SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Flori v Winter & Ors [2019] QCA 281
PARTIES:
RICKY ANTHONY FLORI
(appellant)
v
DAVID BRETT WINTER
(first respondent)
PETER DOYLE
(second respondent)
DIRK PETERSEN
(third respondent)
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(fourth respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 5689 of 2019
SC No 4178 of 2017DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2019] QSC 106 (Bowskill J)DELIVERED ON:
3 December 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
17 October 2019
JUDGES:
Fraser JA and Buss AJA and Henry J
ORDERS:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. The orders made in the Trial Division on 3 and 13 May 2019 be set aside.
3. Order that the separate question be answered “It is not appropriate to answer the question”.
4. Unless the Court is earlier notified of a consent order about costs, the parties have leave to exchange and lodge with the registry within 14 days of the publication of these reasons submissions in writing, not exceeding three pages, as to the appropriate costs orders.
CATCHWORDS:
STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION – PURPOSIVE APPROACH – PARTICULAR CASES – where the appellant commenced proceedings alleging reprisals regarding a letter he wrote to the Crime and Misconduct Commission, which he contended was a public interest disclosure under s 15 Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 – where the question of whether the letter was capable of being a public interest disclosure was separately determined by reference to whether it disclosed “conduct” that was “official misconduct” under ss 14 and 15 Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 – where the appellant contends the primary judge erred by answering that question without regard to whether the appellant held, or could have held, an honest belief on reasonable grounds that he had information which tended to show official misconduct – whether the proper construction of s 15 Whistleblowers Protection Act required consideration of whether the appellant held, or could have held, an honest belief on reasonable grounds that he had information that tended to show official misconduct
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SEPARATE DECISION OR QUESTION – APPEAL FROM DECISION OR DETERMINATION ON SEPARATE QUESTION – where the appellant commenced proceedings alleging reprisals regarding a letter he wrote to the Crime and Misconduct Commission, which he contended was a public interest disclosure under s 15 Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 – where the parties consented to determination of a separate question as to whether the letter was capable of being a public interest disclosure by reference to whether it disclosed “conduct” which was “official misconduct” under ss 14 and 15 Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 – where the primary judge held the letter did not disclose “conduct” which was “official misconduct” under those provisions – where the appellant contends the question was inappropriate to answer because it did not account for his honest belief on reasonable grounds that he had information that tended to show official misconduct –…
Continue reading Flori v Winter
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Flori v Winter [2019] QCA 281
- Case
- [2019] QCA 281
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal meticulously examined the statutory interpretation methods, adhering to the principles elucidated in recent jurisprudence. They underscored the necessity to discern the intended meaning of the statutory text by considering the statutory words within their context, including surrounding provisions, the statute as a whole, and its evident purpose. The Court also highlighted that under the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), an interpretation that best achieves the statute's purpose is preferred, with extrinsic material potentially confirming or clarifying the ordinary meaning of the provision. The Court found that the primary judge's approach to the separate question was flawed as it did not account for the appellant's belief regarding the information disclosed, which was a crucial aspect of the statutory interpretation under section 15.
Consequently, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made in the Trial Division, and ruled that it was not appropriate to answer the separate question as framed by the primary judge. The Court mandated that the separate question should reflect the necessity of considering the appellant's honest belief regarding the information disclosed. The Court also granted the parties leave to exchange written submissions on the appropriate costs orders within 14 days of the publication of the reasons.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. The orders made in the Trial Division on 3 and 13 May 2019 be set aside.
3. Order that the separate question be answered “It is not appropriate to answer the question”.
4. Unless the Court is earlier notified of a consent order about costs, the parties have leave to exchange and lodge with the registry within 14 days of the publication of these reasons submissions in writing, not exceeding three pages, as to the appropriate costs orders.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondents contend that the separate question was premised upon the correct construction. They argue that the meaning given by s 14(2) to “information about conduct” applies to s 15 only in relation to the requirement in paragraph (a) that the officer has “information about the conduct”, and the question whether “the conduct” referred to in s 15(a) amounts to “official misconduct” is to be determined only by reference to that which is disclosed as a public interest disclosure. The respondents submit that, as is made clear by the word “and” between paragraphs (a) and (b) in s 15, those paragraphs describe two separate elements, each of which must be satisfied for a public interest disclosure under that section. It follows, the respondents submit, that whether the conduct about which the officer has information is official misconduct is to be decided upon an objective analysis of the information disclosed about the alleged conduct. The correct approach, the respondents submit, is to commence with an analysis of what is disclosed to ascertain whether or not it asserts that which is official misconduct and, if it does, then to decide whether or not the public officer making the disclosure “has information about the conduct” (s 15(a)); only in that last step is it relevant to apply the provision in s 14(2). The respondents submit that this is the literal meaning of those provisions and that meaning is supported by an aspect of the extrinsic material upon which the appellant relies.The construction question: consideration The method of construing a statute was recently restated by Kiefel CJ and Keane J, with whose reasons Nettle and Gordon JJ agreed, in R v A2.[12] The task is to ascertain the intended meaning of the statutory text. The construction exercise must focus upon a consideration of the statutory words in their context. The context includes surrounding statutory provisions, other aspects of the statute and the statute as a whole, any mischief in the pre-existing state of law the statute was designed to address, and an evident purpose of the statute. Under the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) an interpretation of a provision of an Act that will best achieve its purpose is to be preferred to any other interpretation,[13] and consideration may be given to extrinsic material, including a report of a Royal Commission, Law Reform Commission or similar body that was laid before the Legislative Assembly, an explanatory note or memorandum relating to the Bill, and the speech made to the Legislative Assembly by the member when introducing the Bill. The extrinsic material may be considered to provide an interpretation of an ambiguous or obscure provision, to provide an interpretation that avoids a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result of the ordinary meaning of the provision, or in any other case to confirm the interpretation conveyed by the ordinary meaning of the provision.[14][12][2019] HCA 35 at [31] – [37] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J) and at [148] (Nettle and Gordon JJ). Those reasons are not inconsistent with the reasons upon this topic of Bell and Gageler JJ at [124] and of Edelman J at [163].[13]Acts Interpretation Act s 14A.[14]Acts Interpretation Act s 14B.