DZE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DZE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1521

Appeal from: DZE17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 430
File number: NSD 241 of 2018
Judge: ALLSOP CJ
Date of judgment: 12 October 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Where application for review of delegate’s decision received by Tribunal out of time – where notification of visa refusal received in junk mail – no jurisdictional error – no jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court – no original jurisdiction of the Federal Court – original jurisdiction of the High Court

EVIDENCE – Whether screenshot constituted a business record – whether screenshot demonstrated that notification had been received by the appellant

Legislation:

Constitution, s 75(v)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 69(2)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 66, 408. 409, 412, 476(2), 476A(1), 494B, 494C

High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), rr 25.01, 25.03

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 2.16, 4.31

Cases cited:

Forbes Engineering (Asia) Pte Limited v Forbes (No 4) [2009] FCA 675

Guest v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 193

Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172

Date of hearing: 5 October 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr T Galvin of MinterEllison

ORDERS

NSD 241 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DZE17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ALLSOP CJ

DATE OF ORDER:

5 OCTOBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

2.Reasons to be published.

3.Publication of reasons take place at 9:30am on 12 October 2018.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ALLSOP CJ:

  1. This is an appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 22 February 2018, dismissing an application for judicial review in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 1 September 2017. The Tribunal had determined that it did not have jurisdiction to review the decision of a delegate of the Minister made on 13 February 2017, who refused to grant the appellant a protection visa, on the basis that the application was filed out of time.

  2. The appellant’s application for review of the Tribunal’s decision was lodged on 23 June 2017. The grounds of the application were as follows (quoted without alteration):

    Orders sought by Applicant

    1, I disagree with DIBP and AAT’s decision. They did not well consider that I have provided with the department with correct email address for all their correspondence.

    2, I never received their final decision in my email in box, however DIBP send me their decision into my junk mail box which I could not open it.

    3. AAT did not well…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1521
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of DZE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Circuit Court was called upon to review a decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa. The central dispute was whether the application for review of the delegate’s decision was lodged within the statutory timeframe. The applicant argued that the notification of the refusal was received in his junk mail and thus he was not aware of it, while the Minister contended that the notification was sent to the applicant’s specified email address and was therefore received as per the statutory provisions.

The primary legal issue was whether the Federal Circuit Court had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision. Given the nature of the decision as a privative clause decision, the court found that it did not have jurisdiction under section 476(2)(a) of the Act, which excludes the Federal Circuit Court from having jurisdiction over primary decisions. Additionally, the Federal Court’s original jurisdiction was also ruled out under section 476A(1) as the decision did not fall into any of the specified categories. However, the court noted that the High Court retains original jurisdiction under section 75(v) of the Constitution to review decisions of Commonwealth officers for jurisdictional errors.

The court examined the evidence presented, including a screenshot from the Department’s enterprise correspondence system, which was argued to be a business record demonstrating that the notification had been sent to the applicant’s email address. The court concluded that the evidence showed the notification was indeed sent on the specified date and was thus considered to have been made in compliance with the statutory requirements. As the application for review was lodged beyond the 28-day period allowed by the Act and the Regulations, the court found the application to be out of time.

The court dismissed the appeal with costs and directed that the reasons for the judgment be published. The publication of reasons was scheduled for 9:30am on 12 October 2018. The entry of orders was governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

2. Reasons to be published.

3. Publication of reasons take place at 9:30am on 12 October 2018.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an application for review of a delegate’s decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The applicant, referred to as the appellant, had applied for a protection visa and was notified of the refusal of that visa by a letter sent to his specified email address on 13 February 2017. Despite this, the appellant claimed that the notification had not been seen by him as it had been received in his junk mail. The appellant filed an application for review of the decision on 23 June 2017, which was deemed out of time by the respondent. The respondent relied on evidence, including a screenshot from the Department’s enterprise correspondence system, to argue that the notification was sent on 13 February 2017 and, therefore, the application was lodged beyond the statutory time limit.

