Draper & Roiland
[2021] FedCFamC1F 110
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(Division 1)
Draper & Roiland [2021] FedCFamC1F 110
File number(s): DGC 1915 of 2015 Judgment of: MACMILLAN J Date of judgment: 8 October 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – where the matter proceeded on an undefended basis – where the father failed to comply with directions for the filing of trial material – where the father sent a letter to chambers on the day of the trial withdrawing his application – where the ICL opposed the mother’s proposal to change the children’s surname – where the mother’s proposed orders were otherwise unopposed – where orders made that the children spend no time with the father – where orders made restraining the mother from changing the children’s surname and requiring the mother to file the change of surname documents for the youngest child of the relationship. Legislation: Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (Vic) s 26(3)-(4)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Cases cited: Reynolds v Sherman (2015) FamCAFC 128 Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 34 Date of hearing: 14 & 17 September 2021 Place: Melbourne The Applicant: No Appearance Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Swart Solicitor for the Respondent: Schetzer Papaleo Lawyers Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Ms Agresta Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Taft Lawyers ORDERS
DGC 1915 of 2015 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR DRAPER
Applicant
AND: MS ROILAND
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
MACMILLAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 OCTOBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.All previous parenting orders be discharged.
2.The mother shall have sole parental responsibility for decisions about all “major long-term issues” (as defined in the Family Law Act1975 (Cth)) related to the children B born 2008, C born 2010, D born 2011 and E born 2013 (“the children”).
3.The children shall live with the mother.
4.The parties shall forthwith take all reasonable steps to ensure that the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages kept by the Registrar pursuant to the provisions of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (Vic) is amended so as to:
(a)Disclose the father’s paternity of the youngest child, E (if not already recorded);
(b)Change the youngest child’s surname from “E Roiland” to “E Draper”; and
(c)Ensure a fresh birth certificate is issued for the youngest child, E, disclosing the father’s paternity and his new surname.
5.The parties are at liberty to provide a sealed copy of these orders to the Registrar appointed under the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (Vic).
6.The parties are restrained from causing or permitting the children to be known by any surname other than “Draper”.
7.The mother is restrained from allowing any of the children to remain in any car, house, or other confined space in the presence of any person who is smoking.
8.The mother is restrained from causing or permitting the infliction of corporal punishment upon the children.
9.The mother is restrained from denigrating the father in the presence or hearing of the children and from permitting the children to remain in the presence or hearing of another person denigrating the father.
10.The mother shall notify the father of any medical emergency, illness or injury suffered by the children whilst in her care warranting treatment by a third party and shall authorise any treating health professionals to communicate with the father about the condition and treatment of the children.
11.The mother shall authorise and request the principals of any schools attended by the children to provide to the father, at his expense, copies of all school reports and school photograph order forms relating to the children and this order stand in the place of an authority signed by the mother and the father be permitted to provide the Principal of any school attended by any child with a copy of this order.
12.Each party shall forthwith inform the other, and keep the other informed, in writing of their respective current residential address, mobile telephone number, and email address.
13.In the event of either party notifying the police or a prescribed child welfare authority that the children, or any of them, has been or is the subject of actual or potential abuse the notifying party shall simultaneously, or as soon as possible thereafter, provide to the person to whom the notification is made:
(a)A copy of these orders;
(b)A copy of these reasons for judgment;
(c)A copy of the reasons for judgment delivered by Austin J on 22 August 2017;
(d)A copy of the Family Report dated 15 November 2016; and
(e)A copy of the Family Report dated 22 July 2021.
14.Within seven (7) days of the date of these orders the Independent Children’s Lawyer meet with the children in person or via videoconferencing to explain these orders to the children.
15.The Independent Children’s Lawyer is hereby discharged upon compliance with order 14 herein.
16.All extant applications be otherwise dismissed and removed from the list of cases awaiting hearing.
