Director of Public Prosecutions v Hicks
[2025] ACTSC 15
•5 February 2025
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | DPP v Hicks |
Citation: | [2025] ACTSC 15 |
Hearing Date: | 31 January 2025 |
Decision Date: | 5 February 2025 |
Before: | McWilliam J |
Decision: | Offender sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 year and 7 months, to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – Judgment and Punishment – sentence – reckless infliction of grievous bodily harm – youthful offender – rehabilitation prioritised – intensive correction order made |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 20 Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 69(4) Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 7, 10(2), 11, 12A(9), 33, 35 (2) & (3), 42, 53, 77, 78, 80C, 80D, 80I |
Cases Cited: | AA v McDevitt [2017] ACTSC 342 Aslan v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 114 Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 Douar v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 455; 159 A Crim R 154 DPP v Hagen [2024] ACTSC 360 DPP v Joliffe-Cole [2024] ACTSC 256 DPP v Parker [2024] ACTSC 125 Fares v DPP (No 2) [2025] ACTCA 2 Haoui v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 209; 188 A Crim R 331 Henderson v The King [2024] ACTCA 3 Higgins v The Queen [2022] ACTCA 26 Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 McLeod v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 59 MT v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 22 Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 R v Campbell [2010] ACTCA 20 R v Carmody [2016] ACTSC 382 R v Crawford [2019] ACTSC 8 R v EL [2016] ACTSC 241 R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346 R v Hidic [2017] ACTSC 307 R v Kepaoa [2017] ACTSC 414 R v Lindsay [2020] ACTCA 25 R v Miller [2019] ACTCA 25; 279 A Crim R 232 R v Munday (Unreported, ACT Supreme Court, Burns J, 23 April 2013) R v Myles [2017] ACTSC 194 R v Ngerengere (No 3) [2016] ACTSC 299 R v Peadon [2015] ACTSC 132 R v Ruwhiu [2023] ACTCA 18 R v Thawer [2009] NSWCCA 158 R v Torbert [2015] ACTSC 331 R vVerdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269 Swan v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 79 Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 |
Parties: | Director of Public Prosecutions ( Prosecution) Ryan Matthew Rory Hicks ( Offender) |
Representation: | Counsel C Daly ( ACT DPP) E Chen ( Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Legal Aid (Offender) | |
File Number: | SCC 341 of 2024 |
McWILLIAM J:
1․The offender is before the Court for sentence in respect of one count of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 20(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The maximum penalty for such an offence is a term of imprisonment of 13 years.
Facts constituting the offence
2․The sentence proceeded by way of an agreed statement of facts. On 23 April 2024, the offender had been consuming alcohol and drugs with others socially in a single-room serviced apartment. The offender became agitated due to his perception he was “missing weed”. He rounded on the victim, who yelled words to the effect of “what are you talking about?” Within the small confines of the apartment, the offender produced a folding knife and swung it at the victim’s face, causing a 5cm laceration and a further 10 cm laceration on the victim’s nose and across his face. Specifically, the incised wound was to the victim’s right temporal region, right upper eyelid and right side of the nose.
3․The wound was repaired with local anaesthetic, stitches, steristrips and antibiotic ointment for seven days. The victim now has significant permanent scarring to his face.
Court’s sentencing task
4․The task of the Court is to sentence the offender by reference to the sentencing objectives set out in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act). These include ensuring that the offender is “adequately punished” for the offence in a way that is “just and appropriate”.
5․The Court must achieve those objectives in accordance with the principle of individualised justice: MT v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 22 at [56]. The mandatory relevant considerations are set out in s 33 of the Sentencing Act. These are set out below to the extent relevant in the circumstances of this offender.
