Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] FCA 787

COURTS AND JUDGES – apprehended bias – association between judge and prospective witness – disqualification – test to be applied to determine – reasonable bystander – knowledge to be imputed to.

Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] FCA 604 referred to
R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 at 258-263 referred to
Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288, 293-294 at 300 referred to
Re J.R.L.; Ex parte C.J.L. (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 349 and 351 referred to
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 567 at 570-571, 584-585 referred to
Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 74 referred to
S & M Motor Repairs Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 358 at 368-369 referred to
Trustees of the Christian Brothers v Cardone (1995) 57 FCR 327 at 336 referred to
Aussie Airlines Pty Limited v Australian Airlines Pty Ltd (1996) 65 FCR 215 at 226 to 236 referred to
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 referred to

TAB FRIED & ORS v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
(ACN 004 044 937) & ORS

VG 352 of 1998

WEINBERG J
13 JUNE 2000
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VG 352 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

TAB FRIED
First Applicant

EVA FRIED
Second Applicant

DAVID FRIED
Third Applicant

COMPACK PACKAGING EMPLOYEE SHARE PLAN PTY LTD (ACN 062 925 393)
Fourth Applicant

EVATAB INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (formerly TED Engineering Investment Pty Ltd) (ACN 006 392 972)
Fifth Applicant

INVOTIN PTY LTD (ACN 006 786 394)
Sixth Applicant

WINDINA PTY LTD (ACN 074 572 204)
Seventh Applicant

EVATAB LEASING PTY LTD (ACN 074 572 204)
Eighth Applicant

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)
First Respondent

BENNI ARONI
Second Respondent
& First Cross-Claimant

ADRIAN COLMAN
Third Respondent
& Second Cross-Claimant

RICHARD STARLING CORNISH
Fourth Respondent
& Third Cross-Claimant

MARK WOLLAN
Fifth Respondent
& Fourth Cross-Claimant

NORMAN SAMUEL FRYDE
Sixth Respondent
& Fifth Cross-Claimant

BRUNO JOHN CHARLESWORTH
Seventh Respondent
& Sixth Cross-Claimant

BRUCE DAVID JOSEM
Eighth Respondent
& Seventh Cross-Claimant

EFFIE KAVADAS
Ninth Respondent
& Eighth Cross-Claimant

TED ENGINEERING AUSTRALIA LIMITED
(ACN 006 790 067)
Tenth Respondent

BENDIGO BANK LIMITED (ACN 068 049 178)
Eleventh Respondent

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)
First Cross-Respondent

W F TITCHENER & CO PTY LTD
Second Cross-Respondent

VICTORIAN LAWYERS RPA LIMITED
Third Cross-Respondent

W F TITCHENER & CO PTY LTD
Cross-Claimant

AND:

BENNI ARONI
First Cross-Respondent

ADRIAN COLMAN
Second Cross-Respondent

RICHARD STARLING CORNISH
Third Cross-Respondent

MARK WOLLAN
Fourth Cross-Respondent

NORMAN SAMUEL FRYDE
Fifth Cross-Respondent

BRUNO JOHN CHARLESWORTH
Sixth Cross-Respondent

BRUCE DAVID JOSEM
Seventh Cross-Respondent

EFFIE KAVADAS
Eighth Cross-Respondent

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)
Ninth Cross-Respondent

VICTORIAN LAWYERS RPA LIMITED
Tenth Cross-Respondent

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)
Cross-Claimant

AND

VICTORIAN LAWYERS RPA LIMITED
First Cross-Respondent

W F TITCHENER & CO PTY LTD
Second Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

WEINBERG…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 787
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Fried v National Australia Bank Limited and Bendigo Bank Limited involved an application by the respondents to have the trial judge recuse themselves due to a potential bias arising from their personal relationship with a proposed witness, Mr. Peter Rado, who is the judge's personal accountant. The applicants, NAB and Bendigo Bank, sought the judge's disqualification on the basis that the personal relationship between the judge and the witness could lead to an apprehension of bias. The underlying dispute pertains to a series of fraudulent activities by Max Green, a partner in the law firm Aroni Colman, who embezzled large sums of money from trust accounts held with Bendigo Bank on behalf of the applicants. These funds were transferred to accounts held by Green at NAB. The applicants seek various forms of relief, including claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligence, and misleading or deceptive conduct.

The legal issues central to the court's decision revolved around whether the judge's association with Mr. Rado would lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias, thereby necessitating the judge's disqualification from the case. The court considered the nature of the relationship between the judge and Mr. Rado, the potential importance of Mr. Rado's evidence, and the potential impact of the judge's prior knowledge of Mr. Rado's professional integrity on the impartiality of the trial. The court determined that the hypothetical reasonable and fair-minded observer might indeed entertain an apprehension that the judge might not be impartial in assessing Mr. Rado's evidence due to their long-standing personal relationship. The judge acknowledged that the relationship between an accountant and their client typically involves high levels of trust, and it would be difficult for the judge to avoid subconscious bias.

The court concluded that the interests of justice required the judge to recuse themselves from the case. This decision was made despite the inconvenience and delay it would cause, as the potential for bias was deemed too significant to overlook. The judge's disqualification was necessary to maintain the integrity and impartiality of the judicial process.

The court made an order vacating the trial and listing the case for a new trial before another judge of the Court, scheduled to commence on 3 October 2000.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The trial before the Court as presently constituted be vacated.

