Fair Work Ombudsman and Chia Tung Development Corp Ltd and Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN & CHIA TUNG DEVELOPMENT CORP LTD & ANOR [2016] FCCA 2777
Catchwords:
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Default judgment against first and second respondents based on contraventions of the FWA through failure to comply with Compliance Notices – where the respondents are based on Taiwan – where the workers live in the Philippines but worked in Australia pursuant to subclass 400 visas – where the employment was found to be sufficiently connected to Australia – where accessorial liability of the second respondent established – where it is appropriate to make orders on default judgment which vary from orders sought in Statement of Claim.

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth),ss.14, 21.

Fair Work Act 2009, ss.13, 14, 40, 47, 48, 539, 545, 550, 559, 701, 715, 716, 717

Federal Circuit Court Act 1999 (Cth), s.16
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, rr.4.03, 6.01, 9.04, 13.03
Federal Court Rules 2011, r.5.23
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r.2.40

Cases cited:

Arthur v Vaupotic Investments Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 433
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yellow Page Marketing BV (No 2) [2011] FCA 352
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.net.au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410
Controlled Consultants Proprietary Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385
Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) CLR 319
Fair Work Ombudsman and Ors v Atkins Freight Services Pty Ltd [2015] SAIRC 22

Fair Work Ombudsman v Step Ahead Security Services Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 1482

Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Limited (No 2) [2014] FCA 759
Hartnett Legal Services Pty Ltd v Ballantyne [2015] FCA 744
Hindu Society Of Victoria (Australia) Inc v Fair Work Ombudsman [2016] FCCA 221
Holmes v Balance Water Inc & Ors (No 2) [2015] FCCA 1093
Luna Park v Bose [2006] FCA 94
Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited [2015] HCA 28
Tyco(Australia) Pty Ltd t/as ADT Security v Signature Security Group. Pty Ltd (No 7) [2011] FCA 615

Applicant: FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN
First Respondent: CHIA TUNG DEVELOPMENT CORP LTD
Second Respondent: MICHAEL CHEN-FA LIN
File Number: SYG 562 of 2016
Judgment of: Judge Altobelli
Hearing date: 19 September 2016
Date of Last Submission: 19 September 2016
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 19 September 2016

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Mr O’Brien
With there being no appearance by or on behalf of the Respondents.

ORDERS

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

  1. Based on the admissions which the First Respondent is deemed to have made, by reason of its default, pursuant to sub-rule 13.03A(2) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2011 (Rules), the First Respondent contravened subsection 716(5) of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) by failing to comply with a compliance notice dated 8 January 2016 (Compliance Notice) which required the First Respondent to pay Mr Arlan Segura the amount of $26,445.29 (gross) and Mr Jeofrey Valmeo the amount of $35,465.05 (gross) by 22 January 2016 and provide evidence of the same…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 2777
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Fair Work Ombudsman (the Applicant) commenced proceedings against Chia Tung Development Corp Ltd (the First Respondent) and an individual (the Second Respondent) for alleged contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The dispute concerned the First Respondent's failure to comply with a Compliance Notice issued by an inspector, and the Second Respondent's alleged involvement in this contravention. The matter came before the Court on the Applicant's Default Judgment Application.

The Court was required to determine whether the Second Respondent was "involved" in the First Respondent's contravention of subsection 716(5) of the Fair Work Act, and whether the Applicant had established a case for relief on the facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim, given the default of both Respondents in the proceedings. A preliminary issue arose regarding whether the relevant employees were covered by Australian workplace laws, which the Applicant argued was a matter for a review application by the Respondents that had not been filed.

The Court reasoned that the Second Respondent was an intentional participant in the First Respondent's failure to comply with the Compliance Notice, and therefore was "involved" in the contravention within the meaning of subsection 550(2) of the Fair Work Act. The Court noted that subsection 716(5) is a civil remedy provision, and an inspector has standing to apply for orders under section 539. The Court found that the Applicant had made out a case for relief on the facts as pleaded, and that there were no discretionary reasons not to grant the relief sought. The Court also addressed the Respondents' failure to file a response, obtain legal representation, comply with court orders, or defend the proceedings with due diligence, concluding that both Respondents were in default.

