SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | S APCR 2010 0149 |
| Appellant | |
| v | |
| STEVEN FABRICZY | Respondent |
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| JUDGES | MAXWELL P, NEAVE and REDLICH JJA |
| WHERE HELD | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING | 25 October 2010 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT | 9 December 2010 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION | [2010] VSCA 334 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM | [2010] VCC 0341 (Judge C O’Neill) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Crown appeal – Sentencing – Conspiracy to handle stolen goods – Conspiracy to commit robbery – Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 321C(1)(c) – Whether general rule that sentence for conspiracy should be less than sentence for substantive offence – Nature of crime of conspiracy – Substantive offence not committed – Factors relevant to sentence – Sentences manifestly inadequate – Appeal allowed.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Mr B L Sonnet | Mr C Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Respondent | Mr R Richter QC with Ms G Morgan (Sol) | Robert Stary Lawyers |
MAXWELL P
NEAVE JA
REDLICH JA:
Summary
This is an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions against sentences imposed for conspiracy. In addition to the conventional ground of a Director’s appeal, that the sentences were manifestly inadequate, the Director contends that the sentencing judge misdirected himself by holding that, as a general rule, the sentence imposed for an offence of conspiracy to commit an offence should be less than the sentence which would have been imposed had the planned offence been committed.
The specific ground raises an important issue of principle. For reasons which follow, we have concluded that his Honour did misdirect himself. There is no principle of law that the sentence for conspiracy to commit an offence should be less than the sentence which the completed offence would have attracted. The conspiracy offence is directed at a different mischief – the making of an agreement to act unlawfully – and the sentencing court must assess the degree of criminality, and the moral culpability of the individual conspirators, accordingly. The Court must take into account not only what was done by the particular defendant but also the scope and duration of the conspiracy as a whole and everything done in furtherance of it.[1]
[1]See [17] below.
It was conceded by senior counsel for the respondent that, were the Court to uphold the specific ground, the ground of manifest inadequacy must inevitably succeed. This concession was properly made. We will allow the Director’s appeal and resentence the respondent.
The circumstances of the offending
The respondent pleaded guilty in the County Court to one count of conspiracy to handle stolen goods (count 1) and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery (count 2). He was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment on count 1 and two years’ imprisonment on count 2, the sentences to be served concurrently. Twelve months of the term of two years’ imprisonment was suspended for a period of two years.
The facts are not in dispute, and were conveniently summarised by the sentencing judge as follows:[2]
[2]DPP v Fabriczy (Unreported,…
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- AGLC
- DPP v Fabriczy [2010] VSCA 334
- Case
- [2010] VSCA 334
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal raised questions about the appropriate sentence for a conspiracy offence, particularly when the substantive offence was not committed. The Court of Appeal considered whether the general principle that a sentence for conspiracy should be less than the sentence for the substantive offence applied in this case. The Court also examined the nature of the crime of conspiracy and the factors relevant to sentencing in such cases. The Court concluded that the sentences imposed by the trial judge were manifestly inadequate, taking into account the seriousness of the offences and the need for general and specific deterrence.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and re-sentenced the respondent to six months' imprisonment on the first count and four years' imprisonment on the second count. The Court ordered that two months of the sentence on the first count be served cumulatively on the second count, making a total effective sentence of four years and two months' imprisonment. The Court fixed a non-parole period of two years and six months. The Court noted that had the respondent not pleaded guilty and been convicted after trial, it would have imposed a total effective period of imprisonment of five years and four months, with a non-parole period of three years' imprisonment.
Orders
Orders of the court
We would allow the appeal, and re-sentence the respondent to six months’ imprisonment on count 1 and four years’ imprisonment on count 2. We would order that two months of the sentence on count 1 be served cumulatively on count 2 making a total effective sentence of four years and two months’ imprisonment. We would fix a non-parole period of two years and six months. Had the respondent not pleaded guilty and been convicted after trial, we would have imposed a total effective period of imprisonment of five years and four months, with a non-parole period of three years’ imprisonment.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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