Forstaff Blacktown Pty Ltd v Brimac Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 63 min read

NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Forstaff Blacktown Pty Limited v Brimac Pty Limited & Anor; Brimac Pty Ltd v Johnston & Anor [2005]  NSWCA 423

FILE NUMBER(S):
40213/05
40252/05

HEARING DATE(S):               14 November 2005

JUDGMENT DATE: 05/12/2005

PARTIES:
CA 40213/05:
Forstaff Blacktown Pty Limited (Claimant/Appellant)
Brimac Pty Limited (First Opponent/First Respondent)
Paul Lawrence Johnston (Second Opponent/Second Respondent)

CA 40252/05:
Brimac Pty Limited (Appellant)
Paul Lawrence Johnston (First Respondent)
Forstaff Blacktown (Second Respondent)

JUDGMENT OF:       Hodgson JA Ipp JA McColl JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          DC 780/02

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Delaney DCJ

COUNSEL:
CA 40213/05:
W P Kearns SC/M L Snell (Forstaff) (Claimant/Appellant)
A M Colefax SC/J Sleight (Brimac) (First Opponent/Respondent)
I G Harrison SC/R N O'Neill (Johnston) (Second Opponent/Respondent)

CA 40252/05:
W P Kearns SC/M L Snell (Forstaff) (Appellant)
A M Colefax SC/J Sleight (Brimac) (First Respondent)
I G Harrison SC/R N O'Neill (Johnston) (Second Respondent)

SOLICITORS:
CA 40213/05:
Goldbergs Lawyers (Forstaff) (Claimant/Appellant)
Hunt & Hunt (Brimac) First Opponent/First Respondent)
McDonnell Schroder (Johnston) (Second Opponent/Second Respondent)

CA 40252/05:
Hunt & Hunt (Brimac) (Appellant)
McDonnell Schroder (Johnston) (First Respondent)
Goldbergs Lawyers (Forstaff) (Second Respondent)

CATCHWORDS:
TORT - negligence - duty of care – experienced worker contracted to third party by labour hire firm – whether breach of duty – Contributory negligence – whether worker’s conduct amounted to a departure from the standard of care of a reasonable man.
CONTRIBUTION - joint or several tortfeasors - third party and employer of injured worker - amendments to Workers Compensation Act 1987 limiting damages recoverable from employer - injury before amendments – worker’s proceedings brought against third party after amendments – third party cross-claims against employer of injured worker seeking to recover contribution – injured worker unable to recover damages against employer - whether contribution pursuant to s 5(1)(c) Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 available - whether s 151Z(2) of Workers Compensation Act precludes contribution (D)

LEGISLATION CITED:
Civil Liability Act 2002
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946
Suitors’ Fund Act 1951
Workers Compensation Act 1987
Workers Compensation Commission Rules 2003
Workers Compensation Legislation Further Amendment Act 2001
Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1988

DECISION:
The liability appeal and the cross appeal :
(1) Appeal and cross-appeal allowed (2) Notice of cross-appeal to be filed within 7 days (3) Set aside the verdict and judgment entered by Delaney DCJ on 4 March 2005 against the appellant in favour of the respondent (4 )Verdict and judgment for the respondent in the sum of $191,471.54  (5) Respondent to pay 20% of Brimac’s costs of the appeal but to have a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 if otherwise qualified.
The contribution appeal:
(6) Grant leave to appeal  (7 )Notice of Appeal to be filed within 7 days (8) Appeal allowed  (9) Verdict and judgment on the cross-claim set aside and in lieu thereof verdict and judgment for the appellant on the cross-claim
(10) Respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the contribution appeal and…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Forstaff Blacktown Pty Ltd v Brimac Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2005] NSWCA 423
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal and cross-appeal arising from a District Court judgment concerning negligence and contribution claims. The appellant, Forstaff Blacktown Pty Ltd, was a labour hire firm that had contracted Mr Johnston to work for Brimac Pty Ltd. Mr Johnston suffered an injury while working at Brimac's premises. Brimac had cross-claimed against Forstaff seeking contribution as a joint tortfeasor.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether Brimac owed Mr Johnston a duty of care, whether Brimac had breached that duty, and whether Mr Johnston had been contributorily negligent. Additionally, the court had to determine whether Brimac was entitled to contribution from Forstaff, particularly in light of amendments to the *Workers Compensation Act 1987* that limited damages recoverable from an employer, and whether s 151Z(2) of that Act precluded such contribution.

