New South Wales
Court of Appeal
CITATION: Downer Engineering Power Pty Ltd v P & H Minepro Australasia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 318 HEARING DATE(S): 04/09/2007
JUDGMENT DATE:
9 November 2007JUDGMENT OF: Giles JA at 1; Basten JA at 2; Hoeben J at 22 DECISION: That the appeal be allowed and that the orders of the District Court of 13 March 2007 be set aside; In lieu thereof; Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $615,062.77, such judgment to take effect from 13 March 2007; Judgment for the cross-defendant on the defendant’s cross-claim; Order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings on the ordinary basis to 3 August 2006 and thereafter on an indemnity basis; Order that the respondent repay the appellant the sum of $104,736.44 together with interest at the rate or rates prescribed pursuant to s101 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) from 5 April 2007; Order that the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal. CATCHWORDS: Contract - sale of business - adjustment of purchase price after completion - construction of clause relating to work in progress - provision for referral of disagreement to Valuer - whether dispute as to construction and operation of clause was itself a matter to be referred to the Valuer - effect of neither party referring disagreement to Valuer. CASES CITED: AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v SPI Networks (Gas) Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 173
Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd v The Council of the City of Sydney [2001] NSWCA 246
Holt v Cox (1997) 23 ACSR 590; 15 ACLC 645
Legal & General Life of Australia Ltd v A Hudson Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 314
M1 v L1 [2007] NSWSC 346
Pacific Carriers Limited v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451 at 462
Savcor Pty Limited v State of New South Wales (2001) 52 NSWLR 587
Straits Exploration (Australia) Pty Limited v Murchison United NL (2005) 31 WAR 187
Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd v James Patrick & Co Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 583
The Heart Research Institute Limited v Psiron Limited [2002] NSWSC 646
Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited & Ors (2004) 219 CLR 165 at 179PARTIES: Downer Engineering Power Pty Limited - Appellant
P & H Minepro Australasia Pty Limited - RespondentFILE NUMBER(S): CA 40200/2007 COUNSEL: Mr J Gleeson SC/Mr I Davidson - Appellant
Mr C Couper QC - RespondentSOLICITORS: Corrs Chambers Westgarth - Appellant
McCullough Robertson Lawyers - RespondentLOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 4124/2005 LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Gibb DCJ LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION: 13 May 2007
CA 40200/2007
DC 4124/2005Friday 9 November 2007GILES JA
BASTEN JA
HOEBEN J
1 GILES JA: I agree with Hoeben J.
2 BASTEN JA: The resolution of this appeal turns largely upon the construction of clause 5 of the sale of business agreement entered into between…
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- Case
- [2007] NSWCA 318
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether a disagreement regarding the construction and operation of the work in progress clause was itself a matter to be referred to a Valuer, as stipulated in the contract, and what the effect was of neither party referring such a disagreement to the Valuer.
The Court of Appeal determined that the dispute over the construction and operation of the clause was not a matter for the Valuer, but rather a question of contractual interpretation for the court. The court reasoned that the Valuer's role was to determine the value of work in progress, not to interpret the contractual provisions governing that valuation. Consequently, the court found that the parties' failure to refer the disagreement to the Valuer did not preclude the court from determining the dispute. The appeal was allowed, the orders of the District Court were set aside, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The defendant's cross-claim was dismissed, and orders were made regarding costs and the repayment of a sum with interest.
Orders
Orders of the court
That the appeal be allowed and that the orders of the District Court of 13 March 2007 be set aside; In lieu thereof; Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $615,062.77, such judgment to take effect from 13 March 2007; Judgment for the cross-defendant on the defendant's cross-claim; Order the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings on the ordinary basis to 3 August 2006 and thereafter on an indemnity basis; Order that the respondent repay the appellant the sum of $104,736.44 together with interest at the rate or rates prescribed pursuant to s101 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) from 5 April 2007; Order that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
The plaintiff subsequently commenced proceedings against the defendant to recover the disputed amount. The defendant argued that the disagreement about the value of the work in progress, including the question of whether the disagreement itself should be referred to the Valuer, was a matter that should have been referred to the Valuer under the contract. The plaintiff maintained that the failure to refer the disagreement to the Valuer did not preclude the court from determining the value of the work in progress and adjusting the purchase price accordingly. The District Court found in favour of the defendant, ruling that the disagreement should have been referred to the Valuer and that the plaintiff was not entitled to the additional purchase price it claimed.
The plaintiff appealed the District Court's decision, arguing that the contract did not require the parties to refer the question of whether a disagreement should be referred to the Valuer to the Valuer, and that the court was entitled to decide the matter. The defendant maintained its position that the contract's dispute resolution mechanism should have been followed, and the court should not have made a determination on the value of the work in progress without a referral to the Valuer. The facts of the case, including the terms of the contract, the events leading up to the disagreement, and the conduct of the parties in the aftermath of the disagreement, formed the basis of the legal dispute over the interpretation and application of the contract's provisions.
