Director of Public Prosecutions v Perry (a pseudonym)
[2024] ACTSC 204
•2 July 2024
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | DPP v Perry (a pseudonym) |
Citation: | [2024] ACTSC 204 |
Hearing Date: | 17 June 2024 |
Decision Date: | 2 July 2024 |
Before: | Christensen AJ |
Decision: | See [156] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – DRUG AND ALCOHOL SENTENCING LIST – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – aggravated robbery of vehicle – additional driving offences – whether offence constitutes home invasion without actual entry into home – suitability of drug and alcohol treatment order where offender suffering from significant mental health concerns – prospects of rehabilitation – significant criminal history and previous attempts unsuccessful – whether history of disadvantage enlivens Bugmy principles – whether Verdins principles enlivened where psychosis is drug induced – drug and alcohol treatment order not imposed – sentence of imprisonment imposed |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) pt 4.4, ss 7, 10, 12A, 33, [redacted], 53, 63, 80O, 80S, 80T |
Cases Cited: | Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 |
Parties: | Director of Public Prosecutions ( Crown) Tom Perry (a pseudonym) ( Offender) |
Representation: | Counsel M Dyason ( Crown) J De Bruin ( Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Legal Aid ACT ( Offender) | |
File Numbers: | SCC 311, 312 of 2023 |
CHRISTENSEN AJ:
Introduction
1․The offender Tom Perry (a pseudonym) comes before the Court to be sentenced for an offence of aggravated robbery of a vehicle, and driving offences involving failing to stop for police, driving a motor vehicle without consent, and driving while his right to drive was suspended.
2․Mr Perry seeks that the term of imprisonment that is inevitably to be imposed is ordered to be served by way of a drug and alcohol treatment order (treatment order) rather than one of fulltime imprisonment: s 12A Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act).
3․It follows that the determination of the appropriate head sentence, given the statutory limit on the term of imprisonment to enliven eligibility for such an order, as well as the prospects of rehabilitation, are matters of particular significance in the sentencing exercise.
Nature and circumstances of offending
4․The offences were committed on the morning of 1 May 2023.
5․The night before, at approximately 10:30pm on Sunday 30 April 2023, Mr Perry went to an apartment complex where his co-accused and another person were present.
6․Mr Perry and the co-accused remained in a room rented by the other person, having asked the other person to leave. For a period of about 30 minutes, Mr Perry and his
co-accused discussed their plan for the offending to occur the following day.7․The offending the following morning began with the co-accused picking up Mr Perry from a location in the ACT. At this time, the co-accused was driving a silver BMW. The prosecution submissions provide that this was a hire-car rented in the name of a third person.
8․At about 8:30am, Mr Perry and the co-accused drove to an address in the inner north of Canberra.
9․Mr Perry approached the front door and knocked. The first victim, an older woman, was inside. She asked who was there and Mr Perry replied, “it’s [the offender gave a name that was not his]”. This victim unlocked the door and partially opened it. She saw a
long-barrel firearm that was pointed at her. The firearm was brown in colour with the top part appearing black.10․The person holding the firearm, Mr Perry, was wearing all black clothing, with a black face mask obstructing the lower part of his face. He was holding the firearm with two hands.
11․He then forced open the front door to the residence using the firearm and demanded that the victim give him the keys to “the car”, gesturing towards a green Tesla that was parked in the driveway.
12․After complying with Mr Perry’s demands and giving him a set of keys containing a Tesla branded vehicle key and a number of house keys, Mr Perry then pointed the gun towards the victim. He told her to come outside and show him how to drive it. The victim replied that she did not know how because it was not her vehicle.
13․The victim was then escorted outside at gun point toward the vehicle. Mr Perry got into the driver’s seat of the car. The victim used this opportunity while a firearm was not pointed at her to run back inside. She screamed for help from the other occupants of the residence.
14․Two males were inside at the time. One is the son of the first victim and is the owner of the vehicle that was stolen. The association of the other male in the house was not explained in the facts.
15․The owner of the vehicle was able to use his Tesla application to track the car and apply a speed limit of 80 km/h to assist the police with their response.
16․At 8:46am, police located the vehicle in a street in Watson. It was stationary. The driver was wearing clothing similar to that being worn by Mr Perry when he stole the vehicle from the house. On the opposite side of the street, police observed the silver BMW. It was also stationary. The driver’s door was open, and the co-accused was in the BMW.
17․Police approached the Tesla, with their firearms drawn and aimed towards the driver. The facts provide that the offender, Mr Perry, accelerated away from police. Police were in a marked police vehicle. They activated emergency sirens and lights and directed the offender to stop. He failed to stop and sped off from the location.
18․Police followed the Tesla in a pursuit. The Tesla drove to Downer. The traffic conditions were light, the road conditions wet, and the weather clear. Police reached a speed of 90 km/h in a 50 km/h zone in an attempt to catch up to the Tesla.
19․The Tesla continued to drive through streets in Downer. Police observed that at an intersection the offender merged onto the wrong side of the road, before turning left onto another street. The Tesla entered a School Zone in the Watson area, and police determined the pursuit should be terminated. The offender sped off and was then out of sight of police, having failed to stop in accordance with their direction.
20․The owner of the Tesla was continuing to monitor the movements of the vehicle and provide this information to police. The tracking system indicated that at 8:58am the Tesla had come to a stop in a street in Ainslie. Police cordoned off the area. The Tesla began to drive forward along a driveway, and police units manoeuvred their vehicle in front of the Tesla to prevent it from leaving.
21․A short time later, police extricated Mr Perry from the driver’s seat of the Tesla. He was handcuffed and arrested.
Additional offences: pt 4.4 of the Sentencing Act
22․In considering the fail to stop motor vehicle for police offence, the parties seek that the Court take into account additional offences pursuant to pt 4.4 of the Sentencing Act. These are offences of drive motor vehicle without consent, contrary to s 318(2) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code), carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment and/or 500 penalty units, and drive while right to drive suspended, contrary to s 31A(1) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of 20 penalty units.
23․I have taken these offences into account in accordance with the approach described in DPP v Vincent (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 379 at [64] per Mossop J.
