BTW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BTW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 10

Appeal from: BTW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Anor [2017] FCCA 1752
File number: WAD 402 of 2017
Judges: NORTH, DOWSETT AND MCKERRACHER JJ
Date of judgment: 1 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where the Minister’s delegate refused to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa –  whether the decision-maker’s reasons were illogical, irrational or otherwise unreasonable –  whether the conclusion that the appellant was not facing a real risk of significant harm in respect of the introduction of the death penalty was irrational or illogical on the information before the Immigration Assessment Authority – where the examination of the events clearly and reasonably linked the appellant’s alleged crime with ‘serious crimes’ for which the death penalty could be passed as a sentence – where Sri Lankan President had recently announced an intention to implement the death penalty
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Div 3, Pt 7AA, ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473DB, 473DC(2)
Cases cited:

Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 216 ALR 1

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd vWednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 172

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Date of hearing: 22 November 2017
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr MGS Crowley
Solicitor for the Appellant: AUM Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs.

ORDERS

WAD 402 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BTW17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

NORTH, DOWSETT AND MCKERRACHER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

1 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant have leave to amend his grounds of appeal.

2.The orders made by the primary judge be set aside.

3.The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 23 March 2017 be quashed.

4.A writ of mandamus be directed to the respondents requiring determination of the appellant's application according to law. 

5.The first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceedings of the Court below to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for a constitutional writ.  That primary decision dismissed an application to review a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority). On 23 March 2017, the Authority, under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), had affirmed a decision of the Minister’s delegate…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BTW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, who had arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival, seeking a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. The Minister’s delegate had refused to grant the visa, finding the appellant did not meet the criteria under the Migration Act and was not an excluded fast track applicant. The appellant challenged this decision, arguing that the decision-maker's assessment was illogical, irrational, or otherwise unreasonable, particularly in relation to the risk of significant harm due to the potential introduction of the death penalty in Sri Lanka.

The legal issues before the court were whether the decision-maker's conclusions regarding the appellant’s risk of significant harm were irrational or illogical, and whether the decision-maker adequately considered the appellant’s risk of persecution, including the potential imposition of the death penalty. The court needed to determine if the Immigration Assessment Authority's findings were consistent with the evidence and whether the decision was within the bounds of reason.

The court found that the Immigration Assessment Authority's reasoning was flawed. The appellant had provided credible evidence that he faced a real risk of significant harm due to the potential introduction of the death penalty in Sri Lanka, given the recent announcement by the Sri Lankan President to implement the death penalty. The Authority's conclusion that the appellant was not facing a real risk of significant harm was irrational and not supported by the evidence. The court determined that the Authority's decision was unreasonable because it did not properly consider the appellant’s circumstances and the credible risk of harm.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the court quashed the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority. The court ordered that the appellant's visa application be reconsidered according to law and directed the Minister to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the proceedings in the Court below.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to amend his grounds of appeal.

2. The orders made by the primary judge be set aside.

3. The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 23 March 2017 be quashed.

4. A writ of mandamus be directed to the respondents requiring determination of the appellant's application according to law.

5. The first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceedings of the Court below to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For reasons which follow, the appeal should be allowed.BACKGROUND As noted in the primary decision, the appellant arrived at Christmas Island as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 16 September 2012 and was subsequently transferred to Nauru in 2012 and then again transferred back to Australia. He lodged an application for a protection visa in September 2016. In February 2017, the Minister’s delegate refused to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. The delegate found that the applicant failed to meet the criteria under the Act and found that he was not an excluded fast track applicant. On 14 February 2017, the Authority informed the appellant that the matter had been referred to it for review. The Authority’s correspondence identified that there were limited circumstances in which the Authority could consider new information. The correspondence attached a fact sheet and practice direction and provided the appellant an opportunity to put on new information and provide submissions. The appellant took advantage of this opportunity and made submissions by email of 27 February 2017 purporting to provide new information. The Authority concluded that there were exceptional circumstances to justify the receipt of some but not all of the material supplied. Nothing turns on this. The Authority accepted the appellant shot a gang member in 2011 and it accepted that the appellant was arrested for attempted murder and spent 13 months on remand. Then after, whilst released on bail, the appellant did not report to police as required and subsequently left Sri Lanka illegally. The Authority was satisfied that the appellant may be identified and detained on arrival and that this would be the result of the lawful prosecution of the crime by Sri Lankan Authorities but did not of itself amount to persecution. The Authority made reference to the appellant’s concerns about torture and arbitrary death at the hands of police and other security agents. It did not accept that the appellant faced a real chance of torture or arbitrary death. It placed significant weight on the fact that the appellant was apprehended and charged with offences and held in remand for 13 months and that there had been no indication at that time that he was tortured or otherwise mistreated by the police or authorities. The Authority had not been satisfied that the appellant’s failure to meet his bail requirements would result in adverse action that would lead to torture, arbitrary killing or other harm. It rejected various other claims which are no longer pursued. These claims in particular related to his inability to work and the risk of revenge from other gang members. The Authority also rejected a contention that the appellant faced a real chance of harm due to a data breach, which breach it accepted had occurred. Accordingly, the Authority was not satisfied there was a real chance the appellant would face any harm as a result of being a failed asylum seeker. It found that he did not meet the definition of refugee under the Act and did not meet the criteria under s 36(2)(a).