6․A term of imprisonment is a sentence of last resort: s 10(2) of the Sentencing Act. The parties each submitted that no sentence other than a term of imprisonment was warranted here, but they disagreed on how that sentence was to be served. For reasons that follow, I agree that the gravity of the offence means that no sentence other than a term of imprisonment is appropriate, in order to give due weight to the objectives of making the offender accountable for his actions, denouncing the conduct and general deterrence. I will return to the manner in which the sentence is to be served at the conclusion of these reasons.
Nature and circumstances of the offence (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act)
7․The requirement to consider the nature and circumstances of the offence proceeds upon a number of established principles.
8․The sentence which the court imposes must be proportional to the objective seriousness of the offence: R v Miller [2019] ACTCA 25; 279 A Crim R 232 at [37], cited in R v Lindsay [2020] ACTCA 25 at [32]. The evaluation of the nature and circumstances of the offence is “objective” in the sense that the Court does not consider matters personal to the offender and determines the seriousness “wholly by reference to the nature of the offending”: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 at [27].
9․Subjective considerations, or matters personal to the offender, are separate considerations under s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act, as are the after-effects of the offence: McLeod v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 59 at [12].
10․The maximum penalty for an offence provides a yardstick against which to assess the objective seriousness of the offences before the Court: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at [31]. Given the 13-year maximum penalty prescribed, the offence here was obviously a serious offence.
11․The non-exhaustive definition of “grievous bodily harm” in the Dictionary of the Crimes Act “includes ... any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person”. In AA v McDevitt [2017] ACTSC 342, Murrell CJ stated at [47]:
In the ACT, it has been accepted that “grievous bodily harm” means “really serious harm”, although the harm need not be permanent or life threatening: R v Shevlin [2013] ACTSC 88; R v Byrne [2013] ACTSC 246.
12․Murrell CJ went on at [48]-[49] to cite Swan v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 79 (Swan)at [71] with apparent approval. In Swan,Garling J (R A Hulme J agreeing) had earlier stated at [65]:
It is clear from the authorities that in ascertaining what constitutes really serious bodily injury, questions of fact and degree are involved. In R v Overall (1993) 71 A Crim R 170, Mahoney JA (with whom Allen J agreed) considered the difference between actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm. At 174, his Honour said:
“The difference between actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm is ... one of degree. Actual bodily harm if ‘really serious’ (cf DPP v Smith at 335; 291) may constitute grievous bodily harm. Each is ‘harm’ but the one is more serious than the other.”
13․I have started with this definition because part of the court’s present assessment involves considering where the harm inflicted here sits within the range of conduct covered by this offence. The conduct that may fall within the definition of grievous bodily harm may be really serious without scarring or permanent damage. It may also be not as serious, but cause permanent damage. Both may fall within the definition. Caution must be exercised in assessing circumstances of aggravation because the causing of the harm is itself an element of the offence. That said, in R v Campbell [2010] ACTCA 20 at [37], the Court of Appeal adopted what Howie J, with whom Giles JA and Latham J agreed, said in R v Thawer [2009] NSWCCA 158 at [43]:
Although other factors are obviously relevant to an assessment of the seriousness of an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm, to a very significant degree the seriousness of the offence will depend upon the degree of harm suffered by the victim...
14․The matters I have taken into account here are:
(a)The circumstances of the attack were sudden and unprovoked, but that is indicative of conduct that was a spur of the moment reaction, or that did not involve premeditation or planning (as to which, see R v Carmody [2016] ACTSC 382 at [54]-[57] and the cases there-cited).
(b)The conduct was aggravated by the use of a weapon.
(c)The conduct itself was a single slash of a knife, and in that sense involved an isolated, brief attack.
(d)The offender slashed the victim’s face, an inherently vulnerable part of the victim’s body.
(e)The attack occurred in a confined area with other people present and exposed to the danger.
(f)The size and location of the scar will be a constant and visible reminder of the attack.
15․The degree of recklessness was high, but the overall circumstances fall within the mid-range, given the variety of conduct that the offence deals with, examples of which were discussed in cases such as DPP v Hagen [2024] ACTSC 360 at [68] and Haoui v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 209; 188 A Crim R 331 at [138]-[139].
