DS Clarke Nominees Pty Ltd v Adder Holdings Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

D.S. Clarke Nominees Pty Ltd v Adder Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 277

Citation: D.S. Clarke Nominees Pty Ltd v Adder Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 277
Parties: D.S. CLARKE NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 131 023 777) v ADDER HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 009 264 037)
File number: WAD 120 of 2014
Judge: GILMOUR J
Date of judgment: 27 March 2015
Catchwords: COSTS - application for indemnity costs by defendant where plaintiff discontinued proceedings against defendant - winding-up application discontinued - whether proceedings commenced in wilful disregard of known facts - no proper evidentiary foundation - indemnity costs awarded
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 459C(2), 459F, 459G, 459P, 459S
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.12
Cases cited: Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225
Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397
O’Neill v Mann [2000] FCA 1680
State Bank of New South Wales v Tela Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 188 ALR 702
Date of hearing: 5 February 2015
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 48
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr TJ Porter
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Wilson & Atkinson
Counsel for the Defendant: Mr BG Grubb
Solicitor for the Defendant: Metaxas & Hager

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 120 of 2014

BETWEEN:

D.S. CLARKE NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 131 023 777)
Plaintiff

AND:

ADDER HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 009 264 037)
Defendant

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 MARCH 2015

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of and associated with this application up to and including 22 September 2014 on an indemnity basis.

2.The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the application for indemnity costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 120 of 2014

BETWEEN:

D.S. CLARKE NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 131 023 777)
Plaintiff

AND:

ADDER HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 009 264 037)
Defendant

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE:

27 MARCH 2015

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The defendant has applied for indemnity costs against the plaintiff consequent upon the discontinuance by the plaintiff of its winding-up application against the defendant. The winding-up application, dated 13 May 2014, was made under s 459P of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act), on the ground of insolvency; the plaintiff relied upon the purported failure of the defendant to comply with a statutory demand dated 31 March 2014 (Statutory Demand).

  2. In its application for indemnity costs, the defendant relies upon the following affidavits:

    (a)Gregory Emerson Metaxas sworn on 13 June 2014; and

    (b)Bruce Graeme Grubb sworn on 9 October 2014.

  3. The plaintiff relies on the affidavit of James Richard Marzec sworn on 3 November 2014 as well as its originating application and the supporting documents filed on that date.

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 277
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

DS Clarke Nominees Pty Ltd brought a winding-up application against Adder Holdings Pty Ltd, which was ultimately discontinued. Adder Holdings applied for indemnity costs, arguing that the winding-up application was commenced and continued by DS Clarke in wilful disregard of known facts and without a proper evidentiary foundation. The court was required to determine whether the proceedings were commenced in wilful disregard of known facts, without a proper evidentiary foundation, and whether indemnity costs were appropriate.

The court found that DS Clarke did not have a proper evidentiary foundation for its claims, as evidenced by the refusal of leave for summary judgment and the subsequent amendment of the statement of claim. The court also found that DS Clarke had commenced the proceedings in wilful disregard of known facts, as it had proceeded despite being out of time and without a signed trust deed. The court held that the winding-up application was vexatious and that DS Clarke had acted in bad faith. As a result, the court awarded indemnity costs to Adder Holdings.

The court ordered that DS Clarke pay Adder Holdings' costs of and associated with the application for indemnity costs, as well as the costs of the application itself, on an indemnity basis. The court also ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of and associated with this application up to and including 22 September 2014 on an indemnity basis. The orders were made under Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of and associated with this application up to and including 22 September 2014 on an indemnity basis.

2. The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the application for indemnity costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The defendant submits that the plaintiff commenced and continued the Action in circumstances where the plaintiff, properly advised, should have known that it had no chance of success. Further, the defendant submits that the plaintiff either commenced the Action for some ulterior motive, or in wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law, making allegations that ought never to have been made, and unduly prolonged the Action.The facts In March 2013 the plaintiff, in its capacity as trustee for the D.S. Clarke Superannuation Fund together with a related company and Mr David Clarke, issued Supreme Court proceedings against four parties, one of which was the present defendant although in its capacity as trustee for the Geraldton Retirement Village Unit Trust. The statement of claim in that proceeding is relevantly alleged that by the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding dated 8 May 2008 (the MOU) as orally varied, the plaintiff, as trustee, was owed $225,000 by the defendant, as trustee, following the exercise by the plaintiff, as trustee, of a put option. It is accepted by the plaintiff that so far as concerns the quantum of the amount set out in the Statutory Demand, this is comprised by the same amount of $225,000 plus interest. What is critical however, is that the Supreme Court proceeding alleged the debt was one owed to the plaintiff as trustee by the defendant as trustee. The Statutory Demand, however, it was accepted by the plaintiff, was issued in its individual capacity and against the defendant in its individual capacity. The plaintiff, as trustee, applied for leave to apply for summary judgment in its Supreme Court proceedings. Leave was required because the plaintiff was out of time to apply. On 24 September 2013, Master Sanderson refused leave. The Master, in his reasons, stated that even had he granted leave he could not have ordered summary judgment. He identified that there was a difficulty in establishing that the second plaintiff (the present plaintiff) was in fact trustee of the D.S. Clarke Superannuation Fund. The trust deed proffered in evidence had not been signed and no signed deed could be located. Nonetheless, as was conceded by the present plaintiff, Mr Clarke had sworn an affidavit in support of the summary judgment application (First Clarke Affidavit), relevantly, deposing that the amount was owed by the defendant as trustee for the Geraldton Retirement Village Unit Trust to the plaintiff as trustee for the D.S. Clarke Superannuation Fund. Following this, no doubt to cater for the difficulty identified by the Master, the present plaintiff amended its statement of claim in the Supreme Court proceeding to allege in the alternative that the money was owed to the present plaintiff in its own capacity. It also pleaded facts in support of its case that the D.S. Clarke Superannuation Fund existed and, in effect, that the present plaintiff was the trustee of that Fund. The plaintiff issued its Statutory Demand dated 31 March 2014. It is not clear whether the plaintiff satisfied the statutory requirements for service of the Statutory Demand, although Mr Lindsay Quann, the defendant’s Director, deposes in an affidavit sworn on 16 June 2014 that it was never actually received. There are implications which arise as a result of these facts.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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