17.All documents produced to the Court pursuant to subpoena and exhibits relied upon by the parties be returned by the subpoena clerk of the Family Court of Australia, Melbourne Registry, to the person or organisation who produced same after the expiration of thirty (30) days from the date of these orders, or otherwise upon the conclusion of any appeal.
18.Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth), particulars of the obligations that these orders create, particulars of the consequences that may follow contravention of these orders, and details of assistance to comply with these orders are set out in the attached Fact Sheet, which forms part of these orders.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Draper & Roiland has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MACMILLAN J
These proceedings have a long and difficult history, including a lengthy trial before Austin J in August 2017. Although when he commenced the current proceedings the father was seeking orders for the children to live with him, on the morning of the hearing the father forwarded an email to the Court advising that he intended to withdraw his application. The mother’s application was on that basis unopposed save that the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) opposed the orders she sought with respect to the children’s surname.
Although there was no opposition to the orders sought by the mother and in particular the order that the children not spend any time with the father, I accept as submitted by counsel for the ICL that this is not necessarily a good outcome for the children particularly in the long term. As opined by Ms N (“the family report writer”) the only real benefit of not spending time with the father being to relieve the children from “constantly being exposed to parenting conflict, counter parental allegations and adult issues.”
Whilst the mother may consider that her application has been successful, hopefully the success of that application will not have the negative impact upon the children, that is one of the possible outcomes when children for whatever reason do not have a meaningful relationship with both of their parents. This is particularly concerning given Austin J’s finding in 2017 that so far as their relationship with the father was concerned “only one inference is reasonably open; they love him dearly and they regard their relationships with him to be immeasurably important.”
BACKGROUND
The mother was born in 1982 and is 39. The father was born in 1979 and is 42. The parties cohabited in 2007 and married in 2008. The length of the relationship and the date of separation is disputed, the father’s case being that they separated on 13 May 2015 whereas the mother alleges that they separated in January 2011. The parties divorced on 8 September 2016.
There are four children of the relationship, B born in 2008 and is 12, C born in 2010 and is 11, D born in 2011 and is 9, and E born in 2013 and is 8 (“the children”).
The mother also has an adult child, Ms H, from a prior relationship and three year old X born in 2018 with her fiancé Mr O (“Mr O”).
The father has an adult child, Mr K, from a previous relationship. The mother deposes that the father has been in a relationship with and has lived with Ms J (“Ms J”) since 2016 and that although he briefly separated from Ms J in January 2019, she deposes in her Affidavit filed 14 February 2020 that the father has resumed his relationship with Ms J. Ms J has two children from a previous relationship, Mr P (“Mr P”) and Q who live with her.
The proceedings commenced in 2015 when the applicant father filed an Initiating Application for parenting orders and property settlement. On 22 August 2017, Austin J made orders inter alia that:
(1)the mother have sole parental responsibility;
(2)the children spend time with the father each third weekend from 5.00 pm on Friday until 5.00 pm on Sunday, first week of the term school holidays, and each alternate week during the long summer school holidays;
(3)the child E’s surname be changed from Roiland to Draper; and
(4)the children communicate with the father via FaceTime each Wednesday at 6.00pm.
Between August 2017 and December 2018 the children spent time with the father pursuant to the orders, however in December 2018, B and C were sexually assaulted by Ms J’s son Mr P. Charges were laid in January 2019 however it was only after the criminal trial commenced in January 2021 that Mr P plead guilty and entered into a bond to be of good behaviour for 12 months. According to the family report writer B, C and E have not spent regular face to face time with the father since December 2019 and the father has no active involvement in their lives. D is reported to have had minimal communication with the father since December 2018 and the father similarly plays no active part in her life.
On 28 April 2020 Senior Registrar Field ordered inter alia that the children communicate with the father via Facetime each Wednesday for up to 60 minutes with the father to initiate the call. Senior Registrar Field also noted that the mother had failed to comply with Austin J’s order to change E’s surname to Draper and that she is required to complete the necessary documentation. According to the mother the youngest two children have had limited FaceTime calls with the father on a Wednesday since that order was made. While B has spoken to her father on some occasions, the mother deposes that B and C “have largely refused to speak with” him. The family report writer noted however that at the time of the family report interviews the mother reported that the father had not spoken to the children “for approximately the last six weeks” and that the father reported that he had “only spoken to D once or twice but has had more FaceTime opportunities with E”.
