DCD18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DCD18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 2090

File number: VID 723 of 2018
Judge: ALLSOP CJ
Date of judgment: 21 December 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where applicant’s protection visa refused on character grounds – whether refusal decision communicated to applicant in accordance with s 494B(5) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – refusal decision not transmitted to last email address provided for the purposes of receiving documents – application for review remitted to Administrative Appeals Tribunal
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 368, 368A, 494B, 494C, 500, 500(6B), 501, 501G

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 2.16(3)

Cases cited:

DZE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1521

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 627

Xie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172

Date of hearing: 19 December 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Applicant: A White

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the First Respondent:

J Maloney

Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 723 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DCD18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ALLSOP  CJ

DATE OF ORDER:

21 DECEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of 11 May 2018 to the effect that it did not have jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection made on 11 October 2017 to refuse the applicant’s application for a Protection (Class XA) Visa be set aside.

2.The application for review of said decision be remitted to the Tribunal for the exercise of its jurisdiction of review.

3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ALLSOP CJ:

  1. The applicant is a transgender person who identifies as a woman who is a citizen of Pakistan who had sought a protection visa in 2008.  The application was initially refused by a delegate of the Minister.  That decision was overturned by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) and remitted to the Minister. The application has been under consideration for a considerable period, partly explained by the difficulties over the years in contacting the applicant. In October 2017, a delegate of the Minister refused the protection visa on character grounds under s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant had a number of criminal convictions for dishonesty and had been sentenced to imprisonment. The applicant discovered that her protection visa had been refused in March2018 when she attended an office of the Department.  She sought merits review of the decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), but the Tribunal decided that it had no jurisdiction to undertake a review of the decision.…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 2090
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DCD18 v Minister for Home Affairs involved the applicant, who had applied for a protection visa on 5 November 2008, being refused on character grounds. The dispute centred around whether the refusal decision was communicated to the applicant in accordance with section 494B(5) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant had provided multiple email addresses during the application process, including a gmail address, a ymail address, and a yahoo address. The central issue was whether the refusal decision was transmitted to the last email address provided for the purposes of receiving documents. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal had dismissed the application for review, finding it did not have jurisdiction to review the Minister's decision.

The court had to determine whether the refusal decision was communicated in accordance with the statutory requirements. Specifically, the court needed to ascertain whether the email address used for communication was indeed the "last...email address...provided to the Minister for the purposes of receiving documents." The court also had to consider the implications of the applicant stating that there was no current email address, which was relevant to the interpretation of section 494B(5)(d). The court found that the answer to the question regarding the last email address provided was "no" for two reasons. Firstly, the applicant had explicitly stated there was no current email address, which the court construed as excluding any address that had been declared non-current. Secondly, the statutory language of section 494B(5)(d) must be interpreted in a way that does not include an email address that the applicant has indicated is not in use.

The court concluded that the refusal decision was not communicated in compliance with section 494B(5)(d) of the Migration Act. Consequently, the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was set aside, and the application for review was remitted to the Tribunal for further exercise of its jurisdiction. Additionally, the first respondent was ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the proceedings. This ruling underscored the importance of strict compliance with statutory requirements for the communication of significant decisions, such as the refusal of a protection visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of 11 May 2018 to the effect that it did not have jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection made on 11 October 2017 to refuse the applicant’s application for a Protection (Class XA) Visa be set aside.

2. The application for review of said decision be remitted to the Tribunal for the exercise of its jurisdiction of review.

