Dowling v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dowling v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 339

INDUSTRIAL LAW – termination of employment of the applicant – whether applicant's employment was terminated for a prohibited reason – whether applicant proposed to make a complaint to a body having the capacity under an industrial law to seek compliance with that law – whether applicant proposed to participate in a proceeding under an industrial law – whether respondent has discharged the reverse onus imposed in proceedings under s 807 of the Workplace Relations Act1996 (Cth) – whether respondent has provided an explanation of the real reason for termination of applicant's employment

COSTS – general restriction on costs under s 824 of the Workplace Relations Act1996 (Cth) – whether some or all of the respondents in both proceedings are entitled to costs

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), ss 792, 793, 807, 809, 824
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 27

Australian and International Pilots Association v Qantas Airways Ltd (No 3) (2007) 162 FCR 392
Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland v Etheridge Shire Council (No 2) [2009] FCA 58
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke (2007) 70 FCR 574
Dowling v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (2008) 172 FCR 96
Grout v Gunnedah Shire Council (No 3) (1995) 59 IR 24
Heidt v Chrysler Australia Ltd (1976) 26 FLR 257
Kanan v Australian Postal & Telecommunications Union (1992) 43 IR 257
L v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission,(2006) 233 ALR 432
Paras v Public Service Body Head of the Department of Infrastructure (No 3) (2006) 152 FCR 53
R v Moore; Ex parte Federated Miscellaneous Workers' Union of Australia (1978) 140 CLR 470
Seymour v Saint-Gobain Abrasives Pty Ltd (2006) 161 IR 9
Shackley v Australian Croatian Club Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 736
Standish v University of Tasmania (1989) 28 IR 12

SHANE DOWLING v FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD  

NSD 1743 of 2008

SHANE DOWLING v DAVID KIRK, RON WALKER, JULIA MARION KING, ROGER CORBETT, MARK BURROWS, DAVID EVANS, PETER YOUNG, JOHN FAIRFAX, NICHOLAS FAIRFAX, GAIL HAMBLY, LINDA PRICE, CAROLYN BRADLEY, KELLY DALY, NATALIE CARRINGTON, YEMEE FERNANDES, KEVIN STOKES and ROBERT WHITEHEAD

NSD 1744 of 2008

MOORE J
9 APRIL 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1743 of 2008

BETWEEN:

SHANE DOWLING
Applicant

AND:

FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 APRIL 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.There be no order as to costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court's website.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1744 OF 2008

BETWEEN:

SHANE DOWLING
Applicant

AND:

DAVID KIRK
First Respondent

RON WALKER
Second Respondent

JULIA MARION KING
Third Respondent

ROGER CORBETT
Fourth Respondent

MARK BURROWS
Fifth Respondent

DAVID EVANS

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 339
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dowling v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd involved an application by Dowling for an order that Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd and certain of its officers and directors be held liable for contraventions of the Work Choices (Workplace Relations) Act 1996 (Cth). Dowling alleged that he was terminated from his employment because he had threatened to involve Workcover and to make a complaint to Workcover. Dowling claimed this was an unlawful reason for termination of employment under the Act. Fairfax denied the allegations and asserted that Dowling was dismissed for legitimate reasons, including poor performance and conflict with colleagues.

The central legal issue was whether Dowling could establish that his termination was due to the alleged reasons, or whether Fairfax had successfully rebutted the presumption under section 809 of the Act that the termination contravened the Act. Dowling argued that the real reason for his termination was his threats to involve Workcover, while Fairfax contended that Dowling was dismissed due to legitimate performance and conduct issues.

The court found that Fairfax had provided a credible explanation for the termination that was based on legitimate reasons unrelated to the alleged threats to involve Workcover. The court accepted the evidence of Fairfax's witnesses who described Dowling's poor performance, difficult behaviour, and conflicts with colleagues. The court concluded that Dowling had not established that the alleged reasons played any part in the decision to terminate his employment.

The court dismissed Dowling's application, finding that Fairfax had successfully rebutted the presumption under section 809 of the Act. The court also considered the issue of costs under section 824 of the Act, which limits the circumstances in which costs may be awarded. The court held that Dowling's proceeding was not instituted vexatiously or without reasonable cause, and therefore he was not liable for the costs of the respondents. However, the court ordered Dowling to pay the costs of certain respondents due to his unreasonable conduct during the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. There be no order as to costs.

Note:

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the second to tenth respondents.