The Court found that the First Respondent was in default under subrule 13.03A(2) of the Rules, having failed to satisfy the Applicant's claim, file a notice of address for service, file a response, or defend the proceedings with due diligence. Similarly, the Court found the Second Respondent to be in default for failing to direct compliance with court orders, comply with court orders, file a notice of address for service, file a response, or defend the proceedings with due diligence. Consequently, the Court found that the Applicant was entitled to the relief sought in its Default Judgment Application.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts summarised thus give rise to a contravention of subsection 716(5) of the FW Act. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the SOC alleged that the Second Respondent was involved in that contravention. In summary:(a)the Second Respondent was aware that the Applicant had served the Compliance Notice on the First Respondent; and(b)the Second Respondent was the person who made a decision on behalf of the First Respondent to not comply with the Compliance Notice. The Court finds that the facts summarised demonstrate that the Second Respondent was an intentional participant in the First Respondent’s failure to comply with the Compliance Notice and is thus taken to be “involved” in a contravention of subsection 716(5) of the FW Act within the meaning of subsection 550(2) of the FW Act. Subsection 716(5) of the FW Act is a civil remedy provision for the purpose of subsection 539(1) of the FW Act. Section 539 enables an inspector to apply to the Court for orders in relation to contraventions of a civil remedy provision. The Applicant is an inspector for the purposes of the FW Act, by reason of section 701 of the FW Act, and has standing to bring this proceeding (SOC, [1]). On that basis, the Court finds that the Applicant has an entitlement to the relief sought (ACCC v Dataline, [53]) in its Default Judgment Application as it has made out a case for relief on the facts of the SOC, as summarised above. There is no discretionary reason not to grant the relief sought. Whilst the Applicant submits that it is entitled to the relief sought by reason of both the First and Second Respondents’ default in these proceedings, it noted that, at the hearing of the leave application on 16 May 2016, the Court mentioned an issue raised in an email sent by the Second Respondent to Inspector Zheng on 4 February 2016 (Annexure YZ-8 to the First Zheng Affidavit) which gave rise to the question of whether the relevant employees are (or were at the relevant time) covered by Australian workplace laws (a similar point to that set out in paragraph 27(a) above). As a preliminary matter, the question of whether the Employees were covered by Australian workplace laws is, the Applicant submitted, properly a matter that would be the subject of a review application by the Respondents under section 717 of the FW Act to review the issue of the compliance notice. The Respondents have not filed any such application (SOC, [9]; First Zheng Affidavit, [18]; Second O’Brien Affidavit, [26]). Absent a review application, the belief of the Fair Work Inspector and the demand made in the Compliance Notice must stand; indeed, in circumstances of review, the person issued with the compliance notice is the party that bears the onus of proof of the facts and circumstances necessary to establish the ground that it relies upon when seeking that the court cancel or vary the notice: Hindu Society Of Victoria (Australia) Inc v Fair Work Ombudsman [2016] FCCA 221 at [34]. Inspector Zheng informed the Second Respondent of this avenue in her response on 5 February 2016 (Annexure YZ-9 to the First Zheng Affidavit).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There is no requirement for proof by way of evidence of the applicant’s claim (Arthur v Vaupotic Investments Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 433 at [3], cited in Luna Park v Bose [2006] FCA 94 at [20] and more recently in Tyco(Australia) Pty Ltd t/as ADT Security v Signature Security Group. Pty Ltd (No 7) [2011] FCA 615 at [5] and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yellow Page Marketing BV (No 2) [2011] FCA 352 (ACCC v Yellow Page (No. 2)) at [14]), and generally, an application under subrule 13.03B(2)(c) is determined on the face of the facts pleaded in the statement of claim alone. However, where discretionary relief is claimed, the Court may receive evidence relevant to the exercise of its discretion (ACCC v Yellow Page (No. 2) at [61] to [63], citing Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.net.au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665 (ACCC v Dataline) at [48] to [51]. These decisions were decided in respect of order 35A of the now repealed Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth). Rule 13.03B(2)(c) of the Rules is in identical terms to order 35A and is in similar terms to rule 5.23(2)(c) of the current Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)). Subrule 13.03A(2) of the Rules provides that a respondent will be in default for the purposes of rule 13.03B if a respondent:(a)has not satisfied the applicant’s claim; and(b)fails to:(i) give an address for service before the time for the respondent to give an address for service has expired;(ii) file a response before the time for the respondent to file a response has expired (The requirement under the Rules to file a response was found by Justice Rangiah to be a choice, however, if a respondent wished to defend the proceeding, then a response must be filed. This is relevant to any application for default judgment pursuant to subrule 13.03A(2)(b)(ii): Hartnett Legal Services Pty Ltd v Ballantyne [2015] FCA 744, [49]).(iii) comply with an order of the Court in the proceeding;(iv) file and serve a document required under the Rules;(v) produce a document as required by Part 14 of the Rules;(vi) do any act required to be done by the Rules; or(vii) defend the proceedings with due diligence. Subrule 13.03C(2) of the Rules provides that if a party to a proceeding is absent from a hearing, the Court may make an order of the kind mentioned in subrule 13.03B(2)(c), referred to above. For the purposes of the Default Judgment Application, the Applicant relied on the following provisions of the Rules:(a)rule 4.03, which requires any response filed by a respondent to be filed and served within 14 days of the application to which it relates;(b)rule 6.01, which requires a party to a proceeding to file a notice of address for service; (c)rule 9.04, which provides that, except with leave of the Court, a corporation must not carry on a proceeding unless they are represented by a lawyer; and(d)subrule 13.03A(2)(b)(vii), which provides that a respondent will be in default if they fail to defend the proceedings with due diligence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 22 August 2016, the Applicant filed its Default Judgment Application with the Court. The Court finds that the First Respondent has not:(a)filed a notice of address for service in accordance with rule 9.01 of the Rules;(b)filed a response and any defence in accordance with rules 4.03 and 4.04 of the Rules;(c)obtained legal representation or sought leave of the Court to have a person other than a lawyer represent the First Respondent pursuant to rule 9.04 of the Rules; (d)complied with the Orders of this Court made on 18 July 2016; or(e)defended the proceedings with due diligence in accordance with subrule 13.03A(2)(b)(vii). On the basis of the matters set out above, the First Respondent is in default as defined by subrule 13.03A(2) in that it:(a)has not satisfied the Applicant’s claim;(b)has not filed a notice of address for service in accordance with rule 9.01 of the Rules;(c)has not filed a response within 14 days of being served with the proceedings in accordance with rule 4.03 of the Rules, and has not filed a response in accordance with the Rules at all; and(d)has not contacted either the Applicant or the Court to propose how the matter may proceed, to seek additional time to take any steps, or to seek advice or legal representation and in doing so, has failed to defend the proceedings with due diligence. The Court finds that the Second Respondent has not:(a)directed the First Respondent to comply with the Orders of this Court made on 18 July 2016;(b)complied with the Orders of this Court made on 18 July 2016;(c)filed a notice of address for service in accordance with rule 9.01 of the Rules;(d)filed a response within 14 days of being served with the proceedings in accordance with rule 4.03 of the Rules, and has not filed a response in accordance with the Rules at all; and(e)defended the proceedings with due diligence, by failing to contact either the Applicant or the Court to propose how the matter may proceed, to seek additional time to take any steps, or to seek advice or legal representation. On 14 and 15 July 2016, the Applicant successfully made contact with the Second Respondent, who undertook to respond to the previous communications sent to both Respondents. However, there was no response (Second O’Brien Affidavit, [7]; the Second