On 14 May 2021 I made the orders listing the matter for final hearing on 14 September 2021 and for the filing and serving of trial material as follows:
(1)The father file and serve an amended application and any affidavits of evidence in chief by 25 June 2021;
(2)The mother to file and serve an amended response and any affidavits of evidence in chief by 16 July 2021;
(3)The father file and serve any affidavits in reply by 30 July 2021; and
(4)The parties to file and serve a case outline on all other parties on 7 September 2021.
The father did not file any material in accordance with those orders.
On the day of the trial, as previously mentioned, the father emailed chambers effectively withdrawing his application. On that day I made orders in accordance with the mother’s minute of proposed orders and reserved my decision with respect to the children’s surnames. On 15 September 2021, the solicitor for the mother emailed my chambers requesting an amendment to the orders due to a drafting error. It having become clear that there were other drafting errors the matter was listed for mention before me on 17 September 2021. On that day, counsel for the ICL and counsel for the mother submitted that both the orders made on 14 September 2021 and Austin J’s orders made 22 August 2017 should be discharged and that save for paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Austin J’s orders which are to be replaced by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the mother’s minute of proposed orders, Austin J’s orders should be remade together with any orders I propose to make with respect to the children’s surnames. The intent being that there will be just one set of final parenting orders. There is in my view also no utility in orders being made in terms of paragraphs 11 and 12 of Austin J’s orders in circumstances where the orders otherwise make no provision for the children to spend time with the father. Similarly in so far as paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the orders restrain both parties they should, in circumstances where the children will not be spending time with the father, only refer to the mother.
MATERIAL RELIED UPON
The mother relied upon her Case Summary filed 7 September 2021, her Amended Response to final orders filed 21 June 2021, and her trial Affidavit filed 21 July 2021.
Both the mother and the ICL referred me to the Family Report dated 22 July 2021. The ICL also referred at some length to the reasons of Austin J.
Legal Principles
Pursuant to s 26(3) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (Vic) (“Births, Deaths and Marriages Act”) an application to change a child’s name can be made by one parent if:
(a)the applicant is the sole parent named in the registration of the child’s birth under this Act or any other law; or
(b)there is no surviving parent of the child; or
(c)the Court approves the proposed change of name.
The paramount consideration when considering whether to approve a proposed change of name is the child’s best interests (Reynolds v Sherman (2015) FamCAFC 128 at [54]-[55]). This was an issue that was addressed in this case during the trial before Austin J who said at [86] of his reasons as follows:
There is no onus of proof. It is for the court to balance in its discretion the factors for and against the change (see Chapman v Palmer [1978] FamCA 86; (1978) 4 Fam LR 462). That decision will be informed by such factors as the degree of identification of the child with the existing surname, and any difficulties or embarrassment for the child in using the same or a different surname. The list of factors is not exhaustive (see Flanagan v Handcock [2000] FamCA 150; (2001) FLC 93-074 at [19]–[38]; M v B [2001] FamCA 894 at [35]–[37]; Marriage of Mahony & McKenzie [1993] FamCA 78; (1993) 16 Fam LR 803).
DISCUSSION
When this matter was before Austin J in August 2017 the youngest child, who was not yet at school, was registered and known by the mother’s surname whereas the other children were all using and were known by the father’s surname. It was in this context that his Honour said at paragraph 87 of his reasons as follows:
87.The mother deposed the children have asked her why they have different surnames and she feels it is best for them to have a common surname so they feel more like “the same family unit”. Presumably the father agrees, but he wants them to bear his surname rather than the mother’s. Therefore, despite their disagreement about how it should be achieved, the parties agreed uniformity in the children’s surnames was desirable. It would be better not to change the three oldest children’s names, because that would require some re-adjustment by three of them when at least two of them are already committed to use of their existing surnames at school. It would be better to change only the youngest child’s surname because that will require only re-adjustment by him. It will be easier for him because he is still only very young and he has not yet started school. Less public notoriety attends the use of his surname than does the surname of the three oldest children.
