FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EUW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 744
Appeal from: EUW17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 111 File number: WAD 95 of 2019 Judge: JACKSON J Date of judgment: 27 May 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION - appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review - whether appellant deprived of opportunity to make submissions to Immigration Assessment Authority because practice direction regarding opportunity sent to wrong address - whether that error was jurisdictional error - appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 51A, 422B, 437, 438, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 473DF, 473FB, 473GA, 473GB, 473HA, 473HB, Parts 7 and 7AA, Division 3 Cases cited: BRGAI of 2008 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1302
BSQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 469
COA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 475
CRJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1404
DBE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 942
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 363 ALR 599
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; (2015) 256 CLR 326
Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] HCA 31; (2012) 246 CLR 636
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252
Date of hearing: 8 May 2019 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 65 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr FA Robertson Solicitor for the Appellant: AUM Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PR MacLiver Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
WAD 95 of 2019 BETWEEN: EUW17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
JACKSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 MAY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JACKSON J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review. The application concerned a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) which affirmed a decision by a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) refusing to grant a protection visa to the appellant.
Background
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, who is 24 years of age. He arrived in Australia by boat, disembarking at the Cocos (Keeling) Islands on 3 November 2012.
On 22 April 2016 the appellant applied for a protection…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 744
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues before the court were whether the IAA's failure to send the notification and practice direction to the correct address constituted a jurisdictional error and whether it deprived the appellant of procedural fairness. The court needed to determine whether the IAA had a duty to send these documents to the correct address and, if so, whether the error amounted to a jurisdictional flaw that invalidated the decision.
The court reasoned that while the IAA did indeed fail to send the acknowledgment letter and practice direction to the correct address, this did not result in a jurisdictional error or a denial of procedural fairness. The court found that the relevant sections of the Migration Act did not mandate the IAA to send the practice direction to the appellant, nor did they require the IAA to provide an opportunity for submissions. Furthermore, the appellant had access to the practice direction through other means and was not deprived of the opportunity to make submissions. The court relied on the principle that procedural fairness does not necessitate that the IAA send the practice direction to the correct address, especially since the practice direction was publicly accessible and the appellant was aware of it before the IAA made its decision.
Given the reasoning above, the court concluded that the appeal was without merit. The appellant's argument that the IAA's error amounted to a jurisdictional error was rejected, as was the argument that the error deprived him of procedural fairness. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There are particulars which specify the mistake in sending the Practice Direction which I have already described above and allege that by sending the acknowledgement of referral to the wrong address, the IAA 'deprived the applicant [sic] of an opportunity to comply with the Practice Direction and provide a submission to the IAA when conducting the review'.Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA The appellant's case rested on a contention that in sending the acknowledgement letter to the wrong address, the IAA breached a requirement to afford procedural fairness which Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ identified in the following passages from Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 363 ALR 599:[27]The Minister concedes that the consequences for a review under Pt 7 of the Secretary notifying the Tribunal that s 438 applies in relation to a document or information are sufficient for the common law to imply an obligation of procedural fairness on the part of the Tribunal to disclose the fact of notification to the applicant for review unless such an obligation is specifically excluded by the statutory scheme. The concession is rightly made....[29]The reason why the Minister's concession is correct is that procedural fairness ordinarily requires that an applicant for an exercise of administrative power have an opportunity to tailor the presentation of evidence and the making of submissions to the procedure to be adopted by the decision-maker. Accordingly, procedural fairness ordinarily requires that an applicant be apprised of an event which results in an alteration to the procedural context in which an opportunity to present evidence and make submissions is routinely afforded.(citations omitted) In the present case, the appellant submits, Part 7AA of the Act was the procedural context in which an opportunity to present evidence and make submissions was routinely afforded by the IAA. Part 7AA makes no provision for submissions from an applicant. It was said that the making of the Practice Direction was an event that resulted in an alteration to that routine procedural context. That is because the Practice Direction conferred an opportunity to make submissions which was absent from Part 7AA. Failing to apprise the appellant of the content of the Practice Direction thus denied to the appellant what was referred to in counsel's submissions as a common law obligation of procedural fairness. It is in this sense that it is maintained, by way of ground 1, that the appellant was deprived of the opportunity to make submissions to the IAA on the review. The point was not put this way before the Federal Circuit Court; SZMTA was decided after the primary judge delivered his reasons in this matter. However the Minister did not object to it being raised in that way in this court, so I will deal with it on that basis. For the following reasons, I do not consider that the principle identified in the passages from SZMTA which I have quoted helps the appellant here.