Flanagan v NSW Police Force

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WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION: Flanagan v NSW Police Force [2017] NSWWCCPD 33
APPELLANT: Jamie Flanagan
RESPONDENT: NSW Police Force
INSURER: Employers Mutual Limited
FILE NUMBER: A1-4857/16
ARBITRATOR: Mr J Wynyard
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: 12 April 2017
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: 31 July 2017
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Pleadings in the Commission; section 74 notices – Mateus v Zodune Pty Ltd t/as Tempo Cleaning Services [2007] NSWWCCPD 227; 6 DDCR 488; Sch 6, Pt 19H, cl 25 of the 1987 Act – amendment to s 4(b) of the 1987 Act pursuant to the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012, and application of the amendment to a ‘police officer’
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: Deputy President Michael Snell
HEARING: On the papers
REPRESENTATION: Appellant: Walter Madden Jenkins
Respondent: Hunt & Hunt Lawyers
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:

1.    The Certificate of Determination dated 12 April 2017 is revoked.

2.    The matter is remitted for re-determination by another Arbitrator.

3.    The respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

INTRODUCTION

  1. This matter involves an appeal by a worker, who was a police officer, against a decision by an Arbitrator that he failed to discharge his onus of proving that he suffered a psychological injury as a result of his employment over many years. The appellant was a ‘police officer’, and consequently the amendments to the Workers Compensation Acts in the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (the 2012 Amending Act) do not apply to him: Sch 6, Pt 19H, cl 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act).

BACKGROUND

  1. Jamie Flanagan (the appellant) was employed by the NSW Police Force (the respondent) from 1986 to 1994, and from about September 1997. His last day of active duties was 14 November 2013. He resigned in August 2015. His rank when he last actively carried out duties was that of sergeant. From 21 April 2015 he held the rank of senior constable.

  2. The appellant gave a history of exposure to many traumatic events during his career with the respondent. These included attending a cot death, a murder, suicides, attempted suicides, motor vehicle accidents and the recovery of bodies. He was assaulted and threatened. He said that he had problems in 1994 for which he came under the care of a psychologist. It was around this time that he initially left the Force. He worked as a real estate agent and a car salesman, before re-joining the Force in 1997.  Again, there were events which were traumatic; the appellant said that he suffered from stress, chest pain, headaches and increased blood pressure. There was a forced transfer to Bankstown in December 2008 which he stated was stressful (and which was subsequently reversed). The appellant said that his symptoms worsened in November 2011, and he again came under the care of a psychologist.

  3. The appellant said that he was “wrongly accused” of working in his wife’s bar in the Philippines in 2012,…

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Details
Case
[2017] NSWWCCPD 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Flanagan v NSW Police Force, the Court addressed a dispute between a police officer and the NSW Police Force. The appellant, Flanagan, challenged the decision of the Commission, which dismissed his appeal against the respondent's refusal to pay him statutory redundancy payments. The Commission had concluded that Flanagan was not an 'employee' under the relevant legislation, and thus not entitled to the payments. Flanagan sought to amend his pleadings to include a claim for 'redundancy benefits', which the Commission refused to allow. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the Commission's refusal to permit an amendment to the pleadings was lawful and whether the Commission's interpretation of the legislation was correct.

The central legal issues were whether the Commission correctly exercised its discretion to refuse an amendment to the pleadings and whether the Commission correctly interpreted the legislation to exclude Flanagan from receiving statutory redundancy payments. The Court needed to examine the statutory framework, including the relevant provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1987 and the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012, as well as relevant case law. The Court also had to consider whether the Commission's decision was in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

The Court found that the Commission had not adequately considered the relevant legislative provisions and had failed to apply the correct legal principles when refusing the amendment to the pleadings. The Court held that the amendment should have been allowed, as it was in the interests of justice to do so. The Court also found that the Commission's interpretation of the legislation was incorrect, and that Flanagan was entitled to statutory redundancy payments. Consequently, the Court revoked the Certificate of Determination, remitted the matter to the Commission for re-determination, and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Certificate of Determination dated 12 April 2017 is revoked.

2. The matter is remitted for re-determination by another Arbitrator.

3. The respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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