CITATION: Duncan v Commonwealth of Australia [2006] NSWSC 822 HEARING DATE(S): Written submissions
JUDGMENT DATE :
17 August 2006JUDGMENT OF: Bell J at 1 DECISION: The costs of the plaintiff’s application pursuant to s 60G of the Limitation Act 1969 are costs in the cause LEGISLATION CITED: Limitation Act 1969 CASES CITED: Ayliffe v The Commonwealth, unreported 2 February 2001
Cavanagh v Commonwealth [2006] NSWSC 382
Commonwealth of Australia v Smith [2005] NSWCA 478
Gregory v Commonwealth [2006] NSWSC 82
Gretton v The Commonwealth, 27 April 2005
Holt v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128
Lewis v Commonwealth [2005] NSWSC 959
Lymbery v The Commonwealth, 2 June 2005
Shaw v Commonwealth [2005] NSWSC 1027
Stringer v The Commonwealth, 18 November 2004
Wendt v Commonwealth (2006) NSWSC 549
Wood v The Commonwealth, 22 September 2005PARTIES: Gordon Ian Duncan (Plaintiff)
Commonwealth of Australia (Defendant)FILE NUMBER(S): SC 20186/00 COUNSEL: J Sharpe (Plaintiff)
RJ Burbidge QC / D Brogan (Defendant)SOLICITORS: Hollows Solicitors (Plaintiff)
Australian Government Solicitors (Defendant)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISIONBELL J
Thursday 17 August 2006
JUDGMENT – Re: Costs20186/00 Gordon Ian Duncan v Commonwealth of Australia
1 BELL J: On 7 June 2006 I ordered that the limitation period for the cause of action in this proceeding be extended to the date on which the statement of claim was filed. The parties subsequently filed written submissions on the question of the costs of the application.
2 The Commonwealth submitted that the appropriate order is that the plaintiff pay its costs and, if the Court were not disposed to make that order, that the costs of the application should be the Commonwealth’s costs in the cause.
3 The plaintiff submitted that the Commonwealth should pay his costs of the application. It was submitted that he had been put to strict proof of all aspects of his application and been required to prepare it as though for final hearing. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Kirby J in Wendt v Commonwealth [2006] NSWSC 549. In Wendt his Honour found the opposition to the extension of the limitation period to have been, in the circumstances of that case, unreasonable.
4 I do not consider that the Commonwealth’s opposition to the extension of the limitation period in this case to have been wholly unreasonable. Its opposition was based upon the contention that the plaintiff knew that he suffered injury prior to the expiration of the limitation period because of his symptoms of anxiety and stress and the frequency of his nightmares and that he had sought a discharge from the Navy on medical grounds.
5 The plaintiff submitted that the provisions of s 60L of the Limitation Act 1969 envisage that the usual order for costs in an application under subdivision 2 or 3 is that the plaintiff recover his costs of the application (WS [10]). Section 60L is expressed not to effect any discretion that a court has in relation to costs.…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Duncan v Commonwealth of Australia and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2006] NSWSC 822
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the legal principle that a successful applicant who allowed themselves to get out of time should pay the costs of the application unless the respondent's opposition was wholly unreasonable. The court also took into account the submissions made by both parties and the relevant authorities. Ultimately, the court determined that the appropriate order in this case was that the costs of the plaintiff's motion to extend the limitation period be costs in the cause.
The court's reasoning was based on the fact that the plaintiff did not allow himself to get out of time, and that the Commonwealth's opposition to the extension was not wholly unreasonable. The court found that the orders made in the Melbourne/Voyager litigation did not support the Commonwealth's submission that the practice consistently followed in this Court in relation to applications to extend the limitation period was as stated in Holt v Wynter.
In conclusion, the court ordered that the costs of the plaintiff's application pursuant to s 60G of the Limitation Act 1969 be costs in the cause.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.