Director of Public Prosecutions v Rayment

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPEALS LIST

S CI 03447 of 2017

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(on behalf of Mark Adam Vetter)
Appellant
v
SHAUN RAYMENT Respondent
and
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR VICTORIA Intervenor

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JUDGE:

TAYLOR J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

31 August 2018

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

2 November 2018

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Rayment

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2018] VSC 663

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JUDICIAL REVIEW – Charge of loitering without reasonable excuse contrary to s 60B(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 – Whether ‘loitering’ requires proof of lack of purpose or unlawful purpose – No such proof required – Nadarajamoorthy v Moreton [2003] VSC 283 distinguished.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – Whether the term ‘loiter’ has fixed, technical meaning – Consideration of statutory history of term ‘loiter’ – No such fixed meaning – Primacy of statutory context in determining meaning of the term ‘loiter’ – Hagan v Ridley (1948) 50 WALR 112; Samuels v Stokes (1973) 130 CLR 490 applied.

HUMAN RIGHTS – Right to freedom of movement – No choice of statutory construction arising – Reasonable and demonstrably justifiable limitation –  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, ss 12, 25(1), 32(1), 72(2) considered.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Ms F. Dalziel John Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Defendant Mr J. McLoughlin with
Mr R. de Vietri
Victoria Legal Aid
For the Intervenor Mr A. Pound
Ms E. Thomas
Victorian Government Solicitor

HER HONOUR:

Question Arising

  1. This is an appeal under section 272(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) against the final order of a magistrate made on 31 August 2017 to dismiss a charge brought against the respondent. The charge was one of being a convicted sex offender loitering without reasonable excuse near a school contrary to s 60B(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) (Crimes Act) [1].

    [1]The section has since been repealed and replaced with s 49N of the Crimes Act. Section 49ZB allows for a ‘reasonable excuse’ exception to s 49N.

  1. The question of law arising for determination is ‘did the magistrate err in law in construing the word “loitering” so as to include a component of “lack of purpose”?’

Answer

  1. For the reasons outlined below, the answer is yes.

Statutory Context

  1. It is convenient to set out the full statutory context. Section 60B of the Crimes Act was, at the relevant time, in the following terms:

60B     Loitering near schools etc.

(1)       In this section, sexual offence means―

(a)an offence against section 38, 39, 40, 44(1), 44(2), 44(4), 45, 47, 47A, 48, 49, 55 or 56; or

(b)any offence specified in clause 7A, 7B, 8, 9, 10 or 12 of Schedule 8; or

an offence of conspiracy to commit, incitement to commit or attempting to commit an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).

(2)       A person who—

(a)       has been found guilty of―

(i)        a sexual offence; or

(ia)      an offence…

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Details
Case
[2018] VSC 663
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Rayment, the appellant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, sought judicial review of the dismissal of a charge of loitering without reasonable excuse against the respondent. The respondent was alleged to have contravened section 60B(2) of the Crimes Act 1958. The case was heard in the County Court of Victoria and subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the term "loitering" in section 60B(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 required proof of a lack of purpose or an unlawful purpose, and whether "loiter" had a fixed, technical meaning. The respondent argued that the term did not require such proof and that its meaning was to be determined by the statutory context. The court considered the statutory history of the term and determined that it did not have a fixed, technical meaning. The court further held that the statutory context dictated the meaning of "loiter" and applied the decision in Hagan v Ridley (1948) 50 WALR 112 and Samuels v Stokes (1973) 130 CLR 490 to support this conclusion.

The court also considered the respondent's argument that the right to freedom of movement under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 would be violated if the term "loiter" was construed in a way that required proof of lack of purpose or unlawful purpose. The court found that the statutory construction did not present a choice and that any limitation on the right to freedom of movement would be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable. The appeal was dismissed.

The court found that the term "loiter" did not require proof of lack of purpose or unlawful purpose and that its meaning was to be determined by the statutory context. The court further found that the statutory construction did not violate the respondent's right to freedom of movement under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006. The appeal was dismissed, and the charge against the respondent was reinstated.

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