The court found that Brimac owed Mr Johnston a non-delegable duty of care, akin to that of an employer, given the level of control Brimac exercised over his daily work and the provision of safety equipment and instructions. Brimac's concession that the primary judge correctly concluded it owed a duty was accepted. The court determined that Brimac had breached this duty by failing to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risks of injury, considering the possibility of inadvertence. The argument for contributory negligence was rejected, with the court finding that Mr Johnston could not reasonably have foreseen the specific circumstances leading to the accident. Regarding the contribution claim, the court analysed the application of s 151Z(2) of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987* and relevant case law, concluding that the assessment of damages for contribution purposes should be made under the regime applicable at the time the worker's proceedings were commenced.

The appeal and cross-appeal were allowed, setting aside the original verdict and judgment against Forstaff. The court entered a verdict and judgment for Brimac in the sum of $191,471.54, with Brimac to pay 20% of Forstaff's costs of the appeal. The contribution appeal was also allowed, setting aside the verdict and judgment on the cross-claim and entering a verdict and judgment for Forstaff on that cross-claim. Brimac was ordered to pay Forstaff's costs of the contribution appeal and the cross-claim in the District Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

The liability appeal and the cross appeal :

(1) Appeal and cross-appeal allowed (2) Notice of cross-appeal to be filed within 7 days (3) Set aside the verdict and judgment entered by Delaney DCJ on 4 March 2005 against the appellant in favour of the respondent (4 )Verdict and judgment for the respondent in the sum of $191,471.54 (5) Respondent to pay 20% of Brimac’s costs of the appeal but to have a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 if otherwise qualified.

The contribution appeal:

(6) Grant leave to appeal (7 )Notice of Appeal to be filed within 7 days (8) Appeal allowed (9) Verdict and judgment on the cross-claim set aside and in lieu thereof verdict and judgment for the appellant on the cross-claim

