DZAEK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DZAEK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 247

Appeal from: DZAEK & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1824
File number: NTD 36 of 2016
Judge: PERRY  J
Date of judgment: 14 March 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Tribunal failed to consider child’s speech impediment in assessing reasonableness of relocation - whether Tribunal failed to consider claim to fear persecution by reason of membership of a particular social group, being girls who attend or have attended a western school- appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules (Cth) r 9.61

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30

M211 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 660

Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1004

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26

DZAEK & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1824

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 124

NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

VQAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2014] FCAFC 104

Date of hearing: 15 November 2016
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Appellants: The first appellant appeared in person on behalf of all the appellants
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr P d’Assumpcao, Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NTD 36 of 2016
BETWEEN:

DZAEK

First Appellant

DZAEL

Second Appellant

DZAEM

Third Appellant

DZAEN
Fourth appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY  J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The first and second appellants are to pay the Minister’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of the then Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal).  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) not to grant the appellants protection visas.

  2. The first appellant (the father) is the primary applicant for the visa.  The second appellant (the wife) is the first appellant’s wife and the third and fourth appellants (the son and daughter) are the first and second appellants’ minor children.

  3. Prior to the hearing, I raised with the parties rule…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 247
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DZAEK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerns an appeal against the refusal of protection visas to a Pakistani family. The Federal Circuit Court had previously remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of its failure to consider the risk of harm to the daughter based on her attendance at a western school. The Tribunal, however, again refused the protection visas. The appellants, represented by their father, argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the son's speech impediment and the claim of persecution based on the daughter's membership in a particular social group. The appeal focused on whether the Tribunal's decision was legally flawed.

The central legal issues were whether the Tribunal erred in not considering the son's speech impediment and the daughter's social group membership sufficiently. The court had to determine if these omissions constituted a jurisdictional error that would render the Tribunal's decision invalid. It was critical to assess if the Tribunal's failure to consider these aspects amounted to a misunderstanding of the criteria for assessing the visa applications or a breach of procedural fairness.

