COA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 21 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

COA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2018] FCA 475 

Appeal from: COA16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 838
File number: NSD 704 of 2017
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 27 February 2018
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7, Pt 7AA, Div 3, Subdiv C, ss 5J, 36, 46A, 424, 473BA, 473CA, 473CB, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473GA, 473GB

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 

Cases cited:

COA16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 838

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 610

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 347 ALR 405

Date of hearing: 27 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 45
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

NSD 704 of 2017
BETWEEN:

COA16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The first respondent be granted leave to rely on the notice of contention filed on 19 January 2018.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal except the costs of producing the appeal book.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse the appellant Constitutional writ relief against the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority given on 16 August 2016, that affirmed the Minister’s delegate’s decision of 8 July 2016 to refuse to grant the appellant a safe haven enterprise (class XE) (subclass 790) visa for protection under s 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth): COA16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 838.

    Background

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived here as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 26 August 2012.  The Minister allowed the appellant, under s 46A, to apply for the visa.

  3. The appellant’s claims, both before the delegate and the Authority, included that he feared that he would suffer significant harm for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) were he to return to Sri Lanka and be detained in prison as a failed asylum seeker.  Those claims are no longer sustainable based on the findings of the delegate and the Authority, and the decisions of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 610 and SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 347 ALR 405. I need not deal with them further in these reasons except to note that they formed the basis for ground 2 of the appellant’s notice of appeal in this…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read COA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 475
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of COA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, who had been a resident in Australia, sought to appeal against a decision made by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellant's claims to protection were based on past experiences in Sri Lanka, specifically his Tamil ethnicity, Catholic faith, and alleged involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the civil war. The delegate had accepted most of the appellant's claims regarding his and his wife's experiences in Sri Lanka but found that the appellant could not be returned to Sri Lanka because he would face restrictions and discrimination as a fisherman amounting to persecution.

The legal issues that the court was required to decide included whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had a duty to provide an opportunity for the appellant to provide new information or make submissions, and whether the appellant's claims of persecution based on his alleged involvement with the LTTE and subsequent restrictions as a fisherman were valid. The court also had to consider whether the evidence before the AAT indicated that the situation in Sri Lanka was "fluid" and that the AAT had failed to consider a real possibility that the Sri Lankan authorities would increase restrictions and discrimination on Tamil fishermen in the north.

The court found that the AAT had no obligation to afford an applicant any opportunity to provide new information or put submissions to it, as per the relevant sections of the Migration Act. The court also found that the appellant's claims of persecution were not substantiated, as the evidence did not support the appellant's claims of ongoing harassment or restrictions as a fisherman amounting to persecution. The court further found that the appellant's involvement with the LTTE during the civil war did not warrant a finding of persecution, as the Sri Lankan authorities did not consider the appellant to be a member or supporter of the LTTE.

As a result of the court's reasoning and findings, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal except for the costs of producing the appeal book. The first respondent was granted leave to rely on the notice of contention filed on 19 January 2018. Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent be granted leave to rely on the notice of contention filed on 19 January 2018.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal except the costs of producing the appeal book.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant is a Tamil Catholic fisherman from Sri Lanka who had been providing low-level support to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by transporting food, fuels, and medicines within the Mannar District on his fishing boat from about 2004 to 2007. He claimed to have been interrogated by the Sri Lankan Army, navy, and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in February 2008, held for about eight hours, and subsequently released. The appellant further claimed that he had participated in a Tamil festival and made verbal statements about the Sri Lankan Government during the ceasefire in the civil war between 2002 and 2006. The appellant's wife had also been involved with the LTTE from 1985 to 1991 and was monitored but never harmed by Sri Lankan authorities. The delegate accepted most of the appellant's claims regarding his past experiences in Sri Lanka but found that the appellant had not been physically assaulted during his interrogation and had been released because the authorities did not find him to be an LTTE member or sympathiser.