24․The defence submitted that when assessing the objective seriousness of the fail to stop offence, the fact of Mr Perry having driven on the wrong side of the road is not relevant in assessing the objective seriousness of the offence: R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383. I accept this submission to the extent that it informs the fail to stop offence, however, the Court is to take into account the additional offence of driving a motor vehicle without consent. The nature of the driving is routinely part of the assessment of objective seriousness of such an offence, unless separately charged: R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 at [124]. Accordingly, I have had regard to this fact to the extent that it informs the circumstances of the additional offence that is to be taken into account.
Assessment
25․The prosecution submitted that the Court would categorise the offending that occurred here as a form of home invasion and that, accordingly, the objective seriousness is to be assessed with reference to home invasion offending. It seems to me that the offending here is not to be properly characterised as a home invasion as the offending lacks the feature of actual entry to the home. To focus on authorities involving a more typical example of home invasion could lead to error in assessing the objective seriousness of the offending, and in assessing the authorities that could inform sentencing practice, given the likelihood that such matters include an offence of burglary.
26․That is not to say though that there are not features of the offending here that are informative as to the assessment of the objective seriousness which have aspects in common with home invasion offending. I accept the prosecution submission that the offending here was abhorrent, and that a sentence that sends a “strong message to the community in relation to the unacceptability” of the conduct is warranted. Further, I accept that there is typically a need for general deterrence to be reflected in offending of this type, as there is punishment, denunciation, and accountability.
27․A particularly serious aspect of the offending was that the primary victim was in her own home when confronted at her front door by an armed offender. She was entitled to feel safe in her home, and the victim impact statement, which I will come to, emphasises the violation that was experienced as a result of the invasion to the safety and security of her family home.
28․The use of a firearm to confront the victim, and the manner in which it was used is also particularly serious. Here, it was not simply brandished by the offender, but was pointed at the victim for a sustained period. It was not simply a knife or handgun involved in the robbery, but a long barrel firearm, a particularly frightening weapon for the victim to be confronted with.
29․It is then not only that the firearm was used in the manner described. The offender was masked, no doubt adding to the sense of fear experienced by the victim, and the offender also vocalised the demands, albeit there were no overtly threatening words used. However, it was a sole offender who confronted the victim with no actual violence or force. I accept that this is likely of little comfort to the victim. The offending involved a high intensity of threat on an older member of our community.
30․The offending is an extremely serious example of an aggravated robbery. It was highly planned, committed at the victim’s own home, it involved the use of a firearm, and involved the theft of an expensive item. The vehicle was purchased for the amount of $125,000, but I accept will have depreciated in value since the time of purchase. I infer from the circumstances of the arrest that the vehicle was recovered, although there was a period of inconvenience for the owner while the vehicle was not in his possession.
31․I add to the assessment of the offending, and the planning involved, that the offence was seemingly targeted as to the vehicle sought. There was little information before the Court as to the motivation for the offending involving this particular vehicle. However, the facts as to the planning, and the fact that the offenders went directly to the house where the distinctive vehicle was parked in the driveway, enable the inference to be drawn that the planning related to the theft of this particular vehicle. I do not however, extend this to a suggestion of targeting of the individual victims involved, in the absence of any evidence as to this.
32․Despite the level of planning, which includes the meeting beforehand, the arming with a firearm, and the circumstances of travel to the offence location, the circumstances of the offending itself were not highly sophisticated. That is, Mr Perry plainly did not know how to drive the particular vehicle, and sought the victim’s assistance with this. Mr Perry also plainly did not appreciate the high likelihood of rapid detection of the theft and his location given the technology available in the vehicle involved. It was in that sense, not sophisticated offending. It remains though, as already observed, an extremely serious example of this type of offence.
33․The failing to stop for police offence was also serious, involving as it did, not simply an initial failure to stop, but an extended failure to stop during a police pursuit. The duration, in terms of both distance and time, was not, however, particularly lengthy, nor does it seem the road conditions were of significant concern.
34․Nonetheless, there was persistence in the offending. It was brazen conduct, and it seemingly only came to an end due to police intervention rather than a willingness to end the offending behaviour. In determining the appropriate sentence for this offence, as observed above at [22]-[24], the Court is to take into account that the offender was suspended from driving at the time and that the vehicle being driven was one driven without consent.
Victim impact: ss 33(1)(e), 33(1)(f) and 53 of the Sentencing Act
35․The primary victim provided a victim impact statement that set out the depth of the offending’s effects on her. This statement was bravely and powerfully read out by the victim’s daughter, who, in doing so, left the Court with an understanding that it was not only the immediate victims who have been impacted, but that the entire family have had their lives and emotional wellbeing affected by the offender’s conduct.
36․The statement explained that the offence involved not only an attack on her home, but also an attack on her mind, peace, and her perception of the world around her. The victim felt immediate dread and fear for herself, and for her family. She is haunted by the thought of not being able to protect them.
37․The offence has impacted her physical health and has left her consumed by trauma and fear. In an attempt to obtain a break from the relentless onslaught of traumatic flashbacks and paralysing fear, the victim went overseas to be with family in her birthplace. This was done not only to shield herself, but also to protect her immediate family from the aftershocks of the trauma. The victim described that “even there, thousands of miles away the trauma pursued me by the haunting memories of that day”.
38․There have also been financial implications for the victim, who has required security upgrades to the home. The victim described that these only serve as constant reminders of the horror that she faced.
39․The victim’s attempts to engage with professional help have not erased her raw memories and unending anxiety. Everyday experiences, such as a knock or ring of the door have become triggers of distress that cause waves of panic.
40․The primary victim poignantly concluded that “what was stolen from me that day was far more than a vehicle. It was my sense of security, my peace, my ability to feel safe in my own home, and most devastatingly, my belief that I could protect my family. The lingering trauma from that day casts a long, oppressive shadow over every aspect of my life”.
41․The other direct victim, the owner of the vehicle, also provided a victim impact statement. In this statement he described being woken by his mother screams, which is undoubtedly a haunting memory. He described the immediate effect of this on him, and that there were also other family members who were present at the house that morning who experienced this.
42․The owner of the vehicle described that he has had to watch his mother suffer through her anxiety, stress, and fear, and he has seen her terror to answer the door. The entire family relives the trauma of that day and have a constant vigilance, assuming the worst anytime there is a sound at home. The owner of the vehicle is constantly worried for, and constantly thinks about, his parent’s safety. He worries about the level of trauma and anxiety that has been caused.