2. The application be listed for trial before another judge of the Court to commence on 3 October 2000.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application by the National Australia Bank Limited (“NAB”) and Bendigo Bank Limited (“Bendigo Bank”) that I not continue to sit as the trial judge in this proceeding. The application is made on the basis that a reasonable apprehension of bias might arise because of my association with a witness whom the applicants now propose to call in the trial. That witness, Mr Peter Rado, is an accountant. He also happens to be my accountant, and that of my wife. The background facts The applicants commenced this proceeding in the Court in July 1998. They initially sought relief only against NAB, and against the partners of the Melbourne firm of solicitors Aroni Colman. In May 1999 Bendigo Bank was joined as a respondent. The relief claimed is founded upon a series of fraudulent misappropriations perpetrated by Max Green, a partner in Aroni Colman. It is common knowledge that Green was murdered in March 1998. It was discovered after his death that he had stolen large sums of money from various trust accounts held by Aroni Colman with the Bendigo Bank on behalf of the applicants. Green had arranged for these funds to be withdrawn from these accounts. The monies were transferred, sometimes directly, and sometimes via the Aroni Colman Trust Account, to an account which Green had opened in December 1993 at the Elgin Street branch of NAB. That account was styled “Max Green & Associates Trust Account” and was said to have been secretly maintained by Green. After the applicants’ monies found their way into that account, Green arranged for them to be telegraphically transferred to various overseas accounts including, a number of accounts in Thailand. The monies cannot now be located. The applicants were long-standing clients of Aroni Colman. One of the partners of that firm, Mr Benni Aroni, is the brother-in-law of Mr Tab Fried, the first applicant. The firm handled substantial investments on behalf of the applicants. Most of the monies were invested in mortgages and in fixed interest deposits. In their statement of claim the applicants plead a number of causes of action against the partners of the firm. These include:·their liability as partners for Green’s defalcations;·breach of fiduciary duty;·breach of contract;·negligence; and·misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), and s 11 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 (Vic). The applicants’ claims against the partners have been settled. I have been informed that the applicants propose to seek leave during the course of the proceeding to enter judgment against them. None of the partners has taken any part in the trial. The real contest in the proceeding is between the applicants on the one hand, and NAB and Bendigo Bank on the other. The applicants’ claim against NAB is based upon its allegedly having participated in Aroni Colman’s breach of trust. NAB is said to have been involved in the firm’s contraventions of various provisions of the Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic), and associated legislation. The applicants contend that NAB is liable to them for Green’s frauds because it had sufficient knowledge of his background and activities to have put it on notice of the need to exercise special care in its dealings with him. NAB is further alleged to be liable for Green’s various breaches of fiduciary duty under the rule in Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 Ch App 244. Moreover, NAB is said to have acted in breach of its contractual obligations to Aroni Colman, and in breach of a duty of care owed to the firm. The applicants say that Aroni Colman acted as their trustee and that they are therefore entitled to stand in the firm’s shoes in vindicating all rights which it, as their trustee, has against NAB. Finally, the applicants contend, in the alternative, that NAB is directly liable to them for conversion by reason of its actions in relation to a number of bank cheques. The applicants say they either owned, or were entitled to immediate possession of, those bank cheques.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
Mr Young then sought final instructions from his clients as to whether Mr Rado would be called to give evidence. After obtaining those instructions, Mr Young submitted that I should deal with the present application on the footing that the applicants proposed to call Mr Rado, and that he would give evidence in accordance with his witness statement. Accordingly, I will deal with the application on that basis.Conclusion After giving this matter anxious consideration, I am satisfied that the only realistic course open to me in response to the application made by NAB and Bendigo Bank that I disqualify myself is that I accede to that application. I am satisfied that the hypothetical reasonable and fair-minded but “informed” observer might well entertain an apprehension that, in dealing with the evidence of Mr Rado, I might not bring to the task of assessing that evidence an impartial and unprejudiced mind. In arriving at this conclusion I have taken into account in particular the nature of the relationship which ordinarily exists between any individual and his or her accountant. That relationship, of course, involves the utmost trust. The fair-minded observer would be entitled to conclude that a client would normally regard his or her accountant as a person of integrity and would at least be disinclined to view him as dishonest. The evidence which Mr Rado is to give in this proceeding is not unconnected with his professional background and experience. It concerns his role as an accountant, and in particular his involvement over several years in the preparation of company accounts and tax returns for the applicants. Mr Rado has performed the same functions for me, and for my wife, for many years. I can well understand that a reasonable bystander might think that it would be difficult for me to avoid being subconsciously influenced by my long-standing association with him into accepting as truthful and accurate any evidence which he might give. In any event, my knowledge of Mr Rado and of the nature of his practice provides me with extraneous information of which I ought not be aware in evaluating his evidence. I should indicate that in my view the overall importance of Mr Rado’s evidence in this case has been somewhat overstated, particularly by Mr Garratt who has described him as “an essential witness”. At the same time I am unable to accept Mr Young’s characterisation of Mr Rado’s evidence as being so unimportant and non-contentious as to make it possible for me to continue in this case. Mr Rado’s evidence is potentially important, and it cannot be assumed that what he has to say is uncontentious. Indeed, responsible senior counsel have assured me that he will be subjected to a strong attack on matters of credit. I cannot conclude, on the material before me, that any such attack will be made without proper foundation. The decision which I have reached is one which I believe is unavoidable. It is unfortunate that the possibility that Mr Rado might be called to give evidence in this proceeding did not emerge until after the trial had commenced. I am acutely conscious of the cost, inconvenience and delay which will result from my decision. On balance, however, I am satisfied that given that Mr Rado is now to be called to give evidence, and given what I know about the nature and potential importance of that evidence, the interests of justice require that this case be determined by another judge of the Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J

Full text does not contain this section.