High Court—Appeal—Appeal as of right—Competency—Question respecting civil right amounting to or of value of $20,000 or upwards—Removal of name of medical practitioner from register of practitioners—Whether right involved—Whether right to practise capable of valuation—Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth),s. 35 (3) (b).

Decisions

May 11.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
GIBBS C.J. The present appeal is brought from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Court of Appeal) dismissing an appeal against an order made by the Disciplinary Tribunal under s. 29 of the Medical Practitioners Act 1938 (N.S.W.), as amended, directing that the name of the appellant be removed from the register of medical practitioners for New South Wales. An objection has been lodged to the competency of the appeal. (at p366)

2. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the proceedings "involve directly or indirectly a claim, demand or question to or respecting any property or any civil right amounting to or of the value of $20,000 or upwards" within the meaning of s. 35 (3) (b) of the Judiciary Act, and that an appeal to this Court therefore lies as of right. It was submitted that the proceedings involve the right of the appellant to practise as a medical practitioner, and that the value of that right to him exceeds $20,000. In fact the appellant is employed as a senior medical officer by the State Rail Authority of New South Wales at a salary which is at present $33,761 per annum. He has been employed in that position for some years, and might have expected to remain in it for some years more. However, if his name is not restored to the register, his employment will, it was said, be terminated. It was submitted that the salary which he would have received in that position would have accrued from the exercise of the right to practise and provides a measure of the value of that right. (at p367)

3. It was held by this Court in Clyne v. N.S.W. Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186 that no appeal lay as of right from an order striking the name of the appellant off the roll of barristers, notwithstanding that the net income of the appellant from his practice had been, and was likely to be in future, greater than the amount specified in s. 35 of the Judiciary Act. The Court said of the order of the Supreme Court in that case (1960) 104 CLR, at p 205 : "There is no 'property' that can be said to be involved, and no civil right capable of being valued." That decision governs the present case, and in my opinion it was correct. It proceeds on the ground that a right to practise a profession is incapable of valuation. It is true that a person who has a…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Dorman v Rodgers

Details

AGLC: Dorman v Rodgers [1982] HCA 25
Case: [1982] HCA 25
Decision Date: 11 May 1982

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Dorman v Rodgers*. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a clause in a deed of settlement which provided for the payment of a sum of money by the respondent to the appellant. The appellant sought to enforce this payment, alleging a breach of the deed.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the appellant had validly exercised a right to demand payment of the sum stipulated in the deed. This involved determining the proper construction of the relevant clause within the deed, particularly concerning the conditions precedent to the appellant's right to demand payment and the effect of the respondent's alleged failure to comply with those conditions.

The Court's reasoning focused on the principles of contractual interpretation. It was held that the clause in question required the appellant to provide certain information to the respondent before the payment became due. As the appellant had failed to provide this information, the condition precedent to the demand for payment had not been met. Consequently, the respondent was not in breach of the deed by failing to pay the sum. The Court applied the ordinary rules of contract construction, emphasising the importance of giving effect to the plain meaning of the words used in the agreement.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders