EMR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EMR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 810

Appeal from: EMR17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3968
File number: VID 9 of 2019
Judge: WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 31 May 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court – no specific error by Federal Circuit Court alleged – reliance on the merits – new arguments raised – no merit to new arguments – appeal dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) r 36.03

Cases cited:

AAM15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 452

BZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 995

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51; 115 ALD 303

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189

SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 222 FCR 73

VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 6 May 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 34
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person.
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Barrington
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance.

ORDERS

VID 9 of 2019
BETWEEN:

EMR17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WHEELAHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 MAY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant’s draft notice of appeal received by the Court on 8 January 2019 stand as the notice of appeal, and be taken to have been filed on 8 January 2019.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WHEELAHAN J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court made 12 December 2018 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 8 September 2017. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

  2. On 8 January 2019, the appellant filed an application for an extension of time within which to appeal, together with a draft notice of appeal. While r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) provided for a period of 21 days within which an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court must be filed, r 1.61(5) discounts any day starting 24 December and ending 14…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 810
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of EMR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision to reject her application for a protection visa. The appellant claimed that she was threatened by high-ranking Sri Lankan police officers and received death threats from top government bodies and underworld figures in Sri Lanka because of her refusal to withdraw from the Masters Athletics Games in Australia. The Tribunal found that the appellant’s claims for protection were embellished and inconsistent, and therefore rejected her claims. The appellant appealed the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which dismissed her appeal.

The court had to decide whether the appellant’s claims were sufficient to overturn the Tribunal’s decision. The court found that the appellant’s claims were not supported by evidence and were inconsistent with her own statements. The court also found that the appellant’s new arguments raised issues of the merits of her claim, which could not be considered on appeal. The court held that the appellant had not identified any error by the Federal Circuit Court or jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal.

In summary, the court found that the appellant’s claims for protection were not credible and did not support her application for a protection visa. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant’s draft notice of appeal received by the Court on 8 January 2019 stand as the notice of appeal, and be taken to have been filed on 8 January 2019.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant was self-represented before the Court, and addressed the Court through an interpreter. The Minister was represented by counsel, and the Tribunal filed a notice submitting to any order of the Court, save as to costs.Background The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who applied for a protection visa on 16 October 2013, after having travelled to Australia. On 13 February 2015, her protection visa application was refused. The appellant claimed that the purpose of her travel was to participate in the Masters Athletics Games at Geelong, Victoria. The appellant claimed that she was an inspector of police in the President’s Security Service Unit in Sri Lanka. Her interest in athletics competitions and successful participation in Police Department competitions over the years led to her being selected to compete in the annual Masters Athletic Games on a number of occasions. The appellant claimed that in 2013 Sri Lankan officials sought to block her participation in the Games, because they wanted other persons to travel to Australia under the guise of competing in the Games, but then be able to migrate to Australia. The appellant claimed that she was threatened by high ranking police officers and told to withdraw from the team so that others would have the chance to travel to Australia. The appellant claimed that she refused to withdraw from the Games, and obtained a visa and travelled to Australia. The appellant claimed that after arriving in Australia she was verbally and physically abused and received death threats. The appellant claimed that these death threats came from top government bodies and underworld figure in Sri Lanka. The appellant also claimed that she was told by members of her family living in Sri Lanka that after her arrival in Australia, unknown people had attended her home in Sri Lanka asking for her and threatening her family. A delegate of the Minister refused the appellant’s application for a visa, and the appellant then sought review by the Tribunal.The Tribunal’s decision The appellant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 23 August 2016 to give evidence and to present arguments, and evidence was also taken from three witnesses by telephone from Sri Lanka. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant was associated with sporting activities in the Police Department over a period of 33 years, and that she represented Sri Lanka at the Masters Games in 2006 and 2012. The Tribunal accepted in a general sense that irregularities could occur in the selection process for the Masters Games, and that selection and travel for the Games was sought after. However, the Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s claim that her Visitor’s Visa was rejected on her initial application because a petition had been made against her by people hostile to her travel. The Tribunal considered that the appellant’s credibility was affected by what it considered was the embellishment of her claims for protection. The Tribunal found that the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent in relation to whether her name was omitted from a Police Department list of members selected for the team. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s evidence in respect of this claim was shifting and inconsistent, and did not support her claim that people tried to prevent her travel. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claim that people with influence tried to prevent her participation in the team.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

