Chapman v Saunders

Case [2001] FCA 4

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chapman v Saunders [2001] FCA 4

CONTEMPT OF COURT – failure to comply with subpoena for production – questions of relevance and necessity irrelevant considerations.

Attorney-General v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477
James v Cowan; In re Botten (1929) 42 CLR 305
Hancock v Lynch [1988] VR 173

THOMAS LINCOLN CHAPMAN, WENDY JENNIFER CHAPMAN AND BINALONG PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (IN LIQUIDATION) v SANDRA DOROTHY SAUNDERS

NO S 113 OF 2000

JUDGES:      BEAUMONT & HEEREY JJ
DATE:           3 JANUARY 2001
PLACE:         SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

NO S 113 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

THOMAS LINCOLN CHAPMAN
FIRST APPELLANT

WENDY JENNIFER CHAPMAN
SECOND APPELLANT

BINALONG PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (IN LIQUIDATION)
THIRD APPELLANT

AND:

SANDRA DOROTHY SAUNDERS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BEAUMONT & HEEREY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

3 JANUARY 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Appeal allowed, with costs.

2.Set aside the orders made by O’Loughlin J at first instance; in lieu thereof order that the matter be remitted to O’Loughlin J for further hearing and determination in relation to the relief sought by the appellants, in accordance with the judgment of this Full Court.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

NO S 113 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

THOMAS LINCOLN CHAPMAN
FIRST APPELLANT

WENDY JENNIFER CHAPMAN
SECOND APPELLANT

BINALONG PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (IN LIQUIDATION)
THIRD APPELLANT

AND:

SANDRA DOROTHY SAUNDERS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BEAUMONT & HEEREY JJ

DATE:

3 JANUARY 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. By their notice of motion dated 30 August 2000, the appellants, Thomas Lincoln Chapman, Wendy Jennifer Chapman and Binalong Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) (In Liquidation), gave notice that they would move the Court for an order that the respondent, Sandra Dorothy Saunders, be punished for contempt of court and for ancillary relief, including an order for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the respondent and for her detention in custody in the meantime.  The events giving rise to the motion occurred in the course of a lengthy trial before von Doussa J.  The motion was heard by a Judge of the Court (O’Loughlin J), who on 6 October 2000 dismissed the motion, with costs (Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1407). The appellants now appeal from the order dismissing the motion and, to the extent necessary, seek leave to appeal. The respondent did not formally object to the competency of the appeal; but, shortly before the hearing of the appeal, the respondent foreshadowed a submission that the appeal was incompetent, and filed a notice of motion seeking dismissal of the appeal on that ground. However,…

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Chapman v Saunders [2001] FCA 4
Case
[2001] FCA 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Chapman v Saunders involves the appellants, Thomas Lincoln Chapman, Wendy Jennifer Chapman, and Binalong Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) (In Liquidation), who sought to punish the respondent, Sandra Dorothy Saunders, for contempt of court. The dispute arose during a lengthy trial before von Doussa J, and the appellants sought a warrant for the respondent's arrest and detention as ancillary relief. The initial motion was dismissed by O’Loughlin J, and the appellants now appeal against this decision. The central legal issue before the court was whether the respondent had indeed committed contempt of court by refusing to comply with von Doussa J’s order to produce certain documents. The court examined the evidence provided by the appellants and considered factors such as the necessity of the documents, the timing of the subpoena, and the respondent's refusal to comply with the court order.

The court's reasoning in Chapman v Saunders was grounded in the principle that the appellants had the right to have their court order respected and obeyed by the respondent. The Full Court held that the evidence compelled a conclusion that the respondent had committed contempt of court by deliberately disobeying the order of von Doussa J. The court emphasized that the appellants were not required to demonstrate the necessity or utility of enforcing the order in their motion. This decision aligns with the precedent set in James v Cowan; In re Botten (1929) 42 CLR 305, where it was held that a witness must comply with a subpoena even if the documents in question are claimed to be privileged. The Full Court found that the appellants had satisfied the heavy onus of proving contempt beyond reasonable doubt.

The outcome of the appeal was that the original decision dismissing the motion was set aside. The Full Court allowed the appeal and ordered that the matter be remitted to O’Loughlin J for further hearing and determination in relation to the relief sought by the appellants. The court also ordered that the appeal be allowed with costs, reflecting the importance of enforcing the rule of law and ensuring that court orders are respected.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed, with costs.

2. Set aside the orders made by O’Loughlin J at first instance; in lieu thereof order that the matter be remitted to O’Loughlin J for further hearing and determination in relation to the relief sought by the appellants, in accordance with the judgment of this Full Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