O’Brien Affidavit deposes that, after 15 July 2016, no contact was made with the Second Respondent until 10 August 2016, when the Applicant contacted the First Respondent by telephone) . On 19 July 2016, the Applicant provided the Second Respondent with a copy of the Orders made on 18 July 2016 (Annexure KO-1 to the Second O’Brien Affidavit). After further attempts to engage with the Second Respondent, the Applicant received an email from the Second Respondent on 12 August 2016 which attached a summary spreadsheet of time worked and amounts paid to the Employees, as well as a document in Mandarin that requested this Court dismiss the Applicant’s claim on the basis that the Employees:(a)entered Australia on subclass 400 visas on 3 or 4 occasions for short trips and, as the Employees were originally from the Philippines (Segura Affidavit, [2]; Valmeo Affidavit, [3]), agreed to be, and were, paid locally in the Philippines; and(b)the Employees also agreed to sign “agreement letters” to withdraw their complaints.(The original document appears at Annexure KO-X to the Second O’Brien Affidavit, whilst a certified translation appears at Annexure KO-X to the Second O’Brien Affidavit. The Translator Affidavit sets out the translation of the original document).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Some sufficient connection must be made with Australia, either so far as the constitutional corporation is concerned, or so far as its employees are concerned (Valuair, [68]). This sufficient connection must be made with the employment relationship in question, and not simply with particular work (Valuair, [75]). In summary:(a)the FW Act depends, in the first instance, upon a relationship of employment arising from a contract of employment. It is upon that legal circumstance, not just the performance of work, that the FW Act and modern awards operate (Buchanan J, from [75] to [81], set out that contracts must first exist for award entitlements, including rates of pay, to be imported into them: Valuair at [78] to [80], citing Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 420, 462);(b)awards apply to and supplement a contract of employment in a comprehensive way, and not in some partial or fragmented way (Valuair, [82] and [83]); and(c)the structure of the FW Act makes it clear that the FW Act applies to and covers “employment” or “particular employment” in relation to the NES and modern awards, respectively (Subsection 61(1) of the FW Act provides that the NES “apply to the employment of employees”; Subsections 47(3) and 48(5) of the FW Act provide that modern awards cover an “employee in relation to particular employment.) These provisions do not operate “at large” in relation to foreign employers and foreign employees, as the relevant provisions must be read in accordance with subsection 21(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act (Valuair, [86] to [90]). In Valuair, Justice Buchanan considered whether two Singapore- and Thailand-based airlines and their cabin crew employees, who performed part of their duties in Australia, were “in and of Australia” and found, at [84], that:(a)the employer was a foreign corporation;(b)the employees were not resident in Australia;(c)the contracts of employment were made outside Australia (The Applicant did not make any submission as to the proper law of the contracts set out in paragraphs [11] to [16] of the Segura Affidavit and paragraphs [17] to [28] of the Valmeo Affidavit);(d)payment of wages and taxes (and other liabilities not presently relevant to these proceedings) were made outside Australia;(e)the employees performed “tours of duty” which commenced and finished outside Australia; and(f)the workers’ time on duty in Australia represented only a small proportion of overall working time, and was transient (or “some work (a minority) within the territorial limits of Australia”, as described at [111] in respect of the application of the modern award relevant to that case). In Valuair, it was determined that there was an insufficient connection with Australia. His Honour also found that the relevant award did not apply to the employment of the cabin crew saying, at [94], that there was:“no basis upon which the Award should be construed to apply to contracts of employment made by foreign corporations and their foreign national employees, based overseas, who enter Australia on special purpose visas for short periods of time, only because some of their work (for which they are paid in their own country) is carried out within the territorial limits of Australia before they return home.” (emphasis added)