3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The meaning, content and application of s 494B(5) is best approached by setting its operation in the facts of this case.The facts On 5 November 2008, the Department received an application from the applicant for a protection visa. The form as filled out reflected her then address in Adelaide, and showed that she had lived in Melbourne, Adelaide and Bendigo since 2003. She had studied in Pakistan and Australia. The applicant had come to Australia on a student visa. While in Australia she (to use her words in the application) “came out of the closet and took the road of my transsexualism”. Her claimed fear was of being killed by her family or religious people in Pakistan because of her sexuality. Question 17 of the form asked:Do you agree to the department communicating with you by fax, email or other electronic means?To which the answer was yes, and an email address was given (the gmail address). In December 2008, the applicant filled out a form for financial assistance. The applicant was living at another address in Adelaide and had the assistance of the Red Cross. The form had a similar question asking whether she agreed to the department and the Red Cross communicating with her by fax or email or other electronic means. She once again agreed, giving a new email address (the ymail address). Three months later (in February 2009) the applicant’s newly appointed migration agent sent two forms (Form 956 – appointment of a migration agent and Form 929 – change of address) to the department. The Form 956 contained a third email address (the yahoo address). This address was not provided in answer to a question but under the heading “Applicant details”. After the Refugee Review Tribunal overturned the initial refusal the application was returned to the department. In November 2009, the department wrote to the applicant at her postal address in Kent Town, South Australia about further information. There was then a two year gap in communication. The department had been trying to find the applicant. In November 2011 a letter was returned to the department. The department then sent an email on 8 November 2011 to the ymail address. On 22 November 2011 a response came from the applicant using the ymail address giving a new mailing address. The department then received medical information that accorded with the request it made by letter to the applicant to the new address. Then, in July 2012, the department received a Form 80 concerned with personal particulars for character assessment from the applicant. In answer to a question for her email address, the applicant gave the ymail address. In September 2013, there is an attempt by a case officer to contact the applicant using the ymail address. This was followed up in February 2014. In February 2014 there is a departmental note discussing the difficulty in communication which stated: Hi SeanI propose consideration be given to an expedited AFP without consent so that we are able to refer this case to VACCU.The client lodged PV on 5 November 2008 – was refused 25 March 2009 and remitted 20 November 2009.Since then we have sent several requests for information:∙ 25/11/2009 – Requesting health, AFP, Form 80 – sent via post.∙ 06/05/2010 – Copy of letter sent 25/11/2009 – sent via post. AFP was received on 22/09/2011 with a result of not clear.∙ 02/11/2011 – AFP & Health – sent via post – this letter was returned to sender and the client contacted for up-to-date contact details.∙ 28/11/2011 – Health & Form 80∙ 26/09/2013 – AFP only – sent via email and post∙ 12/02/2014 – AFP only – sent via email (no current contact details on file)The last contact we had from this client was on 13 July 2012, when we received a Form 80. We have had a lot of difficulty locating this person throughout their lodged application.I have spoken to Lia Freeme, DCD18’s case manager in VIC, who has been unable to get in contact with the client. Sharon Pressley was the previous case manager in SA and also was unable to make contact. It is believed that the client is currently in WA given they have come to the attention of WA Police recently.There is an ICSE note dated 28 January 2014 stating “On 17/01/2014 client came to attention of AFP at Brisbane Airport in relation to alleged credit card fraud and use of false names to book travel. Information from AFP indicates that client also has outstanding QLD criminal matters for possession of dangerous drugs. Recommend thorough criminal hoistory [sic] checks befor [sic] any further visa grant action. 28 JAN 2014 10:26 BRISBANE MARK GALLAGHER”.Please let me know if you require further information.RegardsAshlea MoonieRRT Remit OfficerOnshore Protection VictoriaDepartment of Immigration and Border Protection

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 2 March 2018, the applicant was at a departmental office in Melbourne and was given the visa refusal notification. Within nine days she applied for review.The Tribunal’s Decision The reasoning of the Tribunal was contained in [23] to [27] of the decision:REASONING23Section 494B of the Act permitted the Minister to provide notice of the cancellation decision in several different ways, one of which was “the last…email address…provided to the Minister for the purposes of receiving documents”. The choice of the particular method is a matter for the Minister.24The last email address provided to the Minister was the ymail address provided by the Applicant when she submitted the Form 80 – Personal particulars for character assessment in July 2012. This was the same address as that she provided when she submitted her request for asylum seeker assistance in 2008.25I agree with the argument put on behalf of the Minister that he was not required to notify the Applicant of his decision by means of the email address provided to the Tribunal in 2016 and subsequently notified to the Department by the Tribunal. This address was not provided to the Minister by the Applicant and in any event, it was not provided for the purposes of receiving documents in respect of the application for the Protection visa.26Subsection 494C(5) of the Act provides that in the case of email transmission a recipient “is taken to have received the document at the end of the day on which the document is transmitted”. As notice of the cancellation decision was emailed to the Applicant on 20 October 2017 she is taken to have received it on that day. It follows that the last day for making an application to the Tribunal to review the Minister’s decision was 29 October 2017. The Tribunal does not have power to extend the time for making the application.CONCLUSION27The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection made 11 October 2017 to refuse the Applicant’s application for a Protection (Class XA) visa.(Footnote omitted.)Consideration The issue is short: Was the ymail address the “last…email address…provided to the Minister for the purposes of receiving documents”? In my view, the answer is no, for at least two reasons. First, the “nil” answer to the department at the Villawood interview was a statement that there was no current email address. One does not construe s 494B(5)(d) to include the last email address given for the purposes of the receipt of documents when the applicant has later said that there is no current email address. The words of s 494B(5)(d) must be construed in a way not to include an email address said by the applicant no longer to be current. That is the plain meaning of the answer to the question that was given. It was not a refusal to update, leaving existing information current. It was a statement that there was no current email address. However one construes s 494B(5)(d), the last email address provided cannot include one that the person has said is not current. To construe it so would authorise the use of an email address, and to deem receipt at that address, being an address that the department had been told was not current, that is, not in use.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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