Director of Public Prosecutions v Spong

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
COURT OF APPEAL

Case Title:

Director of Public Prosecutions v Spong

Citation:

[2018] ACTCA 37

Hearing Date:

13 August 2018

ReasonsDate:

6 September 2018

Before:

Murrell CJ, Mossop and Wigney JJ

Decision:

On the trial of a culpable driving offence under s 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) that involves negligence, the trial judge is neither required nor entitled to direct the jury that the driving must “involve a high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct”.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – DIRECTIONS TO JURY – culpable driving involving negligence – section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) – whether the accused’s driving must “involve a high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct”

CRIMINAL LAW – REFERENCE APPEAL – statutory interpretation – whether ACT and Victorian provisions are substantially identical – construction of s 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) – construction of s 318 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) – where the wording of the provisions are identical – where the context and purpose differ – whether Victorian Court of Appeal authorities should be followed

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No 2) 1990 (ACT) s 47

Crimes (Dangerous Driving) Act 2004 (Vic) s 318(2A)
Crimes (Driving Offences) Act 1967 (Vic) s 3
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 20, 29, 49 and 52A
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 52A
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 318 and 319
Crimes Ordinance 1963 (No 11) (ACT)
Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) ss 139(1), 140, 141(1) and 141(2)
Road Transport (Safety and Management) Act 1999 (ACT) s 6(1)

Supreme Court Act1933 (ACT) s 37S

Cases Cited:

Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485

DPP (NSW) v Yeo [2008] NSWSC 953; 188 A Crim R 82
Fernando v Commission of Police (1995) 36 NSWLR 567; 78 A Crim R 64
King v The Queen [2012] HCA 24; 245 CLR 588
Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430
Patel v The Queen [2012] HCA 29; 247 CLR 531
R v Antoniazzo [2010] ACTSC 36; 55 MVR 261
R v De’Zilwa [2002] VSCA 158; 5 VR 408
R v Falzon [2018] HCA 29
R v Horvath [1972] VR 533
R v NZ [2005] NSWCCA 278; 63 NSWLR 628
Bouch v The Queen [2017] VSCA 861
DPP v Booth [2018] ACTCA 8
R v Spong [2018] ACTSC 129
R v Shields [1981] VR 717
R v Stephenson [1976] VR 376
R v Wolter (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 277; 302 FLR 1
Tillman v Attorney General (NSW) [2007] NSWCA 327; 70 NSWLR 448

Wilkins v Hague [2011] ACTSC 189; 258 FLR 355

Parties:

ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Applicant)

Alister Peter Spong (Interested Party)

Representation:

Counsel

Ms M Jones (Applicant)

Mr S Whybrow (Interested Party)

Solicitors

ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Applicant)

ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Interested Party)

File Number:

ACTCA 26…

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Details
Case
[2018] ACTCA 37
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) appealed a decision of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory concerning the trial of Mr Spong for culpable driving involving negligence. The central dispute revolved around the correct legal direction to be given to the jury regarding the element of negligence required for a conviction under section 29 of the *Crimes Act 1900* (ACT). The appeal was heard by Murrell CJ, Mossop and Wigney JJ.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the trial judge erred in directing the jury that the accused's driving must involve a "high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct." This question necessitated an examination of the statutory interpretation of section 29 of the *Crimes Act 1900* (ACT), particularly in light of similar provisions in other jurisdictions, specifically section 318 of the *Crimes Act 1958* (Vic). The Court was required to determine if Victorian Court of Appeal authorities, which had interpreted the identical wording of the Victorian provision, should be applied to the ACT legislation, considering any differences in context and purpose.

The Court reasoned that the wording of section 29 of the *Crimes Act 1900* (ACT) does not require proof of a "high risk" of death or serious injury. Instead, it requires proof that the accused's conduct was negligent, meaning it fell below the standard of a reasonable driver and that this negligence caused the death of another person. The Court distinguished the ACT provision from the Victorian one, noting that while the wording was identical, the legislative context and purpose differed. Consequently, the Court held that the trial judge was neither required nor entitled to direct the jury that the driving must involve a "high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct." The Court therefore allowed the DPP's appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

On the trial of a culpable driving offence under s 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) that involves negligence, the trial judge is neither required nor entitled to direct the jury that the driving must “involve a high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct”.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 26 November 2021, the accused, Spong, was driving a vehicle on Parkes Way in Canberra. The weather conditions were rainy and the road was wet, which the accused was aware of. Spong was driving at a speed that he considered safe under the conditions, but he was involved in a collision with another vehicle driven by the victim, who suffered serious injuries as a result. Spong was charged with a culpable driving offence under section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), which involves negligence. At the trial, the trial judge was asked to direct the jury on the meaning of the term “involve a high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct” as used in section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The accused argued that the trial judge should not direct the jury in this way, as it was not an element of the offence. The trial judge ultimately directed the jury in the way requested by the prosecution, and the accused was found guilty. The accused appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the trial judge’s direction was incorrect and that it should not have been given. The Director of Public Prosecutions argued that the trial judge’s direction was correct and that it should be followed in all cases involving culpable driving under section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The Court of Appeal heard the appeal and determined that the trial judge’s direction was incorrect. The Court of Appeal held that the term “involve a high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct” was not an element of the offence of culpable driving under section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), and that the trial judge was neither required nor entitled to direct the jury in this way. The Court of Appeal quashed the accused’s conviction and ordered a new trial.