Decision

Reasons for decision

On this basis the appeal should be allowed. The second ground adds nothing to the first and is unnecessary to address.CONCLUSION For those reasons the appeal must be allowed and the following orders are made:(1)The appellant have leave to amend his grounds of appeal.(2)The orders made by the primary judge be set aside.(3)The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 23 March 2017 be quashed.(4)A writ of mandamus be directed to the respondents requiring determination of the appellant’s application according to law. (5)The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the proceedings of the Court below to be assessed if not agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, the Migration Review Tribunal had refused to grant an adjournment to an applicant seeking a review of a decision refusing to grant an occupationally based visa. The applicant had been awaiting a revised skills assessment from a body known as Trade Recognition Australia. Nonetheless, the Tribunal proceeded to a decision adverse to the applicant without waiting for that relatively imminent revised assessment, an assessment which was necessarily critical to her success and beyond her power to produce at the time of her appearance. It was held that the decision of the Tribunal was officiated by unreasonableness, with Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ referring to Associated Provincial Pictures Houses Ltd vWednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, saying (at [68]) that the legal standard of unreasonableness ‘should not be considered as limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision – which is to say one that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it’. Lord Greene MR in Wednesbury Corporation had made the point (at 229) that bad faith, dishonesty, unreasonableness, attention given to extraneous circumstances and disregard of public policy were all relevant to whether a statutory discretion was exercised reasonably. In Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 172 (1 November 2017), the Full Court (Gilmour, Logan and Mortimer JJ) said (at [34]-[36]):[34] To discern irrationality or illogicality in the Tribunal’s reasoning, more must be shown than simply the fact that the decision is one upon which reasonable minds may differ: SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; (2012) 202 FCR 1 at [84]–[85] citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131] per Crennan and Bell JJ. As Crennan and Bell JJ stated in SZMDS at [135]:A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.[35] Moreover, illogicality must be shown to have affected the decision in question: SZOOR at [85].[36] As to unreasonableness, the applicable standard was summarised by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44] as follows:In order to understand how the standard of legal unreasonableness is to be ascertained, it is important to see where the concept fits in terms of the court’s supervisory powers over executive or administrative decision-making. In Li, the judgments identify two different contexts in which the concept is employed. Legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a supervising court after the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process: 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [27]–[28] per French CJ, at [72] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ; cf Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16 at [39] per Gummow A-CJ and Kiefel J. However, legal unreasonableness can also be outcome focused, without necessarily identifying another underlying jurisdictional error. The latter occurs in what French CJ (in Li 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [28]) calls “an area of decisional freedom”: it has the character of a choice that is arbitrary, capricious or without “common sense”. See also the plurality at [66] referring to an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion. The plurality in Li described this as an inference to be drawn because the court cannot identify how the decision was arrived at. In those circumstances, the exercise of power is seen by the supervising court as lacking “an evident and intelligible justification”. Gageler J also uses language suggestive of review for legal unreasonableness being concerned with an examination by the supervising court of the outcome of the exercise of power (in Li 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [105]):It is, of course, true that, as a measure in fact of time, space, quantity and conduct, reasonableness is a concept deeply rooted in the common law: and so, in such cases, is the power of a court to say whether a particular decision of that fact is or is not within the bounds of reason”: Giris Pty Ltd v FCT (1969) 119 CLR 365 at 383–384 ; [1969] HCA 5. Review by a court of the reasonableness of a decision made by another repository of power “is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process” but also with “whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 at 220–221 [47].