A delegate of the Minister refused the appellant’s application for a visa, and the appellant then sought review by the Tribunal.The Tribunal’s decision The appellant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 23 August 2016 to give evidence and to present arguments, and evidence was also taken from three witnesses by telephone from Sri Lanka. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant was associated with sporting activities in the Police Department over a period of 33 years, and that she represented Sri Lanka at the Masters Games in 2006 and 2012. The Tribunal accepted in a general sense that irregularities could occur in the selection process for the Masters Games, and that selection and travel for the Games was sought after. However, the Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s claim that her Visitor’s Visa was rejected on her initial application because a petition had been made against her by people hostile to her travel. The Tribunal considered that the appellant’s credibility was affected by what it considered was the embellishment of her claims for protection. The Tribunal found that the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent in relation to whether her name was omitted from a Police Department list of members selected for the team. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s evidence in respect of this claim was shifting and inconsistent, and did not support her claim that people tried to prevent her travel. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claim that people with influence tried to prevent her participation in the team. The Tribunal expressed other doubts in relation to the appellant’s credibility, particularly in relation to whether she travelled to Australia primarily to participate in the Masters Games. This view was informed by discrepancies in the appellant’s evidence and the fact that she arrived after her event in the competition had already taken place. The Tribunal considered that the appellant’s explanation for her travel after her events took place to be unconvincing, and ultimately did not accept that the appellant came to Australia with the purpose of participating in the Masters Games, finding that the appellant was not a witness of truth in relation to that matter. The Tribunal accepted the evidence of a colleague of the appellant at the Sri Lankan Police, who was an Inspector of Police, that the appellant’s sister had made a report to him in October 2013 after the appellant had left for Australia, that individuals had attended her house asking about the appellant and threatening the appellant. However, the Tribunal did not consider that the police officer’s report was evidence that the appellant had been threatened, as he was not a witness to the event. The Tribunal did not accept that a similar incident had occurred at the appellant’s cousin’s house, indicating that both reports raised credibility issues. In relation to the appellant’s cousin, the appellant had claimed in her statutory declaration in support of her visa application that after arriving in Australia her sister and “brother” had told her that unknown people had trespassed into her home, asked for her, and threatened her family. The appellant produced a translation of a report to the police by a person who referred to the appellant as his “sister”. The Tribunal noted that the appellant did not have any brothers, and ascertained from the appellant that the person was not her brother, but her cousin. The Tribunal stated that it formed the view that the person providing the report was seeking to strengthen his credentials as a close relative of the appellant. The Tribunal further stated that the place where the incident at her cousin’s house was alleged to have occurred was some distance from the appellant’s residence, and did not accept the appellant’s explanation that she had sometimes stayed there when she was a police officer, and that the people who made the threats would have all their addresses. The Tribunal found that the report by the appellant’s cousin was contrived. The Tribunal set out extracts from the translations of the separate reports of the appellant’s sister and her cousin, and noted the high level of similarity in language, expressions, and content in relation to what were claimed to be two different incidents which the Tribunal stated raised significant concerns about their credibility. The Tribunal considered that the appellant’s own responses to questions about these incidents was vague and limited, leading it to the view that the appellant was not a witness of truth. Ultimately, the Tribunal formed the view that the claimed threats did not reflect incidents that actually occurred, and did not accept that the appellant’s sister and cousin were the subject of abuse or threats of any kind.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the appellant submitted that the situation in Sri Lanka was now quite different to the situation that had existed when she filed her written submissions.Consideration The starting point is to recognise that this proceeding is an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court. The evident purpose of Part 8 of the Migration Act is to limit the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia in relation to judicial review of migration decisions, and to vest much of that jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit Court: AAM15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 452 at [14]. That purpose would be defeated if appeals to this Court were treated as hearings de novo where judicial review proceedings could be argued afresh. The Court has a practice of requiring that leave be sought to raise new arguments on appeal. Leave to raise a new argument may be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so: VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [46]. Typically, in considering whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to allow a new point to be raised on appeal, the Court may consider any explanation for the point not having been raised at first instance, the merit of the point, and whether there is any prejudice to other parties in allowing the point to be raised on appeal: VUAX at [48]. The appellant’s grounds of appeal, which I have set out at [16] above, do not in terms allege any particular error by the primary judge. There were three reasons why the primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application. First, the appellant had not identified anything that would indicate a failure by the Tribunal to afford her procedural fairness. Second, the appellant had not persuaded the primary judge that the Tribunal had failed to take into account a statement by a police officer, because the Tribunal had referred to the evidence of that police officer at [74] of its reasons. Third, the appellant’s submissions otherwise were concerned with the merits of the Tribunal’s decision rather than jurisdictional error. The appellant was self-represented, and there was also much that the appellant put to this Court that was concerned with the underlying merits of her claim for a protection visa. I shall, nonetheless, address four points which the appellant raised in submissions, namely –(1)her claim that that her sister was admitted to a mental health facility in August 2018 as a result of ongoing harassment from an unknown gang;(2)a submission that the Tribunal had misunderstood her evidence in relation to her cousin to whom she had referred as her brother;(3)a submission concerning the evidence that the appellant should not return to Sri Lanka; and(4)that the situation in Sri Lanka is now quite different.The first submission The appellant’s claim that her sister had been subjected to ongoing harassment from an unknown gang, including alleged damage to property, and her sister’s admission to a mental health institute, do not raise any question of error by the Federal Circuit Court, or jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. These claimed events concern the underlying merits of the appellant’s claim, and the events post-date the decision of the Tribunal. As I have recorded at [18] above, the appellant claimed that she presented these events to her agent, which I take to mean the immigration agent who prepared written submissions for the appellant and attended the hearing before the Tribunal. Given that the events appear to post-date the Tribunal’s decision, I am not satisfied that they were matters that could have been conveyed to the agent before the Tribunal published its decision. Further, the appellant alleges neglect by her agent, but negligence or incompetence by a party’s representative is not a basis on which to set aside the Tribunal’s decision: SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 222 FCR 73 at [52], [57]; SZFDE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189, at [53]. The appellant would have to establish some fraud on the Tribunal, and this did not form part of her submissions. In any event, the appellant did not raise these matters before the Federal Circuit Court. I am not satisfied that there is any merit in the point, and I refuse leave to the appellant to raise it before this Court.The second submission