43․This victim described that he has been unable to sleep, which has affected his mental health and livelihood. He is incredibly angry at what the offenders have done to his family and expresses a hope that they understand the pain, anxiety, and trauma they caused.
44․The Court acknowledges the information contained in these statements. There have been emotional, psychological, and financial effects on the victims and those around them, and the safety and security of their family home has been eroded. While much of what will be said today by the Court relates to the offender, that should not be taken as the Court failing to recognise or having misunderstood the depth of harm that was caused, nor the enduring effects on the victims.
Subjective circumstances: s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act
45․Mr Perry is now aged 33 years and was aged 32 years at the time of the offending.
46․He was born and raised in Canberra and is one of four children to his parent’s union. His family relationships were impacted by his behaviour in his youth, but he has rebuilt these relationships in recent years. He completed his year 10 certificate and recently commenced education to obtain certificates in fitness and community services.
47․Mr Perry has been in a relationship for approximately four years, and he has two biological children and one stepchild. He regards himself as a father to three children and considers that he had been a reasonably involved father before his current remand in custody.
48․Mr Perry is described, in submissions, as someone who appears to have reached a juncture, or crossroads in life and that he is strongly motivated to address the underlying issues that have created his criminal lifestyle.
49․On his behalf, it was submitted that there are several matters in his subjective circumstances that lessen his moral culpability and reduce the prominence of general deterrence in the sentence to be imposed. A number of reports were relied upon, being a report of psychiatrist Ms Tabitha Frew dated 7 May 2024, and assessment reports dated 30 and 31 May 2024 prepared for the purposes of a treatment order (the assessments). Ms Frew’s opinion, which was unchallenged by the prosecution, was informed by sources including information dating back to 2005, as well as two interviews conducted with Mr Perry.
Bugmy principles
50․It was submitted that Mr Perry experienced a history of disadvantage that enlivens the principles in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 (Bugmy).
51․The information before the Court includes that Mr Perry was [redacted] and that negative behaviour changes began manifesting when he was around 10 to 11 years of age. This led to Mr Perry running away from home, meeting older males who introduced him to drug use, [redacted], and led to the commencement of his offending behaviour.
52․It was further submitted that the information available to the Court includes that Mr Perry has experienced incarceration as a juvenile, has witnessed family violence, and was exposed to familial substance abuse. In the assessments, this was described as alcohol abuse. In the report of Ms Frew, the violence was never described as being directed towards the children, but rather that his mother “put up with a lot from dad, he often punched holes in the wall when they argued. Most of the time they were arguing about me and my behaviour”. Mr Perry has good memories of his parenting from his mother and his maternal grandfather who, while an alcoholic, was “like a father figure” and would take him fishing and yabbying.
53․Mr Perry is also reported as describing his father as loving, but noted that he drank a lot, consumed cannabis, and subjected him to verbal aggression. He describes having also observed his father inflict physical violence on a partner of his father’s friend.
54․The prosecution submitted that it would be open to the Court to conclude that the Bugmy principles are enlivened.
55․In 2016, when sentencing Mr Perry for dishonesty offences, Penfold J said that “the
pre-sentence report records that Mr [Perry] had a good childhood which does not provide any obvious explanation for his early involvement in substance abuse starting with alcohol and cannabis from the age of 11, and, in due course, in assorted criminal activities”: R v Perry (a pseudonym) (No 5) [2016] ACTSC 380 at [15].
56․Similarly, in 2018, when sentencing Mr Perry for violence offences, Murrell CJ said that “the offender described a supportive upbringing, despite the fact that his father was an alcoholic who failed to provide his four children with the attention that they needed. The offender lacked a responsible and consistent male role model in his life”: R v Perry (a pseudonym) [2018] ACTSC 299 (R v Perry (a pseudonym)) at [27].
57․The most recent information, and the basis for the submission now made, includes that there was [redacted]. [Redacted]. Ms Frew describes that this circumstance “caused a significant change in the trajectory of Mr [Perry’s] life”.
58․[Redacted]. I accept the submission that the Bugmy principles are enlivened, noting also the concession made by the prosecution. That is, I am satisfied on the information now available to the Court, that Mr Perry’s moral culpability for this offending is substantially reduced: Bugmy at [44].
Mental health
59․In the assessments, Mr Perry is described as having previously been diagnosed with ADHD and depression. He described to those report writers that his mental health is currently stable as a result of his sobriety, support system, and medication regime.
60․Canberra Health Services provide that in April 2024 Mr Perry had a confirmed diagnosis of drug psychosis and depression, and that his Custodial Mental Health file was closed in March 2024 as he “does not have a major mental illness”.
61․The psychologist Ms Frew opined that Mr Perry is suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), with Mr Perry’s “behaviour from late childhood onwards … explained by untreated PTSD which had become (and remains) chronic, leading to externalising behaviours (impulsivity, recklessness, hopelessness) and substance use to cope”. He has developed a major depressive disorder secondary to the untreated PTSD.
62․Further, Ms Frew opined that Mr Perry has an alcohol, cannabis, and opiate use disorder. He also has an amphetamine-type substance use disorder at a severe level and one that induces a psychotic disorder during intoxication.
63․It was submitted on Mr Perry’s behalf that there is a clear causal relationship between his adverse childhood experiences, his poor mental health, the development of
multi-substance dependence, and the offending behaviour. Ms Frew described that his childhood experiences “created in him a physiological state of chronic stress and uncertainty, leading to behavioural patterns which were influenced by the need to survive, feel safe and escape further abuse”.64․Ms Frew described there was a decline in mental state leading up to the offending, which culminated in an episode of drug-induced psychosis and the offending behaviour. Ms Frew described that the “theme of his delusions was of being persecuted to the degree that powerful others were out to harm vulnerable members of society, and (paradoxically) his theft of the Tesla was (in his mind) an attempt to protect society rather than to harm anyone”.
65․It is relevant to note at this juncture, that the assessments include that Mr Perry reports that his criminal behaviour wasn’t premeditated but that “crazy thoughts were running through [his] head” and he was “in a place trying to protect [himself], people were trying to hurt [him]”.