Plea of guilty (s 35(3) of the Sentencing Act)
16․The plea of guilty was entered in the Magistrates Court. It was entered at the 7th mention following provision of a full brief of evidence.
17․The fact that a brief of evidence was prepared is relevant to an assessment of the utilitarian value, but it is not necessarily fatal to the exercise of the discretion to award a significant discount. As Taylor J stated in DPP v Joliffe-Cole [2024] ACTSC 256 at [55], the provision of a brief of evidence is what assists in understanding the evidence and the merit of the prosecution case. It is what provides the foundation for comprehensive legal advice as to the prospect of the prosecution discharging the burden to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Here, it was accepted that much of the delay was attributable to matters outside the offender’s control (forensic evidence as to the extent of the scarring), which was critical to understanding the nature of the injury. From that I infer there was uncertainty as to whether it was of sufficient fact and degree as to constitute grievous bodily harm.
18․Having considered the matters set out in s 35(2) of the Sentencing Act (some of which are discussed elsewhere in these reasons), and noting the prosecutor did not submit against a significant discount being given, I accept that in the circumstances of this case the utilitarian value of the plea remained significant, and it is appropriate to apply a discretionary discount of 25%.
Time in custody
19․The offender has spent 5 days in custody, which will be taken into account. If a full-time custodial sentence or partially suspended sentence were to be imposed, backdating the sentence may be appropriate. However, if an intensive correction order (ICO) is made, because that manner of sentence is not available as a combination sentence, taking account of the time spent in custody may require a small adjustment to the length of the overall sentence.
Remorse (s 33(1)(w) of the Sentencing Act)
20․Immediately upon inflicting the wound upon the victim, the offender held him in his arms, cried out for help and said I’m so sorry bro”. The offender made an incision into his own neck following the offending. He identified himself as the offender to police and the pre-sentence report before the court referred to the fact that the offender had accepted responsibility for the offending behaviour. I accept the offender has demonstrated remorse.
Victim Impact (s 33(1)(f) of the Sentencing Act)
21․No victim impact statement was before the court. No inference about the harm suffered by the victim is to be drawn from the fact that no impact statement was given to the court: s 53 of the Sentencing Act. The physical impact of the offence at least was before the court through photos that were tendered and the agreed facts. The injury was serious and permanent, but beyond that no further impact arises for consideration.
Antecedents or Criminal history (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)
22․I have taken the history into account in the manner described in Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 477-8. The offender’s prior criminal history does not mean that a longer sentence is to be imposed, but it speaks against leniency when compared with someone who comes to be sentenced as a person of prior good character.
23․There is also a relevant criminal history here. It includes several property damage offences and two weapons-related convictions, one of those being attempted aggravated robbery. However, the offender has not yet spent any time as a sentenced offender in an adult custodial environment.
Other subjective features – age, background, health anddrug use at the time of the commission of the offence (ss 33(1)(m) and 33(1)(p) of the Sentencing Act)
24․I have taken into account the content of the pre-sentence report and intensive correction order assessment report, each dated 17 January 2025. The offender was 24 years old at the time of the offence. He is now 25, unemployed and in receipt of Disability Support Payments. He lives with his mother. He really has no pro-social supports and is surrounded by friends and associates that he knows are no good for him.
25․There is much that has occurred in relation to the offender’s difficult upbringing and family circumstances. However, it is unnecessary to record any of it in a public judgment. It suffices to state that there was medical evidence before the court describing the personal circumstances as one involving “a traumatic and disrupted developmental history.” It is accepted that the principles deriving from Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 concerning the social disadvantage experienced by the offender which have in turn had consequences for the offender’s mental health, apply here.