By their notice of motion dated 30 August 2000, the appellants, Thomas Lincoln Chapman, Wendy Jennifer Chapman and Binalong Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) (In Liquidation), gave notice that they would move the Court for an order that the respondent, Sandra Dorothy Saunders, be punished for contempt of court and for ancillary relief, including an order for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the respondent and for her detention in custody in the meantime. The events giving rise to the motion occurred in the course of a lengthy trial before von Doussa J. The motion was heard by a Judge of the Court (O’Loughlin J), who on 6 October 2000 dismissed the motion, with costs (Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1407). The appellants now appeal from the order dismissing the motion and, to the extent necessary, seek leave to appeal. The respondent did not formally object to the competency of the appeal; but, shortly before the hearing of the appeal, the respondent foreshadowed a submission that the appeal was incompetent, and filed a notice of motion seeking dismissal of the appeal on that ground. However, upon the appeal being called on, counsel for the respondent informed us that the motion would not be pursued, and it was then dismissed.BACKGROUND(a)The statement of charge By their statement of charge dated 30 August 2000, the appellants made the following allegations:·On 2 August 2000, a subpoena for production (dated 26 July 2000) (“the Subpoena”) addressed to the respondent was returned. On that date, the respondent’s counsel informed the Court (the trial Judge) that she had in her custody or control two field notebooks referred to in the subpoena and a computer disk which, the respondent believed, contained the contents of the “secret envelopes” in electronic form and accordingly was also referred to in the subpoena.·In her evidence given to von Doussa J on 7 August 2000 the respondent informed his Honour that she had such notebooks and disk in her custody or control.·On 2 August 2000, the respondent’s counsel advised von Doussa J that the respondent would refuse to produce such notebooks and disk even if ordered by the Court to do so.·The respondent made a similar statement to von Doussa J on 7 August 2000.·On 7 August 2000, von Doussa J ordered that within seven days the respondent produce into the custody of the Court, to abide its further order the following: (a) the two field notebooks prepared by Dr Deane Fergie; and (b) the computer disk identified by the respondent in her evidence on 7 August 2000.·The respondent was present in Court when this order was made.·A sealed copy of the order was served on the respondent at approximately 3.30 pm on 11 August 2000.·Despite the Court’s order, the respondent failed to produce the notebooks and disk into the custody of the Court.·By letter dated 9 August 2000, the respondent’s solicitor confirmed that the respondent would not comply with the order.·The respondent was in contempt of Court for wilfully refusing to comply with the Court’s order.(b)The Subpoena

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In dismissing the motion, O’Loughlin J said (par 44):“Bearing in mind the heavy onus that the [appellants] carry, I find myself not satisfied that they have led the evidence that would be needed to satisfy me beyond reasonable doubt, that it would be necessary for [the respondent] to produce the notebooks and the disk. In coming to this conclusion, I have found that the totality of the following factors have influenced my decision:·the failure of the [appellants] to address the subject of necessity in the statement of charge and Mr Palyga’s affidavit;·the failure of the [appellants] to explain how they would or might make use of the material if it were produced and the extent to which (if at all) its late production would affect or interrupt the progress of the trial;·the failure of the [appellants] to explain why the subject of [the respondent] and her custody of the material was not addressed until August 2000, some eight months after the start of the trial;·the failure of the [appellants] to explain why this action had been taken against [the respondent] and not against Dr Kartinyeri;·the decision of von Doussa J not to take action against [the respondent] on his own motion.”CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPEAL In our view the evidence compelled a conclusion that the respondent had committed a contempt of court by deliberately disobeying the order of von Doussa J. The respondent made no application to set aside the Subpoena, or to appeal against the order of von Doussa J. As long as that order stood the appellants were entitled to have it respected and obeyed. There was no obligation on the appellants, in the application before O’Loughlin J, to show that enforcement of the order would be necessary or useful for them in the conduct of the litigation, or to explain why they had not obtained the issue of the subpoena at an earlier date, or why they had not taken similar action against someone else. James v Cowan; In re Botten (1929) 42 CLR 305 is directly in point. In an action in the original jurisdiction of the High Court Mr Leonard Botten, the Acting Secretary of the Dried Fruits Board of South Australia, was served with a subpoena to produce certain minute books the property of the Board. Mr Botten admitted that the books were in his possession but refused to bring them into Court saying that the Minister of Agriculture for South Australia had refused to allow him to do so. Starke J ordered Mr Botten to bring the books into Court but after an adjournment he again refused to produce them. Starke J (at 307) referred to a letter from the Minister to Mr Botten asserting that the books were privileged. His Honour continued:“Whether the claim to privilege is good or bad is a matter which I suppose I should have to determine when the books are brought into Court pursuant to the subpoena. Yesterday I referred to a case of R v Greenaway (1845) 7 QB 126 which I think rather shows that, if the witness has the lawful custody of the books, it is his duty to obey the subpoena, and then any question of privilege arising on the documents so brought into Court pursuant to the subpoena will be determined by the Court, but the question I have to determine is whether the witness is right in refusing to produce them, to bring into Court and produce documents according to his subpoena. I think that is simply a defiance of the law in saying that he will not do it upon the authority of somebody who claims to be, as I venture to think, above the law. If the books are produced, I am in a position, I think, to determine the question of privilege, but I am in no position to determine it when a witness says he will do nothing; who will neither obey his subpoena nor act upon the decision of the Court nor indeed take the slightest notice of what the Court thinks proper or right. There is only one result, I am sorry to say, but I must commit the witness to prison for his contempt of Court, and I do not know that I can tell him at what time he will be released until he purges his contempt. I regret the fact, because it seems to me that I am impelled, forced into a position which I think is unfortunate for the witness. He is doing a grievous wrong to the plaintiff. Witness, I regret, but I must commit you to prison for your contempt of Court.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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