Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 627

Appeal from: Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 3112
File number: NSD 2155 of 2017
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 11 May 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where the appellants applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to review four decisions of a delegate of the Minister of Immigration and Border Protection refusing the appellants medical visas – where the AAT determined it lacked jurisdiction because the review application was filed after the deadline had expired – where the deadline for the appellants to lodge their review application was 21 days after notification of the delegate’s decisions – where the delegate’s decisions were sent by email to the appellants’ migration agent, but the emails were deleted from the agent’s inbox due to a technical error – whether the primary judge erred in upholding the AAT’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the matter because the review application was filed out of time – held: appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 66, 347, 494B, 494C, 494D

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 2.16, 4.10

Cases cited: Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355
Date of hearing: 7 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Appellants: The First Appellant appeared in person and on behalf of all Appellants
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M P Cleary
Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

NSD 2155 of 2017
BETWEEN:

MOHAMMAD SAIFUR RAHMAN KHAN

First Appellant

MANZIR YASMIN EMON

Second Appellant

MARZUQ RAHMAN KHAN  

Third Appellant

MUIZZ RAHMAN KHAN

Fourth Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 MAY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r 9.63 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the first appellant be appointed as the litigation representative of the third and fourth appellants.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.There be no order as to costs. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRIFFITHS J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision dated 15 November 2017 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA).  The judgment is reported as Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 3112.

  2. For the following reasons, the appeal will be dismissed.  However, it is appropriate to state at the outset that this is an unusual case.  The appellants find themselves in an unfortunate and awkward position through no fault of their own. 