66․It was submitted that at the time of his arrest, Mr Perry was in active psychosis, with Ms Frew concluding that this had a “direct and causal contribution to the offences to a significant degree”. The submission was made that the Verdins principles (R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269 (Verdins) at [32]) are applicable:
1. The condition may reduce the moral culpability of the offending conduct, as distinct from the offender’s legal responsibility. Where that is so, the condition affects the punishment that is just in all the circumstances; and denunciation is less likely to be a relevant sentencing objective.
2. The condition may have a bearing on the kind of sentence that is imposed and the conditions in which it should be served.
3. Whether general deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing consideration depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of the offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of sentence or both.
4. Whether specific deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing consideration likewise depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms of the condition as exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of the offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of the sentence or both.
5. The existence of the condition at the date of sentencing (or its foreseeable recurrence) may mean that a given sentence will weigh more heavily on the offender than it would on a person in normal health.
6. Where there is a serious risk of imprisonment having a significant adverse effect on the offender’s mental health, this will be a factor tending to mitigate punishment.
67․As acknowledged on behalf of Mr Perry, a court will have a hesitation in concluding that the Verdins principles, particularly as they relate to moral culpability, apply in circumstances where the psychosis was drug induced. It was submitted though that there are inextricable links between Mr Perry’s PTSD and his substance abuse such that a causal link is established.
68․Ms Frew provided that Mr Perry’s background led to the development of PTSD and the subsequent use of substances as a primary coping strategy. Ms Frew said that “consistently his health records indicated Mr [Perry] used substances to block out overwhelming emotional states from intrusive traumatic memories”. She found that Mr Perry’s exposure to traumatic events across his lifespan is in the high range compared to same-age peers in the general population.
69․Nonetheless, Ms Frew concluded that while Mr Perry was suffering from PTSD, as well as drug-induced psychosis at the time of the offending, and that this condition was likely to have exacerbated the intensity of his delusional beliefs, it would not be a direct causal factor in the commission of the offence.
70․In circumstances where reliance on the first limb of Verdins requires “a mental problem that is causative or has contributed to the commission of the offence in a material way” (JP v R [2024] NSWCCA 96 (JP v R) at [69]), I am not persuaded that Mr Perry’s moral culpability ought be reduced on this basis.
71․The defence otherwise relied on the Verdins principles to submit that general and specific deterrence are eliminated or reduced from prominence in the sentencing decision, and that Mr Perry’s experience of custody will weigh more heavily on him. These principles are applicable, whether or not the mental or psychiatric problem is causative: JP v R at [69].
72․Dealing with the last of those submissions first, I am not persuaded that Mr Perry’s conditions of PTSD and depressive disorder will weigh more heavily on him in a custodial environment than it would on a person in normal health. Ms Frew’s opinion does not provide this. Ms Frew certainly emphasises the desirability of a community-based therapeutic order, and I can accept as submitted that the support services that Ms Frew recommends are not available in the custodial environment. I can also accept that Mr Perry’s experience of early and ongoing incarceration have contributed to the trauma he now experiences.
73․But there is otherwise no information as to how his diagnosed conditions would lead to a greater burden for Mr Perry if incarcerated. Rather, the information provided by Mr Perry himself to an assessment report writer as to his current mental health while in custody is contrary to this.
74․This is not to say that I am entirely disregarding or ignoring this factor, and indeed the mental health conditions of Mr Perry in determining the appropriate sentence. The diagnostic opinion and recommendations of Ms Frew have been carefully taken into account.
75․In doing so, that has also involved consideration of the submission made as to the application of the Verdins principles with respect to deterrence. I am not persuaded that elimination of these factors is appropriate. While the offending occurred in a circumstance of drug-induced psychosis, which has occurred as a result of Mr Perry’s mental health conditions, the offending itself was not spontaneous. It involved a seemingly deliberate decision to engage in serious criminal behaviour by a recidivist offender. Both general and specific deterrence continue to have a role, albeit moderated, in the sentencing exercise.
Substance abuse
76․The information before the Court is consistent in providing that Mr Perry has had a
long-standing substance abuse problem. It commenced from when he was approximately ten years of age and has involved alcohol, cannabis, methamphetamine, heroin, and methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA).77․After a period of abstinence from approximately 2018 to 2021, Mr Perry resumed heroin use and developed a dependency on this substance rather than methamphetamine. He identifies as an alcoholic and describes that “if he drinks, he uses, and if he uses, he drinks”.
78․On behalf of Mr Perry, it was submitted that the link between his early childhood experiences and substance use is clearly established. Mr Perry’s own words were relied upon, namely that he says “using drugs is like killing off the part of me [redacted]. I hate that part of me”. It was then submitted that his substance use is strongly linked to his offending behaviour. Ms Frew finds diagnoses of alcohol, amphetamine, opiate, and cannabis use disorders. The assessments find that “historically, heroin and methamphetamine have been the principal substances of concern both precipitating and maintaining Mr [Perry’s] offending behaviour”.
79․It was submitted here, that where drug addiction began at an early age, prior to an opportunity to make informed decisions about illicit substance use, there should be mitigation on sentence: R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346 (R vHenry) at [273]; R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83 (R v Forrest (No 2)) at [133]. I accept this submission.
Criminal history
80․Mr Perry’s criminal history commences from when he was 12 years of age with an offence of a not dissimilar nature to that involved here, an offence of taking a vehicle without authority and unlicensed driving. Offending of this type, as well as dangerous driving, failing to stop when requested by police, and theft offences occurred in the years following.
81․The most serious of these, while still a young person aged 15 and a half, was an offence of culpable driving causing death that occurred on 30 July 2005: [R v TP (a pseudonym) (Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Connolly J, 31 January 2006)]. It is relevant to pause and consider this, not because there can be imposition of a fresh penalty for past offences, but because it is informative when assessing the prospects of Mr Perry’s rehabilitation and the appropriate sentence to now impose.
