DJS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DJS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 254

Appeal from: DJS16 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3166
File number: VID 1378 of 2017
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 5 March 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court affirming decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal to refuse protection visa – whether certain findings of Tribunal irrational or legally unreasonable – impugned findings open to Tribunal in the circumstances –appeal dismissed
Cases cited:

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496

DJS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 2037

Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 172; 255 FCR 486

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 359 ALR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

Republic of Nauru v WET040 [No 2] [2018] HCA 60; 362 ALR 235

Date of hearing: 19 February 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 60
Counsel for the First and Second Appellants: Mr J W K Burnside AO QC with Mr D B Clough
Solicitor for the First and Second Appellants: Bardo Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Hill
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1378 of 2017
BETWEEN:

DJS16

First Appellant

DJT16
Second Appellant
AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MARCH 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The first appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, including reserved costs, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

3.On or before 13 March 2019, the parties are to file a joint note informing the Court whether or not agreement on costs (including reserved costs), and any lump sum figures as to costs, has been reached, including any proposed orders if agreement has been reached.

4.In the absence of any agreement pursuant to the process in paragraph 3, the matter of an appropriate lump sum for the first respondent’s costs is to be referred to a Registrar for determination. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MORTIMER J:

  1. This is an appeal from orders of the…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 254
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In DJS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellants sought to appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which affirmed the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to refuse a protection visa. The primary issue before the court was whether certain findings made by the Tribunal were irrational or legally unreasonable. Specifically, the appellants challenged the Tribunal's conclusions regarding the reliability of evidence presented, including a screenshot and photograph, which they argued supported their claim that the first appellant's ex-husband had visited Australia in 2014 and intended to abduct their son.

The court considered whether the Tribunal’s approach to the reliability of the first appellant's accounts was irrational. It was noted that the Tribunal did not rely on the truth of the history given by the first appellant but rather focused on the absence of any record in the Australian government database of the claimed entry in 2014. Given this, the court held that the Tribunal's findings were not irrational or legally unreasonable. The Tribunal's decision to weigh the absence of records more heavily than the provided evidence was within its discretion. Additionally, the court found that the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the screenshot and photograph were contrived to bolster the first appellant's claim. This conclusion was based on the inconsistency between the applicant's assertion of the visit and the lack of supporting evidence in the Australian government database.

The court further examined the Tribunal's findings regarding the Malaysian justice system and family law, which placed the welfare of the child at the center of its assessment. It was held that it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that any potential loss of custody by the first appellant, pursuant to a ruling by a Malaysian court, would not amount to persecution or serious harm. This finding, while criticised by senior counsel, did not form part of the grounds of appeal, and no argument was developed regarding any error of law. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the first appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs, including reserved costs, to be fixed by a lump sum. The parties were also instructed to attempt to agree on the quantum of costs before the matter was referred to a Registrar for determination if no agreement was reached.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The first appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, including reserved costs, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

3. On or before 13 March 2019, the parties are to file a joint note informing the Court whether or not agreement on costs (including reserved costs), and any lump sum figures as to costs, has been reached, including any proposed orders if agreement has been reached.

