Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Limited (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Limited (No 3) [2014] FCA 1182

Citation: Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Limited (No 3) [2014] FCA 1182
Parties: FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN v VALUAIR LIMITED (200302952W), TOUR EAST (T.E.T) LTD (31629391) and JETSTAR AIRWAYS PTY LTD (ACN 069 720 243)
File number(s): NSD 719 of 2012
Judge(s): BUCHANAN J
Date of judgment: 6 November 2014
Catchwords: COSTS – application for costs in matter arising under the Fair Work Act 2009 (“FW Act”) – application for costs made after judgment – whether respondents barred from recovering costs by s 570 of the FW Act – whether proceedings instituted without reasonable cause – whether applicant’s unreasonable act or omission caused the respondents to incur costs
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 570, 570(2), 570(2)(a), 570(2)(b)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
Cases cited: Clarke v Dixie Cummings Enterprises Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 987
Council of Kangan Batman Institute of Technology and Further Education v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2006) 156 FCR 275
Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Limited (No 2) [2014] FCA 759
Kanan v Australian Postal & Telecommunications Union (1992) 43 IR 257
McCracken v Phoenix Constructions (Queensland) Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 87
Date of hearing: 28 October 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 21
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms E Raper
Solicitor for the Applicant: Baker & McKenzie
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Dr CS Ward with Mr A Macauley
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Arnold Bloch Leibler
Counsel for the Third Respondent: Mr F Parry QC with Mr J Darams
Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

NSD 719 of 2012

BETWEEN:

FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN
Applicant

AND:

VALUAIR LIMITED (200302952W)
First Respondent

TOUR EAST (T.E.T) LTD (31629391)
Second Respondent

JETSTAR AIRWAYS PTY LTD (ACN 069 720 243)
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

BUCHANAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 NOVEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory applications for costs filed by the respondents be dismissed.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

NSD 719 of 2012

BETWEEN:

FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN
Applicant

AND:

VALUAIR LIMITED (200302952W)
First Respondent

TOUR EAST (T.E.T) LTD (31629391)
Second Respondent

JETSTAR AIRWAYS PTY LTD (ACN 069 720 243)
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

BUCHANAN J

DATE:

6 NOVEMBER 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 24 July 2014 I dismissed claims against the first and second respondents that they had breached the terms of a federal award, the Aircraft Cabin Crew Award 2010 (Cth) (“the Award”), and claims against the third respondent that it was knowingly concerned in breaches of the Award (Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Limited (No 2) [2014] FCA 759) (“the Judgment”).

  2. The…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Fair Work Ombudsman sought to recover costs from Valuair Limited and related parties under the Fair Work Act 2009. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether Valuair Limited and the related parties were barred from recovering costs under section 570 of the Fair Work Act. The court also needed to determine whether the proceedings instituted by the Fair Work Ombudsman were done without reasonable cause and if the Ombudsman's unreasonable act or omission caused the respondents to incur costs. The Fair Work Ombudsman argued that the respondents were not entitled to costs as the proceedings were not instituted without reasonable cause, and the respondents' costs were not caused by any unreasonable act or omission by the Ombudsman. The respondents contended that they were entitled to costs as the proceedings were instituted without reasonable cause and the Ombudsman's conduct caused them to incur costs. The court found that the Fair Work Ombudsman's case was not entirely without merit, and an application for summary judgment would not have succeeded. While the court acknowledged that some aspects of the case were artificial and unsatisfactory, it was not prepared to conclude that the requirements of section 570(2)(a) had been met. The court also found that the respondents did not meet the burden of showing unreasonable conduct by the Fair Work Ombudsman. The court held that the proceedings were not instituted without reasonable cause, and the respondents were not entitled to recover costs. The court dismissed the interlocutory applications for costs filed by the respondents. The court held that the Fair Work Ombudsman was not liable for costs to Valuair Limited and the related parties. The court's decision was based on its finding that the proceedings were not instituted without reasonable cause and the respondents' costs were not caused by any unreasonable act or omission by the Fair Work Ombudsman.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory applications for costs filed by the respondents be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Although the respondents now have a judgment which vindicates their legal arguments, one way of testing whether the applicant’s case was entirely without merit is to ask what most likely would have happened if the respondents had sought summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (which they did not). Section 31A provides (relevantly here): 31A Summary judgment… (2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if: (a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and (b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. (3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be: (a)hopeless; or (b)bound to fail; for it to have no reasonable prospect of success. I have no doubt that an application of that kind would not have succeeded. It certainly could not have been said, in my view, that the proceeding was “doomed to fail” (see Kangan). On the contrary, although I described elements of the applicant’s case as “artificial and unsatisfactory” (see [83]) and the consequence of the suggested construction of the Award as “potentially bizarre” (see [110]), those reproaches were offered after the advantage of a full trial and comprehensive written and oral submissions. Although it may be argued (and has been in this case) that the conclusions I reached should have been apparent to the losing party well in advance, that is a counsel of perfection which I am not prepared to act upon in the present case. In my view, it ought not be concluded that the requirements of s 570(2)(a) have been met. The respondents took different approaches to the requirements of s 570(2)(b). The first and second respondents complained about procedural matters arising from the service of notices to produce, pursuing issues not supported by specific evidence and requiring witnesses for cross-examination which the applicant then decided not to cross-examine, although this last aspect was not finally pressed. It would be impossible to deal with matters at this level of procedural detail without conducting an inquiry into the thinking of those advising the applicant. The first and second respondents bear the onus of showing unreasonable conduct. Raising a legitimate criticism about procedural inconsideration (which criticism I will accept at face value for the purpose of the discussion) does not suffice to make out the test in s 570(2)(b). Many twists and turns in the litigious process have the potential to generate legal, or other, costs. Those perils of litigation obviously fall within the generally intended protection given by s 570 of the FW Act. Whether that should be so is not the matter for present inquiry. The third respondent complained, in substance, that the applicant unreasonably caused it to incur costs by not discontinuing the proceedings at particular points in time when, it was submitted, it should have been obvious the applicant would lose. That argument is sufficiently covered by what I have already said.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.