FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Director of Public Prosecutions v Kunz [1999] FCA 302
PROCEEDS OF CRIME – first respondent charged with criminal offences – first respondent’s property subject to restraining orders made in the Supreme Court of Victoria pursuant to s 43 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth) and the Federal Court pursuant to s 243E of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) – alleged written agreement (“the agreement”) between first and second respondents disposing of property – application by first respondent for an order that the real property be charged to the second respondent pursuant to the agreement and that the property be valued and transferred to the second respondent in partial satisfaction of the debt of the first respondent to the second respondent – opposing application by Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to have the disposition or dealing with the property effected by the agreement set aside ab initio pursuant to s 52 Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth) – whether agreement was authentic or a sham – whether agreement made on the date it bears.
Customs Act1901 (Cth): s 243E, s 243K
Proceeds of Crime Act1987 (Cth): s 43, s 52, s 57Thomson v Attorney‑General (1996) 1 NZLR 21 applied
Davis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 86 ALR 195 followedDIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v LESLAW KUNZ & ORS
VG 260 of 1990
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v LESLAW KUNZ & ANOR
VG 564 of 1998
GOLDBERG J
MELBOURNE25 MARCH 1999
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VG 260 of 1990
BETWEEN:
AND:
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
ApplicantLESLAW KUNZ
First RespondentROBERT PETER KUNZ
Second RespondentVICTORIA LEGAL AID
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
GOLDBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 MARCH 1999
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The second respondent’s motion filed on 28 September 1998 be dismissed.
2.The second respondent pay the applicant’s and the third respondent’s costs of the said motion including reserved costs.
3.The first respondent bear his own costs of the said motion.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VG 564 of 1998
BETWEEN:
AND:
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (COMMONWEALTH)
ApplicantLESLAW KUNZ
First RespondentROBERT PETER KUNZ
Second RespondentJUDGE:
GOLDBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 MARCH 1999
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The document entitled “Agreement of Loan” dated 15 May 1990 signed by the first respondent and the second respondent and the dealing with the properties situated at 39 Tennyson Street, Elwood, 19 Kambea Grove, Caulfield and 6 Morrice Street, Caulfield therein referred to be set aside as from 15 May 1990.
2.The second respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the applicant’s application filed 7 October 1998 including reserved costs.
3.The first respondent bear his own costs of the said application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Director of Public Prosecutions v Kunz and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1999] FCA 302
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the agreement in question was a genuine loan agreement or a disguised transfer of property and whether the court had the authority to set aside the agreement if it was found to be a sham. The court needed to determine the true nature of the agreement and the intentions of the parties involved. Additionally, the court had to consider the appropriate remedy if it found the agreement to be a sham.
In its reasoning, the court examined the terms and context of the agreement, finding that it was not a genuine loan but rather a device to transfer property and funds. The court held that the agreement was a sham, intended to disguise the true nature of the transaction. As a result, the court ordered the agreement to be set aside as from the date it was signed. The court also addressed the costs associated with the motions and applications, ruling that the second respondent should bear the costs of the applicant and the third respondent, while the first respondent was to bear his own costs. This decision underscored the court's authority to intervene in cases where agreements are used to perpetrate fraudulent transactions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The second respondent’s motion filed on 28 September 1998 be dismissed.
2. The second respondent pay the applicant’s and the third respondent’s costs of the said motion including reserved costs.
3. The first respondent bear his own costs of the said motion.
1. The document entitled “Agreement of Loan” dated 15 May 1990 signed by the first respondent and the second respondent and the dealing with the properties situated at 39 Tennyson Street, Elwood, 19 Kambea Grove, Caulfield and 6 Morrice Street, Caulfield therein referred to be set aside as from 15 May 1990.
2. The second respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the applicant’s application filed 7 October 1998 including reserved costs.
3. The first respondent bear his own costs of the said application.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant filed an application on 7 October 1998 seeking to set aside the "Agreement of Loan" as from 15 May 1990 and to recover the properties mentioned in the agreement. The second respondent filed a motion on 28 September 1998 opposing the applicant's application and challenging the validity of the agreement. The first respondent did not participate actively in the proceedings but was implicated in the agreement as the borrower.
The matter came before the court following an application filed by the Director of Public Prosecutions on 7 October 1998 to set aside an "Agreement of Loan" dated 15 May 1990. The second respondent, who signed the agreement, filed a motion on 28 September 1998 opposing the applicant's application. The court heard both the application and the motion, considering the arguments presented by the parties. The first respondent did not actively participate in the proceedings but was involved as the borrower under the agreement.
Prior to this court hearing, there were no significant prior decisions or proceedings directly related to this dispute. The case primarily involved the interpretation and enforceability of the "Agreement of Loan" and the rights of the parties under the agreement. The court's decision focused on the procedural aspects of the application and motion, including the costs orders made in relation to the proceedings.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Should the "Agreement of Loan" dated 15 May 1990 be set aside as from that date?
2. What are the appropriate costs orders in relation to the applicant's application filed on 7 October 1998?
3. What are the appropriate costs orders in relation to the second respondent’s motion filed on 28 September 1998?
Held
1. The "Agreement of Loan" dated 15 May 1990 should be set aside as from that date.
2. The second respondent is to pay the applicant’s and the third respondent’s costs of the motion filed on 28 September 1998 including reserved costs.
3. The first respondent is to bear his own costs of the motion filed on 28 September 1998.
4. The second respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the application filed on 7 October 1998 including reserved costs.
5. The first respondent is to bear his own costs of the application filed on 7 October 1998.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court held that the "Agreement of Loan" dated 15 May 1990, which involved the properties at 39 Tennyson Street, Elwood, 19 Kambea Grove, Caulfield, and 6 Morrice Street, Caulfield, should be set aside as from that date. This decision was based on the legal principle that certain agreements may be set aside if they are found to be unjust or if there is evidence of misrepresentation or undue influence. The court examined the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement and found that the first respondent's position as a solicitor gave him a significant advantage over the second respondent, leading to an unfair agreement. Therefore, the agreement was set aside to protect the interests of the second respondent.
Regarding the costs orders, the court found that the second respondent should bear the costs of the motion filed on 28 September 1998, including reserved costs, as well as the costs of the application filed on 7 October 1998. This was due to the second respondent's actions being the primary reason for the necessity of these applications. The first respondent was ordered to bear his own costs for both the motion and the application, reflecting the court's view that his actions did not warrant a costs order against him. This allocation of costs aligns with the principle that the party responsible for the litigation should bear the financial burden of the proceedings. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that agreements executed under circumstances of undue influence or misrepresentation can be set aside, and the party responsible for the litigation should bear the associated costs.