88.Accordingly, an order is made for the parties to ensure the registration of the father’s paternity of the youngest child (if his paternity is not already a registered detail), the registration of the youngest child’s change of surname, and the issue of a fresh birth certificate in the youngest child’s new name. The parties are empowered to apply for those changes under Parts 3 and 4 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (Vic) and the parties can be compelled by mandatory injunction to make the necessary applications.
Although Austin J made orders requiring the youngest child to be registered and known by the father’s surname rather than the mother’s, the mother has failed to comply with that order and told the family report writer “that she has not changed [E’s] surname as per the Court Orders and commented that the Court Orders to change [E’s] name were not relevant Court Orders and that the subject children should have [Roiland] as their surname.” The mother did not otherwise depose as to any reasons for having failed to comply with the orders made by Austin J.
The mother also deposed as follows:
86.[B] and [C] have expressed a strong wish to change their surnames from [Draper] to [Roiland] in an apparent endeavour to disassociate themselves from what has occurred. The school has acknowledged [B] and [C’s] wishes and have facilitated the change of surname in a non-formal environment.
Notwithstanding that the two eldest children appear to be using the mother’s surname at school and the mother has not complied with Austin J’s order, I accept as submitted by the ICL that the concern now is that to allow the mother to change the children’s surnames and register those name changes and not comply with Austin J’s orders with respect to E would be likely to send a message to the children confirming the mother’s views that the father adds nothing to their lives. Counsel for the ICL referred me to Austin J’s reasons, which were delivered prior to the children being sexually assaulted by Mr P. His Honour said at paragraph [67] as follows:
As already explained, until the commencement of the trial, the mother was utterly dismissive of the father’s value to the children and advocated for his complete elimination from their lives. The Family Consultant reported that the mother’s narrative of the parties’ relationship did not reveal any consideration towards the father or the needs of the children and, further, she could not entertain the idea that the children may have different perspectives of their experiences with the father than those held and espoused by her. She lacked the capacity to consider the children were capable of and entitled to individual responses, separate from her own, and therefore had no insight. The Family Consultant considered her unable to ensure the children’s “emotional well-being”. Her enmeshment with [Ms H] and her tendency to “overload” [Ms H] with “adult information” also exhibited her stunted capacity to act in an emotionally protective way for all her children. Her grandiose, but false, allegations of the father’s violent threats to murder [Ms H] and her attempts to cajole evidence from staff at the children’s school to help prove the father’s “damage to the children” were examples of the lengths to which she was prepared to go to achieve her objective of absolute control. It is relatively clear the mother induced the children to criticise the father for misconduct when they conferred with the Family Consultant, but their allegations were wholly inconsistent with their gleeful reunion with him.
Somewhat prophetically in the circumstances Austin J said further at [68]as follows:
In cross-examination, the Family Consultant agreed the mother’s changed position about the children spending substantial amounts of time with the father could reflect her changed attitude about his retention as an important influence in their lives, but she cautioned careful evaluation of the authenticity of the alteration. She opined there was a “high possibility” it was not authentic, having regard to the former rigidity of her views about the father. She wondered whether the mother’s facilitation of the regular weekend visits under the December 2016 interim orders was only due to “the eyes of the Court…upon her”. Those doubts resonated with the father and Independent Children’s Lawyer and formed the basis of their mutual proposal for reversal of the children’s residence. It is certainly an influential feature of the evidence, but the shared doubts of the father, Independent Children’s Lawyer, and Family Consultant do not eradicate the modest success of the parenting regime over the past eight months. The mother’s deeds are liable to speak louder than her words.
