FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ECH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1222
Appeal from: ECH17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 529 File number: NSD 386 of 2018 Judge: STEWARD J Date of judgment: 15 August 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia– whether primary judge erred in dismissing an application for judicial review – whether Immigration Assessment Authority misconstrued its statutory duty by adopting an unduly narrow construction of s 473DD of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 473DD Cases cited: AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111
BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Date of hearing: 15 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 15 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 386 of 2018 BETWEEN: ECH17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
STEWARD J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 AUGUST 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed with costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
STEWARD J:
Introduction
The appellant is a Tamil man from Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia on 13 October 2012 as an irregular maritime arrival. He applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa on 26 February 2016. On 25 November 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the “Minister”), found that the appellant failed to meet the criteria for the grant of a visa pursuant to s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”). The matter was then referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (the “Authority”), which affirmed the decision of the Minister on 21 August 2017. The appellant sought judicial review of this decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. That application was dismissed on 28 February 2018. The appellant now appeals that decision to this Court.
The Ground of Appeal
It is unnecessary for me to set out the appellant’s history or the circumstances of his application for a visa. That is because the only ground relied upon in the appellant’s notice of appeal concerned the application of s 473DD of the Act. That ground was in these terms:
His Honour erred when he did not find that the [Immigration Assessment Authority] did not misconstrue its statutory duty by…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1222
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to determine whether the IAA misconstrued its statutory duty by adopting an unduly narrow construction of section 473DD(a) when deciding not to consider the new information. The applicant argued that the IAA had failed to consider all relevant circumstances and had overly focused on the absence of an explanation for the delay in providing the new information. The Minister, on the other hand, contended that the IAA had properly considered all relevant circumstances and did not confine its application of section 473DD(a) solely to the explanation for the delay. The court had to scrutinise the IAA's reasoning and determine if it had correctly balanced all relevant factors in accordance with the statutory provisions.
The court found that the IAA had not misconstrued its statutory duty. It concluded that the IAA had considered all relevant circumstances in deciding whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify considering the new information. The court emphasised that the IAA's decision was based on a holistic assessment of the provided information and not solely on the absence of an explanation for the delay. The court rejected the applicant's contention that the IAA had erred in its interpretation and application of section 473DD, holding that the IAA had appropriately exercised its discretion under the statute. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In his written submissions, the Minister submitted that the Authority had not confined the application of s 473DD(a) to an examination of why the new information had not been previously disclosed. At [10] and [22], the Minister’s written submissions provided:10.Relevantly, the Authority noted that the appellant in his second set of submissions purported to raise two new claims that had not been advanced before the delegate, relating to the appellant’s political activity and his wish to exercise cultural rights as a Tamil in Sri Lanka: [5]; AB 241. The Authority considered the new claims to be new information: [6]; AB 241. The Authority was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information under s.473DD(a) having regard to the following circumstances:(a)The new information added to the basis on which the appellant’s claims were initially made before the delegate;(b)The appellant had not previously claimed that he wanted to be more politically active or seek to exercise undefined cultural rights on return to Sri Lanka;(c)No explanation was provided as to why the new claims were not provided to the delegate;(d)The claims rather appeared to have been constructed after a consideration of the Federal Circuit Court’s decision in BBS16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 4;(e)The appellant was given an opportunity at the [Safe Haven Enterprise visa (“SHEV”)] interview to provide details of the events he claimed to be involved in and was asked specific questions about each of his claims and given an opportunity to respond to concerns raised;(f)The appellant was asked at the end of the SHEV interview whether he had anything else to add and whether he had put forward all of his claims for protection;(g)The appellant was represented at the SHEV interview and made a post-interview submission; and(h)The Authority was satisfied that the appellant had an opportunity to present his claims to the delegate.…22.Addressing the first contention, it is simply incorrect to assert, as the appellant does, that the Authority at [6]; AB 241 reasoned that a failure to provide an explanation as to why his new claims (summarised by the Authority at [5]; AB 241) were not provided to the delegate was determinative of the matters set out in s.473DD. To the contrary, the Authority at [6] identified relevant circumstances (detailed above at paragraph [10]) and it expressly relied upon those matters in its conclusion that having regard to ‘all the circumstances’ it was not satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed to justify consideration of the new information. Read fairly, the Authority’s consideration of the relevant circumstances was not as limited as contended by the appellant. The Authority, accordingly, did not treat as ‘decisive’ any singular factor that might point to the Authority having misconstrued s.473DD(a): cf BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958.