The case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Spong originated as a trial in the Magistrates’ Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The accused was charged with culpable driving involving negligence under section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). After the prosecution presented its case, the accused applied for a dismissal of the charge pursuant to section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1983 (ACT). The application was dismissed, leading to the accused’s appeal against the conviction to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in directing the jury that the accused's driving must "involve a high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct". The Director of Public Prosecutions subsequently appealed to the High Court of Australia, seeking leave to appeal against the Supreme Court’s decision. The High Court granted special leave to appeal, and the matter proceeded to a full hearing on the merits of the statutory interpretation and the correctness of the jury direction.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the accused’s driving in a culpable driving offence must "involve a high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct" as per section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).

2. Whether the statutory provisions of section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) and section 318 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) are substantially identical despite their identical wording but differing context and purpose.

3. Whether Victorian Court of Appeal authorities should be followed in interpreting section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), given the differences in context and purpose between the ACT and Victorian provisions.

4. Whether the trial judge is required or entitled to direct the jury regarding the "high risk" element in a culpable driving offence under section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).

Held
1. The court concluded that in a culpable driving offence under section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), the accused’s driving need not necessarily "involve a high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct". Result: The court determined that the presence of a high risk is not a necessary element of the offence.

2. The court held that the statutory provisions of section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) and section 318 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) are not substantially identical despite their identical wording, due to their differing context and purpose. Result: The court found the provisions to have different meanings due to their distinct legislative contexts.

3. The court decided that Victorian Court of Appeal authorities should not be followed in interpreting section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) as there are significant differences in context and purpose between the ACT and Victorian provisions. Result: The court ruled that interpretations from a different jurisdiction should not be applied in this case.

4. The court concluded that the trial judge is neither required nor entitled to direct the jury regarding the "high risk" element in a culpable driving offence under section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). Result: The court confirmed that such directions are not mandatory and are beyond the trial judge’s entitlement in this context.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court in Director of Public Prosecutions v Spong meticulously examined the statutory interpretation of culpable driving involving negligence under section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The primary issue centred around whether the accused's driving in such an offence must "involve a high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct". The court delved into the statutory language and its implications, noting that the statutory provisions in the ACT and Victoria, despite identical wording, are not necessarily substantially identical due to their differing contexts and purposes. This distinction was pivotal as it influenced the court's approach to interpreting the ACT provision.

In addressing the first issue, the court highlighted that the statutory language in section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) does not explicitly require that the driving must "involve a high risk that death or serious injury would follow from the relevant conduct". Instead, the court found that the statutory language simply requires negligence on the part of the driver. This interpretation was supported by the court's analysis of the legislative intent and context, which indicated that the requirement of a "high risk" is not a necessary element of the offence as defined by the ACT statute.

The second issue explored whether the statutory provisions of section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) and section 318 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) are substantially identical, despite their identical wording. The court found that although the wording of the provisions is identical, their contexts and purposes differ sufficiently to warrant separate interpretations. The court underscored that the context and purpose of the Victorian provision, as interpreted by the Victorian Court of Appeal, should not be applied to the ACT provision due to these differences. This distinction was crucial in ensuring that the interpretation of the ACT statute is aligned with its specific legislative intent and context.

In examining whether Victorian Court of Appeal authorities should be followed in interpreting section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), the court concluded that such authorities should not be followed due to the differences in context and purpose between the ACT and Victorian provisions. The court emphasized that each jurisdiction's legislative framework must be interpreted within its own context, and cross-jurisdictional authorities should only be considered when they do not conflict with the specific legislative intent of the ACT statute. This approach ensures that the interpretation of the ACT provision is faithful to its unique legislative context and purpose.

Lastly, the court addressed whether the trial judge is required or entitled to direct the jury regarding the "high risk" element in a culpable driving offence under section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The court held that the trial judge is neither required nor entitled to direct the jury on this element. This conclusion was based on the court's finding that the statutory language does not mandate that the driving must involve a "high risk" and that such a direction would be inconsistent with the statutory provisions. The court's decision aligns with the principle that jury directions should accurately reflect the statutory language and legislative intent without introducing additional elements not specified in the statute.

In summary, the court's reasoning in Director of Public Prosecutions v Spong establishes that the trial judge is neither required nor entitled to direct the jury regarding the "high risk" element in a culpable driving offence under section 29 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The court's interpretation of the statutory language and its contextual and purposive analysis leads to the ratio decidendi that the statutory provisions in the ACT and Victoria, despite identical wording, are not substantially identical due to their differing contexts and purposes. Consequently, Victorian Court of Appeal authorities should not be followed in interpreting the ACT provision, and the trial judge's role in directing the jury is limited to accurately reflecting the statutory language and intent.