R v Antoniazzo - [2010] ACTSC 36

R v WAYNE RINO ANTONIAZZO [2010] ACTSC 36 (23 APRIL 2010)

CRIMINAL LAW – trial by judge alone – culpable driving causing death – failure to keep a proper lookout – degree of departure from the standard of care required of the ordinary prudent driver.

Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 68C
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 29
Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT), s 6

Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250
R v De’Zilwa (2002) 5 VR 408
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Yeo and Anor [2008] NSWSC 953

Caldwell v Deka, NSWCA, Full Court, 40280 of 1990, 16 June 1993, unreported
Maragrave v Vrazalica (1999) 29 MVR 419

No. SCC 337 of 2008

Judge: Gray J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 23 April 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SCC 337 of 2008
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )

R
v
WAYNE RINO ANTONIAZZO

ORDER

Judge:  Gray J
Date:  23 April 2010
Place:  Canberra

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The accused be found not guilty of the charge of manslaughter.

The accused be found not guilty of the charge that, by the culpable driving of a motor vehicle, he caused the death of Amaranta Vrinalin Vega.

This is a trial by judge alone.

Before the Court first allocated a date for the trial of these charges, the accused elected to be tried by judge alone.

Section 68C of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) provides that a judge who tries a criminal proceeding without a jury may make any finding that could have been made by a jury as to the guilt of an accused person and such finding has the same effect as a verdict of a jury. My judgment in this proceeding is to include the principles of law that I apply and the findings of fact upon which I rely. Further, I must explain the reasoning process linking those matters so as to justify the verdict to which I come (Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250).

There are certain general directions to which I have regard. They are that, as far as the conduct of the trial is concerned, I direct myself in accordance with the law in relation to all of the matters which a jury would ordinarily be directed before retiring to consider its verdict. The accused is entitled to have a fair trial according to law. As the tribunal of fact, as well as the tribunal of law, it is my function to find the facts and to draw inferences from them as well as to apply the law to those proven facts. I must deliver my verdict according to the evidence. The burden of proving the charge lies wholly on the prosecution and no burden at all lies upon the accused. If the accused makes or points to an explanation which is consistent with innocence, the accused does not have to prove it. It is for the prosecution…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Antoniazzo

Details

AGLC: R v Antoniazzo [2010] ACTSC 36
Case: [2010] ACTSC 36
Decision Date: 23 APRIL 2010

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Antoniazzo involved the accused, Antoniazzo, who was charged with manslaughter and culpable driving causing death in relation to the death of Amaranta Vrinalin Vega. The matter was heard by a judge alone, without a jury, in a court of summary jurisdiction. The central issue was whether the accused had driven his vehicle in a manner that departed from the standard of care required of a prudent driver, and whether this departure was a cause of Ms Vega's death.

The court had to determine if Antoniazzo had failed to keep a proper lookout, and if so, whether this failure constituted a significant departure from the standard of care. The defence argued that Antoniazzo had acted with the care and attention that a prudent driver would have exercised in the circumstances. The prosecution contended that Antoniazzo had breached the standard of care by not observing the deceased, leading to the fatal collision.

In examining the evidence, the court found that while Antoniazzo may have made an error in judgement, it did not reach the level of gross negligence required for a conviction of manslaughter or culpable driving causing death. The judge concluded that the degree of departure from the standard of care was not significant enough to constitute a criminal offence. Consequently, the accused was found not guilty on both charges. The final orders of the court were that Antoniazzo be acquitted of both the charge of manslaughter and the charge of culpable driving causing death.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The accused be found not guilty of the charge of manslaughter.

2. The accused be found not guilty of the charge that, by the culpable driving of a motor vehicle, he caused the death of Amaranta Vrinalin Vega.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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