Engine Protection Equipment Pty Ltd v Miller - [2017] WADC 71

JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: ENGINE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT PTY LTD -v- MILLER [2017] WADC 71

CORAM: SCOTT DCJ

HEARD: 7 APRIL 2017

DELIVERED : 26 MAY 2017

FILE NO/S: APP 98 of 2016

BETWEEN: ENGINE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT PTY LTD
Appellant
AND
RONALD CRAIG MILLER
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :  WORKERS' COMPENSATION ARBITRATION SERVICE (WA)
Coram  :ARBITRATOR EKANAYAKE
File No  :A 32400 of 2016

Catchwords:

Workers' compensation appeal - Compensable knee injury - Worker on return to work program - Knee collapsed resulting in fall which aggravated asymptomatic degenerative back condition - Application of s 19(1)(b) of Act - Whether resulting back injury personal injury by accident - Entitlement of further prescribed amount

Legislation:

Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) s 5(1), s 19, s 247 sch 1 cl 17

Result:

Leave to appeal granted
Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: Mr A Basile
Respondent: In person

Solicitors:

Appellant: SRB Legal
Respondent: Not applicable

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Srdic (1982) 66 FLR 41
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139
BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Brady [2008] WASCA 250
Cole v P & O Ports Ltd [2002] WASCA 157
Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452
Leggett v Argyle Diamond Mines Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 182
March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506
McNair v Press Offshore Ltd (1997) 17 WAR 191
Pacific Industrial Co v Jakovljevic [2008] WASCA 60
Rosmini v Chrysler (1973) 6 SASR 212
Royal Perth Hospital (Unreported, WASCA, Library No 970648, 5 December 1997)

SCOTT DCJ: This is an application for leave to appeal and an appeal against the decision of Arbitrator Ekanayake to order the appellant to pay weekly payments to the respondent for total incapacity resulting from a back injury sustained by him on 12 April 2011.

Background

The respondent suffered a left knee injury on 9 November 2009 in the course of his employment with the appellant (knee injury).
The respondent made a claim for workers' compensation pursuant to the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (Act) relating to the knee injury. The appellant accepted liability for the knee injury and weekly payments for the knee injury were made until 12 December 2014 when the respondent reached the prescribed amount pursuant to the Act.
On or about 19 January 2011 the respondent commenced a return to work program at host employer Bunnings during which on 12 April 2011 his knee gave way resulting in the respondent falling and striking a pallet with his right buttock which caused his previously asymptomatic lumbar spine degeneration to become symptomatic and a compromise of his L5 nerve root resulting in him suffering from sciatica (back injury).
The appellant's insurer was notified of the back injury and accepted liability on or about 11 February 2015.…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Engine Protection Equipment Pty Ltd v Miller and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2017] WADC 71
Decision Date: 26 MAY 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Engine Protection Equipment Pty Ltd v Miller involved a dispute between an employer and a former employee over workers' compensation benefits. The employee, Miller, had sustained a knee injury at work and was on a return-to-work program when his knee collapsed, causing him to fall and aggravate an asymptomatic degenerative back condition. The primary legal issue was whether Miller's back injury was a "personal injury by accident" under section 19(1)(b) of the Workers Compensation Act. The secondary issue was whether Miller was entitled to a further prescribed amount of compensation after the initial prescribed amount had been exhausted.

The Court examined the nature of Miller's injuries and determined that the collapse of his knee constituted an external force causing a sudden physiological change, which led to his back injury. The Court found that this sudden change rendered Miller's previously asymptomatic lumbar spine degeneration symptomatic, satisfying the criteria for a "personal injury by accident." The Court emphasized that the sudden physiological change was not the inevitable consequence of a progressive disease, and Miller's long-standing pre-existing lumbar spine degeneration did not preclude him from claiming he suffered a personal injury by accident. The Court concluded that Miller's current incapacity resulted from his compensable injury, and therefore, he was entitled to weekly payments for incapacity that 'result from the injury.'

The Court further examined whether Miller was entitled to a second prescribed amount after the first had been exhausted. The Court determined that Miller's total incapacity continued following his back injury, and as such, he remained entitled to his full entitlement to compensation. The Court concluded that Miller was entitled to a second prescribed amount as his incapacity after 12 December 2014 resulted from the back injury.

In summary, the Court found in favor of Miller, holding that his back injury was a personal injury by accident and that he was entitled to further compensation beyond the initial prescribed amount.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Consistent with the meaning of 'personal injury by accident' referred to by Toohey J in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Srdic (1982) 66 FLR 41, 43 – 44, the arbitrator found:(i)the respondent suffered an external force that caused a sudden physiological change, that being his knee gave way resulting in him hitting a pallet with his right buttock causing his previously asymptomatic lumbar spine degeneration to become symptomatic;(ii)the respondent was then in the course of his employment in the extended sense contemplated by s 19(1)(b) of the Act;(iii)the sudden physiological change rendered a previously asymptomatic condition symptomatic and was not the inevitable consequence of a progressive disease; and(iv)the respondent's long standing pre‑existing lumbar spine degeneration did not preclude him from claiming he suffered a personal injury by accident. The arbitrator was satisfied that the respondent suffered a personal injury by accident on 12 April 2011. The arbitrator observed that pursuant to s 21 and sch 1 cl 7 of the Act a worker is entitled to payment of weekly payments for incapacity that 'results from the injury'. As to that expression his Honour referred to Leggett v Argyle Diamond Mines Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 182; Rosmini v Chrysler (1973) 6 SASR 212 and Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452 from which he distilled the relevant question to be whether the respondent's current incapacity resulted from his compensable injury and in determining whether one resulted from the other. What was required was a common sense evaluation of the causal chain. The arbitrator observed that it was common ground that if it were not for the knee injury, the respondent's knee would not have given way and he would not have injured his back and as such in that sense the causal chain remained unbroken and any incapacity resulting from the back injury, in effect resulted from the knee injury. He said that had the respondent suffered his back injury when he was at home (and therefore otherwise non‑compensable) there would be little doubt that his weekly payments for total incapacity would have continued as the continuing incapacity resulted from his knee injury. The difficulty, as he found, was that the respondent suffered a second compensable injury that contributed to the respondent's incapacity. To that end he observed that when the respondent suffered his back injury he had regained some capacity but was still in receipt of weekly payments for total incapacity which simply continued following his back injury. The arbitrator said that the respondent's total incapacity simply continued following his back injury and as he remained totally incapacitated he received his full entitlement to compensation. He posed as the relevant question whether the respondent was entitled to a second prescribed amount when the first prescribed amount had been exhausted. That is, having found that the respondent suffered a personal injury by accident on 12 April 2011, did his incapacity after 12 December 2014 (when the first prescribed amount had been exhausted), result from the back injury and if so, was he entitled to a new prescribed amount from that time?