(10) Respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the contribution appeal and the appellant’s costs of the cross-claim in the District Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Underlying the reasoning in Clout is the premise that because the hypothetical s 151Z(2)(d) exercise requires assessment in accordance with Pt 5, Div 3, the Court should apply the provisions of that Part 5 which would apply if the plaintiff worker had taken proceedings against the employer at the time the proceedings were commenced against the non-employer. As Mr Raj’s proceedings were commenced before 27 November 2001 and were immunised from the operation of the 2001 amendments by cl 9, Pt 18C of Schedule 6, the s 151Z(2)(d) assessment was to be undertaken in accordance with the pre-amendment Pt 5, Div 3.Conclusion The reasoning in Clout means that in assessing damages pursuant to s 151Z(2)(d) in Mr Johnston’s proceedings, regard must be had to the fact that they were commenced on 6 September 2002 so that, in contrast to Clout, the 2001 amendments applied. Consistently with Clout, the same damages regime had to be adopted to assess the damages recoverable pursuant to both pars (c) and (d). That regime was the post 27 November 2001 regime. An assessment pursuant to that regime would only have resulted in a notional award of damages if Mr Johnston had suffered a 15% permanent impairment as a result of his injury. As I have earlier noted Forstaff’s submissions before the primary judge concerning Clout turned, in part, upon the proposition that Mr Johnston had not been assessed as having a 15% degree of permanent impairment an assertion his Honour appears to have accepted. In its written outline in support of its Summons for Leave to Appeal, Forstaff noted that the only evidence as to the degree of Mr Johnston’s impairment was that it was less than 15%. This was a reference to a report from Dr Bodel, an orthopaedic surgeon qualified by Brimac, who concluded that Mr Johnston was suffering from a 3% impairment of his hand which amounted to a 2% whole person impairment according to Tables 16–1, 16–2 and 16–3 of AMA 5 (pp 438 – 439). WorkCover’s Guides for the evaluation of Permanent Impairment issued pursuant to s 376 of the Workers Compensation Act are substantially based on AMA5. Neither Brimac or Mr Johnston’s responses to Forstaff’s written outline challenged the proposition that the primary judge had been entitled to consider Forstaff’s contribution argument on the basis that Mr Johnston had not been assessed as having the degree of permanent impairment required under the 2001 amendments to s 151H to attract an award of economic loss. During the hearing of the appeal, however, the question was raised as to which of the parties before the primary judge had borne the onus of proof of the Pt 5 Div 3 damages. Mr Kearns submitted it was the plaintiff as he was seeking to recover damages. Mr Colefax submitted that where the third party and the employer were both parties to the injured worker’s proceedings the plaintiff bore the onus. Mr Harrison submitted the plaintiff did not bear any onus in that regard. Section 151Z(2)(d) is silent as to who bears the onus of proving what the plaintiff worker’s damages would be if assessed under Pt 5, Div 3 of the Workers Compensation Act. Several matters persuade me that, in circumstances such as have arisen in this case, that burden of proof in that respect is borne by the plaintiff worker.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Harrison also submitted that the primary judge was correct to conclude that Mr Johnston had not been guilty of contributory negligence. He submitted that short of doing no work at all, there was nothing Mr Johnston could have done to avoid the accident. In essence he argued that the accident had occurred because as Mr Johnston emptied the cage and it became increasingly lighter, the effect of him walking in and out of it from the loading dock, combined with the smooth texture of the forklift tynes and the fact that they had a slight downhill grade meant the cage tipped slightly and started to slide. Mr Harrison contended that Mr Johnston could not reasonably have foreseen this scenario. The liability appeal: consideration Brimac’s effective concession that the primary judge correctly concluded that it owed a duty to take reasonable care to avoid the risk of injury to Mr Johnston akin to that of an employer was, in my view, properly made. The evidence revealed that Mr Johnston had been working for Brimac for several weeks prior to the accident. He was working there five days a week and received his instructions on a daily basis from a leading hand employed by Brimac. He wore safety clothing supplied by Brimac and used its equipment. It is apparent, in such circumstances, that Brimac treated Mr Johnston as its worker: see TNT Australia Pty Limited v Christie [2003] NSWCA 47 at [41]. In such circumstances, Brimac’s duty was clear. It owed a non-delegable duty to take reasonable care to avoid exposing Mr Johnston to unnecessary risks of injury. If there was a real risk of injury to him in the performance of his work, it was obliged to take reasonable care to avoid the risk by devising a method of operation for the performance of the task which eliminated it or provide adequate safeguards. It was required to take into account the possibility of thoughtlessness, inadvertence or carelessness: Czatyrko v Edith Cowan University [2005] HCA 14; (2005) 79 ALJR 839 at [12]. O’Connor v Commissioner of Government Transport does not assist Brimac. In that case an experienced plumber employed by the defendant fell through an awning which was affected by dry rot. While acknowledging the duty the defendant owed the plumber as his employer, Dixon CJ, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ observed (at 229 – 230) that the equipment with which the plumber had been provided was not wanting, that the plumber was experienced and that the question whether the awning would bear his weight was an obvious one. The deceased had been sent to the job in question (which was to reduce the length of an awning) with a party of workmen who included carpenters and several others. The High Court observed that that party was as “expert” or competent to judge of “that simple subject [whether the awning would bear the deceased’s weight] as anybody that could reasonably be sent”. It also expressed the view that the presence of the dry rot, which caused the awning to fail under the deceased’s weight, was as easily ascertainable by him as “by anybody however skilled”. Having observed that there were means at hand which could have enabled the deceased to undertake the work without climbing onto the awning, the High Court said:“It was an ordinary question for a plumber to decide for himself how he would do the work. Obviously any experienced plumber would see that there must be a question whether a structure like the awning supported not by posts but by brackets was strong enough to bear his weight as he dismantled it. It was not made for that purpose and neither of his companions can be supposed to have thought that it had been specially tested to see if it was strong enough. It seems fanciful to treat the question as one to be gone into and decided by some superior officer, as distinguished from the workmen on the spot, and still more fanciful to suppose that a warning or special instruction was demanded about so simple and obvious a matter requiring neither special skill or knowledge to decide and ordinarily treated as a matter for the man doing the job.”