26․I have applied those principles in accordance with what was said in R v Ruwhiu [2023] ACTCA 18 at [126], approved in Henderson v The King [2024] ACTCA 3 at [56], and accept the offender’s moral culpability is reduced, emphasising that while the offender’s social deprivation and exposure to family violence does not excuse the offending itself, it will feature in crafting a sentence that is designed to support him in overcoming the disadvantage he has plainly suffered.
27․The biggest concern for this offender is his drug use, which includes cannabis use and methamphetamine use. In that regard, I consider further that the “Henry” principles, deriving from R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346, concerning drug use at an early age have operation here. The offender is engaging with the Ted Noffs treatment program and has weekly sessions with a psychologist. He also has a treating general practitioner for prescription medication.
28․The parties have also submitted on the operation in the circumstances of the case of the Verdins principles, derived from the case of the same name R vVerdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269. This includes the impact of the applicant’s underlying mental conditions and his anticipated experience in custody.
29․The principles were discussed in Higgins v The Queen [2022] ACTCA 26 at [40]-[45], with the Court of Appeal noting that the principles recognise the potential effect of a mental disability in any given case (citing Aslan v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 114 at [34]) and calls for a discretionary evaluation as to the significance of the operation of those principles in the broader sentencing process. I accept that the offender’s major depressive disorder means that a sentence of full-time custody would weigh more heavily upon him. I do not accept that he would be unable to accept appropriate treatment if he were incarcerated.
Current sentencing practice (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)
30․I have taken into account a number of cases by way of comparison to ensure consistency in sentencing practice, accepting that the objective in doing so is not to bind the sentencing court to achieve numerical equivalence with similar sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction: see Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at [48].
31․The parties gave considerable assistance in the cases involving offences of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm. I have had regard to the cases that were discussed in the parties’ submissions among others. The authorities that I have found to be of most assistance are: R v Munday (Unreported, ACT Supreme Court, Burns J, 23 April 2013), R v Torbert [2015] ACTSC 331; R v Peadon [2015] ACTSC 132; R v Kepaoa [2017] ACTSC 414; R v Hidic [2017] ACTSC 307; R v Myles [2017] ACTSC 194; and R v Crawford [2019] ACTSC 8.
32․A number of the cases that I considered are “one punch” cases, with conduct involving considerable damage to the victim. Although these cases involved different physical violence, I have taken note of them because they shared many of the features here – a youthful offender, a spontaneous unprovoked attack, with fleeting violence but with significant consequences.
33․Overall, what I draw from the authorities is that the sentencing practice for this type of offence is so varied that there is no clear trend. Specifically, an Intensive Correction Order (ICO) or a wholly suspended sentence are each available options for offending of the kind that occurred here.
Disposition
34․The ICO regime has been recently discussed in Fares v DPP (No 2) [2025] ACTCA 2, with the Court (at [25]) describing the three-step process where a sentence of imprisonment is to be imposed and the making of an intensive correction order falls to be considered as uncontroversial. It is as follows:
(i) First, a determination that a sentence of imprisonment is warranted in accordance with s 10;
(ii) Secondly, a determination of the appropriate length of sentence; and
(iii) Thirdly, where the issue arises, consideration of whether to make an ICO.
35․Here, as stated at the outset, the considerations above and nature of the offending mean that a sentence of imprisonment is warranted. Taking all of the above matters into account, including the gravity of the offence, the subjective circumstances of the offender, the impact upon the victim and the need for personal and general deterrence, the length of the sentence to be imposed is a term of imprisonment for 2 years 1 month and 10 days, reduced to 1 year and 7 months on account of the offender’s guilty plea.
36․Consideration must then be given to whether it is necessary for the offender to serve a component of full-time custody (with a non-parole period), or whether there is an alternative form of sentence that reflects the objective seriousness of the offence and fulfils the statutory purposes of punishment: Douar v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 455; 159 A Crim R 154 at 166; [72].