82․In that matter, which involved causing the death of a young woman in circumstances where Master Perry was driving a stolen motor vehicle during a police pursuit, Connolly J said at T 3.31-39; 5.19-22; 7.35-38; 8.29:
[I]f you keep stealing motor vehicles, the pattern I think [sic], ever increasing sentences will continue, and you would be warned that if this flows through into adult offending you will be looking at substantial sentences for motor vehicle theft. A prison has been built in the ACT and if you are not careful your name will be on one of those cells. Because this [sic] pattern of repeat motor vehicle thefts, the courts on behalf of the community just have to deal with it by way of custodial sentences. …
If you are going to continue that pattern in life you will end up spending the greater part of your young adulthood in the prison system. You will end up spending the bulk of your 20s and 30s locked up inside an adult prison. It is not much of a life. It is a pretty miserable existence. …
You have got to stay away from stolen cars. Driving them, being driven in them. Because that is what has led to this tragedy and the community has no alternative but to keep locking you up for longer and longer periods if you keep stealing motor cars. …
You cannot continue this pattern of stolen motor cars. …
83․It must be recognised that the offending that occurred there, and the warning that Mr Perry was given, occurred when he was a young person. Had his offending behaviour ended there, the relevance of this might be limited given the capability for growth and change as a person matures.
84․However, Mr Perry’s offending behaviour did not end there. Mr Perry has, to apply what was said in Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 (Veen (No 2)) at 239 [14], “manifested in his commission of the instant offence a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law”.
85․Further, as said in Veen (No 2) at 477, “it is legitimate to take account of the antecedent criminal history when it illuminates the moral culpability of the offender in the instant case, or shows his dangerous propensity or shows a need to impose condign punishment to deter the offender and other offenders from committing further offences of a like kind”. This is not to say though, that his history should “be given such weight as to lead to the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the gravity of the instant offence”: Veen (No 2) at [14].
86․Mr Perry’s criminal history continued as an adult with offences of burglary, theft, taking a motor vehicle without consent, dishonesty offences, and, with violent offending while in custody in 2017: (R v Perry (a pseudonym)). Some of the previous offending has occurred while Mr Perry was on parole for earlier offending. On his behalf it was submitted that he was able to successfully complete a parole order in the community in July 2022. The assessment reports provide that there was “largely satisfactory” compliance with three breaches for illicit substance use during parole. The information includes that AFP records indicate Mr Perry has breached bail conditions twelve times and nine warrants have been issued for his arrest.
87․The criminal history of Mr Perry is such that no leniency can be afforded with reference to it, and the Court must have great hesitation in accepting that there are real prospects of rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation
88․Turning then more directly to the prospects of rehabilitation.
89․It is apparent that Mr Perry has sought to engage in rehabilitation. He is described in the assessments as motivated to address his substance abuse, and it is to his credit that he expresses a willingness to engage in the onerous requirements of a treatment order.
90․The information before the Court also provides that rehabilitation is something Mr Perry has previously sought, particularly while in custody, but that Mr Perry has not “received the longer-term help that he requires to put an end to the cycle …” Ms Frew further provides that until Mr Perry therapeutically addresses his childhood trauma, alongside drug rehabilitation and teaching of life skills, it “may be difficult for Mr [Perry] to become unstuck from the current repeated cycle”.
91․His most recent engagement with supports has occurred while in custody. He has engaged in counselling and pastoral support, has held a trusted position of employment, engaged in peer mentor training, completed competencies in certificates, and engaged with the Solaris Therapeutic Community Program.
92․Mr Perry is described as displaying “significant strengths”. Similarly, Ms Frew described that “deep down, Mr [Perry] impresses as a caring, loyal, and courageous young man who would benefit from long-term, intensive support to provide what he needs to recognise these positive attributes in himself”.
93․His ability to be a valued family and community member was apparent from letters tendered on his behalf. These include a letter from a long term family friend who is willing to offer employment in a painting and decorating business in the future. And from his family members, his parents and fiancé, who speak of his connection with, and love for his children, and his strong desire to change his life for the better.
94․The previous pro-social aspects of Mr Perry’s life were emphasised on his behalf. He ran a [redacted] business that employed multiple people from 2018. While he resumed substance abuse in this period, he believes that he remained “functional” overall. In March 2023 Mr Perry injured his knee and ceased operating his business. He consistently used heroin and methamphetamine after this injury.
95․Mr Perry reported to one assessment reporter not having used illicit substances for the past nine months, and when tested in October 2023, he was negative for such substances. I note though that the information provided to the other assessment reporter was that he had ceased use of non-prescribed buprenorphine while in custody approximately five to six months prior to the time of assessment.
96․He is described in submissions as having a strong motivation to change given the ongoing support he has of his partner, and his three children. His pastoral care worker in the Alexander Maconochie Centre describes that he believes Mr Perry is serious about his commitment to his rehabilitation and taking on a responsible role in caring for his family and becoming a productive member of society.
97․The assessments described Mr Perry as having multiple protective factors including stable accommodation, supportive familial relationships, a recently established period of abstinence, and employment and education prospects. It is though also recognised in the assessments that he “possesses multiple risk factors including a significant criminal record, unaddressed drug dependency, current unemployment, mental health concerns (recent psychosis plus trauma history) and anti-social companions”.
The offender’s insight and remorse: s 33(1)(w) of the Sentencing Act
98․It is also relevant to consider the evidence that came directly from Mr Perry. This was primarily from an undated letter produced by Mr Perry that he presented in sworn evidence in Court. The letter includes an acknowledgement of the seriousness of his offending behaviour and his sincere apology to the victims and their families for his actions.
99․Mr Perry says that having read the victim impact statements, he now understands that his actions have directly affected them, and that there is continued trauma and fear. He says that he is sincerely sorry for this, and that he has spent time thinking about how his behaviours and actions have affected others physically and mentally. He says that he now thinks about and acknowledges others’ feelings, “which is something [he] failed to see in the past”.
100․Mr Perry describes his battles with addiction and criminal conduct, and explains his experience of his childhood, and how this resulted in spending lengthy amounts of time in custody.
101․He describes that despite his poor choices, he has never turned away from the opportunity for change, describing his participation in the Solaris program while in custody. He says he has spent a lot of time over the past year trying to focus on areas of change in his life. He has developed an awareness and understanding of past behaviours, attitudes and thought patterns. He now tries to model pro-social behaviours and attitudes and has found peace and calmness through spiritual mindfulness, meditation and the 12-step program. He has noticed a change in his character.
