FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BTW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 10
Appeal from: BTW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Anor [2017] FCCA 1752 File number: WAD 402 of 2017 Judges: NORTH, DOWSETT AND MCKERRACHER JJ Date of judgment: 1 February 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – where the Minister’s delegate refused to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa – whether the decision-maker’s reasons were illogical, irrational or otherwise unreasonable – whether the conclusion that the appellant was not facing a real risk of significant harm in respect of the introduction of the death penalty was irrational or illogical on the information before the Immigration Assessment Authority – where the examination of the events clearly and reasonably linked the appellant’s alleged crime with ‘serious crimes’ for which the death penalty could be passed as a sentence – where Sri Lankan President had recently announced an intention to implement the death penalty Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Div 3, Pt 7AA, ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473DB, 473DC(2) Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd vWednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 172
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Date of hearing: 22 November 2017 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 32 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr MGS Crowley Solicitor for the Appellant: AUM Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs. ORDERS
WAD 402 of 2017 BETWEEN: BTW17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
NORTH, DOWSETT AND MCKERRACHER JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
1 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant have leave to amend his grounds of appeal.
2.The orders made by the primary judge be set aside.
3.The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 23 March 2017 be quashed.
4.A writ of mandamus be directed to the respondents requiring determination of the appellant's application according to law.
5.The first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceedings of the Court below to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
The appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for a constitutional writ. That primary decision dismissed an application to review a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority). On 23 March 2017, the Authority, under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), had affirmed a decision of the Minister’s delegate…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 10
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the decision-maker's conclusions regarding the appellant’s risk of significant harm were irrational or illogical, and whether the decision-maker adequately considered the appellant’s risk of persecution, including the potential imposition of the death penalty. The court needed to determine if the Immigration Assessment Authority's findings were consistent with the evidence and whether the decision was within the bounds of reason.
The court found that the Immigration Assessment Authority's reasoning was flawed. The appellant had provided credible evidence that he faced a real risk of significant harm due to the potential introduction of the death penalty in Sri Lanka, given the recent announcement by the Sri Lankan President to implement the death penalty. The Authority's conclusion that the appellant was not facing a real risk of significant harm was irrational and not supported by the evidence. The court determined that the Authority's decision was unreasonable because it did not properly consider the appellant’s circumstances and the credible risk of harm.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the court quashed the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority. The court ordered that the appellant's visa application be reconsidered according to law and directed the Minister to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the proceedings in the Court below.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant have leave to amend his grounds of appeal.
2. The orders made by the primary judge be set aside.
3. The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 23 March 2017 be quashed.
4. A writ of mandamus be directed to the respondents requiring determination of the appellant's application according to law.
5. The first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceedings of the Court below to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, the Migration Review Tribunal had refused to grant an adjournment to an applicant seeking a review of a decision refusing to grant an occupationally based visa. The applicant had been awaiting a revised skills assessment from a body known as Trade Recognition Australia. Nonetheless, the Tribunal proceeded to a decision adverse to the applicant without waiting for that relatively imminent revised assessment, an assessment which was necessarily critical to her success and beyond her power to produce at the time of her appearance. It was held that the decision of the Tribunal was officiated by unreasonableness, with Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ referring to Associated Provincial Pictures Houses Ltd vWednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, saying (at [68]) that the legal standard of unreasonableness ‘should not be considered as limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision – which is to say one that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it’. Lord Greene MR in Wednesbury Corporation had made the point (at 229) that bad faith, dishonesty, unreasonableness, attention given to extraneous circumstances and disregard of public policy were all relevant to whether a statutory discretion was exercised reasonably. In Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 172 (1 November 2017), the Full Court (Gilmour, Logan and Mortimer JJ) said (at [34]-[36]):[34] To discern irrationality or illogicality in the Tribunal’s reasoning, more must be shown than simply the fact that the decision is one upon which reasonable minds may differ: SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; (2012) 202 FCR 1 at [84]–[85] citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131] per Crennan and Bell JJ. As Crennan and Bell JJ stated in SZMDS at [135]:A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.[35] Moreover, illogicality must be shown to have affected the decision in question: SZOOR at [85].[36] As to unreasonableness, the applicable standard was summarised by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44] as follows:In order to understand how the standard of legal unreasonableness is to be ascertained, it is important to see where the concept fits in terms of the court’s supervisory powers over executive or administrative decision-making. In Li, the judgments identify two different contexts in which the concept is employed. Legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a supervising court after the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process: 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [27]–[28] per French CJ, at [72] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ; cf Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16 at [39] per Gummow A-CJ and Kiefel J. However, legal unreasonableness can also be outcome focused, without necessarily identifying another underlying jurisdictional error. The latter occurs in what French CJ (in Li 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [28]) calls “an area of decisional freedom”: it has the character of a choice that is arbitrary, capricious or without “common sense”. See also the plurality at [66] referring to an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion. The plurality in Li described this as an inference to be drawn because the court cannot identify how the decision was arrived at. In those circumstances, the exercise of power is seen by the supervising court as lacking “an evident and intelligible justification”. Gageler J also uses language suggestive of review for legal unreasonableness being concerned with an examination by the supervising court of the outcome of the exercise of power (in Li 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [105]):It is, of course, true that, as a measure in fact of time, space, quantity and conduct, reasonableness is a concept deeply rooted in the common law: and so, in such cases, is the power of a court to say whether a particular decision of that fact is or is not within the bounds of reason”: Giris Pty Ltd v FCT (1969) 119 CLR 365 at 383–384 ; [1969] HCA 5. Review by a court of the reasonableness of a decision made by another repository of power “is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process” but also with “whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 at 220–221 [47].