EDK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EDK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1258

Appeal from: EDK17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 708
File number: NSD 467 of 2018
Judge: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 22 August 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where IAA found applicant did not meet criteria for grant of a visa on complimentary protection grounds  – where appeal to FCC was that the IAA had made a legally unreasonable finding of fact – where there was sufficient material before the IAA to support its conclusions – whether primary judge made an unreasonable finding of fact – held, considering evidence no real risk of significant harm – no unreasonableness
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

BTW17 v Minister for Immigration (2018) 353 ALR 657

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Date of hearing: 20 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 25
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr O Jones
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 467 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EDK17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 AUGUST 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court (FCC) of 12 March 2018 which dismissed an application for review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) made on 23 June 2017.  By that decision the IAA affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) refusing to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) Visa (SHEV).

  2. Before this Court the sole ground of appeal is:

    The primary judge erred by concluding that the Authority had not made a legally unreasonable finding of fact with respect to the question of whether the applicant would be located by the family of his alleged victim in Beirut, in circumstances where there was material before the Authority and otherwise relied upon by the Authority which supported the conclusion that the applicant would be so located.

  3. That issue relates to the appellant’s claim that he was entitled to a SHEV based upon the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act). 

    Background

  4. The appellant is a citizen of Lebanon.  He is a Sunni Muslim…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1258
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of EDK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a citizen of Lebanon, sought judicial review of the Federal Circuit Court's decision to dismiss his appeal against the refusal of a subclass 417 visa under the complementary protection provisions. The appellant argued that the Immigration Appeals Authority (IAA) had made a legally unreasonable finding of fact regarding the likelihood of his alleged victim's family locating him in Beirut, Lebanon, if he were to be returned. The court was required to determine whether the IAA's decision was legally unreasonable and if the appellant's claim under the complementary protection provisions was valid.

The Federal Circuit Court examined the IAA's decision, which concluded that there was no substantial ground for believing that the appellant would suffer significant harm if returned to Lebanon, as he could safely relocate to Beirut. The IAA found that the appellant's family name was uncommon, the alleged victim's family had no links or influence in Beirut, and there was no evidence that the family could locate the appellant based on his Facebook comments. The court considered the appellant's argument that there was ample evidence to show that the alleged victim's family could locate him in Beirut, but rejected this submission. The court held that the IAA's conclusion was based on sufficient material and was not legally unreasonable.

The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the IAA's decision was not legally unreasonable and that there was no real risk of significant harm to the appellant if returned to Lebanon. The court ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

That issue relates to the appellant’s claim that he was entitled to a SHEV based upon the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act). Background The appellant is a citizen of Lebanon. He is a Sunni Muslim from the Northern District of that country. His parents and 12 of his siblings remain living in that location. He claims that in 2013 he fled Lebanon because he was threatened by the militant group Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN). He travelled legally from Lebanon to Indonesia. From there he travelled by boat to Christmas Island, destroying his passport along the way. One of his brothers travelled on the same boat. On 23 December 2016, he made an application for a SHEV. He claimed a fear of harm from members of JN if he were returned to Lebanon because he had refused to join that organisation. Subsequently, he has made a further claim to the effect that he faces a real risk of harm from the family of a woman who has made allegations of aggravated sexual assault against her by him. That alleged event is said to have occurred in Australia and whilst he has been charged, as at the date of the delegate’s decision, the matter was continuing. On 10 May 2017, the delegate refused to grant the appellant a SHEV. The delegate concluded that the appellant’s fear of harm at the hands of JN was not well founded. Whilst it was found that the appellant was at a risk of significant harm from the family of a woman whom it was alleged he assaulted, it was also found that, if he returned to Lebanon, he could safely relocate to Beirut. On that basis it was determined that his circumstances did not fall within the complementary protection provisions. The IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision. On 15 September 2017, the appellant applied for judicial review to the FCC. Decision of the IAA Much of the decision of the IAA is concerned with the appellant’s claim for protection under the Convention grounds. That related to his assertion that he would be targeted by JN because he would not agree to become a member. That claim is no longer pursued. With respect to the ground under the complementary protection provisions the substance of the IAA’s decision was as follows:(a)It was found that the appellant did not face a chance of serious harm at the hands of JN. That was significant because it was through JN that the appellant asserted the family of his alleged victim would locate him were he to return to Lebanon.(b)It was accepted as plausible that the appellant faced a risk in relation to a vendetta by the family of his alleged victim and, although the extent of any harassment or harm may have been speculative, the IAA was prepared to accept that he may face a risk of significant harm as defined under s 36(2A) of the Migration Act.(c)That if he did face harassment or threats from his alleged victim’s family, the law enforcement authorities would be able to provide a degree of protection although it would be difficult in his home village.(d)He could relocate to another area of Lebanon, such as Beirut, where there are opportunities for employment and a greater degree of State protection. The IAA recorded that the appellant claimed that JN was able to locate him anywhere and that as his family name was uncommon he would be capable of being identified such that he would be as vulnerable in Beirut as in his home village.(e)There was no evidence that the appellant’s alleged victim’s family had any link with JN or other official or paramilitary organisations or that it has any links to, or influence in, Beirut. (f)The IAA was not satisfied that the appellant’s location in Beirut would become known to the family because of his name or by his comments on Facebook.(g)The IAA was not satisfied that the victim’s family would be able to locate the appellant in Beirut and he would not face a real risk of significant harm if he were to relocate there.(h)In the circumstances, it was reasonable for him to relocate to Beirut an area with which he was familiar. He would be able to live amongst the same religious and ethnic community and would find support in the Sunni majority neighbourhood. He was also a person who would be able to secure employment because of his qualifications and because he had worked there previously. (i)Consequently, the IAA found there were no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned from Australia to Lebanon as a receiving country, there is a real risk he would suffer significant harm. Application to the FCC