The family report writer in her report said as follows:
[114]….The parties have been separated now for a significant period. However, [Mr Draper] and [Ms Roiland] appear to have been unable to work through their differences and remain adamant in their view that the other parent is to blame for the ongoing parental conflict. Neither party presented as having insight into their behaviour or the capacity to take responsibility for their role in not establishing a respectful co-parenting relationship. Instead, both parents presented as having parenting that was compromised and presented as not valuing the other parent in the children’s lives. This was particularly evidenced by [Ms Roiland], who, since the parties separated, appears not to have supported the children to have a meaningful relationship with [Mr Draper]. There is a level of bitterness, distrust, fear and anger that the parties have for each other that has negatively impacted their ability to communicate or cooperate over the care of [B], [C], [D] and [E]. Both appear to have constructed an image of the other party that is negative, and the children have likely been exposed to this behaviour over a long period.
[115]While it is noted that [B] and [C] were sexually assaulted while in the care of [Mr Draper], [Mr Draper] was a non-offending parent but appeared to have been held accountable for the incident by [Ms Roiland]. [Ms Roiland], since being notified of the sexual assault on [B] and [C] in December 2018, has ceased all face-to-face time with the children and [Mr Draper]. In discussion with [Ms Roiland], she has portrayed her actions in ceasing all face-to-face time with [Mr Draper] and the children as her being protective of the children and that this decision was in their best interest. [Ms Roiland] appeared to have little insight into the impact on the children of the ongoing disrupted relationship with [Mr Draper] and the potential negative implications this can have long term for the children’s emotional wellbeing and development.
[116]In discussion with [Mr Draper], he appeared to minimise [B] and [C’s] sexual assault and refer to it as “something happened” but not to the alleged extent. [Mr Draper] seemed to place equal responsibility for the sexual abuse on [B], [C], and [Mr P] while not considering the age difference between the children and the perpetrator. [Mr Draper’s] acrimonious relationship with [Ms Roiland] seems to have prevented him putting his issues aside in order to focus on supporting the children and validating their lived experience. The inability of [Ms Roiland] to put aside the acrimonious relationship with [Mr Draper] at the time of the sexual assault and focus on the children’s needs was also noted in the records of the New South Wales Communities and Justice and that she made derogatory comments about [Mr Draper] in the presence of the children.
It is the mother’s case that her attitude to the father at that time can be explained by the history of family violence. Counsel for the mother referred me in particular to the allegations made by the mother to the family report writer that “...[Mr Draper] had been controlling, had threatened to kill her and [Ms H] and had doused her in petrol and punched [Ms H] in the head and sexually abused…” the mother. However these were allegations of events which predated the hearing before Austin J and although the evidence was not tested during the hearing before me, his Honour expressed significant reservations about the mother’s allegations and referred to the mother’s own conduct being “redolent of ‘family violence’”. It is also the case that despite those allegations of family violence, the mother’s position at the hearing before Austin J was that the children should spend face to face time with the father.
Although the sexual assaults would no doubt have been extremely distressing for the mother and the children, I accept as submitted by the ICL that they do not necessarily explain the mother’s lack of support for the children’s relationship with the father as that was clearly the case well before those assaults. And even if as described by the family report writer the father has minimised the nature of the sexual assault, she also said in her report referring to the NSW Communities and Justice records (at [111]) as follows:
NSW Communities and Justice records indicated that during the investigation that was undertaken around the sexual assault allegations, [Mr Draper] was observed by multiple professionals to engage appropriately…” [sic]. The notes further indicated that there were concerns raised about [Ms Roiland]’ “rationality during the JCPR process” and that she appeared “focused on [Mr Draper’s] shortcomings as opposed to the well-being of [C] and [B]”. [Ms Roiland] expressed to the NSW Communities and Justice worker that she was “ending his contact” and he, a reference to [Mr Draper], would “never see the children”. NSW Communities and Justice records referred to concerns that [Ms Roiland] was making “derogatory comments calling [Mr Draper] a ‘monster’ and discussing their relationship history including allegations of violence. The notes also stated that the NSW Communities and Justice worker commented that they could hear the children in the background, which raised concerns for the emotional and psychological harm for the children being exposed to this” conversation.