    Summary of background matters

  3. The four appellants are all members of the same family, comprising the husband and wife and their two children.  They are…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 627
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was brought by four Bangladeshi nationals against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the decisions of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection because the review application was lodged out of time. The AAT’s decision was upheld by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and the matter is now before the court on appeal. The central issue before the court was whether the primary judge was correct to uphold the AAT’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the matter because the review application was filed out of time. The court found that while the appellants were in an unfortunate and awkward position through no fault of their own, the primary judge had correctly applied the relevant legislative provisions. The court held that section 494D of the relevant Act was the leading provision, and that section 494B(5) was subordinate to it. The court found that for the purposes of section 494B, the recipient in question was not each of the appellants but rather was the nominated contact person, Md. Haque, who plainly was not a minor. The appeal was dismissed and there was no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to r 9.63 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the first appellant be appointed as the litigation representative of the third and fourth appellants.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, the appeal will be dismissed. However, it is appropriate to state at the outset that this is an unusual case. The appellants find themselves in an unfortunate and awkward position through no fault of their own. Summary of background matters The four appellants are all members of the same family, comprising the husband and wife and their two children. They are Bangladeshi nationals. On 8 June 2016, the husband, acting through a migration agent (Md. Haque from MS Haque & Associates), applied to the Department for a subclass 602 medical treatment visa in relation to treatment of his sinuses. By a Form 956, which was signed by both the husband and the agent, the Department was directed to send written communications about the visa application to the identified migration agent. On 9 June 2016, the wife and two children applied separately for subclass 602 visas on the basis of each being a person who accompanied a person seeking treatment. It was indicated on each of the applications that all written communications about these accompanying persons’ applications should be sent to the same migration agent, Md. Haque . On 16 June 2016, the Department sent letters to each of the appellants notifying them of the decision to refuse the grant of the visas. The visa applications of the first and second appellants were refused because they did not satisfy the relevant requirement that their applications be made within 28 days of the last day the appellants had held a substantive visa. The children’s applications were refused on the basis that there was no evidence that either of them were seeking medical treatment and also because their father’s visa application had been refused. The Department’s four letters were all sent by email to the nominated email address of the migration agent as set out in the husband’s Form 956. It was not disputed that the emails arrived in the inbox of the migration agent’s email account. It appears, however, that the agent did not immediately access those emails and it was only one or two days later that he says he went to the inbox and found that the emails had been deleted because of a technical problem. It appears that the agent did nothing further about the matter until, on 30 June 2016, he sent an email to the Department requesting an update on each of the four applications in circumstances where it was explained in the email that “all correspondence has been deleted regarding this client”. The agent asked the Department to resend all correspondence to him regarding the client and he provided his mobile telephone number and email address. The agent sent another email to the Department on 4 July 2016 in which he informed the Department that he had not received a reply to his earlier email dated 30 June 2016. On 5 July 2016, the agent sent a letter by facsimile to the Department. The letter stated that the agent believed that the applications had been decided by the Department and that an email had been sent to the agent but that, unfortunately, “we missed the email or it was deleted from our email”. The letter referred to the fact that other emails had been sent to the Department but no reply had been received. The letter contained a fresh request for the Department to send the agent “the decision of all applicants at your earliest” [AB 267].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister sought costs. Notwithstanding the appellants’ failure, I do not consider that they should be ordered to pay the Minister’s costs having regard to the very unusual circumstances of this case and, in particular, the Department’s failure to respond to the agent’s repeated requests that further notifications of the refusal decision be sent during the period for seeking a review, a matter which was not disputed. Conclusion For these reasons, the appeal must be dismissed. It is to be hoped that the peculiar features of this case will be taken into account by the Minister and those who advise him.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is unnecessary to summarise the Minister’s submissions because they are substantially reflected in the reasons given below for dismissing the appeal. Consideration and disposition of the appeal Given the high volume of decisions made by the Minister and his Department, it is understandable that there is a need for certainty with regard to such matters as to when and how decisions on visa applications are to be notified. It is equally understandable that there is a need to specify time periods within which review applications must be made, by reference to the date when notification of adverse decisions has been made. These kinds of considerations explain why there are quite detailed provisions in both the Act and Regulations dealing with these matters. The legislative scheme includes provisions which deem matters to have occurred if particular actions are taken. The Note to s 494B(1A), s 494B(7), the Note to s 494D(1) and s 494D(5) are examples of such provisions. The public policy rationale for this type of legislative scheme is clear and understandable. As this case well illustrates, however, the need for certainty from a public policy perspective can collide with individual justice considerations. The Minister did not suggest either below or in this Court that the agent’s account of what had occurred in respect of the inadvertent deletion of the emails dated 16 June 2016 from his email inbox due to technical problems should be disbelieved. Nor did the Minister contest the agent’s claims that from late June 2016 onwards he sought to draw the Department’s attention to the problem both in writing and by telephone calls. Nor did the Minister contest the agent’s claim that, despite his repeated attempts to rectify the problem, the Department did not respond to his requests that it resend the decision letters. On the face of things, the appellants are justifiably aggrieved by the operation of the legislative scheme in their particular circumstances. The scheme has the potential to operate in ways that can fairly be described as harsh and draconian. It is unfortunate that there is no provision in the regime for discretionary powers to operate in appropriate cases to relieve the draconian operation of the scheme. The evidence strongly suggests that the first appellant has acted responsibly and conscientiously throughout this unhappy saga, which has been occasioned by the inadvertent deletion of the Department’s notification letters from the migration agent’s email system. Having said that, however, in my respectful view, the primary judge has correctly applied the relevant legislative provisions, for the reasons given by his Honour in [18] to [21] of his Honour’s reasons for judgment (which are set out in [24] above). On one view, there is a tension between ss 494B(5) and 494D. As McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ stated in Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355 at [70], where such a tension arises from the language of particular provisions, it must be alleviated, so far as is possible, by “adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to achieve that result which will best give effect to the purpose and language of those provisions while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions”. Their Honours added that such a process of reconciliation often requires the Court to determine what is the leading provision, as opposed to the subordinate provision, the latter of which must give way to the former. In my respectful view, the primary judge was correct to treat s 494D as the leading provision to which s 494B(5) is subordinate. Accordingly, as held by the primary judge, for the purposes of s 494B, the recipient in question was not each of the appellants but rather was the nominated contact person, Md. Haque, who plainly was not a minor.