[2014] AATA 237
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number(s)
2012/4514
Re
DNJN
APPLICANT
And
COMCARE
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President J W Constance
Date 24 April 2014 Place Melbourne The reviewable decision, being the decision of Comcare made 12 September 2012 that the Applicant is not entitled to compensation for aggravation of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, is affirmed.
.........................[sgd]........................................
Deputy President J W Constance
CATCHWORDS
COMPENSATION – Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – chronic fatigue syndrome - whether applicant suffered an ailment within the meaning of the Act – whether applicant suffered an aggravation of an ailment – whether aggravation was contributed to, to a significant degree by the applicant’s employment – reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner in respect of the applicant’s employment – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4(1), 5A, 5B, 7(4), 14(1)
CASES
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Reeve [2012] FCAFC 21
Federal Broom Company Pty. Limited v Semlitch (1964) 110 CLR 626
Hart v Comcare (2005) 145 FCR 29
Peters v Comcare [2013] FCA 1361Smith v Comcare [2013] FCAFC 65
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President J W Constance
24 April 2014
INTRODUCTION
The Applicant has been employed in the Australian Public Service since 2003. In 2012 she made a claim for compensation for an injury she suffered and which she claimed was caused by her employment. In her claim form the Applicant described the injury as an aggravation of pre-existing Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.
On 12 September 2012 Comcare decided to affirm an earlier determination denying liability to compensate the Applicant. The Applicant has sought a review of this decision by the Tribunal.
For the reasons which follow the reviewable decision made by Comcare will be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Unless stated otherwise, the following findings of fact are based on the evidence of the Applicant.
The Applicant grew up in country Victoria. She was a healthy child who enjoyed sports and outdoor activities and at the same time was an excellent student.
In 1992 the Applicant took a course of Roaccutane, a drug prescribed by her general practitioner for the treatment of acne. Immediately following her taking the drug the Applicant suffered a number of acute symptoms, including mental fatigue, insomnia, sore throat, swollen glands, sinus pain and headache.
At the time of the onset of these symptoms the Applicant was studying at University. After some time the acute symptoms subsided but the sinus pain and sore glands continued in a mild state. She was able to complete her study and graduate with the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in Criminal Justice Administration. Following graduation the Applicant worked in several jobs.
In 2003 the Applicant commenced employment with Centrelink and has continued in that employment ever since. In 2005 she was working in the Fraud Investigation Team when she suffered anxiety and depression arising, in part at least, from the type of investigative work she was undertaking. After some time off work the Applicant was able…
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- AGLC
- DNJN and COMCARE [2014] AATA 237
- Case
- [2014] AATA 237
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine several issues: whether the Applicant suffered from an ailment within the meaning of the Act, if there was an aggravation of that ailment, if the aggravation was contributed to significantly by her employment, and if the aggravation resulted from reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner. The court found that the Applicant did suffer from an ailment, specifically a disorder manifesting in various symptoms including tiredness and cognitive fatigue. There was also an aggravation of this condition, which occurred between June and August 2010, and this aggravation was contributed to significantly by her employment. However, the court concluded that the aggravation was a result of reasonable administrative action, namely the transfer to the new team, which was taken in a reasonable manner. Consequently, the aggravation was not compensable under the Act.
The court's reasoning was based on the evidence provided, which indicated that the Applicant's condition worsened after the transfer and the associated stress. However, the court found that the transfer was a reasonable administrative action, and since the aggravation occurred after this action, it could not be said to have resulted from it. Therefore, the claim for compensation was dismissed. The court did not find it necessary to determine a specific diagnosis of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome to conclude that the Applicant suffered from an ailment.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The follow issues arise for determination.(1)Has the Applicant suffered an ailment within the meaning of subsection 4(1) of the Act?(2)If so, has she suffered an aggravation of that ailment?(3)If so, was the aggravation contributed to, to a significant degree, by her employment by Centrelink?(4)If so, was the aggravation suffered as a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner in respect of the employee’s employment?CONSIDERATIONIssue 1: Has the Applicant suffered an ailment within the meaning of subsection 4(1) of the Act? On many occasions the Applicant has described in detail the condition she has experienced in varying degrees from 1992 onwards. She claims that what she has experienced are the signs and symptoms of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. Based on her evidence I am satisfied that from time to time since 1992 the Applicant has suffered and continues to suffer the following:·pain in the sinus;·an overwhelming feeling of tiredness;·cognitive fatigue;·post-exertion exhaustion;·insomnia;·depression;·anxiety;·painful and swollen lymph nodes in the neck;·cognitive deficiencies;·adverse reaction to extremes of temperature;·sore eyes and floaters within vision;·a flu-like illness with aching and pain and at times a sore throat;·tightness and pain in muscles throughout the body;·dizziness;·digestive problems;·heart palpitations;·high sensitivity to the side-effects of medications;·sensitivity to crowds, loud noise and bright lights.[9]Not all of these signs/symptoms are constant. They vary in intensity. I accept her evidence that she is never symptom free.[9] Exhibit A6. The definition of ailment is very broad, although it is in part circular in that it includes the word ailment as part of the definition. The definition does not require that the ailment be a condition which fits within a recognized diagnostic criteria.[10][10] In Federal Broom Company Pty. Limited v Semlitch ((1964) 110 CLR 626) the High Court considered the provisions of State workers’ compensation legislation, but the principles are applicable. Windeyer J at para 639 said:But I can see no need for the Court to put a label upon the applicant’s illness, or to be concerned because witnesses labelled it differently. The Macquarie Dictionary includes the following definitions:Disorder: a derangement of physical or mental health or functions;Defect: a fault or imperfection. I am satisfied that since 1992 and as at the date of this decision, the Applicant has suffered from an ailment, being a disorder which manifests itself in variable signs and symptoms which include an overwhelming feeling of tiredness, cognitive fatigue and post-exertion exhaustion. This condition is properly described as a derangement of physical or mental health or functions and therefore is a physical or mental … disorder or defect within the definition of ailment in subsection 4(1) of the Act. During the hearing of this matter both parties devoted very considerable time and effort in arguing whether or not the Applicant was suffering from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome at the time she alleges she was injured by reason of that condition being aggravated. It is sufficient that I am satisfied that the Applicant suffers from an ailment; it is not necessary that I be satisfied of a particular diagnosis.