4. In the absence of any agreement pursuant to the process in paragraph 3, the matter of an appropriate lump sum for the first respondent’s costs is to be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There is no basis to find the Tribunal’s approach to the reliability of the first appellant’s accounts was irrational because the Tribunal did not rely on the truth of the history given by the first appellant to various professionals. These were judgments for the Tribunal to make.First finding: whether screen shot evidence contrived The appellants identify as the impugned finding what is said at [31] of the Tribunal’s reasons:The Tribunal has had regard to this evidence which indicates that the applicant’s ex-husband visited [REDACTED] in 2014. However, the Tribunal has placed greater weight on the absence of any record in the Australian government data base of this claimed entry into Australia in 2014 and, in the absence of any record of his entry, finds that the applicant’s ex-husband did not visit [REDACTED] in 2014 as claimed. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant’s ex-husband has the power or the inclination to erase his entry from the Australian government data base. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the screen shots, photograph and the IO application have been contrived in order to bolster the applicant’s claim that her ex-husband wants custody of [REDACTED]. The references to the visit in 2014, the “screen shots” and the records on the “Australian government data base” (also referred to as “movement records”) are explained earlier in the Tribunal’s reasons at [24]-[26], all of which was relevant to the appellants’ claims that the first appellant’s ex-husband was planning to abduct his son from Australia:The applicant claims that her ex-husband came to Australia in August 2014 and sought contact with [REDACTED]. She claims that she was afraid he would abduct [REDACTED] so, on the advice of [REDACTED]’s school, obtained an Intervention Order (IO) on 15 August 2014 preventing her ex-husband from having any contact with [REDACTED] (f.357 of the Tribunal file) however the IO subsequently lapsed because it could not be served on her ex-husband. The Tribunal searched the Department’s Movement Records and issued a summons to the Department for their Movement Records in order to confirm that the applicant’s ex-husband entered Australia in 2014. The Movement Records obtained by the Tribunal and provided by the Department show that his most recent entry into Australia was on 26 December 2010 and that he departed on 12 January 2011. When the Tribunal put to the applicant (pursuant to s.424AA of the Act) that there is no record of her ex-husband entering or departing Australia in August 2014, the applicant stated that she does not understand how this is the case and re-iterated that he visited [REDACTED]in 2014. She told the previous Tribunal that he may have travelled on a diplomatic passport however the Tribunal understands that entry on a diplomatic passport will still show up in the Movements Records data base. The applicant told the Tribunal that her husband may have used his intelligence contacts to have his entry and exit deleted from the Australian government data base.The applicant provided screen shots of chats allegedly between herself and her ex-husband on 15 August 2014 making arrangements for his contact with [REDACTED] and a photo of [REDACTED] supposedly with his father in Geelong. The Tribunal raised the following concern about this evidence with the applicant. The applicant obtained the IO on 15 August at 11.45 then, despite the IO, apparently messaged her ex-husband at 2pm on the same day and asked him if he wanted to see [REDACTED] that day or the next day and then arranged for them to meet at the waterfront that night at 6pm. When the Tribunal queried why she obtained an IO then arranged for her ex-husband to meet [REDACTED], the applicant said that the IO was just to prevent her ex-husband from taking [REDACTED] out of school. The Tribunal noted that it prevents all contact. When asked why she did not tell the police her ex-husband would be at the waterfront that evening so they could serve the IO, the applicant said she didn’t think ahead and was traumatised and didn’t know her ex-husband’s motives.

Decision

Reasons for decision

However, the Tribunal had found that the Malaysian justice system, and the family law system in particular, places the welfare of the child at the centre of its assessment, and having made those findings, it was open to the Tribunal to find, in effect, that even if there was some prospect the first appellant might lose custody of her son pursuant to rulings made by a Malaysian court, the reason for that treatment (and its acknowledged distressing consequences) would be a ruling of the Malaysian court and not any Convention reason. Further, it was open to the Tribunal to find that any application for custody made by the first appellant’s ex-husband, or grant of custody after a legal process, in those circumstances would not amount to persecution or serious harm of either the first appellant or her son. Although senior counsel criticised this finding as well, that finding did not form part of the findings set out in what I have described as the five “grounds” of appeal, and no argument was developed, by reference to applicable legal principles, as to how there was any error of law (let alone one of a jurisdictional nature) in the Tribunal making this particular finding.CONCLUSION Returning to the descriptions of irrationality by the High Court in WET040, the impugned findings of the Tribunal were not “bare assertions” or “speculation or conjecture”, or findings “unsupported by basic inconsistencies”. The inferences drawn were within the bounds of rationality, even though it can be accepted that other decision-makers may have preferred different aspects of the evidence. Accepting that reality is to recognise one of the features of merits review, which sometimes works in favour of review applicants, and sometimes against them. The appeal must be dismissed. The parties will be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of costs, including an appropriate quantum for any lump sum, whether to be fixed by agreement or by reference to evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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