IN THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA Appeal No ALE 9 of 1999 AT SYDNEYFile No SY 3427 of 1997
BETWEEN:
JOHN EDWARD FLANAGAN
Applicant/Appellant Father
- and -
NARELLE IRENE HANDCOCK
Respondent Mother
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE FULL COURT EDITED FOR PUBLICATION
CORAM: FINN, KAY AND HOLDEN JJ DATE OF HEARING: 17 November 1999 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 2 March 2000
APPEARANCES: The Appellant Father in person.
The Respondent Mother in person.
FLANAGAN and HANDCOCK ALE 9 of 1999 Coram: Finn, Kay and Holden JJ Date of appeal: 17 November 1999 Date of judgment: 2 March 2000
CATCHWORDS: CHILD SUPPORT- Departure - natural justice - whether adequate notice given to allow claims for current years to be dealt with whilst formally dealing with claims for past years
The parties are the parents of twin daughters A and C born April 1996. The parties lived together in a de facto relationship from mid-1992 until June 1996. In the latter half of 1996 F had irregular contact with the children. From July 1997 until June 1998 there was no contact between F and the children. Otherwise there has been regular contact.
Since early 1997 there has been continuous litigation in the Family Court concerning F’s liability for child support. In January 1999 Johnston JR made departure orders that F pay child support for the 1997 year at $11,856, for the 1998 year at $10,296. In the course of proceedings he asked the mother if she wanted him to deal with the 1999 and 2000 years. He then made departure orders for the 1999 year at the rate of $10,296, and for the 2000 year at the rate of $10,296.
In May 1999 Rose J heard the father's review application against the orders of Johnston JR and an application for an injunction under s 68B Family Law Act that the mother be restrained from using a surname other than Flanagan in respect of A and C.
His Honour made some adjustments to the figures arrived at by the JR for the 1997 and 1998 years to allow for some double counting of child minding expenses and also made marginal adjustments to the 1999 and 2000 assessments. In dismissing the name change application his Honour held that the paramountcy principle applied to the exercise of s 68B(1) discretion.
On appeal, F sought leave to appeal all of the child support orders of the trial Judge, asserting (inter alia) that he had insufficient notice of a claim being made for a child support departure order for 1999 and 2000 by the mother. He also appealed the order dismissing his application for an injunction in relation to the children's surname.
Held: * Application for leave to appeal dismissed
*Appeal in relation to the refusal to grant an injunction in relation to the children's surname dismissed
Per Finn J Child support
Agreed with Kay and Holden JJ…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Flanagan & Handcock [2000] FamCA 150
Case
[2000] FamCA 150
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Full Federal Court heard an appeal concerning a dispute between Flanagan & Handcock, the applicants, and the respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation. The core of the disagreement revolved around the deductibility of certain expenses incurred by Flanagan & Handcock.
The primary legal issue before the Full Federal Court was whether the expenses in question were incurred in gaining or producing assessable income, or alternatively, whether they were outgoings of a capital, private or domestic nature, thereby rendering them non-deductible under section 8-1 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1997* (Cth).
The Court analysed the nature of the expenditure, considering the purpose for which it was incurred and its connection to the applicants' business operations. Applying established principles of tax law, the judges determined that the expenses were not sufficiently connected to the gaining or production of assessable income and were, in fact, of a capital nature. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.