3. Save for Order 2, there be no order as to costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Before discussing the facts in greater detail, it is desirable to set out the allegations made by the applicant. They provide the context for the subsequent consideration of the facts. The applicant said his employment was terminated because:§ On 16 April 2007, he sent an e-mail to David Kirk, the then CEO of Fairfax, complaining about a number of matters which might broadly be described as victimisation. In the e-mail, the applicant said if his allegations of a "clear breach of NSW Occupational Health and Safety Law and NSW Industrial Relation[s] Law" were "not dealt with summarily", he would "have no choice but to look at other options in dealing with them"; and/or§ On 7 May 2007, in a meeting to discuss his work performance and behaviour, the applicant allegedly announced that "I will be getting Workcover involved"; and/or§ On 8 May 2007, the applicant allegedly told Ms Linda Price that "[t]hey are threatening to sack me and (I) believe I can take out a court order stopping them from sacking me. I also told Natalie Carrington yesterday that I would be making a complaint to Workcover but have decided to at least wait until after the meeting with you and Carolyn Bradley tomorrow".I should note, at this point, that Ms Price had been asked by Mr Kirk to investigate the allegations in the 16 April 2007 e-mail. Ms Price then (and still) held a senior position in Fairfax. She was the IT and Group Human Resources Director of Fairfax. The two people allegedly mentioned by the applicant in the above conversation were Natalie Carrington, who was employed at the time, as a contractor, by Fairfax as a Human Resources Manager (Fairfax Business Media) and Caroline Bradley who, at the time, was Human Resources Director (Corporate Services). The facts I commence with my impression of the witnesses. Three witnesses called by Fairfax were particularly impressive. They are Mr Kirk, Ms Price and Ms Carrington, each of whom gave a clear and considered answer to virtually every question. In saying this I am not suggesting the other witnesses called by Fairfax were not being truthful. I entertain no doubt that each witness endeavoured to give an honest account of their recollections of both the events before the applicant's e-mail was sent to Mr Kirk, and the events which followed leading to the applicant's termination on 9 May 2007. I thought Ms Fernandes was, on occasions, a little too ready to answer the question too quickly during cross-examination. This may have influenced the accuracy of her answers in her oral evidence. However, having regard to her evidence, which I accept, that she had been significantly troubled by the aggressive attitude the applicant had adopted towards her in the workplace, I could understand that it may not have been comfortable for her to give evidence under cross-examination by the applicant. It is convenient, at this point, to say something about the course the final hearing took. When the trial commenced, the applicant initially refused to lead any evidence. His position then was that having regard to the judgment of Jagot J (Dowling v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (2008) 172 FCR 96 and particularly what her Honour said at para [85]), a point had been reached where s 809 had been engaged and it was necessary for the respondents to lead evidence to prove that the alleged reason or reasons for the termination were not the reason or reasons or part of them. I indicated to the applicant that it was incumbent upon him to at least lead evidence at the trial to show that the basal facts which might engage s 809 of the WR Act could be established on his evidence. After some resistance, the applicant undertook this task which involved reading affidavits or parts of them and tendering certain documents. Senior counsel for the respondents wished to cross-examine the applicant. The applicant resisted this course. I allowed the cross-examination to commence. But shortly thereafter I decided, on reflection, that it would be procedurally fairer to require the respondents to adduce their evidence but on the basis that in due course, the applicant could lead any responsive evidence and then be cross-examined on all his evidence. The cross-examination stopped. The applicant agreed to this course and it is tolerably clear that he agreed to submit to cross-examination at the conclusion of the respondents' evidence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MOORE J
Mr Stokes was cross-examined at some length by the applicant. I accept that he had concluded on reasonable grounds that the applicant was not performing in his role, had made limited sales, was a difficult employee to manage, had very poor relationships with Ms Fernandes and other Fairfax employees, breached client communication protocols and was very dismissive of management and its right to issue directions. Conclusion The task of Fairfax in the Principal Proceedings is to displace the legislative presumption that it has acted for a reason that contravenes the WR Act, and I am satisfied that, having regard to all the evidence, Fairfax has successfully discharged the onus cast upon it by s 809 of the WR Act. I am satisfied that Fairfax has provided an explanation of the real reasons for the termination of the applicant's employment, which I accept were the reasons, and there is no basis for concluding that the alleged reasons played any role whatsoever in the decision to terminate, or the termination of, the applicant's employment. It follows that there can be no accessorial liability on the part of the respondents in the Officers and Directors Proceedings. Both the Principal Proceedings and the Officers and Directors Proceedings should be dismissed. Costs – principles I now turn to the issue of costs. The respondents sought an order that the applicant pay their costs of the Proceedings. Central to the issue of costs is section 824 of the WR Act, which provides that:Section 824: Costs only where proceeding instituted vexatiously etc. (1) A party to a proceeding (including an appeal) in a matter arising under this Act (other than an application under section 663) must not be ordered to pay costs incurred by any other party to the proceeding unless the first‑mentioned party instituted the proceeding vexatiously or without reasonable cause. (2) Despite subsection (1), if a court hearing a proceeding (including an appeal) in a matter arising under this Act (other than an application under section 663) is satisfied that a party to the proceeding has, by an unreasonable act or omission, caused another party to the proceeding to incur costs in connection with the proceeding, the court may order the first-mentioned party to pay some or all of those costs. As I noted in Grout v Gunnedah Shire Council (No 3) (1995) 59 IR 248 at 259, the word "proceeding" does not have a fixed or immutable meaning and its precise meaning in any particular circumstance must be derived from the relevant statutory context. The meaning of "proceeding" in s 347 of the then Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (which is relevantly identical to s 824(1) of the WR Act) was considered by the Full Bench of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia in Shackley v Australian Croatian Club Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 736. In Shackley, Wilcox CJ (with whom von Doussa J agreed) said (at 745): ... the word "proceeding" is widely used to refer, not only to a principal action (or "proceeding") between parties, but also to any subsidiary application made during the course of the principal action. There is no reason to believe that the word is used in a different sense in s 347; indeed the word in parenthesis indicates the contrary. If parliament had intended that "proceeding" should be understood, in s 347, as meaning only a principal action that commenced when the Court's jurisdiction was first invoked and concluded with final judgment, it would have been absurd to say that an appeal alone might constitute a "proceeding".The approach of Wilcox CJ in Shackley was subsequently approved by a Full Court of this Court in Commonwealth of Australia v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2003) 129 FCR 271 at 274, where the Court said: In an action brought to enforce a right given by the [Workplace Relations] Act, it would be quite contrary to this object to read s 347(1) narrowly such that interlocutory proceedings about, for example, discovery were not seen as proceedings "in the matter" at the heart of the principal proceeding and were instead seen as proceedings in a separate matter, defined according to the narrower and subsidiary controversy about discovery. Viewed in that way, the policy choice that s 347(1) reflects would be undermined since the so-called ordinary rule as to costs would often, perhaps nearly always, prevail in interlocutory matters. Only the trial of the principal action would be unassailably a proceeding in a matter arising under the Act. Such a result could not have been intended.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MOORE J

Full text does not contain this section.