102․Mr Perry says that “I am not going to lie, I have really struggled over the past year tearing myself down in order to build myself back up”. He says that he now recognises that he cannot allow his past to become an excuse to stay trapped in rebellion and addiction. He sees the importance of being a father, to not only be loving and supportive, but to be present and available to his children.
103․Mr Perry concludes that he is very motivated and determined to make more of himself and his life. He says that he doesn’t want to spend the rest of his life living in addiction and institutions. He wants to find freedom from his addiction and build a reputation as a person with honesty and integrity. He hopes to be given the opportunity to make up for his mistakes and learn to live a life as a good standing member of the community.
104․Further, in his evidence, Mr Perry expressed that the period when he relapsed arose because of complacency. He also provided the Court with a relapse prevention plan that sets out his goals and the steps he would take to achieve this. This demonstrates a level of insight into his challenges with substance abuse, and measures to be implemented to avoid a return to such use.
105․Additional information as to Mr Perry’s remorse can be ascertained from his action in providing a letter of apology to the victims, which I was informed occurred prior to the victim impact statements being provided, and from his expressions of remorse to report writers. In the assessments he is reported as saying he felt “very sorry for what [he] did” and that “[he is] sorry for what’s happened. [He has] had time to think about the victims”. He expresses a willingness to engage in a restorative justice process.
106․I am satisfied that he evidences remorse, particularly more recently, for his offending behaviour.
107․Nonetheless, overall, there must be a level of circumspection to a finding of there being a depth of insight into his offending behaviour. In 2018, when being sentenced by Murrell CJ, it is reported that Mr Perry said in evidence that he was now at the point where “the penny has dropped” and that “he is aware of the rewards of pro-social behaviour and strong positive family relationships and is committed to rehabilitation”. Her Honour was, at that time, “as optimistic as one can be that the offender has reached a “crossroads” and will maintain rehabilitation when he returns to the community”: R v Perry (a pseudonym) at [40].
108․Mr Perry did demonstrate an ability to rehabilitate for a time, with the offences the subject of that sentence being the last offences committed by Mr Perry in the ACT prior to the current offending. That is, from January 2017 until the current offending in May 2023, Mr Perry is not recorded as having committed any criminal offences in the ACT. He did though commit an offence, for which he was fined, of negligent driving in NSW in October 2022.
109․The return to the offending behaviour, with an offence of such a serious nature, is almost inexplicable in those circumstances. The explanation provided is a return to substance abuse, and a lengthy period of drug-induced psychosis, resulting from his unaddressed trauma. Ms Frew described that in that psychotic state, Mr Perry “started to believe that [he] could communicate with Elon Musk through a Tesla to tell him that [he] knew what he was doing to everyone [that is, controlling people through microchips in vaccines] but an entity would kill [Mr Perry] if [he] tried to reach him”.
110․Even with this explanation, it leaves the Court with significant concern as to whether Mr Perry is capable of sustained and permanent rehabilitation. While this Court is hesitant to conclude that there is anyone that is not able to achieve such growth (see, for example DPP v Baudinette [2024] ACTSC 157 at [67]), it is apparent that without comprehensive supports to address his trauma, mental health and addiction, there is little prospect of rehabilitation being achieved.
Other relevant sentencing considerations
Maximum penalties
111․The offence of aggravated robbery contrary to s 310 of the Criminal Code carries a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment and/or 2500 penalty units.
112․The offence of failing to stop motor vehicle for police as a first offender contrary to s 5C of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT) carries a maximum penalty of 12 months imprisonment and/or 100 penalty units.
Current sentencing practice: s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act
113․Both parties referred the Court to Henry, applicable in the ACT per Hall v The Queen; Barker v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 16, as to the features that inform the objective seriousness of, and the range that can apply for, the aggravated robbery offence. I accept the prosecution submission that the offending here was more serious than the “typical” armed robbery described in Henry for which a sentence between four and five years imprisonment is generally imposed.
114․As to other authorities said to inform current sentencing practice, the prosecution referred the Court to authorities from Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory: Dean v The Queen [2020] VSCA 100; DPP v Green [2020] VSCA 23; R v Nikolovski [2018] NSWSC 1156; R v Lucas [2018] NSWDC 480; R v Wen [2019] NSWDC 267; Nabalarua v The Queen [2020] NSWCCA 68; R v Achurch [2020] NSWDC 312; Stokes v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 9; R v Wilson [2015] SASCFC 54; R v Baker [2020] ACTSC 186 (R v Baker); R v Stacker [2020] ACTCA 34 (R v Stacker); R v Nicholas; R v Palmer [2019] ACTCA 36 (R v Nicholas; R v Palmer); Thompson v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 2; R v Tresize (Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Nield J, 7 September 2012); Miles v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 41 (Miles v The Queen); Miles v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 54; R v Will [2018] ACTSC 154). The defence referred the Court to the following authorities: (R vForrest (No 2)); R v Baker; R v Johnstone (No 2) [2019] ACTSC 39 (R v Johnstone).
115․I accept the defence submission that the court must be cautious in applying authorities from other jurisdictions with respect to this offence given the distinction in sentencing legislation and applicable maximum penalties. I otherwise accept the submission made by both parties as to the caution that must be had in any application of authorities said to be of comparative value.
116․I have found of most assistance, to the extent comparative features can be ascertained, the following authorities provided by the prosecution –
(a)R v Baker; R v Stacker: The two offenders, both armed with firearms, confronted a victim as he exited his vehicle. There was a threat to shoot, and a subsequent attempt to discharge the rifle and strike the victim’s head with the rifle butt. Several items were stolen from inside the vehicle. Both offenders had lengthy criminal histories and were on conditional liberty. For the aggravated robbery offence, a starting point of 5 years imprisonment was imposed for the 53 year old offender, and a starting point of 5 years and 8 months was imposed for the 25 year old offender.
(b)R v Nicholas;R vPalmer: The robbery was of a commercial premises and involved some planning. A firearm was pointed at staff who were made to lie on the ground. A low amount of cash was stolen. Both offenders were aged in their 30s and had significant criminal histories and were on conditional liberty. Sentences with starting points of 6 years and 6 months, and 6 years, were imposed.
(c)Miles v The Queen: The offender was sentenced for two separate robberies, committed in company, of licensed clubs. One of the robberies involved the use of a firearm with some $46,000 stolen. The offender had a significant drug addiction with a substantial criminal history including armed robberies and limited remorse. A starting point of 8 years and 1 month imprisonment was upheld.