The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court for an appeal against a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellant had previously sought review of a delegate's decision to refuse his protection visa application. The Federal Circuit Court was asked to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court examined the timeliness of the appellant's application for review and whether the evidence provided by the respondent was sufficient to establish that the appellant was notified of the decision within the required time frame. The court concluded that the appeal was out of time and did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The prescribed time referenced in s 412(1)(b) is given content in reg 4.31 of the Regulations. As the appellant was not in immigration detention on the date of notification, to which I will later come, sub-reg 4.31(2) applies:For paragraph 412(1)(b) of the Act, if an applicant is not in immigration detention on the day the applicant is notified of a Part 7-reviewable decision, the period in which an application for review of the decision must be given to the Tribunal by or for the applicant is 28 days, commencing on the day the applicant is notified of the decision. Evidence I now turn to the evidence that the first respondent submits is demonstrative of the appellant’s non-compliance with the time limit taken from the provisions. First, I was directed to the appellant’s protection visa application. In this document: the applicant requested all written communications about the application to be sent to him; the applicant indicated that he had an email address; and the applicant specified this email address was to be used for communication with the department by fax, email or other electronic means. Secondly, I was referred to a “Form 929 – Change of address and/or passport details” that the appellant had completed in which he had again listed the specified email address as the means of communication with the department. Thirdly, the notification letter sent by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection on 13 February 2017 was addressed to the specified email and contained details that satisfied the relevant mandatory matters in s 66(2) of the Act. Finally, I was referred to the affidavit of Julian D’arcey Pinder (a solicitor) affirmed on 21 December 2017, which was said to demonstrate that the email was in fact sent to the specified email address. Mr Pinder’s affidavit annexed several documents. The first was said to be a screenshot from the Department’s enterprise correspondence system. On the first respondent’s submission, the screenshot showed that the Department sent an email with attachments to the specified email address at 10:46am on 13 February 2017. Those attachments – the notification letter and the delegate’s refusal – were the other documents annexed to Mr Pinder’s affidavit. On the basis of the above evidence, the first respondent submitted that, by the operation of s 494C(5), the appellant was taken to have been notified by the Minister at the end of 13 February 2017, the date of transmission, despite the appellant’s claim that he had not actually seen the notification, which had been received into his junk mail. Section 412(1)(b) of the Act and sub-reg 4.31(2) of the Regulations were then said to have given the appellant 28 days to provide to the Tribunal any application for review. The appellant’s application, which was received on 23 June 2017, was therefore, on the first respondent’s submission, clearly out of time. The documents annexed to Mr Pinder’s affidavit are business records of the Department. There was no evidence, however, from any member of the Department as to the documents, and the meaning of the entries therein. Here, certainly in circumstances where it is accepted that the appellant’s computer received the email (though it was sent to or stored in his “junk mail”), I am prepared to draw the inference that these records prove that notification was made in accordance with the Act and the Regulations on 13 February 2017.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 476(2)(a) of the Act provides that the Federal Circuit Court has no jurisdiction in relation to a primary decision, which is defined as follows:“primary decision” means a privative clause decision or purported privative clause decision:(a)that is reviewable under Part 5 or 7 or section 500 (whether or not it has been reviewed); or(b)that would have been so reviewable if an application for such review had been made within a specified period... “Privative clause decision” is defined in s 474 of the Act as meaning:a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not)… Section 474(3)(b) clarifies that the refusal to give a visa is a “decision” for the purposes of s 474. As a privative clause decision that was reviewable under Part 7 of the Act, the delegate’s decision was therefore a primary decision in relation to which the Federal Circuit Court had no jurisdiction, pursuant to s 476(2)(a). Similarly, s 476A(1) limits the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court:(1)Despite any other law, including section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 and section 8 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, the Federal Court has original jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision if, and only if:(a)the Federal Circuit Court transfers a proceeding pending in that court in relation to the decision to the Federal Court under section 39 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999; or(b)the decision is a privative clause decision, or a purported privative clause decision, of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on review under section 500; or(c)the decision is a privative clause decision, or purported privative clause decision, made personally by the Minister under section 501, 501A, 501B, 501BA, 501C or 501CA; or(d) the Federal Court has jurisdiction in relation to the decision under subsection 44(3) or 45(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. The decision of the delegate does not fall into any of the s 476A(1) categories and therefore the Federal Court also does not have original jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision. However, s 75(v) of the Constitution confers upon the High Court of Australia original jurisdiction in respect of matters in which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. As the decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse to grant a protection visa constitutes a decision of an officer of the Commonwealth, it remains reviewable for jurisdictional error before the High Court. If the appellant decides to apply for a constitutional writ under s 75(v), that application must be in Form 12 and comply with the requirements in rr 25.01 and 25.03 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth). This is the only remaining avenue by which review may still be available to the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court first examined the timeliness of the appellant’s application for review, noting that the appellant had specified an email address for communication with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. The notification letter sent on 13 February 2017 was addressed to this email address and contained all mandatory matters required by s 66(2) of the Act. The court accepted the screenshot from the Department’s enterprise correspondence system as evidence that the email was sent to the specified address at 10:46am on 13 February 2017. Therefore, the court determined that the appellant was taken to have been notified by the Minister by the end of 13 February 2017, and thus had 28 days to lodge an application for review. Since the application was received on 23 June 2017, it was deemed out of time.

Regarding the second issue, the court accepted the screenshot as a business record of the Department. The court drew the inference that these records proved that notification was made in accordance with the Act and the Regulations on 13 February 2017.

In terms of jurisdiction, the court found that the Federal Circuit Court had no jurisdiction over the delegate’s decision because it was a privative clause decision reviewable under Part 7 of the Act. Similarly, the Federal Court lacked original jurisdiction over the decision because it did not fall into any of the categories listed in s 476A(1). However, the High Court had original jurisdiction to review the decision for jurisdictional error as it was a decision of an officer of the Commonwealth. This decision established that the High Court retains jurisdiction in cases where the Federal Circuit Court and Federal Court lack such jurisdiction.