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision. On 15 September 2017, the appellant applied for judicial review to the FCC. Decision of the IAA Much of the decision of the IAA is concerned with the appellant’s claim for protection under the Convention grounds. That related to his assertion that he would be targeted by JN because he would not agree to become a member. That claim is no longer pursued. With respect to the ground under the complementary protection provisions the substance of the IAA’s decision was as follows:(a)It was found that the appellant did not face a chance of serious harm at the hands of JN. That was significant because it was through JN that the appellant asserted the family of his alleged victim would locate him were he to return to Lebanon.(b)It was accepted as plausible that the appellant faced a risk in relation to a vendetta by the family of his alleged victim and, although the extent of any harassment or harm may have been speculative, the IAA was prepared to accept that he may face a risk of significant harm as defined under s 36(2A) of the Migration Act.(c)That if he did face harassment or threats from his alleged victim’s family, the law enforcement authorities would be able to provide a degree of protection although it would be difficult in his home village.(d)He could relocate to another area of Lebanon, such as Beirut, where there are opportunities for employment and a greater degree of State protection. The IAA recorded that the appellant claimed that JN was able to locate him anywhere and that as his family name was uncommon he would be capable of being identified such that he would be as vulnerable in Beirut as in his home village.(e)There was no evidence that the appellant’s alleged victim’s family had any link with JN or other official or paramilitary organisations or that it has any links to, or influence in, Beirut. (f)The IAA was not satisfied that the appellant’s location in Beirut would become known to the family because of his name or by his comments on Facebook.(g)The IAA was not satisfied that the victim’s family would be able to locate the appellant in Beirut and he would not face a real risk of significant harm if he were to relocate there.(h)In the circumstances, it was reasonable for him to relocate to Beirut an area with which he was familiar. He would be able to live amongst the same religious and ethnic community and would find support in the Sunni majority neighbourhood. He was also a person who would be able to secure employment because of his qualifications and because he had worked there previously. (i)Consequently, the IAA found there were no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned from Australia to Lebanon as a receiving country, there is a real risk he would suffer significant harm. Application to the FCC The only ground of the application for review to the FCC was that the IAA had made a legally unreasonable finding of fact with respect to the question of whether the appellant would be located by the family of his alleged victim in Beirut as there was material before the IAA which supported the conclusion that the appellant would be so located. In the course of oral submissions Mr Jones for the appellant submitted that this was sufficient to vitiate the decision and there was no need to consider the materiality of the finding. That submission can be accepted in the circumstances of the present case although it would not necessarily be true in all cases.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant’s argument was rejected by the FCC. After reviewing the decisions of the delegate and of the IAA, the learned primary judge considered in some detail the decisions in Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 and BTW17 v Minister for Immigration (2018) 353 ALR 657, the following points were made:(a)That the focus of attention was on the IAA’s conclusion that, after considering all the information and evidence, the decision maker was “not satisfied that the victim’s family would be able to locate the applicant in Beirut”. It was necessarily part of the appellant’s claim under the complementary protection provision that he would be so located.(b)The point advanced by the appellant was that there was an ample trail for ascertaining whether he was in Beirut and this trail of association shows it was “legally unreasonable for the Authority to conclude that it was not satisfied that the alleged victim’s family would be able to locate him in Beirut”.(c)That assertion was based upon the proximity of the appellant’s home village to Beirut; that the appellant’s brother commuted between the two on a daily basis; that the appellant had worked in Beirut in his brother’s shop previously; and, that the Tribunal had suggested he could reside near his brother’s shop. (d)The learned primary judge rejected the submission as to the absence of evidence. It was noted the IAA was aware of the information before the delegate which identified the alleged victim’s family was located in the Northern part of Lebanon and there was an absence of any links to or influence in Beirut. It was also noted that the location of the brother’s shop in Beirut, being 2 hours from his village in North Lebanon, did not provide a ground, either on its own or cumulatively with other grounds, to suggest that the IAA’s state of non-satisfaction was unreasonable. (e)It was also noted that there was no evidence of the family having any links with JN or any other official or paramilitary organisation and there was no claim or evidence that the family had any links or influence in Beirut.(f)On this topic the learned judge below concluded:41.Contrary to the case put by the Applicant, there is nothing to show that the process of reasoning undertaken by the Authority in identifying and putting into context that the Applicant’s family name was uncommon, that the alleged victim's family has no links to or influence in Beirut, and that there are no other claims than general comments in relation to being on Facebook, and no evidence before the Authority that the alleged victim's family would be able to track the Applicant down if he was to relocate to Beirut, was unreasonable. On the basis of the material before the Authority, weighing the circumstances of the Applicant's brother's shop in Beirut does not lead to an unreasonable conclusion by the Authority that it was not satisfied that the alleged victim's family would be able to locate the Applicant in Beirut.(g)Consequently, the FCC determined that the IAA’s finding of non-satisfaction as to the alleged victim’s family’s capacity to locate the appellant in Beirut did not disclose any jurisdictional error. Its conclusion that it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Beirut, being an area where there was no real risk that he will suffer significant harm, was not shown to be legally unreasonable. Consideration