37․The offender is at an early stage of adulthood. Given his background, his maturity level is not necessarily that of his peers. I was initially hopeful that the offender would be able to avail himself of a drug and alcohol treatment order (DATO) as he is unlikely to be able to abstain from drugs in the long term without wrap around support and intervention of the kind that only programs such as the Court scheme can deliver.
38․However, under s 12A(9) of the Sentencing Act, he is ineligible for a DATO because an offence under s 20 of the Crimes Act is a “serious violence offence”. Offences that are so defined are excluded from the operation of the regime. Other serious violence offences that render an offender ineligible for a drug and alcohol treatment order are murder, manslaughter and intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm. The other offences falling within the definition are of a significantly greater magnitude of criminality than the conduct involved here. It is unlikely that the legislature contemplated someone in the offender’s present circumstances should be excluded from the regime created by s 12A of the Sentencing Act. It is unfortunate that the legislature has not permitted the court the discretion to determine whether the criminality of the offence is of a kind that can be comprehended or reflected by this type of order. That is something judges do when crafting sentences every day. I say all this to make it clear to the offender why this form of sentence is regrettably not available to him.
39․That leaves consideration of other options such as a suspended sentence or an ICO. The aims of an ICO are to combine supervision and strict conditions while providing an opportunity for an offender to change their behaviour. In that way, the ICO supports an offender’s rehabilitative path: DPP v Parker [2024] ACTSC 125 at [71], citing R v Ngerengere (No 3) [2016] ACTSC 299 (Ngerengere) at [21] – [22].
40․In R v Samani [2016] ACTCA 48, Refshauge ACJ referred at [31] to the Explanatory Statement for the Crimes (Sentencing and Restorative Justice) Amendment Bill 2015 (ACT), which set out the background to the sentencing order of an intensive correction order (at 2) as follows:
The new sentence to be called an ‘intensive correction order’ is formulated by the bill's provisions to be a standalone way of serving a sentence of imprisonment. As such, it will sit just below a sentence of full-time imprisonment in the sentencing network. It is intended as a sentence of ‘last resort’ for offenders before full-time imprisonment. The sentence can fulfil more than one of the purposes of sentencing in circumstances where community safety and other sentencing considerations do not require the sentence to be served by way of full-time imprisonment.
The intensive correction order is designed to be punitive while still allowing the courts to incorporate elements of rehabilitation. It will allow offenders to remain in employment and maintain their community ties, which are important to reduce the risk of future offending. It is flexible enough to allow the courts to tailor the order to suit the circumstances of the offence and the offender, but still sufficiently structured to ensure every order places appropriate demands on an offender.
41․A report as to the suitability of an intensive correction order was before the court, as required by s 78 of the Sentencing Act. Although the offender consented to serving the sentence by way of an ICO, he was assessed as not suitable because of his degree of dependence on a controlled drug (one of the suitability matters assessed under s 78 of the Sentencing Act).
42․It has been stated frequently in different ways in this Court (an example being
Ngerengere at [27]) that the very purpose of an ICO is to promote rehabilitation, yet the matters that make an offender unsuitable are often the very matters that need to be addressed if rehabilitation is to be achieved. As Penfold J said in R v EL [2016] ACTSC 241 at [43], “[i]t would be curious if intensive correction orders were only available to people who really did not need any help.”43․Given the unsuitability finding in the ICO assessment, the offender’s counsel contended strongly for a fully suspended sentence. However, an ICO has a punitive element to it and does impose significant restrictions on the offender who is subject to it. As the Explanatory Statement states, it is effectively the last stop before full-time custody and I think the offender needs to know and appreciate that in terms of his ongoing criminal behaviour, he is at that last stop.
44․I have considered the experienced author’s view that an ICO at this stage would be setting the offender up to fail. The difficulty is that the relative freedom of a suspended sentence may well put that sentencing option in the same category. If he breaches a suspended sentence, any elapsed time under the suspended sentence regime is not counted as time served and the offender is at risk of serving the entirety of the sentence in full-time custody (if the sentence is imposed). The position with respect to an ICO is different. If an ICO is cancelled, the offender only serves the remainder of the sentence of imprisonment: s 69(4) of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT).