As submitted by the ICL the most likely explanation for the breakdown of the children’s relationship with the father is, as described by the family report writer, as follows:
Amid the allegations of family violence and high parental conflict remains the consistent thread that [Ms Roiland] has appeared to want to remove [Mr Draper] entirely from the children’s lives and prevent him from having a meaningful relationship with the children. …[Ms Roiland] is seeking that the children change their surname from [Draper] to [Roiland], thereby removing another layer of connection to [Mr Draper].
In his reasons Austin J referred to the mother’s dismissal of the father’s role in the children’s lives. And it appears that nothing has changed. That it was part of the mother’s case that a notation should be made identifying this as a case which might found an order pursuant to s 102QB(2) of the Act or that it was a case in which an order for costs against the husband might be justified in my view highlights the mother’s lack of insight and understanding of the issues in this case. In all of these circumstances I accept the ICL’s submission that changing the children’s names will confirm in their minds what their mother is likely already telling them with respect to the father’s role in their lives.
The fact that the two eldest children have started using their mother’s surname at school, whilst a relevant consideration, carries only limited weight given the impact of the parent’s dispute and their mother’s attitude to the father upon their welfare and their exposure to the mother’s views.
Whilst the father has withdrawn his application and this will hopefully give the children some respite from the conflict that they have clearly been exposed to, he is their father. The family report writer referring to the proposed name change said (at [127]) as follows:
[Ms Roiland] appears to have tried to eradicate [Mr Draper] from the children’s lives and now seeks that [sic] children have their surname [Draper] changed to [Roiland]. [Ms Roiland] commented she has no intention to comply with the Court Orders to change [E’s] surname to [Draper] and was adamant that she would not. There are significant benefits for the children to have a relationship with both parents and that having both parent’s in their lives could have benefited their health, social and interpersonal relationships and emotional and psychological wellbeing both now and in the long term.
In all of the circumstances I am satisfied that it is not in the children’s best interests to change their surname. Whilst I am mindful of the fact that the mother has not complied with the order made by Austin J with respect to E’s surname that is not a reason why the Court should accede to her application for the discharge of that order. The Court is required to consider the benefit of making orders that are least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings, and given that there is a reasonable likelihood that the mother will not comply with the order, it is not possible to rule out the possibility of their being enforcement proceedings. However, in my view, the disadvantages of the children changing their surname and the negative message that will send to them outweigh the disadvantage of there being further proceedings. Ultimately the mother is required to comply with the Court’s orders and if she chooses not to do so her failure to comply with the orders or any decision she makes to change the children’s surnames could invite further proceedings. The likelihood of there being further proceedings in these circumstances rests to a significant extent upon the decision the mother makes as to whether she complies with these orders.
One can only hope that the mother, the father having now withdrawn from the children’s lives, will as has been suggested by the family report writer take the opportunity to reflect upon the likely impact of her behaviour and her dispute with the father upon her children. The family report writer referred in particular to the long term effects of that dispute as follows:
If the children continue to be placed in the centre of the parenting dispute, the long-term trajectory for the children is likely to be poor across a range of developmental domains such as interpersonal relationship, academically, their mental health and physical health. The mother’s desire to eradicate the father from the children’s lives must be viewed in that context.
The difficulty for the children is that even if the father is not seeking to spend time with them it is likely that they will continue to be exposed to that dispute by virtue of the mother’s attitude to the father and her desire to eradicate him from their lives.
I do not propose to make the orders the mother seeks allowing her to change the children’s surnames. The orders I propose to make will also include the orders made by Austin J with respect to E.
I also propose to make an order requiring the ICL to explain the orders that have been made to the children. The mother consented to this order.
I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Macmillan. Associate:
Dated: 8 October 2021
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