FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 627
Appeal from: Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 3112 File number: NSD 2155 of 2017 Judge: GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 11 May 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where the appellants applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to review four decisions of a delegate of the Minister of Immigration and Border Protection refusing the appellants medical visas – where the AAT determined it lacked jurisdiction because the review application was filed after the deadline had expired – where the deadline for the appellants to lodge their review application was 21 days after notification of the delegate’s decisions – where the delegate’s decisions were sent by email to the appellants’ migration agent, but the emails were deleted from the agent’s inbox due to a technical error – whether the primary judge erred in upholding the AAT’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the matter because the review application was filed out of time – held: appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 66, 347, 494B, 494C, 494D
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 2.16, 4.10
Cases cited: Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355 Date of hearing: 7 May 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 36 Counsel for the Appellants: The First Appellant appeared in person and on behalf of all Appellants Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M P Cleary Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia ORDERS
NSD 2155 of 2017 BETWEEN: MOHAMMAD SAIFUR RAHMAN KHAN
First Appellant
MANZIR YASMIN EMON
Second Appellant
MARZUQ RAHMAN KHAN
Third Appellant
MUIZZ RAHMAN KHAN
Fourth Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 MAY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to r 9.63 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the first appellant be appointed as the litigation representative of the third and fourth appellants.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GRIFFITHS J:
This is an appeal from a decision dated 15 November 2017 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). The judgment is reported as Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 3112.
For the following reasons, the appeal will be dismissed. However, it is appropriate to state at the outset that this is an unusual case. The appellants find themselves in an unfortunate and awkward position through no fault of their own.
Summary of background matters
The four appellants are all members of the same family, comprising the husband and wife and their two children. They are…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 627
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to r 9.63 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the first appellant be appointed as the litigation representative of the third and fourth appellants.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is unnecessary to summarise the Minister’s submissions because they are substantially reflected in the reasons given below for dismissing the appeal. Consideration and disposition of the appeal Given the high volume of decisions made by the Minister and his Department, it is understandable that there is a need for certainty with regard to such matters as to when and how decisions on visa applications are to be notified. It is equally understandable that there is a need to specify time periods within which review applications must be made, by reference to the date when notification of adverse decisions has been made. These kinds of considerations explain why there are quite detailed provisions in both the Act and Regulations dealing with these matters. The legislative scheme includes provisions which deem matters to have occurred if particular actions are taken. The Note to s 494B(1A), s 494B(7), the Note to s 494D(1) and s 494D(5) are examples of such provisions. The public policy rationale for this type of legislative scheme is clear and understandable. As this case well illustrates, however, the need for certainty from a public policy perspective can collide with individual justice considerations. The Minister did not suggest either below or in this Court that the agent’s account of what had occurred in respect of the inadvertent deletion of the emails dated 16 June 2016 from his email inbox due to technical problems should be disbelieved. Nor did the Minister contest the agent’s claims that from late June 2016 onwards he sought to draw the Department’s attention to the problem both in writing and by telephone calls. Nor did the Minister contest the agent’s claim that, despite his repeated attempts to rectify the problem, the Department did not respond to his requests that it resend the decision letters. On the face of things, the appellants are justifiably aggrieved by the operation of the legislative scheme in their particular circumstances. The scheme has the potential to operate in ways that can fairly be described as harsh and draconian. It is unfortunate that there is no provision in the regime for discretionary powers to operate in appropriate cases to relieve the draconian operation of the scheme. The evidence strongly suggests that the first appellant has acted responsibly and conscientiously throughout this unhappy saga, which has been occasioned by the inadvertent deletion of the Department’s notification letters from the migration agent’s email system. Having said that, however, in my respectful view, the primary judge has correctly applied the relevant legislative provisions, for the reasons given by his Honour in [18] to [21] of his Honour’s reasons for judgment (which are set out in [24] above). On one view, there is a tension between ss 494B(5) and 494D. As McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ stated in Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355 at [70], where such a tension arises from the language of particular provisions, it must be alleviated, so far as is possible, by “adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to achieve that result which will best give effect to the purpose and language of those provisions while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions”. Their Honours added that such a process of reconciliation often requires the Court to determine what is the leading provision, as opposed to the subordinate provision, the latter of which must give way to the former. In my respectful view, the primary judge was correct to treat s 494D as the leading provision to which s 494B(5) is subordinate. Accordingly, as held by the primary judge, for the purposes of s 494B, the recipient in question was not each of the appellants but rather was the nominated contact person, Md. Haque, who plainly was not a minor.