The matter came before the court as an appeal against a decision of the delegate under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appeal was heard by the court, which reviewed the decision of the delegate and the subsequent decision of the Authority. The appeal was based on two grounds, one of which was found to be without merit due to previous decisions. The appellant argued that he could not be returned to Sri Lanka because he would face restrictions and discrimination as a fisherman amounting to persecution, and that the Authority had failed to consider that there was a real possibility that the Sri Lankan authorities would increase the restrictions and discrimination placed on Tamil fishermen in the north.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The delegate accepted most of the appellant’s claims as to his and his wife’s past experiences in Sri Lanka, on which he based his claims to protection, other than those on which he relied as having occurred immediately before he left and subsequently. The delegate’s decision The delegate found that the appellant and his family resided in the Mannar District in the northern province of Sri Lanka, he was ethnically a Tamil of Catholic faith and had been a fisherman who had continually practiced his trade for all his working life since the early 1980s. He found that the appellant’s wife and children had subsequently moved to the Vavuniya District and that she had continued to work there, where they had experienced no problems. He found that that no one had sought the appellant’s whereabouts from his family or others since he departed for Australia. The delegate found that the appellant claimed to fear harm on the basis of his Tamil ethnicity, his religion as a Catholic, and his activities during the Sri Lankan civil war from 1990 to 2007 when he provided low level support to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for payment by transporting food, fuels and medicines within the Mannar District on his fishing boat. The delegate found that from about 2004 to 2007, the appellant had to assist the LTTE between three and 10 times per month, being paid for each such activity. He claimed that, as a result of those activities, he would be imputed with a political opinion or being a member of a particular social group that supported the LTTE. He also claimed that he had been interrogated in February 2008 when the Sri Lankan Army had advanced to his home region and that he had been held and interrogated for about eight hours by the army, navy and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) before being released to return to the community. He claimed that he had also participated in a Tamil festival and made verbal statements about the Sri Lankan Government during the ceasefire in the civil war between 2002 and 2006. He claimed his wife had been involved with the LTTE from 1985 to 1991 and that she had been monitored, but never harmed, by Sri Lankan authorities. The delegate accepted the factual basis for all of those claims. He found that the appellant had provided low level support to the LTTE during the conflict through his transportation activities. He found that the Sri Lankan authorities did not consider the appellant to be a member or supporter of the LTTE. The delegate also noted that the appellant had claimed to have suffered some harm from the Indian Army prior to its departure from Sri Lanka in 1991 but that he no longer feared harm from them were he to return to Sri Lanka because the Indian Army was not present there. The delegate also accepted that the appellant had departed Sri Lanka illegally and, if returned, would be viewed as a failed asylum seeker but he had had no involvement in people smuggling activities himself. The appellant had claimed that despite his release by the army in February 2008, following his eight hours of questioning, the Sri Lankan authorities had imputed to him that he had links with the LTTE. The delegate found that, on his own admission, the appellant had not been physically assaulted and had been released, after being questioned, by the authorities on the same day in February 2008 as he came to their attention and that that happened because the Sri Lankan authorities did not find or suspect him to be an LTTE member or sympathiser.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The notice of appeal asserted two grounds, the second of which, as I noted above, cannot succeed because of the decisions in WZAPN 2524 CLR 610 and SZTAL 347 ALR 407. The first ground of appeal asserted that the appellant could not be returned to Sri Lanka because he would face restrictions and discrimination as a fisherman amounting to persecution based on the Authority’s findings of the harassment that it accepted he may face. The ground also contended that the evidence before the Authority indicated that the situation in Sri Lanka was “fluid” and that the Authority had failed to consider, and thereby fell into a jurisdictional error, that there was a real possibility that the Sri Lankan authorities would increase the restrictions and discrimination placed on Tamil fisherman in the north.Consideration It is convenient to deal first with the notice of contention. Relevantly, in a case like the present, s 473DB(1) provided that, subject to Pt 7AA, the Authority had to review a fast track reviewable decision, such as the delegate’s, that the Minister had referred to it under s 473CA, by considering the material that the Secretary provided it under s 473CB. Importantly, s 473DA(1) provided that Div 3 of Pt 7AA (and ss 473GA and 473GB which are not relevant to this appeal) was deemed to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Authority. Next, s 473DB(1) provided that, subject to Pt 7AA itself, the Authority had to review the delegate’s decision on the papers without accepting or requesting any new information and without interviewing the applicant for a visa. Subdivision C of Div 3 of Pt 7AA limited the receipt of new information by the Authority to those instances identified in s 473DD, namely, that the Authority had to be satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify it considering the new information and, where relevant, the visa applicant satisfied the Authority that, in relation to any new information that he or she gave or proposed to give it, that information, first, was not and could not have been provided to the Minister or his delegate before the decision under review had been made and, secondly, was credible personal information that was not previously known and had it been known, may have affected the consideration of that applicant’s claims. His Honour did not identify the source of any obligation of procedural fairness that required the Authority to afford an applicant, in the circumstances, any opportunity to provide new information or put submissions. There is nothing in Pt 7AA that prevents an applicant for a visa putting submissions or providing whatever he or she wishes to the Authority for it to consider as new information. However, the material before me does not suggest that, in the circumstances, Pt 7AA imposed on the Authority any obligation to afford an applicant any opportunity to provide new information or put submissions to it.