117․In addition to R v Baker, which was also relied upon by the defence, I found the following authorities to be of assistance as provided by the defence –
(a)R v Forrest (No 2): Mr Forrest pleaded guilty to a number of offences which included two offences of attempted aggravated robbery and one of aggravated robbery. The aggravated robbery involved Mr Forrest and another offender gaining access to a house while armed with a shotgun. The occupants were forced to open the door and a car was taken. Mr Forrest was aged 27 years at the time of sentence, he had experienced childhood disadvantage but not mental health conditions that enlivened Verdins. He had a long history of similar offending and was subject to conditional liberty at the time. The starting point for the aggravated robbery offence was 4 years and 6 months, in an aggregate sentence of 12 years and 10 months imprisonment.
(b)R v Johnstone: Mr Johnstone was found guilty after a trial of offences that included aggravated robbery and physical violence. He entered a home, but there was no burglary charge. He demanded money from the residents, and Mr Johnstone and another offender were physically violent. A small amount of money and drugs were taken. Mr Johnstone suffered childhood disadvantage and had a long history of illicit substance abuse. He was on conditional liberty and had a lengthy criminal history. A sentence of four years imprisonment was imposed for the aggravated robbery offence.
Plea of guilty
118․On 8 March 2024, Mr Perry pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court. This was after the entry of a not guilty plea in the Magistrates Court such that the utilitarian value of the plea is reduced. The plea of guilty was entered prior to a case conference or trial listing in the Supreme Court, and the prosecution submissions provide that negotiations to resolve the matter commenced prior to committal.
119․The prosecution submitted that there was an early plea of guilty “in the face of a strong prosecution case”. There was no submission that it was an overwhelming case (s 35(4) of the Sentencing Act), and I make no such finding in the absence of such a submission. On behalf of Mr Perry, it was submitted that a full discount should be afforded given the circumstances.
120․I am not satisfied that a full discount is appropriate as it remains that it was not a plea of guilty at the earliest opportunity where full utilitarian value was realised. I assess the appropriate discount for the plea of guilty to be in the order of twenty per cent.
[Redacted]
121․[121]-[127] [redacted].
Pre-sentence custody
128․Mr Perry has been remanded in custody since he was arrested on 1 May 2023, a total of 428 days in custody. It is appropriate that the sentence be backdated to commence from that time: s 63 Sentencing Act.
Totality
129․The offending here involves discrete forms of conduct, although I find that on the application of the totality principle, it is appropriate to incorporate a small level of concurrency given the vehicle being driven was the vehicle stolen in the aggravated robbery.
130․I do not accept the submission made that the application of totality in the manner it was approached in R v Crawford (No 1) [2020] ACTSC 245 (R v Crawford) is an appropriate application of that principle here. The sentencing exercise in R v Crawford involved sentence orders for many offences, and I am satisfied that, in the instinctive synthesis involved in determining the appropriate sentence, I have otherwise appropriately reflected the determinations I have made as to the application of the Bugmy, Verdins and Henry principles.
Consideration
131․It is clear that a term of imprisonment is the only appropriate sentence to be imposed:
s 10 Sentencing Act.132․It is also clear that there are matters that are mitigatory on sentence, as already outlined. However, recognising those factors also involves the Court recognising that they raise the need for protection of the community in the circumstances here.
133․While supporting rehabilitation is often in the best interest of society and can lead to the best mechanism to achieve community protection (R v Molina [1984] 2 FCR 508 at 510; Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 at 537 [32]), there is no compelling circumstance here that leads me to conclude that the prospects of rehabilitation are such that the other purposes of sentencing ought not otherwise be given due weight.
134․The purposes of sentencing as provided by the Sentencing Act must be at the forefront of the Court’s mind, these being –
7 Purposes of sentencing
(1)A court may impose a sentence on an offender for 1 or more of the following purposes:
(a)to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence in a way that is just and appropriate;
(b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences;
(c) to protect the community from the offender;
(d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender;
(e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions;
(f) to denounce the conduct of the offender;
(g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.
(2)To remove any doubt, nothing about the order in which the purposes appear in subsection (1) implies that any purpose must be given greater weight than any other purpose.
135․In order to give effect to these purposes, I conclude that the appropriate aggregate term, after application of the statutory reductions in penalty already outlined, is one of 4 years and 6 months imprisonment.
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order
136․Mr Perry accepts that the seriousness of the offending warrants the imposition of a term of imprisonment, but seeks an opportunity for this to be served by way of a treatment order. The assessments conclude that Mr Perry is suitable for such an order, although concerns as to his being a recidivist offender were acknowledged.
137․The appropriate aggregate term of imprisonment that will be ordered is such that Mr Perry is not eligible for such an order: s 12A(b)(ii) Sentencing Act. It is clear in the legislation that the Court must not impose a lesser sentence of imprisonment on the offender than the circumstances of the offence would ordinarily require, only to allow the Court to make a treatment order: s 12A(5) Sentencing Act.
138․It is relevant to observe that there are circumstances that arise here that raise whether, in any event, such an order could have ever been appropriate. The legislation provides that, even where such an order is available, and an offender is suitable per s 80T, the Court must not make an order unless satisfied that it is appropriate for the offender to serve a sentence suspended in accordance with a treatment order: s 12A(2)(b), 80S(b) Sentencing Act. The following matters have informed the observation as to whether a treatment order could be appropriate for Mr Perry.
Objects of a Treatment Order
139․The first aspect of relevance to observe is what the objects of a treatment order are, as provided by s 80O of the Sentencing Act –
80O Objects of drug and alcohol treatment orders
The objects of making a treatment order in relation to an offender is to—
(a)facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by providing a judicially supervised, therapeutically oriented and integrated treatment regime; and
(b)reduce the offender’s dependency on alcohol or a controlled drug; and
(c)reduce the health risks associated with the offender’s dependency on alcohol or controlled drugs; and
(d)assist with the offender’s integration into the community; and
(e)promote community safety by reducing the level of criminal activity caused by alcohol or controlled drug dependence in offenders.