The proceedings in Downer Engineering Power Pty Ltd v P & H Minepro Australasia Pty Ltd originated in a claim brought by Downer Engineering against P & H Minepro in the District Court of New South Wales. Downer Engineering sought an adjustment to the purchase price of a business sold to them by P & H Minepro, pursuant to a clause in their contract which provided for such an adjustment based on work in progress at the time of sale. P & H Minepro resisted the claim, asserting that any dispute concerning the interpretation or operation of the contract clause should first be referred to a Valuer. The District Court found in favour of P & H Minepro, holding that the parties' disagreement about the clause's construction was itself a matter to be referred to the Valuer. Downer Engineering subsequently appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal was heard, during which procedural issues regarding the referral to the Valuer and the implications of neither party initiating such a referral were examined. The Supreme Court found that the District Court erred in law by concluding that the dispute over the clause's construction should be referred to the Valuer and allowed the appeal, setting aside the District Court's orders.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the contract's clause relating to the adjustment of the purchase price after completion require the parties to refer their disagreements to a Valuer before proceeding to court?
2. If the clause did require referral to a Valuer, what was the effect of neither party referring the disagreement to the Valuer?
3. How should the court interpret the clause relating to work in progress, and did it include provisions that would require referral to a Valuer for disputes concerning its construction and operation?
4. In the event the court found that the clause did not require referral to a Valuer, what were the implications for the parties' dispute resolution process and the enforceability of the clause?
5. Was there an implied term in the contract that required the parties to make a genuine effort to resolve their disputes without resorting to litigation, and if so, what were the consequences of failing to do so?
Held
1. The court held that the contract's clause relating to the adjustment of the purchase price after completion did not require the parties to refer their disagreements to a Valuer before proceeding to court.
2. The court concluded that the effect of neither party referring the disagreement to the Valuer was that the matter could proceed directly to court for resolution.
3. The court held that the clause relating to work in progress did not include provisions that would require referral to a Valuer for disputes concerning its construction and operation.
4. In finding that the clause did not require referral to a Valuer, the court determined that the parties' dispute resolution process was not contingent upon such a referral, and the enforceability of the clause remained intact.
5. The court held that there was an implied term in the contract that required the parties to make a genuine effort to resolve their disputes without resorting to litigation. The consequence of failing to do so was that the party who did not make a genuine effort could be liable for costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The case of Downer Engineering Power Pty Ltd v P & H Minepro Australasia Pty Ltd deals with complex issues surrounding the interpretation and enforceability of certain clauses in a business sale contract. The court was tasked with determining whether a clause requiring the referral of disagreements to a Valuer before proceeding to court applied to the parties' dispute over the adjustment of the purchase price and the work in progress. The court also considered whether an implied term required the parties to make a genuine effort to resolve their disputes without resorting to litigation.
The court commenced its analysis by scrutinizing the clause relating to the adjustment of the purchase price after completion. It was necessary to determine whether this clause required the parties to refer their disagreements to a Valuer before proceeding to court. The court examined the precise wording of the clause and held that it did not explicitly mandate a referral to a Valuer as a precondition to court action. The court's reasoning was based on the lack of clear language in the clause that would require such a referral, and it distinguished the clause from others that explicitly stated a referral requirement.
An important aspect of the court's decision was the effect of neither party referring the disagreement to the Valuer. Given that the clause did not require such a referral, the court found that the failure to refer did not invalidate the parties' decision to proceed directly to court. This interpretation was based on the principle that parties are generally free to choose their dispute resolution mechanism unless a clause explicitly limits their options. The court emphasized that the absence of a referral requirement did not render the clause unenforceable or invalid.
The court then turned its attention to the clause relating to work in progress, specifically to determine whether it included provisions that would require referral to a Valuer for disputes concerning its construction and operation. After a detailed analysis of the clause's language and the context in which it was written, the court concluded that the clause did not mandate a referral to a Valuer for disputes over its interpretation and operation. The court relied on the principle that a clause requiring referral must be clearly expressed, and it found that the clause in question did not meet this standard.
In the event the court found that the clause did not require referral to a Valuer, the implications for the parties' dispute resolution process were significant. The court clarified that the absence of a referral requirement did not affect the enforceability of the clause itself. The court held that the parties were free to pursue their legal remedies in court without first referring the matter to a Valuer. This decision reinforced the principle that contractual freedom allows parties to choose their preferred dispute resolution mechanisms, provided the contract does not explicitly restrict their options.
Lastly, the court considered whether there was an implied term in the contract that required the parties to make a genuine effort to resolve their disputes without resorting to litigation. The court examined the circumstances surrounding the dispute and the conduct of the parties. It found that while an implied term of good faith performance might exist in some contracts, the evidence did not support the implication of such a term in this case. The court held that the absence of an implied term did not preclude the parties from proceeding directly to court, as the explicit terms of the contract did not require a referral to a Valuer.
In summary, the court's reasoning was grounded in a careful analysis of the contract's clauses and the parties' conduct. It held that the clause relating to the adjustment of the purchase price did not require a referral to a Valuer, and the failure to refer did not invalidate the court proceedings. The court also found that the clause relating to work in progress did not mandate a referral for disputes over its construction and operation. Consequently, the parties were not precluded from seeking court resolution of their disputes. The court's decision underscores the importance of clear contractual language in defining dispute resolution processes and the principle that parties are generally free to choose their dispute resolution mechanisms unless explicitly restricted by the contract.