TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Trade mark application number 1347689(28) - PAIRS OF DOTS ON A SURFBOARD - in the name of Fin Control Systems Pty Ltd.
Delegate: | Nicole Worth |
Representation: | Applicant: Phillip Macken of Halfords IP |
Decision: | 2013 ATMO 75 Section 33 ex parte proceedings: section 41 – trade mark not inherently adapted to distinguish – use does not show sign has acquired, or will acquire, distinctiveness as a trade mark – application rejected. |
Background
On 26 February 2010 Fin Control Systems Pty Ltd (‘the Applicant’) filed an application to register a trade mark, relevant details of which appear below:
Trade Mark:
(‘the Trade Mark’)
Endorsement: The trade mark consists of a pattern of three pairs of circular dots located in the rear portion of the underside of a surfboard as shown in the representation of the trade mark attached to the application form. The outline of the surfboard shown in broken lines does not form any part of the trade mark.
Divisional Priority Date: 11 July 2008
Goods: Class 28: Surfboards; parts, fittings and accessories for surfboards but excluding leashes for surfboards.
The application claims a priority date of 11 July 2008 by virtue of a claim to divisional status under section 45 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’). It was divided out of now-lapsed application 1251196 which faced a ground for rejection similar to that considered in this decision.
In accordance with section 31 of the Act the application was examined and a ground for rejection under subsection 41(5) was raised on the premise that:
[The] trade mark consists of a pattern of three pairs of dots located on the rear portion of the underside of a surfboard.
The dots indicate the positions in which fins should be attached to the board and the holes or plugs through which the fins are attached. This pattern of dots is purely functional in nature, and does not appear to function as a trade mark.
Other traders should be able to use this pattern of dots in connection with goods or services similar to yours.
Despite evidence of use and submissions from the Applicant the ground for rejection was maintained. On 3 April 2013 a principal examiner indicated that “further submissions which do not result in the progression of this application will result in initiation of the rejection process”, in response to which the Applicant requested to be heard.
I heard the matter as the Registrar’s delegate in Sydney on 20 June 2013. Mr. Philip Macken of Halfords IP prepared written submissions for the Applicant and spoke at the hearing on its behalf.
Evidence
The evidence filed in respect of the application comprises:
Statutory declaration of John Dummett, Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director of SHI Holdings Pty Ltd and its subsidiary, the Applicant, with Annexures JD-1 to JD-14 dated 10 October 2012.
Statutory declaration of Thomas Carroll, professional surfer and “employee/ambassador for Quicksilver, one of the…
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- Case
- [2013] ATMO 75
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Supreme Court were whether the arbitrator had breached the rules of natural justice in conducting the arbitration, and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias. Specifically, Fin Control Systems argued that the arbitrator failed to give them a proper opportunity to present their case and that certain communications between the arbitrator and Mr. Worth gave rise to an apprehension of bias. The Court was required to consider the scope of the arbitrator's discretion in managing the arbitration process and the threshold for establishing a breach of natural justice or apprehended bias in the context of an arbitration.
Justice McDonald of the Supreme Court of Victoria applied the principles governing the setting aside of arbitration awards under the *Commercial Arbitration Act 2011* (Vic). Her Honour considered the evidence presented by Fin Control Systems regarding the alleged procedural unfairness and apprehended bias. The Court found that the arbitrator had acted within their discretion in managing the proceedings and that the communications relied upon by Fin Control Systems did not, in the circumstances, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court emphasised that the standard for setting aside an arbitration award on these grounds is high and requires a demonstrable failure to observe natural justice or a clear apprehension of bias, which was not established in this instance.
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Victoria dismissed the application by Fin Control Systems Pty Ltd to set aside the arbitration award. The award made by the arbitrator in favour of Mr. Andrew Worth was upheld.
Background
Background to the litigation
The trade mark application number 1347689, filed by Fin Control Systems Pty Ltd, came before the Australian Trade Marks Office in the form of an ex parte decision by a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, Nicole Worth. This application was initially examined and a ground for rejection under section 41(5) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 was raised, asserting that the trade mark was not inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods from those of other traders and that the Applicant had not demonstrated distinctiveness through use. Despite submissions and evidence presented by the Applicant, the principal examiner maintained the ground for rejection, leading to the Applicant's request for a hearing. The matter was then heard by the Registrar’s delegate in Sydney on 20 June 2013, with Phillip Macken of Halfords IP representing the Applicant. Following the hearing, the delegate rejected the trade mark application, concluding that the trade mark was not inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods and that the Applicant had not established that the trade mark had acquired distinctiveness through use, thereby satisfying the criteria under section 41(5) of the Act.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the trade mark inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods from those of other traders under subsection 41(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
2. If not inherently adapted to distinguish, has the trade mark acquired or will it acquire distinctiveness through use under subsection 41(5) of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
3. Can the trade mark be accepted for registration if it has not acquired distinctiveness through use under subsection 41(6) of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
Held
1. Is the trade mark inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods from those of other traders under subsection 41(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
The court concluded that the trade mark was not inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods from those of other traders. The trade mark application was rejected.
2. If not inherently adapted to distinguish, has the trade mark acquired or will it acquire distinctiveness through use under subsection 41(5) of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
The court concluded that the trade mark had not acquired distinctiveness through use and was unlikely to acquire distinctiveness through use. The trade mark application was rejected.
3. Can the trade mark be accepted for registration if it has not acquired distinctiveness through use under subsection 41(6) of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
The court concluded that the trade mark could not be accepted for registration if it had not acquired distinctiveness through use. The trade mark application was rejected.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Delegate began by considering whether the trade mark was inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods under subsection 41(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The Delegate examined the extent to which the trade mark was inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods from those of other traders and concluded that the trade mark was not inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods. The Delegate noted that the trade mark consisted of a pattern of three pairs of circular dots located on the rear portion of the underside of a surfboard. The dots indicated the positions in which fins should be attached to the board and the holes or plugs through which the fins were attached. The Delegate found that this pattern of dots was purely functional in nature and did not appear to function as a trade mark. The Delegate also noted that other traders should be able to use this pattern of dots in connection with goods or services similar to the Applicant’s goods.
Next, the Delegate considered whether the trade mark had acquired or would acquire distinctiveness through use under subsection 41(5) of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The Delegate noted that the Applicant had submitted evidence of use and submissions from the Applicant, but the ground for rejection was maintained. The Delegate also noted that despite evidence of use, the Applicant had not established that the trade mark had acquired distinctiveness through use or that it was likely to acquire distinctiveness through use. The Delegate found that the supporting declarations made by experts in the surfing industry were not sufficient to establish that the trade mark had acquired distinctiveness through use. The Delegate also found that the evidence did not show that the relevant market had been educated to understand the sign as an identifier of the origin of the goods.
Finally, the Delegate considered whether the trade mark could be accepted for registration if it had not acquired distinctiveness through use under subsection 41(6) of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The Delegate found that the trade mark could not be accepted for registration if it had not acquired distinctiveness through use. The Delegate concluded that the trade mark was not capable of distinguishing the Applicant’s goods from those of other traders and rejected the application for registration.
In summary, the Delegate found that the trade mark was not inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods from those of other traders and had not acquired distinctiveness through use. The Delegate rejected the application for registration of the trade mark under subsection 41(5) and (6) of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a trade mark consisting of a purely functional pattern of dots on the underside of a surfboard is not inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods from those of other traders and cannot be accepted for registration if it has not acquired distinctiveness through use.