sense of "practicable", must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality.