SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Flori v Winter & Ors [2019] QSC 106
PARTIES:
RICKY ANTHONY FLORI
(Plaintiff)
v
DAVID BRETT WINTER(First Defendant)
PETER DOYLE
(Seventh Defendant)
DIRK PETERSEN
(Eighth Defendant)
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(Ninth Defendant)
FILE NO/S:
BS No 4178 of 2017
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Determination of a separate question
DELIVERED ON:
3 May 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
28 February 2019
JUDGE:
Bowskill J
ORDER:
The answer to the question posed for separate determination by the court is no, the letter dated 21 February 2010 is not capable of being a “public interest disclosure” under s 15 of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994, as it does not contain information about conduct that is “official misconduct” within the meaning of ss 14 and 15 of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001.
I will hear from the parties about any consequential orders, and as to costs.
CATCHWORDS:
COMMUNICATIONS LAW – WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION AND PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION – determination of a separate question under r 483 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) – where the plaintiff sent a letter to the Crime and Misconduct Commission alleging conduct engaged in by two police officers – where the plaintiff contends the letter was a public interest disclosure under s 15 of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) (repealed) and therefore the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) – whether the letter contained information about conduct which amounts to “official misconduct” under s 15 of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld) – whether the alleged conduct is “conduct” within the meaning of s 14 of the Crime and Misconduct Act – if so, whether the alleged conduct could, if proved, be a criminal offence and/or a disciplinary breach providing reasonable grounds for termination of a police officer’s services under s 15 of the Crime and Misconduct Act
STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES – GENERALLY – consideration of the meaning of the phrases “breach of the trust placed in the person” and “misuse of information or material acquired” in s 14 of the Crime and Misconduct Act – consideration of the meaning of “a place to which the public are permitted to have access” for the purposes of s 227 of the Criminal Code – consideration of the meaning of “use” of a motor vehicle in s 408A(1)(a) of the Criminal Code
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 35C
Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld) (Reprint No. 5) (now the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld)) s 14, s 15, s 20, s 21
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 227(1)(a), s 408A(1)(a)
Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) s 1.4, s 7.4(2), s 7.4(3)
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 42, s 74
Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 s 135(1)(a)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 483
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) (Reprint No. 5D) (repealed) s 3, s 7(2), s 7(3), s 14, s 15,…
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- AGLC
- Flori v Winter [2019] QSC 106
- Case
- [2019] QSC 106
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the letter did not contain information about conduct that was "official misconduct" within the meaning of sections 14 and 15 of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001. The court held that the letter did not meet the threshold for a public interest disclosure as it lacked the necessary elements of "official misconduct." The court examined the definitions of "breach of the trust placed in the person" and "misuse of information or material acquired" under section 14 of the Crime and Misconduct Act, concluding that the conduct alleged in the letter did not satisfy these criteria. The court also considered the meaning of "a place to which the public are permitted to have access" for the purposes of section 227 of the Criminal Code and the meaning of "use" of a motor vehicle in section 408A(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, but found these considerations did not alter the conclusion regarding the letter's contents.
The court dismissed Flori's claims and found that the letter dated 21 February 2010 was not capable of being a "public interest disclosure" under section 15 of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994. The court will hear from the parties about any consequential orders and the allocation of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
The answer to the question posed for separate determination by the court is no, the letter dated 21 February 2010 is not capable of being a “public interest disclosure” under s 15 of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994, as it does not contain information about conduct that is “official misconduct” within the meaning of ss 14 and 15 of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001.
I will hear from the parties about any consequential orders, and as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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