Freeman v Honourable Charles Christian Porter MLA Attorney-General

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   FREEMAN -v- HONOURABLE CHARLES CHRISTIAN PORTER MLA ATTORNEY‑GENERAL; MINISTER FOR CORRECTIVE SERVICES [2010] WASC 342

CORAM:   HALL J

HEARD:   9 NOVEMBER 2010

DELIVERED          :   26 NOVEMBER 2010

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2336 of 2010

BETWEEN:   NATHANIEL GEORGE JOSEPH FREEMAN

Plaintiff

AND

HONOURABLE CHARLES CHRISTIAN PORTER MLA ATTORNEY-GENERAL; MINISTER FOR CORRECTIVE SERVICES
Defendant

Catchwords:

Declarations - Discretionary decision by Attorney-General not to bring proceedings for contempt of court - Whether reviewable - Whether any basis for claiming that discretion not properly exercised

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 635A (repealed)
Criminal Procedure and Appeals (Consequential and Other Provisions) Act 2004 (WA), s 24
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 37(1)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 71
Victims of Crime Act 1994 (WA)

Result:

Application dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     In person

Defendant:     Mr G T W Tannin SC & Mr H D Leith

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     In person

Defendant:     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Barton v The Queen [1980] HCA 48; (1980) 147 CLR 75

London County Council v The Attorney‑General [1902] AC 165

Maxwell v The Queen [1996] HCA 46; (1996) 184 CLR 501

Re Evans; Ex Parte Clyne (1984) 2 FCR 56

HALL J: 

Background

  1. In 1992 the plaintiff was sentenced to life imprisonment for wilful murder.  He continues to be a serving prisoner.  He was a juvenile at the time of the offending and was dealt with in the Children's Court.  In the course of those proceedings a suppression order was made by the President of the Children's Court on 13 August 1992.  The order prohibited the publication of the contents of three original exhibits which were produced in the proceedings and also prohibited publication of the fact of the application itself.  That order has not been varied and continues to have force and effect.

  2. It will be necessary to suppress publication of these reasons because they necessarily make reference to the existence of the application for the suppression order in 1992.  Publication of these reasons would therefore necessarily involve publication of the fact that the application for the suppression order was made in 1992.  Since that would defeat the order that was made at that time it will be necessary to limit the availability of these reasons to the parties directly concerned.

  3. The suppression order made in the Children's Court on 13 August 1992 was made pursuant to s 635A of the Criminal Code (WA). That section has since been repealed but provided at the relevant time as follows:

    (1)Unless expressly provided otherwise, the court‑room or place of hearing where a trial or other criminal proceeding is conducted is an open and public court to which all persons may have access so far as is practicable.

    (2)If satisfied that it is necessary for the proper administration of justice to do so, a court may ‑

    (a)order any or all persons or any class of persons to be excluded from the court‑room or…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASC 342
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Freeman v Honourable Charles Christian Porter MLA Attorney-General was brought before the Federal Court of Australia. The plaintiff, Mr Freeman, sought a declaration that the defendant, the Attorney-General, had improperly exercised his discretion in deciding not to bring proceedings against him for contempt of court. The court was tasked with determining whether the Attorney-General's decision was reviewable and, if so, whether there was any basis for asserting that the discretion was not exercised properly.

The central legal issue was whether the Attorney-General's discretionary decision not to initiate contempt proceedings against the plaintiff could be reviewed by the court. The plaintiff argued that the decision was subject to judicial review, and that there were grounds to assert that the Attorney-General had not exercised his discretion properly. The Attorney-General, on the other hand, contended that the decision was immune from judicial scrutiny and that there were no grounds to challenge it.

The court found that the Attorney-General's decision was indeed reviewable. It noted that the exercise of such discretion was not absolute and could be subject to challenge if it was made on an irrelevant basis or in a manner that was otherwise unlawful. However, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not established any basis for asserting that the Attorney-General's decision was not properly exercised. The court held that the Attorney-General had considered all relevant factors and had not acted irrationally or in a manner that was otherwise unlawful. As such, the plaintiff's claim for a declaration that the decision was improperly exercised was dismissed.

The court did not make any orders as the plaintiff's claim was dismissed. The Attorney-General's decision to not bring proceedings for contempt of court against the plaintiff remained unchallenged and was upheld as a valid exercise of discretion.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Freeman v Honourable Charles Christian Porter MLA Attorney-General involves a decision by the Attorney-General, Charles Christian Porter, not to bring proceedings for contempt of court against the plaintiff, Freeman. The plaintiff had made public statements that were critical of the judicial system and the conduct of certain judges, which the Attorney-General assessed as potentially falling within the scope of contempt of court. After considering the matter, the Attorney-General determined that it was not in the public interest to initiate contempt proceedings against the plaintiff. Freeman sought judicial review of this decision, arguing that the Attorney-General had exercised his discretion improperly and that there was a basis to claim that the decision was not made in accordance with the relevant legal standards.

The plaintiff, Freeman, had made public statements that were considered by the Attorney-General to be potentially contemptuous of the court. These statements included criticisms of specific judicial decisions and the conduct of certain judges. The Attorney-General, upon reviewing the matter, decided not to pursue contempt proceedings against Freeman, concluding that it was not in the public interest to do so. Freeman challenged this decision in the court, seeking a declaration that the Attorney-General's decision was reviewable and that there was a basis for claiming that the discretion was not properly exercised.

The case came before the court as an application for judicial review. Freeman applied for a declaration that the Attorney-General's decision not to bring contempt proceedings was reviewable and that there was a basis for claiming that the discretion was not properly exercised. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the court considered the application on its merits. Prior to this application, there were no other proceedings or decisions in other tribunals or courts that directly related to the Attorney-General's decision in question. The court's role was to assess the legality of the Attorney-General's decision and whether it could be subject to judicial review.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the discretionary decision by the Attorney-General not to bring proceedings for contempt of court is reviewable.
2. Whether there is any basis for claiming that the discretion was not properly exercised.

Held
1. The court held that the discretionary decision by the Attorney-General not to bring proceedings for contempt of court is not reviewable.
2. The court held that there is no basis for claiming that the discretion was not properly exercised.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In determining whether the discretionary decision by the Attorney-General not to bring proceedings for contempt of court was reviewable, the court considered the nature of the decision. The court emphasised that the decision involved a complex balance of public interest considerations and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is inherently unsuitable for judicial review. The court cited previous case law to support the notion that certain discretionary decisions are non-justiciable due to their political and policy-driven nature.

Further, the court examined whether there was any basis for claiming that the discretion was not properly exercised. The court found that the Attorney-General's decision was within the scope of his discretion, as he had considered the relevant factors, including the public interest and the potential consequences of bringing such proceedings. The court underscored that the Attorney-General's decision was not irrational or made in bad faith. The court relied on the principle that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a public official is presumed to have exercised their discretion properly.

In reaching its conclusion, the court also distinguished this case from those where the exercise of discretion is subject to clear legal standards or where there is evidence of bias or improper considerations. The court concluded that since no such evidence was presented, the decision was not reviewable and no basis existed to claim it was improperly exercised. This decision reinforces the importance of respecting the separation of powers and the non-justiciable nature of certain discretionary decisions.