The court found that the Tribunal did not commit a jurisdictional error. It determined that the documents related to the son's speech impediment and allergies were not before the Tribunal and thus could not be used to argue for a jurisdictional error. The court held that even if the documents had been inadvertently omitted due to the representative's negligence, this did not constitute a jurisdictional error that would invalidate the Tribunal's decision. The court also concluded that the Tribunal had appropriately assessed the claims regarding the daughter's social group membership and found no basis for the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the Minister's costs. This decision underscores the limited scope of judicial review in migration cases, emphasizing that courts cannot reassess the merits of the factual findings made by the Tribunal unless there is a clear jurisdictional error.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The first and second appellants are to pay the Minister’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the appeal must be dismissed. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 The first Tribunal decision The appellants are citizens of Pakistan. The father initially arrived in Australia in 2005 as a student, returning to Pakistan in 2006. He returned to Australia with his wife in 2006. Their children were subsequently born in Australia. The appellants applied for protection visas in 2012. Their application was refused by a delegate and the Tribunal. However in February 2015 the Federal Circuit Court remitted the matter by consent to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law. The remittal orders stated that the Tribunal had failed to consider whether there was a real chance that the daughter would suffer serious harm by reasons of her membership of a particular social group, namely girls who attend school in a particular region of Pakistan. 2.2 The second Tribunal decision On 29 May 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants protection visas. It was this decision which was the subject of the decision in the Federal Circuit Court to which the current appeal relates. The appellants made various claims. The father claimed to fear persecution or harm from a militant group based a few kilometres away from his family home, as well as a fear of persecution or harm from other militant terrorist groups, due to his occupation as a social/welfare worker, his links to the West, and the perception that he and his family may be considered as non-Muslim because he had lived in Australia for more than 10 years, and his children had been educated in Christian schools, for which Pakistan was unable to provide adequate protection. The appellants further claimed to fear persecution or harm from militant terrorist groups on the basis of the gender of the wife and daughter, the daughter’s membership of a particular social group (girls who have attended or are attending schools), as well as other factors that might increase the family’s profile. The father claimed that the family could not reasonably relocate within Pakistan to avoid this alleged persecution or harm, including because of the son’s special needs by reason of his speech impediment. The Tribunal made a number of adverse credibility findings against the father, including that he had failed to provide truthful information when completing his visa form and when questioned by the delegate in relation to criminal matters involving him (at [28]). The Tribunal also considered that the father had manufactured his evidence as to his university qualifications and his employment as a social worker in an attempt to embellish his claims for protection in Australia (at [32]). The Tribunal further concluded that the father “showed a considerable willingness to make unsubstantiated and exaggerated assertions regarding his own and his family’s circumstances, particularly in relation to his children’s education, the language they speak, his family’s willingness to assist him upon his return to Pakistan, and his employment upon his return to Pakistan” (at [33]).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It will be recalled that the last of these grounds was also raised by the grounds of review in the Federal Circuit Court, while the first had been raised by the appellants in their outline of submissions below insofar as it concerned the son’s speech impediment. 3.2 Further evidence on which the appellant sought to rely Attached to the appellants’ written submissions were several documents on which they sought to rely as evidence. These included the following:(1)a speech pathology assessment summary relating to the son dated 6 June 2016; (2)a letter from the South Australian Department of Allergy & Clinical Immunology dated 8 August 2016 informing the father and mother that an appointment had been made for the third appellant to attend an appointment; (3)an undated speech pathology assessment report which among other things indicated that the son had been assessed on 20 May 2015 and 10 June 2015; (4)a letter from a paediatrician at Royal Darwin Hospital dated 2 April 2015 relating to the son’s speech impediment and allergies; (5)a document entitled ‘Medication Instructions from Prescribing Doctor’ dated 11 November 2014 relating to the son’s allergies; and(6)a letter dated 5 March 2015 from a medical practice in Darwin concerning the son’s allergies. These documents were received into evidence subject to relevance. In assessing whether these documents are relevant, it is important to emphasise that the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court is limited to deciding whether the Tribunal’s decision was made lawfully under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) , that is, whether the Tribunal’s decision is invalid by reason of a jurisdictional error. This Court in turn must decide whether the Federal Circuit Court wrongly decided that there was no jurisdictional error. The Tribunal would make a jurisdictional error if, for example, it misunderstood the criteria by which the appellants’ visa applications must be assessed under the Migration Act, or if it failed to hear and determine their applications in accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 (the Court). However, neither this Court nor the Federal Circuit Court has jurisdiction to assess for itself whether the appellants satisfy the criteria for the grant of protection visa or to correct mistaken findings of fact by the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 at 240 [65] (Sackville J), 257 [146] (Kenny J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 at [114] (Kirby J). It follows that this Court cannot admit new evidence for the purpose of deciding whether or not it agrees with the factual findings made by the Tribunal unless that evidence bears on a jurisdictional error in the sense I have explained: M211 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 660 at [30] (Crennan J); Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1004 at [27] (Perry J).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants applied for protection visas in 2012. Their application was refused by a delegate and the Tribunal. However in February 2015 the Federal Circuit Court remitted the matter by consent to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law. The remittal orders stated that the Tribunal had failed to consider whether there was a real chance that the daughter would suffer serious harm by reasons of her membership of a particular social group, namely girls who attend school in a particular region of Pakistan. 2.2 The second Tribunal decision On 29 May 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants protection visas. It was this decision which was the subject of the decision in the Federal Circuit Court to which the current appeal relates. The appellants made various claims. The father claimed to fear persecution or harm from a militant group based a few kilometres away from his family home, as well as a fear of persecution or harm from other militant terrorist groups, due to his occupation as a social/welfare worker, his links to the West, and the perception that he and his family may be considered as non-Muslim because he had lived in Australia for more than 10 years, and his children had been educated in Christian schools, for which Pakistan was unable to provide adequate protection. The appellants further claimed to fear persecution or harm from militant terrorist groups on the basis of the gender of the wife and daughter, the daughter’s membership of a particular social group (girls who have attended or are attending schools), as well as other factors that might increase the family’s profile. The father claimed that the family could not reasonably relocate within Pakistan to avoid this alleged persecution or harm, including because of the son’s special needs by reason of his speech impediment. The Tribunal made a number of adverse credibility findings against the father, including that he had failed to provide truthful information when completing his visa form and when questioned by the delegate in relation to criminal matters involving him (at [28]). The Tribunal also considered that the father had manufactured his evidence as to his university qualifications and his employment as a social worker in an attempt to embellish his claims for protection in Australia (at [32]). The Tribunal further concluded that the father “showed a considerable willingness to make unsubstantiated and exaggerated assertions regarding his own and his family’s circumstances, particularly in relation to his children’s education, the language they speak, his family’s willingness to assist him upon his return to Pakistan, and his employment upon his return to Pakistan” (at [33]). Those credibility findings notwithstanding, the Tribunal accepted (at [36]) that the appellants had a genuine fear of returning to the region of Pakistan where the father and wife were from (the appellants’ home region), given the volatile and unpredictable nature of the region. The Tribunal also accepted their fear is particularly acute “given… the number of attacks on schools which, particularly girls’ schools, are considered soft targets to further the militants’ ultra-orthodox agenda.” The Tribunal accepted that in an environment of such instability there are risks for the appellants, particularly the son and daughter who will need to attend school (at [36]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In assessing whether these documents are relevant, it is important to emphasise that the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court is limited to deciding whether the Tribunal’s decision was made lawfully under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) , that is, whether the Tribunal’s decision is invalid by reason of a jurisdictional error. This Court in turn must decide whether the Federal Circuit Court wrongly decided that there was no jurisdictional error. The Tribunal would make a jurisdictional error if, for example, it misunderstood the criteria by which the appellants’ visa applications must be assessed under the Migration Act, or if it failed to hear and determine their applications in accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 (the Court). However, neither this Court nor the Federal Circuit Court has jurisdiction to assess for itself whether the appellants satisfy the criteria for the grant of protection visa or to correct mistaken findings of fact by the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 at 240 [65] (Sackville J), 257 [146] (Kenny J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 at [114] (Kirby J). It follows that this Court cannot admit new evidence for the purpose of deciding whether or not it agrees with the factual findings made by the Tribunal unless that evidence bears on a jurisdictional error in the sense I have explained: M211 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 660 at [30] (Crennan J); Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1004 at [27] (Perry J). All of the documents in question relate to the son’s speech impediment or allergies. The first two documents postdate the Tribunal’s second decision on 29 May 2015. The third document is undated. However, as it refers to an appointment on 10 June 2015, logically it must postdate the second Tribunal decision. It follows that these documents were not before the Tribunal and cannot therefore bear upon the question of whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. There is no evidence that the remaining documents were before the Tribunal. The father submitted that he had given the documents to his representative and that it would appear for unknown reasons that his representative did not give the documents to the Tribunal. However, even accepting that that was the case (on which there was no evidence), there is no suggestion that the evidence was not given to the Tribunal because of a fraud perpetrated on the appellants: cf SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189 (SZFDE) at [49]-[52]). That being so, the fact that through the representative’s negligence or by some other mishap the documents were not given to the Tribunal does not amount to a jurisdictional error that invalidates the decision: SZFDE at [53]. It follows that none of the documents are relevant to the appeal and should be excluded. 3.3 The claims relating to the third appellant’s speech impediment and allergies