Victim views
140․A further consideration that informs whether such an order could be appropriate is that the Court is to take into account any information given relating to the concerns of a victim as to their safety or welfare: s 12A(2)(b) Sentencing Act.
141․The assessments provide that the victims indicated they had continued concerns regarding their need for protection from violence or harassment by Mr Perry. While there is no evidence before the Court as to the basis of this concern, beyond an understandable concern arising from the nature and circumstances of the offending, the victim’s views as to their safety or welfare are relevant in considering the appropriateness of such an order.
Previous opportunities to engage in rehabilitation
142․Mr Perry’s background in rehabilitation does not engender confidence in his ability to complete rehabilitation under a treatment order. There have been previous opportunities to engage in residential rehabilitation that, while successfully completed, have not prevented a return to criminal offending: see, for example, R v Perry (a pseudonym) at [24]-[25].
143․While it is recognised that different forms of rehabilitation are capable of achieving rehabilitation when it has previously failed (see, for example, R v Rowlands (No 2); DPP v Rowlands [2024] ACTSC 143 at [66]), the rehabilitation programs available under a treatment order include the same ones that Mr Perry has previously engaged, ultimately unsuccessfully, with.
144․For example, he previously completed the Canberra Recovery Services Residential Rehabilitation Program (CRS), which is the program proposed that he engage with on this occasion. And he admits that while attending Narcotics and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, another program utilised by treatment order participants, he was actively using substances.
145․In the assessment process, Mr Perry was deemed unsuitable for the more intensive Karralika Program, a program available under a treatment order, due to his criminal history. The report of Ms Frew includes that in any event, a previous involvement by Mr Perry in this program in 2016 ended after Mr Perry struggled with the restrictions and the approach of the program.
146․Ms Frew highlights the value in a program such as the Triple Care Program that Mr Perry engaged “extremely well” with in 2008. It is described as a model to treat the “whole person”. This program, and programs of this nature, are not available under a treatment order, at least in terms of the rehabilitation program service providers currently utilised.
Mental health concerns
147․There are mental health concerns for Mr Perry that have more recently come to be understood, and, as submitted on his behalf, “he is yet to receive appropriate mental health interventions leading to chronic PTSD and substance use disorders”. Ms Frew’s opinion is that without a holistic treatment plan including both substance interventions and trauma-based therapy, Mr Perry’s mental condition is likely to continue.
148․Further, the opinion provides that previous attempts to focus on substance use issues or anti-social behaviours as the primary problems experienced by Mr Perry have “in some ways … perpetuated the cycle of offending because the focus continued to be on what he was doing wrong with his life and choices, rather than targeting what happened to him to change the trajectory of his life to such a significant degree”.
149․Ms Frew concludes that “Mr [Perry] has a good prognosis for recovery under the supervision of the Drug Court because it uses a combination of trauma-informed incentives, and sanctions which are corrective rather than punitive”. Ms Frew also described that there is a prospect of new supports becoming available to Mr Perry, including the NDIS, Mind Dog, the Interchange General Practice Social Worker Trial and ongoing trauma therapy.
150․A treatment order, while one that is trauma informed and inevitably involves addressing mental health concerns for most, if not all, participants, and one that has in the past been ordered when a participant is known to have mental health concerns, is not necessarily the appropriate order to address significant and unaddressed trauma and mental health concerns. The Court must be cautious in not creating an outcome of inconsistency in therapeutic or rehabilitative orders and programs: DPP vJohn (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 199.
151․It is apparent that Mr Perry requires significant supports and interventions around trauma and mental health, and this will no doubt assist him in addressing his substance abuse disorders. The recommendations of the drug and alcohol assessments cannot of course be ignored, but they did not have access to the psychologist report that is available to this Court. Had it been necessary to decide, I would have had a hesitation that a treatment order was appropriate to support Mr Perry to address his trauma and to address his criminogenic risks.
152․A treatment order can be very effective in meeting the objects that the order is designed to address, but it is not a panacea for all offenders, nor is it necessarily an appropriate order to address all criminal conduct that comes before the Court.
Nonparole period: s 65 of the Sentencing Act
153․It is then necessary to consider the order to be made as to the nonparole period. Plainly, this is to be a period that is the minimum period that justice requires to be served and it must have regard to Mr Perry’s prospects of rehabilitation. I have considered what was said by the Court of Appeal in R v Nicholas; R v Palmer at [109]-[113].
154․It is apparent that Mr Perry, as submitted on his behalf, requires more treatment and support to maintain recovery long-term. Ms Frew opines that Mr Perry poses a high risk of reoffending if his matter is not managed through diversionary measures available through the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List. Such an outcome is said to be likely to reduce his reoffending risk. As concluded, such an order is not an option for Mr Perry.
155․The seriousness of the offending, and the need for community protection limits the leniency that can be afforded with the nonparole period, but I have moderated it to the extent possible. A nonparole period in the order of 65 per cent will be set.
Orders
156․For those reasons, the following orders are made:
(1)Tom Perry be convicted of aggravated robbery (CAN 4324/2023) and he be sentenced to a term of 3 years 11 months imprisonment, reduced from 6 years and 6 months imprisonment, commencing on 1 May 2023 and expiring on 31 March 2027.
(2)Tom Perry be convicted of fail to stop motor vehicle for police (CAN 4325/2023) and he be sentenced to a term of 8 months imprisonment, reduced from 10 months imprisonment, commencing on 1 March 2027 and expiring on 31 October 2027. It be noted that Tom Perry is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for 3 months from today, 2 July 2024.
(3)The total term of imprisonment imposed is 4 years 6 months, commencing on 1 May 2023 and expiring on 31 October 2027.
(4)A nonparole period be imposed to commence from 1 May 2023 and end on 31 March 2026.
(5)The charge of resist territory public official (CAN 4328/2023) be dismissed under s 68D of the Supreme Court Act1933 (ACT).
(6)Pursuant to Pt 4.4 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), it be noted that the offences of drive motor vehicle without consent (CAN 4327/2023) and drive while right to drive suspended (CAN 4326/2023) have been taken into account on the sentencing of Tom Perry in the offence of fail to stop motor vehicle for police (CAN 4325/2023).
| I certify that the preceding one hundred and fifty-six [156] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Acting Justice Christensen. Associate: Date: 3 July 2025 |
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