45․A sentence of full-time custody with a non-parole period comes with its own challenges in terms of the environment and potential for further anti-social connections to be made. Recalling the medical evidence and the heavier burden of such a sentence, I am not convinced that it is the most appropriate, in that I do not consider the long-term protection of the community will be best served by such a sentence.
46․Bearing in mind the eligibility requirements under s 77 of the Sentencing Act, although I share the pre-sentence report author’s misgivings, and particularly given that the core conditions of an ICO require the offender not to use a controlled drug, the drug use does not appear to be of such an extent that it would effectively prohibit the offender from meeting the conditions of an ICO. In my view, although it will be difficult without immediate access to a full-time residential rehabilitation program (which he should try to get into if he can), an ICO remains suitable, and it is the most appropriate option to give effect to the offender’s rehabilitation. If it can be achieved, rehabilitation is the most durable guarantor of community safety and is clearly in the public interest: Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 at [32].
47․In the event that an ICO was made, it was recommended that the order contain additional conditions requiring the offender to continue to engage with the Ted Noffs Foundation to address his mental health and to engage with an alcohol and other drug service for counselling or support. Given that he is already engaging with the program and receiving benefit from it, I am satisfied that there is a place for the offender, the program is suitable for the offender and rehabilitation of this kind is appropriate (eligibility requirements under s 80I of the Sentencing Act).
48․I am also going to impose a community service requirement. The offender has been assessed as suitable for such a condition and work is available (ss 80C and 80D of the Sentencing Act). By way of explanation to the offender, I am imposing this condition because I am firmly of the view that he needs support, that he needs connection with the community, and that he needs to experience feeling good about himself in doing something good for others. Community service can sometimes lead a person back into employment. It can also be an opportunity for the offender to be put into contact with pro-social mentors.
49․I know that the offender is likely to have other heavy priorities in attending to his mental health and getting off drugs, but once he has taken the initial steps to progress those objectives, community service is the best way that I can think of, within the proper bounds of the Sentencing Act, to give this young man another dimension to his life and hopefully to raise him up from where he is. It is to be hoped that he approaches the commitment with that attitude. The quantum of hours and time for the community service to be served has been crafted considering the ICO report and s 80D(4) of the Sentencing Act. My intention is that there be sufficient flexibility in the timing of this condition for the offender to prioritise a suitable rehabilitation program before separately undertaking the hours for community service. There is provision to amend an ICO, and I would encourage those supervising the offender to keep in contact with the court if they feel the terms of the ICO require amendment.
50․Can I say candidly to the offender that someone with his background is already in the position of being a survivor. He still has a lot to overcome, but he must leave the courtroom today with a self-belief that with help and hard work he will get there. No one wants this offender to fail, but ultimately the supports that I have attempted to put in place will require the offender to genuinely engage with turning around his life. The next 19 months could actually be his toughest yet, but they could also prove to be his finest moment.
Orders
51․The orders of the Court are:
(1)In respect of the offence of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s 20 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 year and 7 months (reduced from 2 years, 1 month and 10 days on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 5 February 2025 and conclude on 4 September 2026.
(2)The sentence is to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order under s 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) with the following conditions:
(a)The core conditions mentioned in s 42 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT);
(b)That the offender continue to engage with the Ted Noffs Foundation to address his mental health as directed;
(c)That the offender engage with an alcohol and other drug service for counselling or support as directed;
(d)That the offender undertake 60 hours of community service over a period of 1 year and 6 months; and
(e)That the offender report to Level 1, 249 London Circuit by 4pm on Friday 7 February 2025.
| I certify that the preceding fifty-one [51] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice McWilliam Associate: Date: |
2
38
3